ROMANIA’S EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY PROFILE POST-COLD WAR:

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY HABITUS

AND

THE PRAXIS OF ROMANIA’S SECURITY FIELD

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees, in any other institutions. The thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Raluca Csernatoni

September 19th, 2014
ABSTRACT

This research outlines the willingness of an under-researched, formerly communist, and Atlanticist state, *i.e.* Romania, to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy mechanisms of governance and to implement common security and defence policies. The driving question that inspires the research is the motivation of Romania to participate in, to contribute to, and to further cultivate the Euro-Atlantic partnership in light of its challenging security sector transformation post-Cold War. In the case of a newer EU member state such as Romania, the newly emerged national strategic culture practices and articulations need to be teased out so as to analyse the specific security profile of the country.

The cases of Hungary and Poland are put forward so as to compare and contrast with the Romanian case the levels of adaptation and change in their national security strategy, under the influence of NATO and the CSDP during their post-Cold War transition.

Romania has seen the two international influences of NATO and the CSDP as complementary frameworks for enhanced national contribution to the Euro-Atlantic common security and defence. NATO has played the fundamental role of mentorship during Romania’s security sector reform, during and preceding and also continuing after its integration process in the Alliance. These security reforms have also been mirrored by the country’s involvement in the EU’s Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP), Romania using the CSDP framework to develop civilian capabilities and to participate in civilian-military operations.

The research goal is to map out the evolution and the inherent tensions triggered by the transformation of security professionals’ *habitus* from the outdated Cold-War representations to more modern understandings of security production and international projection under the joint tutorship of NATO and the CSDP. The research gives valuable insights of Romania’s security policy change by focusing on the processes of domestic transformation, resistance and professionalization in the field of security and defence.

In doing so, the thesis reconstructs Romania security profile from the perspective of Romanian security practitioners’ *habitus* as revealed in interviews and it traces their levels of involvement in shaping the country’s national attitude towards the Euro-Atlantic partnership. The research reveals that there have been tensions and *hysteresis effects* in such practitioners’ normative attitudes as regards the processes of professionalization and change in the post-Cold War Romanian security field.

The thesis operates under the proposition that in a transitional security context, when formal structures and rationalizations of strategic action are under construction or in question, security practitioners rely on a practical substrate to guide their actions. The present research advances to cross-cut the practice-oriented scholarship of Pierre Bourdieu with the broader debates on Europeanization and strategic culture, but it also moves beyond Bourdieu’s conceptual understanding of the *habitus*. 
The research proposes the original concept of the *transitional security habitus* to best describe the fluid character of the Romanian security *habitus* and the constantly fluctuating security practices during transitional stages under multiple security policy reforms. The *transitional security habitus* best captures the idiosyncratic character of post-communist Romania’s security policy transition – adaptation to change and adjustments in the security *habitus* become ingrained habitual dispositions, embodied by security actors as social “survival” tools; it reflects the struggles encountered by security practitioners during changing security context, fluid security practices, and international professionalization prerequisites.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP – The Common Foreign and Security Policy
CNSAS – Council for Studies of the Archives of the Former Securitate
CSAT – Romania’s Security and Defence Council
CSDP – The Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA – European Defence Agency
EDC – European Defence Community
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
EU – European Union
ESS – European Security Strategy
EUBAM – EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova
EUMS – European Union Military Staff
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
LTV – Long Term Vision
NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SSR – Security Sector Reform
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU – The Western European Union
INTRODUCTION

French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory and the more recent research wave inspired by his work have become consistent “go-to” approaches in the field of Security Studies. The “practice turn” in International Relations and Security Studies literature has been heralded as the latest theoretical “turn”, capable of solving the existing conceptual difficulties of the structure and agency debate, infusing research design with the much needed reflexive academic gaze, and smoothing the path between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge production.

A sociologically-minded research design á la Bourdieu is expected to better clarify why certain habits become embedded and why certain practices change, due to the dialectic relation between structural conditions and the agency of actors with their specific habitual dispositions, values and interests. However, the problem with such high expectations resides in Bourdieu’s overly-complex attempt to rebuild social reality in its constitutive intersubjectivity and his sometimes cumbersome and heavy theoretical apparatus. As well, several analytical aspects need to be further clarified so as to better understand Bourdieu’s standpoint and his theoretical utility for the creation of a supposedly middle ground solution in Security Studies.

To understand the workings of the social world according to Bourdieu, a bifocal analysis is needed, a “duplex look” on the objective life (structure) and the subjective life (individuals). Agency is not situated simply in bounded actors but within the wider set of social structure and relations that “make up” the actors. According to Bourdieu, the idea of agency must be broadened to consider a relational perspective with
structures and other actors, this understanding being the closest to *how everyday practice works*, where it is mostly difficult to flesh out where agency starts and structure ends in the intersubjective mesh.

Along these lines, this thesis makes use of Bourdieu’s theoretical insights so as to address the ways in which security practitioners mitigate the compatibility between their habitus and the configuration of the security field they are activating in, the level of authority and symbolic capital these actors possess, whether they abide by the *status-quo* or want to change it, and the level of cross-mobility between national security sub-fields and policy arenas. All of the above are relevant variables to consider when analysing the nature of the country’s security field and the actors’ position within it. The thesis makes use of fieldwork experience in the emerging post-Cold War Romanian security field, the research agenda resorting to theoretical and methodological insights derived from Bourdieu’s sociological agenda and adopted in the overall research design.

The project cross-cuts the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu with the broader debates on Europeanization and strategic culture, the principal aim being that to trace and signify the reform dynamic of the newer Euro-Atlantic member state’s security sector, *i.e.* Romania. Three general lines of argumentation are followed in this thesis: one that sheds an empirical and in-depth light in the ways in which the Romanian security practitioners and the broader Romanian security field mitigated the waves of reforms and transition post-Cold War; one that brings to the fore the conceptual apparatus proposed by Pierre Bourdieu, in an attempt to test his sociological inquiry with the afore-mentioned study case, by putting forward an
original understanding of how security habits, practices, and dispositions are manifested within transitional contexts; and finally, one that discusses the tensions and complementarities between two international influences in the case of the new EU member states’ security and defence reform, *i.e.* the EU’s influence and the role of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Cold War security context.

The *research goal* is to map out the evolution and the inherent tensions during the transformation of Romanian security professionals’ habituses from the outdated, traditional defence-based Cold-War representations to more professionalized understandings of security production and international projection, and especially the ways in which there exist cross-fertilization or conflicts between security sub-fields in the Romanian security context.

Special empirical focus is given to the blurred analytical lines between military/civilian and internal/external security nexuses and how they impacted and transformed the national strategic culture of Romania under the influence of Brussels-ization and NATO-ization processes.

The value-added of a Bourdieusean-inspired micro-analysis of a national security field is that it opens up the black box of the state – and in contrast to the attempts made by decision-making and liberal approaches in International Relations theory, it puts forward a practice-oriented sociology that looks primarily at practices reflected in the social relations between actors, engaged in a constant game of power struggle and position-taking over the national security agenda.
The *theoretical puzzle* proposed by this thesis consists in integrating the overlapping, complementary, but also competitive institutional influences of both NATO and the EU in the transformation of the security sector of Romania. Therefore, the present thesis does not cast either Europeanization or NATO-ization processes as the sole explanatory factors for the practices of adaptation and change in the Romanian security field. Due to the fact that the scholarly attention has been mainly given to Western and “old” member states’ processes of security transformation and change, little or no interest was paid to the newer member states’ in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

It could be argued that the majority of Critical Security Studies regarding the utilization of the above-mentioned conceptual rivalries have been empirically concentrated in the Western European security context and mainly targeted the definitional problems of security threats. This argumentative point is important because the majority of the research on the EU’s governance is motivated by an implicit or explicit normative agenda.

The central empirical contribution of this research is that it tells the evolutionary story of the Romania security context by highlighting the reform dynamics post-Cold-War in the field of security and defence policy. In doing so, it shifts the analytical focus from macro-structures or identity/interest-based analysis to a more in-depth, practice-oriented micro-analysis, which assumes that interests, beliefs and identities are produced, mediated, and intersubjectively reinforced through *everyday social practices*. 
The unit of analysis thus becomes the relational dimension between social agents and their social milieu or field, the two relational elements interacting constantly in an intersubjective manner. Social actors are in their turn “structured” by the “structuring” social field in which they display relations of domination and power, while the social field and its cartography of power relations structures the actors through determining the internalization of the field’s symbolic representations, i.e. the habitus.

The habitus with its internalized symbolic representations, conversely, will constitute actors dispositions and their strategic actions, or more precisely their further active engagement within the field. The afore-mentioned power relations are determined by varying resources or capitals (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic) that define actors’ positions in social hierarchies and micro-structures. The actors will eventually compete in their professional “battlefield” so as to establish their legitimacy and power, i.e. “every field is the site of a more or less overt struggle over the definition of the legitimate principles of the division of the field” (Bourdieu 1985: 734).

An important researchable cluster takes centre stage in the thesis, stemming from the scarcity of the academic literature on the new EU member states’ transformation of their security sectors. How and to what extent have Romania’s security sub-fields changed since the end of the Cold War and secondly, whether there have been intersections, conflicts, inter-institutional tensions, and cross-fertilizations between the military security and defence field and the civilian or political field. The fact of the matter is that Romania presents an interesting study case where there may be potentially tensioned doctrinal and strategic relations between its communist
ideological legacies, its European Union membership status, and the major influence of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The external institutional influences contributed to the modernization and professionalization of the Romanian security and defence sector, and the consequent involvement or lack of it in NATO-led operations or the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The main research question goes as follows: in the context of a lack of an overarching national strategic vision, to what extent and in which ways has the security field of Romania been affected and transformed by the EU membership, with its participation in the CSDP, and by its NATO allied forces-status?

By applying abductive reasoning to the case of Romania and its post-communist, geopolitically-influenced, and limes-cast status, the hunch to be formulated could spell different scenarios of practices in terms of security production and reform. If the redefinition of the traditional security field, i.e. internal/policing and external/defence, in Western Europe has been a direct consequence of the extreme Other’s collapse – the Soviet Union, as well as an aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the security gamut between the afore-mentioned internal/external, civilian/military nexuses could spells out different dynamics of practices, dispositions and representations in the case of the newer Euro-Atlantic member states such as Romania.

A Bourdieusian-inspired research design lends weight to the interplay between the expertise acquired by security professionals in different historical contexts and how they are acted upon within national security fields. Specific forms of know-how or what Bourdieu refers to as habitus trigger particular and context-specific hierarchies
between legitimate skills and resources, which in turn generate strong competitive relations between security actors and groups that make up the broader spectrum of the security field. Hence, especially in the realms of security and foreign policy making, the security and political fields are populated with high ranking officials that embody authoritative descriptors, translated in their political and military positions and the high politics nature of their daily practice.

The capacity of actors to mobilize and “transport” their capitals to other twin professional fields could account for the penetration of the military professional field by other actors from the civil service. The more networked and open becomes the sometimes impenetrable security and defence field of military professionals to outside influences (stemming from either an international transgovernmental field of European security professionals, from the political realm, the civil society or internal security structures), the more likely it is that those actors will be willing to socially interact and reform their strategic doctrine. For instance, the notion of habitus can be an extremely helpful tool so as to put into focus the actors’ capacity to adapt and their responses to social change, international institutional influences, and the competitive challenge from other actors within their field.

Habitual actions and practices, derived from the actors’ habitus, account for the actors’ reflexivity in their actions, whether they respond well or not to changes in their social field, or the degree of internalization of their professional field. The hypotheses are that it is to be expected that the pressures for adaptation within NATO and the EU’s CSDP institutional frameworks have been high for a new Euro-Atlantic member state such as Romania, with little or weak leveraging power so as to influence the
agenda from their part; the lack of a strong national military tradition within the post-communist political setting and the programmatic influence of NATO in informing Romania’s strategic vision make the processes of security transformation more fuzzy; the influence of a new Euro-Atlantic member state within NATO and the CSDP milieus is weak, with strong instances of institutional isomorphism and policy emulation.

Moreover, by questioning the emergence of a transnational, distinct security field in the national context of a new Euro-Atlantic member state such as Romania, the research can trace back the elite competition for symbolic power and representations, as well as the turf monopoly over security practices and threat formulations. Therefore, the research is not only focused on the actors’ strategic manipulation of policy windows of opportunities or the use of their capital, but also on the ways in which they monopolise and reproduce these opportunities by establishing legitimate practices, closed professional networks and policy exclusionary tactics.

Where flourishing transnational security action takes place, it reflects the potential of free spaces within the field of national security structures, opened up by the CSDP or NATO prospects for professionalization and reform. From this point of view, a Bourdieusean research agenda analyses the way in which the impact of Europeanization and NATO-ization processes on the Romanian national strategic culture is framed within discourse and practice by practitioners. The analytical stakes run deeper than simply scrutinizing the role of the state and its monopoly over the security agenda.
In what follows, the structure of the thesis is concisely laid out: it starts off with a critical appraisal of the relevant academic literature; it advances a Bourdieusean-inspired theoretical framework and proposes an original understanding of the concept of habitus in transitional security contexts; it foregrounds the empirical analysis of the Romanian security field with historical and descriptive elements of Romania during the Cold War so as to contextualize the transition from traditional defence-based to projection-oriented professionalized structures; by resorting to extensive interviewing, it centres on a micro-analysis of the Romanian security field; it looks at the evolution of Romanian security professionals’ practices and dispositions post-Cold War and under the Euro-Atlantic double-folded influence; it identifies the monopolizing symbolic power of the Romanian Presidency in terms of the national security-agenda setting; and lastly, through the comparative analysis of Hungary and Poland and their security transformation as contrasted to the case of Romania, it assesses through secondary sources the potential generalization of the research design. The methodology section covers the main research methods used to flesh-out the evidence of exogenous international incentives for adaptation, cross-national structural isomorphism, social learning, changes in discursive practices, and institutional reforms in the Romanian security sector.

In Chapter 1, the relevant literature review is presented and addressed: the Europeanization literature, the strategic culture body of work and the recent practice “turn” and the sociological-inspired research in International Relations theory. The literature review chapter looks at the conceptual affinities and tensions of the above literatures with Bourdieu’ conceptual apparatus and it assesses the Europeanization and strategic culture literatures as regards their strengths and weaknesses in terms
of accounting for social action, practices and representational knowledge (Pouliot 2010: 11). Attention is also given to the fact that both literatures offer a thin understanding of how security practices emerge and become entrenched in certain national contexts. The chapter pays special attention to the strands dedicated to discursive institutionalist approaches within Europeanization literature as the closest perspective to the present research’s objectives. A more in-depth conceptualization of strategic culture as practice is put forward in the chapter, while at the same time referencing the handful of International Relations researchers that have made use of Bourdieu’s rich conceptual apparatus and sociological theory.

The theoretical Chapter 2 proposes a Bourdieusean-inspired theory of praxis that can be applied to the understanding of national strategic culture. The research design and Bourdieu’s conceptual grid, i.e. habitus, field, hysteresis, doxa, homology, symbolic capital, and symbolic power, shed new light on how national strategic cultures are being constructed through security actors’ practices and dispositions.

The concept of transitional security habitus is put forward so as to account for a particular understanding of the Romanian security habitus during the transition period and the security reforms post-Cold War. The concept encompasses contrasting influences in the changing Romanian strategic doxa or the established ways of doing security as they are reflected in security practices. When the security field is under constant change and transition, there is much more latitude for hysteresis effects and being out of sync with changing doxic patterns. Lastly, the present thesis approaches Bourdieu’s complex and heavy conceptual apparatus with a critical eye, by also
taking into account in the theoretical chapter the potential limitations and challenges of his sociological perspective.

The historical *Chapter 3* traces the reform of the Romanian security and defence sector post-Cold War and looks at the transformation steps in the Romanian national security strategy, the important policy reforms and relevant institutional developments under the influence of both NATO and the EU. For the purpose of the research, the case of Romania serves as an in-depth study for the intertwined influence of NATO and the EU in shaping the country’s security sector and its strategic culture in the post-Cold War era and the sometimes haphazard policy and institutional response during its security sector reform.

The chapter also introduces concise backgrounders of Romania’s strategic position during the Cold War and the evolution of both NATO and the EU post Second World War. The choice for Romania as a study-case is accounted for by the fact that it provides a hard case for the European Union’s influence in the field of security reform, due to Romania’s stated strong Atlanticist position and NATO’s vast influence during the Romanian armed forces’ modernization. The analytical focus is given to security practices at the junction of important policy reforms and in line with the integration steps taken in both international structures.

The micro-analysis forwarded in the empirical *Chapter 4* sheds light on the continuities, changes, or lack of decisions in policy, institutions, and doctrines, as influenced by various reforms stages and reflected in the practice of Romanian security professionals. The objective in this chapter is to reconstruct out of the
interviewees’ answers the specificity of Romania’s transitional security habitus: what is the security practitioners point of view regarding the structure and hierarchy of the Romanian security field; how they consider the relations of power and the objects of struggle within their field of practice in the post-Cold War context; which are the transferable skills and capitals most legitimate and amenable to lead to the construction of Romania’s security priorities; as well as their opinion on what are Romania’s options in terms of reforms and models to follow when dealing with NATO and the CSDP.

The diachronic analysis of the Romanian transitional security field takes into account the alignment of security actors’ habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 72; Bourdieu 1990: 135) and their hierarchical positions (Pouliot 2010: 46-47), namely by analysing what Bourdieu terms as the homology (alignment) and hysteresis (non-alignment/discrepancy) (Bourdieu, 1990: 62) between the actors’ ingrained dispositions and their given locus within the hierarchy of the security field (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 16-18). In doing so, the chapter focuses on the varying successful and unsuccessful strategies employed by such actors and the capitals (resources) they use in the power game over the symbolic framing of Romanian security objectives.

The empirical Chapter 5 aims to signify the gap between public rhetoric and actual practice for the case of Romania’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) during the Romanian President Traian Băsescu’s two administrations (2005-2014). The chapter identified the totalizing influence and monopolizing symbolic power of the charismatic
President in shaping the institutional role of the Presidency and Romania’s security and defence policy. In this chapter, the analytical priority is given to identifying the idiosyncratic factors in Romania’s security behaviour and how a particular typology of charismatic leadership resorts to discursive practices to control the country’s foreign and security agenda for almost a decade.

In the comparative Chapter 6, Bourdieu’s concept of *hysteresis* (Bourdieu 1990) is used as a guiding compass so as to characterize the specificity of post-Cold War security sector reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Like in the Romanian case, the *hysteresis effect* better illustrates how the two newer EU member states, Hungary and Poland, made sense of the reform dynamics within their security sectors, by pinpointing the main structural incongruities and complications engendered by the post-Cold war transition.

The case of Romania’s post-Cold War security reforms is contrasted to the experience of both Hungary and Poland so as to account for cross-case similarities or differences. The chapter makes reference to the particular post-Cold regional security configuration in Central and Eastern Europe, the country profile of both Hungary and Poland after the Cold War, and their main security reforms under the influence of both NATO and the EU. The choice for Poland and Hungary is accounted for by the fact that both countries, as compared to Romania’s late-comer status, were at the forefront of the Euro-Atlantic integration in Central and Eastern Europe.
Pierre Bourdieu’s vision of a true social scientist is that of a researcher constantly and critically engaged in the “sociology of sociology”\(^1\) (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 68), reflexivity, in his understanding, being a deeper level of epistemological analysis. Bourdieu’s work has lain the epistemological grounds for a critical social scientific knowledge (Maton 2003: 57), his “signature obsession” throughout his career being with the development of a reflexive method (Wacquant 1992: 36). Bourdieu’s primary concern was with the constant testing of the advantages and disadvantages of such a reflexive method for social inquiry. The “problem of reflexivity” (Bottero 2010), in a Bourdieusean logic, can be translated into the *intersubjective dimension of practice*, the constantly negotiated relations between agents within their respective professional fields, *i.e.* the case of “situated intersubjectivity” (Bottero 2010), and their reflection upon their subject positioning and activity.

Without any doubt, reflexivity does matter for the overall enrichment of an ethically-grounded research agenda (Eagleton-Pierce 2011), concerning not only the choices made of the objects of study, but also how specific research problems are handled by the researcher with his/her autobiography, biases, epistemological commitments and

\(^1\) “(…) Indeed, I believe that *the sociology of sociology is a fundamental dimension of sociological epistemology.* Far from being a specialty among others, it is the necessary prerequisite of any rigorous sociological practice. In my view, one of the chief sources of error in the social sciences resides in an uncontrolled relation to the object which results in the projection of this relation onto the object. What distresses me when I read some works by sociologists is that people whose profession it is to objectivize the social world prove so rarely able to objectivize themselves, and fail so often to realize that what apparently their discourse talks about is not the object but their relation to the object. Now, to objectivize the objectivizing point of view of the sociologist is something that is done quite frequently, but in a strikingly superficial, if apparently radical, manner. When we say “the sociologist is inscribed in a historical context,” we generally mean the “bourgeois sociologist” and leave it at that. But objectivation of any cultural producer demands more than pinpointing to – and bemoaning – his class background and location, his “race”, or his gender. We must not forget to objectivize his position in the universe of cultural production, in this case the scientific or academic field (…)” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 68-69).
subject positioning within both the field of security production and the field of academia (Kurowska & Tallis 2013). The methodological framework outlined in what follows takes lead from the above basic assumptions that formulate the “scientific standards and truth conditions” (Pouliot 2010: 53) for a reflexivity-minded research design. Accordingly, International Relations and Security Studies academics have turned to Bourdieu and his reflexive method as a potential blueprint for critical research designs and for developing guidance elements to understand the ability to be reflexive with one’s work. Issues of positioning and power struggle in the academic field of security scholars or in the broader field of security professionals and practitioners, the risks of autobiographical and ideological biases, the quest for introspection and critical inquiry, all hint towards the more encompassing theme of objective versus subjective knowledge production.

Other issues also become extremely relevant: ethnography as autobiography and the possible risks of such an approach in the research process; levels of distance, embeddedness and subsequent dis-embeddedness during field work activities; the chosen techniques of recording embeddedness and the processes of academic reflection upon them; and finally the role of mental frames and temporal distance in framing the research. More recent contributions to research methods in Critical Security Studies concerning reflexive methodologies inspired by Bourdieusean concepts and applied to security (Kurowska & Tallis 2013; Salter & Mutlu 2013: 238), have made a significant impact in systematizing the research of practices and tacit knowledge. Among such methodological endeavors, Xavier Guillaume’s contribution is particularly interesting with the introduction of the concept of “criticality” (Guillaume in Salter & Mutlu 2013: 29). Criticality is understood as a “self-conscious posture and
attention” that helps researchers to avoid what Bourdieu terms as “scholastic illusion” (Bourdieu 1994: 217), namely remaining blind to potential latent biases when creating the research design.

The critical gaze, in a Bourdieusean understanding, must be always double-folded and directed to both the researcher himself or herself (the position in the academic field) and his or her academic discipline (Bourdieu 2004). In the case of the present research, reflexivity was applied during the field work stage as well as all throughout the writing process: special attention was given to the intricate relation between personal beliefs, misconceptions and values and the object of the research, the Romanian security field. This implied that academic knowledge and theoretical biases are intrinsically ideological and context specific. During the writing process, reflexivity was used concerning knowledge production and its transformative impact upon the object of study. Special attention was given not to impose personal views on the topics discussed during the interviewing process. Hence, the value added of a Bourdieusean reflexivity-driven agenda is that it inspired the research perspective to be always critically engaged and to examine subject positioning and theoretical biases with relation to the academic work.

That being said, the aim of this section is not to discuss the epistemological subtleties of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociological method and their purchase in constructivist IR or Critical Security Studies research, however insightful they may be, but to flesh out the research methods used as tools of inquiry in a practice-oriented analysis of security fields. Equally, the research methods proposed in the thesis are in fact a combination of “inductive, interpretative, and historical” (Pouliot 2010: 53) mixed techniques of
inquiry intended to study the practices and subjective knowledge of security actors. Taking into account the necessity for reflexivity when conducting research, the present thesis follows in the spirit of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology by making use of qualitative research methods so as to acquire an in-depth understanding of security practices in specific transitional contexts, such as the case of the Romanian security field’s transformation post-Cold War.

Chapter 3 offers a historical analysis of the Romanian security field’s transformation under the institutional influence of NATO and the EU. Chapter 4 extensively draws on data from semi-directed qualitative interviewing and is devoted to the in-depth micro-analysis of the Romanian security field so as to recover the practical logic of Romanian security professionals. Chapter 5 further reflects the reform experience of the Romanian security field by focusing on the role of symbolic power and the overwhelming institutional and charismatic influence of the President and the Presidency as a corporate body determining Romania’s security orientation. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the comparative experience of Hungary and Poland in the reform of their security fields post-Cold War and speaks to certain trends in the evolution of the Central and Eastern European security configuration after NATO’s double expansion.

In doing so, the thesis holds true to the Bourdieusean view that any methodological endeavour should be accompanied by deeply epistemic reflexive strategies, which play the key role to fundament a critically informed research agenda. Qualitative-oriented investigative work is conducted in the thesis so that it answers the questions of “why” and “how” concerning actors’ practices and behaviours: by resorting to a combination of historical longitudinal analysis and by emphasising the meaningful
historical narratives of security transformation and change post-Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe; by looking and relevant policy documents and discourses so as to illustrate the security fields’ transformation of Romania, Hungary, and Poland; by conducting open-ended qualitative interviews and field work in the case of the Romanian security field; and finally by comparing and contrasting the experience of representative study-cases for the transformation of the security sectors post-Cold War for Romania, Hungary and Poland and how the meanings of security changed over time in Central and Eastern Europe.

Firstly, the research makes use of historical longitudinal analysis to look at: the changes starting from the end of the Cold War in the case of the Romanian security field; the country’s security evolution to the present day during the communist regime; NATO’s and the EU’s CSDP historical origins; and Romania’s adherence to both NATO and the EU. As well as, the research resorts to a longitudinal and cross sectional analysis of the evidence relevant for developments in different national security fields and for identifying variations across them.

Romania’s transitional experience in the field of security post-Cold War takes centre stage in the research, as an in-depth study case used for tracing and signifying the security reform processes engendered by the EU’s CSDP and NATO. Hence, the historical chapter (Chapter 3) draws extensively on empirical data from a longitudinal historical study of Romania’s security field post-Cold War in order to discuss alternative interpretations that go beyond the traditional understandings in the strategic culture literature.
Moreover, the method of process-tracing is used to investigate the temporal, ideational and material processes, which led to significant transformations in the discursive and institutional frameworks of security and defence in the case of Romania. Such a historical perspective is meant to reconstruct path-dependent trajectories and possible ruptures from the traditional understanding in the security field and to provide a more comprehensive image of the evolution of the country’s strategic culture through the analysis of security actor’s practices and behaviour. At a general level, evidence of exogenous international incentives for adaptation, national structural isomorphism, social learning, changes in discursive practices, the role of charismatic leaders and institutional reforms are observed.

Qualitative interviews were conducted with security stakeholders, military personnel (active and retired) and policy decision makers in the Romanian national security field so as to instantiate their material/rationalist incentives and identity/culturalist concerns. As already mentioned, the thesis proposes a context-specific micro-analysis of security practices as they were identified out of the qualitative interviewing of security practitioners and civil servants in Bucharest and Brussels. This was meant to develop the subjective knowledge regarding their social milieu as it is made clear by the interview data analysis in Chapter 4, this step being fundamental in identifying the symbolic and cultural capital of such security actors. The aim was to reconstruct, through often informal discussions, the intersubjective contexts in which security actors exert their agency and performativity, as well as the constituted structures constraining their practices, and the ways in which practices are derived from shared understandings (King 2000: 431).
By meeting with politicians, security professionals, local policy-makers, and experts from Romania, both in Bucharest (May 2011, June 2012) and during prolonged stays in Brussels (April 2013, October 2013), empirical data has been uncovered as regards Romanian security practices, dispositions and the context of Romanian security processes and reforms. Many of the interviews were made under the prerequisites of secrecy and off-the-record, mainly due to the sensitive nature of security and defence topics approached during the discussions. Consequently, qualitative, semi-structured interviewing was used so as to get a better understanding of security practitioners’ points of view, symbolic meanings, tacit assumptions, in sum their explanatory narratives as regards the reforms and changes within the Romanian security field post-Cold War.

Participant observation would have best aided the aim to reconstruct the subjective meanings and the practical knowledge of Romanian security professionals. However, by taking into account the high politics of the security fields and the security clearance prerequisites of prolonged embeddedness necessary for participant observation, the research made use of the second-best alternative, namely qualitative interviews and semi-directed questionnaires.

The data from the interviews was triangulated with personal interpretative and ethnographic sensibilities and the historical and discourse analysis data from the historical chapter (*Chapter 3*). It is worth mentioning the interviewing obstacles met (low interest or suspicion in meeting researchers so as to discuss national security themes) because of the opaque and distinctively guarded professional environment and the nature of the security topics broached during the interviewing process.
Insights into security practitioners’ routines and beliefs or what they believe to be real (Pouliot 2010: 59), as revealed during the interviewing process, were interpreted in the empirical chapters of the thesis so and provide a grounded understanding of the Romanian transitional security field.

Tacit knowledge was revealed through open-ended questions that often followed the lead of the interviewees themselves, through informal discussions as regards poignant security themes and by asking security practitioners’ to describe their routine and interactions on an everyday basis. The interviews were conducted by keeping in mind the contextual knowledge and subjective understanding of Romanian security practitioners regarding the specific reforms of the Romanian security field and the NATO-EU double-folded influence in the reform process.

During the field work activity, several Romanian civil servants and military officers in Bucharest and Brussels were interviewed from a variety of departments of the ministries of external relations and defence, so as to gain a better grasp of their organizational perspective. Moreover, the inductive method was used so as to ascertain and reconstruct the cultural repertoires of the security actors, starting from the actors themselves, their institutional position, and the meanings they ascribed to their social reality (Pouliot 2008: 61) and related to Romania’s transition in terms of security and defence.

Finally, primary and secondary resources were consulted, special attention being given to official records, policy frames, and discourses for the key cases of Romania, Hungary, and Poland. The goal was to relate such substantive narratives to the real
achievements made in the recent years to construct the policy security field post-Cold War and triggered by the increased participation in NATO and the CSDP milieus respectively.

The choice for focusing on the comparative security reform experience of Romania, Hungary, and Poland is accounted for by these countries’ shared geographical proximity and historical legacy post-Cold War, as well as their common experience as NATO and EU members. The intention in the present research is not to come up with law-like generalizations of Central and Eastern European security reforms from the analysis of such transitional experiences, but to discover comparable patterns, trends, regularities in shifting security contexts, and the levels of distinction and cross-case correspondence.

In a constructivist spirit of research, interpretation, as a methodological important tool, had plaid a central role in the research, the aim being that to recreate the subjective meanings that “become objectified as part of an intersubjective context” (Pouliot 2008: 63). All in all, the research unfolds under two consistent caveats: one that follows in the spirit of the Bourdieusian research ethic, the reflexivity of this study’s researcher is imperative so as to avoid scholastic bias; and the other, consistently informing the research to triangulate information and to alternate the use of inductive, interpretative and historical techniques of inquiry.
1.1 Introduction

The present thesis carves a conceptual niche at the “horizon” of three academic literatures: the strategic culture body of work, the Europeanization literature, and the sociological, praxis-oriented sociological turn of rethinking key concepts in International Relations theory and as influenced by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The added value of such a research is multi-folded. First, it proposes an original “fusion” of literatures developed in a novel conceptual framework.

Second, it fills in the theoretical blind spots of the Europeanization and strategic culture literatures in the field of Security Studies by making use of the conceptual apparatus of Pierre Bourdieu.

Third, it develops a more comprehensive analytical grid, which does not comprise of an already built-in bias towards the EU-centric position such as the Europeanization/EU-ization literature. Hence, it allows for other mitigating factors to influence and shape the security field in the cases of new EU member states.

Fourth, it develops a comprehensive research design which takes into account both material and ideational, structural and agentic, epistemological and methodological dimensions of social enquiry, mainly due to the Bourdieusian-inspired analytical framework.
Fifth, it proposes both a highly critical and constructivist lens of inquiry in its epistemological dimension and a sociological and empirically-minded investigation with its theory of action and focus on practices.

Lastly, it reorients the research towards the case of new EU member states and their security sectors, by proposing an in-depth analysis of the Romanian security field and its evolution in the post-Cold War era.

The analysis is less concerned with measuring or explaining monolithic strategic culture outputs by strictly looking at national cultures or actors’ rational interests. Instead, it resorts to the case of the Romanian security field to explore the concentration of actors and their strategies and the structural underpinnings that made security policy transformations possible in the first place. A new concept of strategic culture as influenced by Bourdieu’s theory of culture as practice is proposed in the research. It analyses strategic culture in its everyday security practices and accounts for the continuously transformative character of this process. What one perceives as a homogenous body understood as strategic culture, in the present research it is construed as a contested and negotiated fixed image of a constantly challenged reality, transformed by security processes and practices.

The research concern is directed towards the ways in which representations come to be taken for “reality” *per se*, by taking into account how such processes of representation are transformed through everyday practices. In this perspective, interests and identities are produced through social practices at the grass roots of everyday security and defence policy practical manifestations and under the
socializing influence of two international organizations such as NATO and the EU. To this end, the conceptual apparatus developed in this thesis draws inspiration from three strands of literature: the state of the art in the Europeanization literature, the theoretical debates centring on strategic culture, and the political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu – more precisely the interrelationship between his three core conceptual clusters, the field, the habitus, and the notion of capital.

In the last few years the field of International Relations has benefited from a rich wave of Bourdieusean-inspired and sociologically-oriented research. The concept of the field (Bourdieu 1993) makes reference to networked and institutionalized social milieus within which state actors interrelate, socialize and construct common recognitions and meanings, as well as the ways in which they pursue their material interest in a competition for social positions and power to influence the national security agenda. As far as the concept of the habitus (Bourdieu 1977) is concerned, Bourdieu understands by it the process of internalized practices, objective social structures, and external conditionings by actors. They acquire, through daily experiences and interactions, a set of dispositions and attained patterns of thinking and behaving.

And last but not the least, the concept of the capital (Bourdieu, 1984), be it social, economic, cultural, or symbolic, represents the summation of virtual or actual resources that actors possess. Such resources signify a source of recognition and misrecognition by other actors and establish their relative position in the field. Among the resources that are strategically used by actors, that of the symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984) plays a key role in the analysis of Romania’s security field, due to
the fact that it is based on elements of honour, prestige and recognition, functioning as an authoritative personification of legitimacy and power.

The chapter starts off with a general appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses concerning the existing Europeanization literature and the strategic culture scholarship. In doing so, it lays emphasis on the logics of consequences, appropriateness and the discourse logics so as to account for social action and representational knowledge (Pouliot 2010: 11) as reflected by the above literatures. Attention is also given to the treatment of strategic culture within European Studies. The argument is that there is nothing intrinsically flawed about the theoretical assumptions of the above logics, except for the fact that they offer a thin understanding of how practices emerge and become entrenched in certain contexts.

The chapter continues with the appraisal of the strategic culture literature through Bourdieusean lenses and proposes a more in-depth understanding of strategic culture as practice. Out of the Europeanization literature contribution, the chapter pays special attention to the strands dedicated to discursive institutionalist approaches, being considered as the closest perspective to the present research goals. As well, the empirical focus in this thesis falls primarily on issues connected to the formerly known as the intergovernmental second pillar of security and defence, which is less covered by the Europeanization literature that traditionally focused on issue connected to the first pillar. While the first part of the chapter evaluates the logics of consequences and appropriateness in terms of their potential or lack-of-theirof to illuminate security action, the middle section concentrates on the institutional and discursive dimensions of the Europeanization literature.
Lastly, the chapter forwards the conceptual apparatus supported by Bourdieu’s sociological theory and the rich opportunity it provides to rethink international politics (Adler-Nissen 2013: 1) in a novel way. It observes that more recently the field of International Relations literature has benefited from a handful of researchers that have “borrowed” from the conceptual apparatus of Bourdieu and enriched the field of security studies. Bourdieu’s sociology is particularly useful to tease out the everyday practices of security actors (Adler-Nissen 2013: 1) and the structural and symbolic fields that they navigate and compete in.

The aim in this chapter is to position the project in the broader practice “turn” in IR by proposing a different perspective on security making and security action, and by laying emphasis on of the everyday practical logic of security production for the case of Romania. The intention is not to disregard or negate the academic work of authors contributing to the strategic culture of Europeanization literatures. Constructed on Bourdieu’s sociology, this chapter situates the present thesis within the broader sociological trend in IR and Security Studies that gives pre-eminence to social scientific perspectives that take into account the practical underpinnings of security agents’ actions and their practical reasoning (Pouliot 2010: 22) of their respective security fields.

The latest works of authors such as Michael Williams, Didier Bigo and Frédéric Mérand, Stefano Guzzini, Niilo Kauppi, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, and more recently Vincent Pouliot (Bigo 2000, 2006a, 2006b; Williams 2007; Mérand 2008; Pouliot 2010; Adler-Nissen 2013; Kauppi, 2013) demonstrate that a strong sociological niche
is being carved in the fields of International Relations and Security Studies literatures. It is worth mentioning the valuable critical contribution of Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s latest editorial book project (Adler-Nissen 2013: 1) focused on systematizing the use of Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus within IR theory. Special attention is given to the more recent work of Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot in terms of their take on Bourdieu’s conceptual grid and its application to International Relations and Security Studies. By following in the line of the above-mentioned authors’ academic work, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the “practice” turn in International Relations literature by proposing a Bourdieusean-inspired conceptual grid and a sociologically-oriented study of transitional security fields.

1.2 Strategic Culture in Focus

Almost a decade after the initial discussions generated by authors such as Alistair Iain Johnston and Colin Gray, the concept of strategic culture “remains deeply contested” (Bloomfield & Nossal 2007: 286-307), mainly due to the epistemological implications of its applicability to different security contexts and state behaviours. Grounded in either positivist epistemological traditions or more interpretative, culturalist-oriented approaches (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007: 286-287; Katzenstein 1996), the concept of strategic culture and its influence on security practitioners’ security behaviours and national security policies requires further discussion and analysis.

However, this section does not intend to extensively chart the evolution of the scholarship on strategic culture through its several generations (Meyer 2006; Lantis 2002; Katzenstein 1998), but to pinpoint the main debates and to discuss the
explanatory value of the concept as regards security actors’ practices and strategic behaviour. A Bourdieusean-inspired critique allows for complementing strategic culture and Europeanization scholarships in order to develop a practice-oriented research agenda.

In this respect, several shortcomings in the three generations of strategic culture are of particular significance. In the first generation, the concept of strategic culture puts forward a monolithic cultural determinism that mechanically reinforces a self-referential argumentation – different national cultures produce different strategic behaviours. As Colin Gray pointed out, “Germans cannot help but behave except under the constraints of Germanic strategic culture…” (Gray 1999: 52). Both Snyder and Gray (Snyder 1977; Gray 1981: 35-37) advanced a conceptualization of strategic culture that is semi-permanent and which revealed one of the more obvious fallacies of the existing literature on strategic culture: the determinist and reductionist definition of culture, drawn from outdated and realist/state-centric perspective in Security Studies.

The second generation develops an unclear account of instrumentality (Johnston 1995): it attempts to reassert the role of power and hegemony while casting strategic culture as merely a tool in the hands of decision-makers. Strategic culture emerges as a neat and tidy reflection of purposeful decision-makers and strategic action is not determined by strategic cultural discourse (Johnston 199: 18).

The third generation narrows the concept of strategic culture to the meso-level of institutional analysis with a focus on organisational culture as the independent
variable. Here the first generation of strategic culture is conveniently brought down to an organisational/institutional level and it is often contrasted to neorealist interpretations, but it retains an inherent inability to address strategic action that may not have been influenced by cultural variables. Strategic culture is either seen as foundational and essentialist: by comprising general national categories such as history, language, identity, it operates in the same manner at the meso-level of institutions and organisation, or it is a discursive tool in the hands of self-interested political leaders (Legro 1994; Kier 1995).

This cursory overview points to one of the more obvious shortcomings of the existing literature on strategic culture, namely the reliance on either thin, realist/state-centric definitions (Neumann & Heikka 2005: 5-23) in traditional Security Studies or on holistic cultural interpretations that rely on norms and collective identities (Pouliot 2010: 5). If organizational culture determines the interests of actors and circumvents their options in terms of policy-making, how is a hierarchy between such interests substantiated in specific strategic choices? Or how can it account for cross-variation between preferences when practitioners occupy different positions within the security field? The strategic culture literature assumes the one-way, teleological relation between culture in its broader homogenizing understanding (the first generation) and organizational culture in its narrower understanding of security behaviour (the third generation).

Conversely, the use of cultural interpretations in the strategic culture literature received substantial theoretical impetus from the contribution of constructivist scholars (Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner 1998; Lapid & Kratocwil 1996; Rose
Authors such as Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner put forward more sophisticated interpretations of strategic culture: through intersubjectivity as regards the mutual creation of structures and identities and with the logic of appropriateness in security behaviour. Such approaches focused predominantly on issues concerning state or organizational identity-formation and the role of norms (Hopf 1998), with shared meanings shaping in an intersubjective manner the actors’ strategic behaviour.

However, less attention was given to the role of practices and the ways in which security practitioners make sense of the world of security making beyond the logic of appropriateness. What is considered to be the leading thread of constructivism in Security Studies is affiliated to authors from International Relations literature, Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, and Peter Katzenstein. Their position, however, is what can be termed as “thin” constructivism, due to the fact that their research agendas tackle possible avenues of accommodating the constructivist theoretical input to state centric analysis of security issues. Such a perspective can be accounted for by the fact that the Wendtian standpoint on structure and agency tensions can be translated into the state as the agent and the international system as the structure framework.

Nevertheless, it was Wendt who asserted that security is not something objective out there that we respond to but is intersubjectively defined through agent-structure relations. Such an approach is particularly keen to differentiate itself from poststructuralist stances (Buzan et al. 1998: 212), and from Critical Security Studies that are rooted in a variety of influences from critical theory, poststructuralism and
constructivism, the most influential works of constructivist Security Studies adopting thus a more “mainstream” approach.

Essentially, there are a number of key works that should be mentioned under the umbrella of constructivist Security Studies. An important volume that proposes a constructivist interpretation is Peter J. Katzenstein’s edited book *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, written by “scholars of international relations rummaging in the ‘graveyard’ of sociological studies” (Katzenstein 1996: 1). The authors’ contribution is major in respect to the emphasis put on the constructions and meaning of national security interests as well as on the power of cultural factors (Katzenstein 1996: 2) determining security actors to attach different meanings to power and security. According to Katzenstein, the volume focuses on: “the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand, and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors on the other” (Katzenstein 1996: 4).

Nevertheless, despite the extensive attention given to culturalist factors, norms, and identity, the common thread intersecting the book is the emphasis on states as the principal actors, and hard military security as the most important element to be explained.

Last but not the least, Michael Desch’s critical examination of the role of constructivism in Security Studies and strategic culture literature is further enlightening. The author, by assessing the importance of ideas and culture in studying security (Desch 1998), rightfully observes that existing contributions in the
constructivist field do not necessarily further an independent research agenda, but rather fill in the gaps of the mainstream literature. According to Desch, four strands of cultural theorizing dominate Security Studies: organization, political, strategic, and global (Desch, 1998, 142-142), authors such as Jeffrey Legro, Elizabeth Kier, Thomas Berger, Stephen Rose, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Martha Finnemore being representative for the above-mentioned positions. As Desch poignantly observes, the contribution of these authors is obviously linked by their common dissatisfaction with the traditional realist explanations for state behaviour and national strategic culture.

However, the author observes that “cultural theories seek to challenge the realist research program, the key question is whether the new strategic culturalism supplants or supplements realist explanations” (Desch 1998: 143).

The analysis of strategic culture in the Europeanization literature tradition suffers from similar reification practices. The end product (or dependable variable), *i.e.* security behaviour, is an effect of either the EU’s identity or hard power self-interests, seen solely as material objects (Posen 2006: 184). By applying an ontological priority to such objects as either causes or ends within teleological chains, such research designs negate the relational, middle-way dimensions of both practice and discourse. Consequently, most theories of social action derived from the above perspectives lay more emphasis on what actors think *about* (Pouliot, 2010, 11) (interests or values) rather than how they came about to act and “what they think *from*” (Pouliot 2010: 11).

The literature on strategic culture in the context of the EU’s international security identity, while primarily emphasizing either rationalist or norm-oriented logics to
identify what (or who) can consciously alter norms, ideas, and interests about European security, falls short in shedding light on how the change occurs or persists within daily practice and due to inarticulate and unconscious representations (Pouliot 2010: 11-22).

In the words of Vincent Pouliot, “most contemporary theories of social action” based on either a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness “are unable to account for the non-representational bedrock on which practices rest” (Pouliot 2010: 14). The present research adds to the growing body of work in IR that makes use of Bourdieu’s sociologically-designed conceptual grid and its systematic application to empirical cases so as to reach the more hidden strata of unconscious and inarticulate knowledge as revealed through practices.

In the case of the European studies debates on strategic culture, the focus falls under the remit of two contrasting theoretical positions, a more realist orientation, with authors such as Hyde-Price or Posen, and a hard core normative/constructivist position, represented by authors such as Manners. In the case of the CSDP development and the EU’s European Security Strategy in 2003\(^2\), the new academic discussion marks a conceptual move within the field of European Studies from the inward-looking, institutional-building debates on the EU’s *sui generis* identity to the EU’s foreign policy *engagement* and its proactive international involvement.

Furthermore, such a theoretical shift was accounted for by two gaps in the literature, *i.e.* the under-theorized international agency of the EU and the narrow scope of the

civillian/normative power concept, too domestically-oriented and unable to accommodate the EU’s international role and its foreign policy agenda. Hence, the dilemmas provoked by the EU’s international exercise of power and its ethical legitimations took centre focus in the discussion about strategic culture. As well, the empirical focus was dedicated almost predominantly to the Brussels-end of security community construction and institutional build-up, with less attention being given to the ways in which new EU member states were becoming socialized in the EU’s strategic culture.

Both the afore-mentioned theoretical strands have drawn on specific ontological frameworks and their diverging epistemologies concerning the EU’s strategic culture. For example, while Hyde-Price premised his theoretical angle in the sturdy IR tradition of neorealism (Hyde-Price 2008: 29-44), Manners adopts the softer normative and cosmopolitan approach (Manners 2008: 40-60). Both perspectives suffer from the already mentioned theoretical fallacies of reification, either of a materialist inspired logic or a culturally essentialist interpretation. Authors such Posen go a bit further and argue that, due to its military capabilities in the making in response to the so called capabilities-expectations gap (Christopher Hill), even a self-effacing CSDP can be pigeonholed as a type of hard balance. As Posen states: “Though the Europeans are … balancing US power, we must concede that they are not balancing very intensively” (Posen 2006: 184), and “states and statesmen are not necessarily expected to couch their actions in balancing language” (Posen 2006: 165).
At the other end, Manners put forward his own complex conceptualization that focused on a constructivist discourse of the EU’s strategic identity, whether the EU will assume the traits of a military, a civilian or a normative power (Manners 2006: 405-421). The CSDP therefore pivoted on communicative and symbolic processes in the European Union and the interrelated dimension of Self and Other relations. Following the argumentative lines of Mannes, Meyer’s strategic culture can be conceptualized roughly as “comprising the socially-transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals” (Meyer 2006: 20).

Nevertheless, in the case of the European Union such norms and ideas do not forge a coherent and unified whole, or for that matter a fully-drawn political identity with a clear-cut thick EU security doctrine, divergence and diversification being still a predominant characteristic among member states, be them newer or older, Atlanticist or Europeanist, militarized or civilian and so on.

Moreover, the literature of strategic culture and on the EU’s international role and its security identity seems to be lacking focus and coherence in terms of clearly identifying what (or who) exactly can alter norms and ideas about European security, and under what conditions, and how the change occurs or persists. As Mérand poignantly observes, constructivists make use of the concept of norm entrepreneur “who by virtue of his/her social agility and ability to forge discourses that resonate with people will be able to create new identities and policies” (Mérand 2008: 4). Such entrepreneurs or key state actors then, through social learning socialization and
internalization will give way to what Howorth termed as “epistemic communities” in the realm of security.

Nevertheless, Mérand criticized such approaches on the grounds that the concepts proposed lack the focus and the sharpness of more attuned conceptual grids. To be added to this criticism, the concept of norm entrepreneur should encompass a level of dynamism and change, such actors being able to move across security fields and transform the normative dimension of these fields. Also, the concept of norm entrepreneur seems to rely mostly in the normative dimension of analysis, without taking into account material based structures and practices.

The discussion has focused on whether cultural variables can become constitutive of research agendas and not merely intervening variables that help explain gaps in the mainstream literature. There seems to be an overall reluctance to draw from the rich conceptual input of sociological and anthropological theoretical efforts, ignoring behavioural variables and more “thick” understandings of culture. Therefore, one of the shortcomings of the strategic culture literature (Neumann & Heikka 2005: 5-23) and the work of authors such as Gray, Klein and Johnston resides in the thin understanding of the notion of culture from a sociological point of view (Klein, 1994; Johnston, 1995; Gray, 1999).

1.3 The Europeanization Literature in Focus

The Europeanization literature may be labelled as highly heterogeneous, with at least three important conceptual clusters taking centre stage in the scholarship, i.e. an European institutional level advocated by authors that attempt to conceptualized the
creation of the European Union’s institutions; a domestic level that addresses the
changes in the national political arena because of the EU integration processes; and
finally one that emphasizes the mutually constitutive relation between the two levels.
The state of the art in the Europeanization academic literature could be best
described as a continuous process of conceptual refinement and development,
increased efforts being made to set out inclusive research designs. In the case of the
Europeanization literature, the theoretical and analytical challenge is to
accommodate the ontological priority of the praxis logic over the logics of
instrumentality or appropriateness (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier 2005;
Featherstone & Radaelli 2002; Radaelli & Schmidt 2004; Grabbe 2002; Wiener &

The goal was to develop a comprehensive framework that addresses both material
interest-based and normative cultural factors. From this point of view, Mérand’s work
offers an interesting approach that examines the practice of security professionals in
new spaces of transnational action (Mérand 2008). This perspective speaks to one
let-down of the Europeanization literature, which fails to account for a multitude of
social actors subject to intersecting and at times conflicting rationales. Specifically,
the logic of appropriateness seems insufficient for explaining specific strategic
actions based on material and interest-specific behaviour or when hard military
capabilities and an economic rationale play a fundamental role in the security
dynamic. Conversely, the logic of consequence proves unsatisfactory as an exclusive
explanation if, in the process, the discursive/ideational elements are downplayed to
epiphenomenal categories.
The more sophisticated attempts to conceptualize Europeanization generically draw on the scholarship of discourse analysis and new institutionalism, one such example being the work of Heather Grabbe (Grabbe 2002) and the guiding definition of Europeanization that Claudio Radaelli proposes “...shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public politics” (Radaelli in Featherstone & Radaelli 2002: 30). The present research considers the discursive institutionalist approach as the closest to achieving the underlying goal of analysing new member states’ security sector transformation in term of Europeanization processes.

Enriched by the input of authors such as Vivien Schmidt and Claudio Radaelli (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004), the perspective has an added theoretically-guiding value to illustrate the state of the art in a certain institutional and national field through more complex discursive lenses. The institutional theoretical family has its roots and is part of a general theoretical pool of politics, displaying a high degree of accommodation and covering a wide-variety of topics from domestic to international politics. The approach may locate discursive practices in an institutional framework at a meso-level of analysis in specific professional fields such as security or foreign policy.

As a mid-level approach (Pollack 2005: 139), discursive institutionalism translates its conceptual lenses at an international as well as at the domestic level. Accordingly, the added value of the theoretical framework developed by the discursive institutionalist interpretation in the case of Europeanization literature is that it brings to the fore testable hypotheses about both the role of institutions and discourses.
On the one hand, it can provide a theoretical guide to both trace and signify the institutional milieu of discourse formation, as an intersubjective dynamic reinforcing the mutually constitutive nature of an EU security discourse contrasted to the national one. On the other hand, in order to explore how Europeanization occurs, the mutually constitutive (Mörth 2002: 160) nature between the EU and new member states within the CSDP framework assumes that processes of identity construction and reconstruction (Mörth 2002: 160) take place, and “ideas may not only cause actors to make certain choices, but (...) the institutionalization of certain ideas gradually reconstructs the interests of (...) actors” (Rieker 2006: 516).

However, the approach is not specific enough to point to other potential practical processes in which a multitude of social actors are directly involved in. As well, in the case of specific strategic actions, based on material and interest-specific behaviour or when hard military capabilities and economic rationale play a fundamental role in the security dynamic of the new member states, the discursive institutional explanatory instruments seem to be insufficient. Even more, in the case of identity formation, the discursive institutionalist approach falls short in explaining how interests and ideas are exactly reconstructed in practice, the change in the discourse of security actors appearing in this case again as merely epiphenomenal.

As well, discourse analytical frameworks that rely on the illocutionary/performative logics (Austin 1975) in the Europeanization literature (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde 1998; Schmidt & Radaelli 2004; Schmidt & Radaelli 2004; Schmidt 2008) contain certain shortcoming as regards the analysis of practices. The emergence of security
practices is not as straight-forward as discursive approaches may envisage with either the transformation of an issue into a security problem or securitisation as an extreme version of politicisation. Bourdieu is thus particularly useful in analysing the fallacies of discourse which ignore the social and practical aspects of language (re)production, especially in case of the dominant/legitimate language becoming institutionalised (Bourdieu 1991) in certain professional contexts.

By examining the linguistic style of actors, the hierarchy between fields and actors, the social/institutional field legitimising the utterance, and the symbolic market in which the linguistic product is meant to be “sold” – the audience, Bourdieu’s framework points to the practical dispositions and the conflictual stages over definitional monopolies that make speech acts possible in the first place.

In contrast to strategic culture literature and the discursive agenda in European Studies, the sociological approach has the potential to offer a more focused explanation to why the strategic culture is “semipermanent”, why it evolves, who are the relevant carriers of the symbolic cultural power and why they shift discourses or compete for privileged positions within the security field.

Similarly, it attends to what are the ideational and institutional interests of such actors, and it explores their social representations and their habitus as mediation between past influences and present stimuli (Wacquant 2006: 7). As well, some researches inspired predominantly by the logic of discourse or communication or, for that matter, the more postmodern social constructivist strands, they have a tendency to “epitomize the representational bias” (Pouliot 2010: 22) from an epistemological
point of view. They remain silent concerning the role of practices within social inquiry and over-emphasizing the role of discourse in the detriment of practice or the practical dimension of discourse.

In terms of the empirical focus within the Europeanization literature, the majority of studies having an Europeanization approach centre around issue areas that were previously connected to what was considered first pillar *problematique*, less attention being given to Europeanization in the second pillar, due to its intergovernmental dimension and the sensitive *problematique* of the security and defence policy. What is more, most of the studies focus on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) realm, and only recently scholarly attention has been given to possible Europeanization processes within the security field. Such contributions include the work of Vanhoonacker (2008), Gross (2007), Eriksson (2006), Wagner (2005), and Major (2005).

The scholarly attention has been given mainly to Western and “old” member states’ processes of Europeanization within the framework of the CSDP, with little or no interest given to the cases of new member states. Nevertheless, contributions on the Europeanization of foreign policy have been extremely helpful, because they demonstrated that member states, be them newer or older, have not been resistant to adaptational incentives coming from the EU on matters of high politics. However, such interpretations rely heavily on an EU-centric bias without mitigating enough for the influence of other international organizations such as NATO in the reform of new EU member states security sectors.
The Europeanization literature on new member states, at a general level, is quite a recent and still comparatively small body of literature, most of the significant contributions being made in the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. Moreover, at a specific level, the Europeanization literature on new member states’ involvement in the CSDP is even smaller, if not completely absent, the research interest being given to the broader policy field of the CFSP (Baun & Marek 2013; Sedelmeier, 2011; Kaminska 2002). So far, most academic attention has focused on the Europeanization of the new member states’ foreign policy before and beyond their accession, presenting it as either a process of domestic adaptation to EU foreign policy practices or as contributing to the making and shaping of the EU’s foreign policy in specific issue areas³ (Pomorska & Copsey 2008).

Furthermore, analytical material consequential to in-depth case studies that analyse the impact of the CSDP on new member states is also largely inexistent, most of the studies concentrating on the Northern dimension and other “older” member states, such as France, the UK, Belgium, and Germany. The question to be asked is whether the very nature of the security and defence policy offers a clarification to why the Europeanization literature has been scarcely applied to the CSDP field more generally and even less so to the cases of new EU member states.

To name a few examples, Eriksson’s research explored the Swedish Europeanization processes in the field of defence policy by drawing theoretical input from the area of policy analysis (Eriksson 2006). Her main contribution to the Europeanization literature has been the definition of Europeanization as embeddedness,

³ The authors research Poland’s power and influence in the European Union by analysing the case of its Eastern policy. (Pomorska & Copsey 2008)
characterized by mixed modes of governance. Another good study on the security policies of the Nordic and Baltic States has been put forward by Archer, giving valuable insights of these countries, yet not concentrating on the processes of domestic transformation or projection of interests at the EU level (Archer 2008). Malena Britz’s academic input on the Northern dimension’s security and defence problematique is another example of research in the CSDP Europeanization literature (Britz 2007). By illustrating how European crisis management capacities are being created by the Europeanization processes in the field of the CSDP, she conceptualized Europeanization as a process of translation in which organizational changes and linguistic/conceptual elements become mixed to bring about elements of national convergence or divergence.

Going forward, Rieker’s study, whose research in 2004 focused on the Northern dimension and the cases of Sweden and Finland, has enriched the body of literature on the Europeanization of security and defence, because she observed that there has been a discrepancy between the two countries’ strategic doctrine of “neutrality” and the European Union’s security doctrine. The author argued that changes have occurred in both countries and resulted in the modification of their constitutions and their neutrality clauses (Rieker 2004). In a later work, Rieker resorted to the French example and its security discourse, suggesting that the French military offensive approach has been transformed towards a more inclusive European security approach, due to the EU’s discursive pressures (Rieker 2006).

Additionally, Eva Gross’s research in this field of security and defence focused on the analysis of German policy preferences towards the CSDP (Gross 2007). In her case,
the Europeanization of national crisis management policies is seen as both a top-down and bottom-up process, highlighting the ways in which Germany was able to influence and be influence by the CSDP. Eva Gross’ contribution is extremely valuable because she pertinently pointed to the methodological problems inherent to the Europeanization concept, reflected in the broad and fuzzy use of the term, as a “historical phenomenon, as transnational cultural diffusion, as institutional adaptation, or as the adaptation of policies and policy processes” (Radaelli & Featherstone 2002). As far as the application of the concept to the field of security and defence policy is concerned, Gross recognized that the works of Major and Pomorska as regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have pushed the research agenda further, by problematizing the dialectical relation between nation state actors and the EU in areas of high politics. All in all, the afore-mentioned researchers could be counted as several of the most relevant voices in the Europeanization literature that focuses specifically on the CSDP.

The existing academic literature on the topic, however, also highlights diverging opinions on the matter, from Wong’s estimation that even the security realm “is not a special case immune to Europeanization” (Wong 2005: 137) processes, to Major, who rightfully demonstrates that the scarcity of studies on the topic “may be due to the unique nature of (...) security policy” (Major 2005: 182) in itself.

As a result, incurring problems in the application of Europeanization to security still exist. As far as other authors are concerned, they acknowledge possibilities to cross the theoretical paths of Europeanization and the study of the CSDP. For instance, Wagner argues in the research on the Europeanization of Germany’s security and
defence policy that the CSDP demonstrates “a dynamic of its own” (Wagner 2005: 456) and assumes a certain incremental progression of development. Nevertheless, Gross’ take on the CSDP’s incrementalism seems to suggest a different representation, since, according to author, the CSDP framework has been “used selectively” (Gross 2007: 502) and on an *ad-hoc* basis by member states, thus not being able to develop a path-dependency of its own.

From this point of view, Wong’s conclusion that “convergence processes are not irreversible or pre-determined” (Wong 2005: 148) offers a good explanation in the cases of security transformation and Europeanization. Therefore, one should be aware of a discrepancy (Wagner 2005) between the discursive commitments of member state to the CSDP incentives and the policy-translated practical steps made by these states, due to the fact that the CSDP framework does not have what has been pre-Lisbon Treaty considered as the first pillar’s binding legislative and juridical toolkit, and lacks strong procedural influence (Major 2005) on member states in the security and defence field.

Moreover, any explanations regarding the particular policy field of the CSDP may run the risk of considering the “vague idea of Europeanization” (Major 2005: 177) as a singular and encompassing explanatory factor for the transformation in member states’ institutional and discursive dimensions, while other exogenous or endogenous factors may be neglected.

Therefore, one should be careful not to relegate Europeanization as the sole explanatory factor for the processes of adaptation and change in member states’
security and defence policies, and take into consideration the strenuous relationship between the security and defence policy field and the impact of the Europeanization processes. The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the transformation of new EU member states percolates any attempt to analyse the security and defence sector transformations after the Cold War and the impact of the EU integration on the reform of such sectors.

1.4 The Position of the Research in the IR Practice “Turn”

There are several contributors drawing on a Bourdieusian approach in the realm of Security Studies, counting as scholarly path-breakers and demonstrating the viability of following a sociological lead in studying security practices. The sociological turn in International Relations and European Studies literatures brings to the fore conceptualisations that attend more fruitfully to the structure versus agency dilemma and allow for an in-depth analysis of both material and ideational dimensions of institutional structures and the role actors play within them (Lawson & Shilliam 2010: 69-86).

Vis-à-vis the practice turn in IR and security studies, Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991) opens up the space for positional analysis of the constellations of actors and their power structures. It studies affinities between domination, inequality, and the institutions of the modern state, such as the military or the police. Several already-mentioned path-breakers in the literature have successfully applied a Bourdieusian-inspired approach in the realm of security studies. In particular, the thesis positions itself along the inspiring theoretical work done by authors such as Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot.
Taking into account the *sui generis* nature of the EU and its particular ways of its integration project, Frédéric Mérand addressed and discussed the EU’s supranational military transformation through the creation of the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (also known post-Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) (Mérand, 2008). Taking lead from the conceptual framework put forward by Bourdieu, Mérand advanced a political sociology agenda in international relations and developed important conceptual bridges between constructivism and institutionalism in international relations theory.

Following also in the spirit of the “practice” turn in IR, Vincent Pouliot’s latest contributions to the literature are in the direction of expanding the constructivist research agenda on security communities, by exploring the “theoretical implications of the logic of practicality in world politics” (Pouliot 2008: 257-288; Pouliot 2010). Contrasted to the already existing three logics of consequences, appropriateness, and that of discourse, which suffer for a so-called “representational bias” in that they lay emphasis on what actors think and not on what determines their thinking, Pouliot argues that the logic of practicality is ontologically prior, due to its middle positioning between structure and agency. Drawing on the conceptual insight provided by Bourdieu, Pouliot attempts to construct a “theory of practice of security communities” by studying the diplomatic practical sense of security actors, *i.e.* the formation of transnational diplomatic security communities with an empirical interest in NATO-Russia relations.
The Paris School of security studies⁴ and the academic journal *Cultures & Conflicts* have been as well the locus of original thinking and theoretical development inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. The community declared their commitment to detailed, empirical analysis of real practices, the object of analysis being various agencies that compete for “de-territorialised tasks of traditional police, military and customs ... by constantly connecting immigration, organised crime and terror” (Waever 2004: 11). The organizing concepts of this framework are surveillance, exceptionalism and security (Lyon 2006) and they are applied to theories about the activities of surveillance and policing of minorities by relevant agencies, such as the police or international intelligence services. Surveillance in particular brings to sharp relief the technologies of monitoring and on how such practices become routines embedded within everyday social practices.

The establishment of trans-territorial networks of policing with ever increasing militaristic attributes and an overwhelming surveillance role is attributed to transnational in-security professionals, who create in turn “the field of unease management” (Walker 2006; Fierke 2007; Singer 2007; Bigo in Williams 2007; West 2012) and the “governamentality of unease beyond the State” (Bigo 2005: 1-4). According to Bigo, managing unease is fraught with practices of exceptionalism, controlling immigration, and derogatory measure, special laws, profiling foreigners, and imposing normative imperatives of mobility (Bigo & Guild 2005). The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as “all forms of discourse” (Bigo 2000: 194).

Michael Williams, for instance, resorts to Bourdieu to re-conceptualise the praxis of security in the language of cultural strategies in the international field (Williams 2007). With the empirical focus on the role of NATO and the EU’s enlargement, he is concerned in particular with the facile reductionism of culture in IR which sees the latter as either merely an ideological instrument in the hands of rational actors or a fuzzy concept covering everything and anything ideational or normative (Williams 2007: 2).

He argues that to understand the post-Cold War era one must shift the focus of analysis from hard power categorisations to a reconfiguration of the “field” of security where “military and material power, while remaining significant, were repositioned within what might be called the ‘cultural field of security’ that privileged cultural and symbolic forms of power” (Williams 2007: 2). The author accordingly calls for new conceptual categories to understand the “construction” of security practices without over-emphasizing either the materialist or cultural dimensions of the power dynamics.

In a form of response to such calls, this thesis also forwards a thicker understanding of national strategic culture and the changes engendering its construction, permanence or transformation, especially in transitional contexts.

1.5 Conclusion

As argued in the previous sections, most models of security socialization found in the strategic culture literature typically assumed the existence of relatively homogenous and stable cultural systems in which new security actors become acculturated. Processes of socialization are portrayed as dependent on the socialization tactics
employed by different security environments and the learning and adaptation on the part of new security actors, but few models take into account the hands-on role played by such actors in the socialization process.

Equally, the problem of most of the post positivist-inspired strategic culture literature is that it does not offer a fully-fledged theoretical alternative to positivist frameworks of security policy behaviour analysis. They are considered more or less as complementary approaches that introduce non-material variables as intervening/explanatory indicators without a constitutive or foundational potential. In this case, the role of the social, cultural, ideational variables is rendered secondary through the conceptualization of ideas/norms as objects in causality chains and not intersubjectively constituted by discourse and social practice.

By emphasising the analytical separateness of ideas and interests or by over-emphasising and over-determining ideas over interests or by proposing post-positivist intellectualization, such approaches circumvent the practical dimension and the mutual constitutive character of interests, ideas, norms, and practices. The logics of consequences, appropriateness, and discourse tend to emphasize certain theoretical preferences such as instrumental rationalization, norm-based understandings, or communicational tactics, while at the same time relegating the role of practices to a secondary or even inexistent status.
CHAPTER 2 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECONSTRUCTING THE PRACTICAL LOGIC OF THE TRANSITIONAL SECURITY FIELD

2.1 Introduction

The chapter lays out the theoretical framework for an in-depth study of the Romanian security field’s transition and transformation post-Cold War, under the double-folded influence of NATO and the EU. The thesis follows the evolution of the Romanian security field by looking at security dispositions, practices, and non-representational variables guiding Romanian security practitioners during transitional stages and security reforms. By looking at what De Certeau terms as the common-sense of everyday practice (De Certeau 2002) of security production and reproduction, the research attention falls on security practices. Yet, as knowledge that does not know itself or as what Bourdieu understood by tacit knowledge, “which exists in a practical state in an agent’s practice and not in their consciousness or rather in their discourse” (Bourdieu 1977: 27), practical knowledge is not effortlessly perceptible in scientific analysis.

In following the lead of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this thesis advocates for a practice-oriented analysis of human activity in the field of security production and the “common sense” of security practitioners in the case of the emerging Romanian security field. The thesis proposes security practices as social strategies following a logic of practicality that is ontologically prior (Pouliot 2010: 13) to human action in the field of security production. As shown in the previous chapter, traditional concepts of strategic culture failed to account for variations in culture and practices within and between sub-security fields, treated security actors as passive recipients of cultural
inputs, divorced cultural practices from their structural underpinnings, and fell short of providing a theory of cultural change.

The Bourdieusean theoretical triad of the capital, the habitus, and the field lend a helpful hand in empirically operationalizing the logic of practice in the Romanian security field with a view to unravel the commonsensical and sometimes hidden side of security practices. Several elements take centre stage in this research and in a sociologically inspired formula of security practices: *i.e.* the security agents’ practical feel of the game (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 120-21) or their *agency*, as it is determined by their respective *capital* (material or non-material power resources (Bourdieu 1984: 14); the *habitus* or the agents set of ingrained dispositions that generate practices and perceptions; and the security *field* (Bourdieu 1985: 723-44) or the hierarchical and competitive social/professional space where actors compete over positions and power.

To be more precise, *the afore-mentioned theoretical formula was best synthesised by Bourdieu himself: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice* (Bourdieu 1984: 101).

The intentionality of security professionals and their actions and what Frédéric Mérand calls the “carriers of state sovereignty: statesmen, diplomats and military officers” (Mérand 2008: 5) become important in the research, as the key institutional and political actors that compete over the symbolic monopoly of national strategic cultures. In place of focusing on governmental preferences, state interests, or cultural macro-transformations as the building blocks of changes in national strategic culture, the *thesis proposes to explore the ways in which Romanian security actors mitigated*
in practice their communist legacy and traditional defence-based habituses with the new changes in security making as introduced by NATO and the EU influences.

More precisely, the thesis looks at the dispositions and practices of Romanian security professionals embedded in the transitional security field and the ways in which such actors used their symbolic power to restructure it. The conventional constructivist understanding of the afore-mentioned issue would concentrate on the ways in which certain norms become internalized by security professionals that behave and comply with the fundamental principles in their field by either obeying them out of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness.

However, this chapter goes beyond such an understanding by proposing an additional layer to socialization and norm following processes, namely tacit knowledge or learning in and through practices. Actors acquire ways of doings things and follow certain norms by not necessarily deciding upon ways of action in a rational, intentional manner or due to a sense of normative suitability.

This chapter is guided by the underlying assumption that everything that people do, in national security politics, as in any other social field, there are always practical underpinnings that do not stem from deliberate and cognizant decisions, but come from practical, inarticulate, and commonsensical knowledge. Such a type of self-evident behaviour permits actors to perform social activities unencumbered by cost-benefit deliberations, by making use of their practical sense and a type of background knowledge that does not know itself, namely habits, dispositions, and time-ingrained skills.
In contrast to constructivist accounts that lay emphasis on identity and ideational markers in the construction of a feeling of we-ness and a shared-belief system in a given policy field, the “practice turn” that a Bourdieusean theoretical analysis proposes could prove to be more beneficial (Pouliot 2010). The value-added of such an approach compared to constructivist interpretations is double-folded. On the one hand, while identity markers, mutual identifications, or Self-Other divisions are beneficial in understanding how security practitioners define their group identity, that is their identity determining their actions, it is also the case that their practices and what they do on a daily-basis in terms of security have a great impact upon their identity.

Consequently, the empirical gain of a Bourdieusean inspired theoretical analysis resides in reversing the ideas and practice causality, so as to focus on how daily interactions and practices contour meanings and doctrines, i.e. the focus is on the modus operandi and not on the opus operatum (Pouliot 2010: 16). Security practice informs a priori the security professionals’ instrumentality or normativity in a given social field. The security professionals’ rational instrumentality and norm-following is thus determined by non-rational and non-normative elements, namely the socially-determined practices in a given field or they are merely a result of historically ingrained habitual behaviours and dispositions.

Thus, building on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology, the thesis shows that there is an ingrained discrepancy between the Romanian security practitioners’ dispositions, namely the background knowledge derived and accrued from experience, and their
positions within the Romanian security field, demarcated by transitional rules of the game and a continually contested _status quo_. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of _hysteresis_ and _doxa_, the thesis proposes a theoretical apparatus that highlights the power dynamics in the Romanian transitional security field, which render the sources of symbolic upheaval and hysteresis in the Romanian strategic culture post-Cold-War more apparent.

The chapter expounds on how a Bourdieusean-inspired theory of praxis can be applied to the understanding of national strategic culture and how _Bourdieu’s conceptual grid_, _i.e._ habitus, field, hysteresis, doxa, homology, symbolic capital, and _symbolic power_ can provide new ways of interpreting strategic culture and the security actors’ socialization processes.

In the process of security production, the notion of strategic culture was traditionally defined as a system of shared values and understandings, which are reinforced through practices, skills and attitudes and passed on from one generation of security actors to the next, by becoming integrated into the operational culture of the military core. While the strategic culture literature views culture as a unitary and semi-permanent body of values, interests, and beliefs, the chapter proposes a theoretical conception of strategic culture that is more open-ended and diffused, as a result of its continually negotiated character that allows for flexibility and social change.

### 2.2 Transitional Security Habitus – Going Beyond the Rigidity of the Concept

The value added of the theoretical framework along the Bourdieusean conceptual lines of habitus, field, hysteresis, capital, and power is that they can encompass
elements of variability and contingency, salient in transitional political contexts, and can account for deviations from the usual socialization paths. The habitus is especially amenable for describing the system of dispositions that individuals acquire, first through personal history and experience, and later by entering the ranks of a professional field.

The *habitus* is a

“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in anyway being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends, or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them, and being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” (Bourdieu 1977: 72) or as “a principle of invention which, generated by history, is somewhat dragged away from history: since dispositions are durable, they spark all sorts of hysteresis effects (of lag, gap, discrepancy” (Bourdieu 1990: 135).

For a clearer understanding of the habitus, several elements need to be taken into consideration: it integrates several elements of cultural knowledge, uncritical assumptions, unquestioned definitions, shared values, as well as physical bearing. Under normal conditions, the new security actors that enter the security field adjust their habitus to fit with the existing cultural patterns, so as to develop a stable set of dispositions that engender consistent ways of acting.

A new understanding of the Romanian security habitus is proposed in the theoretical framework, namely that of a *transitional security habitus*, which, in more explicit terms, is an oxymoronic concept that attempts to capture the constantly changing and negotiated character of Romanian security actors’ habituses during transitional periods and security reforms. The concept of *transitional security habitus* best
expresses the clashing reality in Romania’s transitional security field: adaptation to change in itself and for itself becomes an ingrained habitual disposition, embodied by security actors as a social “survival” tool and reflecting the shared security context of post-communist Romania.

This theoretical chapter starts from the premise that in a transitional security context, when formal schemes and rationalizations of strategic action are under debate, security actors rely on a practical substrate, which does not stem from the logics of consequences or appropriateness. That is not to say that there is no value added in various studies about socialization processes, focusing on different types of logics (March & Olsen 1998; Risse 2000, Checkle 2005).

The gap identified here rests with the many practices and skills of the security production craft, which are not particularly covered by rational choice or rule-based actions (Pouliot 2010).

Also, the concept of transitional habitus proposed here expands on the original Bourdieu-sean understanding of the habitus in three specific ways: one by connecting it to the concept of the field (King 2000: 425), understood in the Romanian security context as transitional; second, by relating it to the concept of hysteresis and its lag effect between security habituses and the changing objective conditions in the transitional security field; and third, by using the concepts of symbolic power and symbolic capital to bolster the agency of actors and to propose a performative interpretation of symbolic power, as an effective use of domination over a particular policy field through charisma and discourse.
2.2.1 Habitus and field

While there is indeed a tendency to suppose that Bourdieu seems to favour structures in the structure versus agency debate (with his understanding of internalized structural conditionings in the form of the habitus, namely the internalized cultural schemata or external social structures to which actors seem to adapt to and to develop a so-called “feel for the game”), the concept of the field becomes crucial in tilting the analytical balance towards the agency of actors. Beyond the feel for the game developed as a consequence of the habitus, the field delineates the subject positions of actors (Bourdieu 1977). From newcomers with very low capital to hierarchically superior actors with high degrees of capital in terms of knowledge and experience (cultural capital), loyalty and popularity (social capital), reputation and respect (symbolic capital), the field is populated by heterogeneous power positions.

The field is in turn is structured by certain values and rules, though such values and rules have an undoubtedly arbitrary and contingent nature, according to changes in the professional and social environment. Thus, even though the habitus tends to become entrenched and relatively stable, the field undergoes shifts in power positions due to external and internal changes, such as transitional periods and reforms and the ways in which different capitals vary in their value and practical utility.

In contrast to authors who rely unilaterally in their analysis on one of the above Bourdieusean concepts of the capital, the field, or the habitus, such as Frédéric Mérand’s use of the field so as to explain the transnationalization of the European
defence field, the present chapter argues for maintaining the logical dialectic between the habitus and the field. Frédéric Mérand counts himself among several theoretical path-breakers in the IR literature who have attempted to apply a Bourdieusian approach and specifically the concept of the field in the realm of Security Studies. Nevertheless, the Bourdieusean theoretical triad of the capital, the habitus, and the field are together instrumental for the analytical operationalization of the logic of practice in a given professional field.

Notwithstanding the fact that the afore-mentioned Bourdieusian concepts cannot be easily divorced from their triadic theoretical coherence, Mérand preferred to unilaterally focus on one specific concept. The concept of the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 16-18) is understood as a “battlefield” with unequal positions, where some actors are dominant while others are dominated, the field becoming the structure of power relations where actors compete over legitimacy and monopoly. The focus on the CSDP and the security and defence field it creates take centre stage in Mérand’s research: by identifying the “carriers of culture” and the actors with the symbolic power in their respective power/security fields and by pinpointing the interplay between these competing actors and groups over the monopoly of security articulations in the EU defence integration.

Frédéric Mérand body of work has explained the emergence of a transnational security field in the CSDP and noted that “a theory of preference formation must begin with this multiplicity of purposive and non-purposive forms of behaviour” (Mérand 2006: 147). These forms of behaviour make sense only if the social and cognitive world inhabited by the individual is taken into account. Social action is not
mere strategic action (Mérand 2006: 147) and it may as well be driven by material interest. But it may as well also be driven by idealist interests, constraints, interpretations of a situation, beliefs in a legitimate order and, quite simply habits.

Hence, to understand preference formation the inquiry starts where the action takes place, to grasp the “nature of the game” and the position of actors within it, i.e. the nature of the security field itself. Nevertheless, while the present research delineates the Romanian security field, it also moves beyond conceptually from a predominant application of the concept in the context of Romania’s security reform process. In doing so, it also takes into account the complex interconnectedness of the security field with the security practitioners’ capitals and habituses. Such an analysis promises a more in-depth understanding of the nature of the security field and brings about a conceptual apparatus that puts forward a more substantive application of Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of the field, the capital, and the habitus.

From this point of view, the conceptual dynamic between the habitus and the field best captures, for heuristic purposes, the practical sense of Romanian security professionals or their “sense of the game” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 120-121) in the context of transitions and reforms. Thus, the actors’ practical sense has the value-added advantage to tease out mutually constitutive relations between agency and structure, due to the fact that the logic of action is not merely structurally determined or individualistic, but mostly dialectical, i.e. between “the internalization of exteriority and the externalization of interiority” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 120-121).
Consequently, the theoretical framework presented here highlights the fundamental characteristic of the habitus, the fact that it is deeply relational, and due to this fact, never entirely static. The research proposes that the stakes are not merely to identify security actors’ material interests or beliefs, but to know how they are framed by actors, through social representations, norms, discourse, and cultural repertoires, and why actors choose to take specific social actions. Indeed, diplomats and security professionals may shifts their allegiance from the nation state towards possibly ephemeral “transnational governance”, yet it is not very clear why they choose to do so in the first place. Hence, as already mentioned, the three Bourdieusian concepts, i.e. capital, habitus and field, cannot be easily divorced from their triadic coherence.

Consequently, Mérand’s study uses primarily the concept of field and adds two further variables: social skills and exogenous crises (Mérand 2008). Are social skills another reading of social capital? The reference to habits in connection with the assumption that military professionals have either traditional or more modern habitus (Mérand 2010: 348, 359; Mérand 2008: 9) may misread the original concept of the habitus. The latter, as defined by Bourdieu, denotes a historically structured and structuring social system of durable and transportable dispositions that may even go as far back to childhood experiences and impregnate one’s worldview and actions (Bourdieu 1990: 52-53).

Mérand further sees crises as exogenous shocks that trigger changes within the balance of a given social field. This externalises the notion of change, “Things become more fluid when, for whatever reason, relations of domination and symbolic representations are undermined by an external shock” (Mérand 2010: 352). In
contrast, Bourdieu does not exogenize change, which he conceives of in terms of conversion and mobility in the structure of the field itself (Weininger 2005: 89), through the renegotiation of positions and dynamism within the existing fields and expounding on complex and intertwined networks between and within the fields (Bourdieu 1984: 131-132).

The relation between the field and habitus operates at two levels: the field *conditions* the habitus that is the “product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 127) and the habitus *constitutes* the field as it provides the cultural frames for making sense of the field. As Bourdieu mentions, “agent *do* do, much more often than if they were behaving randomly” (Bourdieu, 1990, 11), being guided by their practical sense. But when new actors enter the field, they carry with them the habitus which is the result of the field they formerly populated.

Such actors have thus the potential to become extremely reflective and aware of the power dynamics in the field and the socialization processes within it. They resort to strategic calculations to shift their position in the field, as they do not merely rely like automatons on their established habitus. New international or transitional security contexts spell out new marketable skills sets that define the current “good practice”. Hence, if the habitus is undergoing constant changes and is fragmented, then actors will constantly and cautiously cast an eye on how the rules of the “game” or the “battlefield” may be shifting as well.
Figure 2.2.1 clearly illustrates the intersubjective contexts in which actors exert their agency, such constituted structures constraining their practices and ensuring that practices are derived from shared understandings (King 2000: 431). But what is also clear is that the context does not determine precisely and unilaterally what the behaviour of agents will be – the agents themselves cannot perform an immaculate, individual act (as posited by Sartre’s existentialism). There is always a level of indeterminacy between the agents’ relations, which gives way to creative improvisations in the context of intersubjective social actions within a respective professional field. It is at the very core of actors’ performativity and practical interaction that lays the answer to the agency/structure divide and the refutation of Bourdieu’s preference for structuralism.

Figure 2.2.1 Bourdieu’s agency and structure interaction

Consequently, the concept of the field is defined as a “battlefield” where relations of domination take place – in other words, the field defines the structure of power relations (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16-18). Concerning the relation of the habitus to the field, by introducing the material realities of a transitional security field

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such as the Romanian one post-Cold War, the notion of habitus begins to lose its initial rigidity and durability. In a security field in transition and dominated by constant legislative changes and more haphazard reform processes, security actors are forced to transform their habitus strategically so that adaptation to transitional stages and social change become almost second nature.

By connecting the habitus to the field and by allowing for a level of intersubjective struggle, power competition and change, the concept of transitional security habitus provides a richer and more convincing account of social life. As already mentioned, the habitus is contingent and highly dependent on shifting realities during transitional stages. This is what Bourdieu means by “regulated improvisation” (Bourdieu 1977: 78), i.e. the habitus is made up as actors act and it is informed but not completely controlled by past understandings of the field. While long-term members tend to take their habitus for granted, “when habitus encounters a social work of which it is the product of, it is like a ‘fish in water’” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 127), new actors, when entering the field, carry with them a disruptive habitus.

2.2.2 Habitus and hysteresis

Another layer of theoretical flexibility concerning the concept of habitus is introduced by the concept of the hysteresis effect. In the case of a transitional security field, the hysteresis effect would consist of a lag time in security professionals’ habituses, still operating with anachronistic values and rules (in the Romanian security field this is translated in a Realpolitik, communist-dominated traditional habitus) in a context of changing realities and constant reforms. In order to clarify the above-mentioned theoretical position, the chapter proposes a theoretical framework that sheds light on
the conditions and relations through which the Romanian transitional security field is being reinforced in its traditional ways by some actors, while at the same time being challenged by others.

New ways of doing security are being introduced as the Romanian transitional security field becomes more open to internal reforms and the disruptive influences of larger international structures, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union with the Common Security and Defence Policy. In a Bourdieusean understanding, the success and domination of certain security agents is determined by the level of symbolic capital they possess so as to legitimize the rules of the game, the patterns of order or the so-called *doxa* – “the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense” (Bourdieu 1990: 68).

Thus, new security actors develop a form of doxic experience (Bourdieu 1977: 159-170) that is manifested as an almost unconscious submission to a supposedly unchangeable set of values and rules within a professional field. On the other hand, the doxic experience can also be contested by such new security actors in a bid for power over the national security agenda and strategy.

*Doxa*, namely what is taken for granted, is understood as the experience by which “the natural and social world appears as self-evident”, “the universe of possible discourse”, “that which goes without saying because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu 1977: 164-167). Nevertheless, in transitional security contexts that lack a
strong strategic culture, particularly in the case of the post-communist, almost *tabula rasa* political settings, the creation of a strong professional doxa in the field of security production is questionable. In such situations, nothing is taken for granted or self-evident, everything remaining to be negotiated or fought upon. As objective structures transform, new types of habituses enter the stage, in a bid to adapt to the nascent social reality. This situation is predominant in a generalized state of hysteresis.

_Hysteresis_ is defined by Bourdieu as “cases in which dispositions function out of phase and practices are objectively ill-adapted to the present conditions because they are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain” (Bourdieu 1990: 62). Hence, when the practical sense of actors (the interchange between habitus and field) is socially ill-adapted to a specific *doxa*, “quixotic agents” (Pouliot 2010: 48) behave in Don Quixote manner or out of tune with the doxa or the common-sense.

Moreover, a given practice becomes doxic or a standard of social order becomes settled when a level of what Bourdieu terms as “homology” (Bourdieu 2003: 332-333) between the actors’ positions in the field (objective structures) and their dispositions in the habitus (subjective structures) takes place. On the other hand, when the aforementioned aligning is out of tune, the agency of actors is manifested and the power struggle for domination in a specific field occurs. Consequently, contrary to a state of alignment and homology, this state of disconnection is termed by Bourdieu as _hysteresis_.

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The Romanian case study also points towards the fact that successful adaptations in the field do not entail blind following of deeply engrained cultural markers or rules. On the contrary, a transitional context with shifting realities, constant reforms, and new challenges would imply that Romanian security actors would have to become creative problem-solvers with an independent agency, they will have to deliberately question and battle against their own habitus in order to adapt to a new context. A reflective practitioner of security would have to uplift practice from the thoughtless automatism of his or hers communist-inherited habitus.

The goal is not only about blindly adapting to a homogenous body of rules or values such as an overarching strategic culture, nor solely utilizing such rules and values as strategic tools. It is also about learning the art of doing security, i.e. security practice, by taking into account both sides of the coin. Especially in a context where no such homogenous body of rules and values exists and still waits to be created, security actors are given much more leeway for innovation and change.

All in all, actors do not merely adapt to transitional changes but become proactively involved in either defending the old habitus or changing it. In transitional societies the chances for a certain professional habitus in the security field to reproduce itself into a status-quo arrangement, without being challenged, are very small. Here, the capacity of actors to aggregate their resources into action is paramount to successfully establish the strategic agenda. Consequently, the root in understanding Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of agency resides in the difference between identity and action, it is not a question of who actors are together in a security field, but what they do together (Kitchen 2009: 100) or their performativity.
2.2.3 Habitus and capital

In the specific field of security production, according to a Bourdieusean perspective, there cannot be a process of securitisation devoid of a security field constructed by actors, groups or institutions that are authorised to formulate the definition of security. The concept of the field (Bourdieu 1993) presented in the previous section can clarify the power dynamics mentioned above: it was coined for the purpose of identifying the differentiated social milieus and micro-structures in society, each and every one functioning under the remit of particular rules, patterns, and forms of authority (Wacquant 2006: 7).

As already mentioned, the concept of field can also be defined as “a network or a configuration of objective relations between positions” (Jackson 2008: 166) that actors occupy in the wider distribution of power relations. The term signifies a “playing field” that is a competitive context in which actors confront each other for more advantageous positions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 16-18). In this competitive struggle, actors make use of what Bourdieu terms capital, “the set of actually usable resources and powers” (Bourdieu 1984 14), be them economic, cultural, social, or symbolic.

From this point of view, positions of privilege in the security field are held by dominant actors that possess certain valuable resources or capitals that can be converted into the capacity to perform and impact the strategic agenda. In a transitional context, security agents struggle over the value and form of capital best suited to further a certain agenda, these competitive stances “offering at every moment the possibility of
a miracle" (Bourdieu 1986: 241). With the concept of the capital, another breach in the rigidity of the habitus is engendered: it allows for the unequal distribution of capitals and it opens the discussion for position-taking and power competition. Capital or in a Bourdieusean understanding “accumulated labour” (Bourdieu 1986: 241) is symbolic when the rules of the game in a given field are maintained or changed due to arguments of legitimacy, expertise and authority, and when the symbolic power of certain actors becomes a form of universal currency presiding over other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 114).

This combination of both material and symbolic resources helps to comprehensively understand the role of security professionals and it is significant in order to understand the broader processes and power relations within the field of security (re)production. The security field becomes a space of power conflict and hence of possibilities and contingency, because the underlying principle is that of struggle (Bourdieu 1991) – this clearly denies the unified visions of strategic culture as an agreed upon, coherent output. Moreover, the field becomes a space of positions but also a space of position-takings (speech acts, discourses, policies...) (Bourdieu 1991).

The afore-mentioned arguments help also refute the claims that a more constructivist IR understanding lacks the potential for a theory of power. The security space becomes the legroom for power competition between security professionals, the power dynamics itself constituting and being constituted by the security space in which security professional perform within different hierarchies and with different material/non-material resources.
By proposing a conceptual connexion between the notion of *symbolic power* and *symbolic capital* the thesis makes use of a performative understanding of symbolic power, as an efficient hegemonic practice of influence over a particular policy field through language and the politicization of the state bureaucracy. A structural and agential performative-based analysis of the differential symbolic power and power strategies of Romanian political and security actors is used in the thesis, where, following Bourdieu, symbolic power is *the performative power* (Adler & Pouliot 2011) to shape the various collective representations, which struggle for hegemony in Romania’s transitional security field.

The level of analysis is being shifted from actors within the Romanian security field to certain high-ranking political actors that operate above it and who seek to impose their dominance and capital to restructure the field through the use of their symbolic power in the public sphere.

In the analysis of symbolic capital outputs in the Romanian security field, the thesis puts forward a conceptual discussion of symbolic power, symbolic capital and the typology of charismatic leadership to illustrate the above struggle over the agenda-setting power as regards national security and defence decisions. Symbolic power together with the Weberian notion of charismatic leadership are used as heuristic devices for the purpose of teasing out the particularities of what the symbolic power of the Romanian Presidency does in the field of security policy in terms of performative symbolic practices.
2.2.4 Habitus and symbolic power

Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1999) is particularly linked to his understanding of the above-mentioned view on symbolic capital, contributing within the IR theoretical imaginary with the possibility for unequal positional analysis through the relations between actors with different capitals. Bourdieu’s theory of praxis in terms of a symbolically mediated interface between the social structures of the field and the agents’ habitus brings to the fore possible affinities between domination, inequality, and the institutions of the modern state, such as the military. Such an analysis has the potential to establish a hierarchy between relevant security capitals in transitional contexts that give security professionals further symbolic power.

The concept of power becomes a central element for analysing security practices and the capacity of such practices to reproduce intersubjective/relational meanings constituting structures and actors alike. The power to reproduce, dominate, censor the intersubjective reality of a security field means that an actor has access to material/non-material resources that allows him or her to employ either discursive power, cultural capital, expertise, training or make strategic use of material resources.

According to Bourdieu, the use of symbolic capital, i.e. honour, status, expertise, culture, prestige, can account for one of the most crucial sources of power in social hierarchies, placing privileged actors in a position of authority and legitimacy to speak for/against members of a field. The holders of the symbolic power can make people
see and believe certain visions of the world rather than others (Bourdieu 1991) in a given regime of representations.

Max Weber had an undeniable theoretical effect on Bourdieu’s thinking as regards symbolic power. Concerning the notion of the state as the ultimate repository of the monopoly over physical violence, Weber has had a clear influence on how Bourdieu understands the state. Bourdieu’s definition of the state is an offshoot of his extensive conceptualization of symbolic power, but Bourdieu had a different understanding of power than the Weberian one.

As compared to Weber, Bourdieu theorizes the state (Bourdieu 1994: 3) as the institutional body that indeed holds legitimate monopoly over violence but it is also the instrument of *symbolic* violence over a given territory and population (Bourdieu 1989: 22). From this point of view, the symbolic element is an added element, introduced as an important dimension of power, the monopolization of symbolic violence coming on top of that of physical violence *per se*.

What is particularly lacking is the theorization of power relations that create manifest practices. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of power, with the focus on habitus and practices, sheds further light on the non-intentional, impersonal empowering characteristics of power (Guzzini 2006). Moreover, as it is clearly evident in Bourdieu’s definition of symbolic power, the author does not reduce power to merely a possession of material or non-material resources, such capitals becoming power only with the explicit acceptance of other actors’ engagement in the power relations.
Also, in a case of a specific professional field such as the security one, one capital may have precedence over others; it is particularly privileged as a means to advance in hierarchy and thus it is field-dependent. Specifically, when power is formulated in the above-mentioned terms, it truly becomes a form of domination when it is internalized as part of the habitus, namely it acquires a naturalized, non-intentional characteristic and its origins and modes of manifestation are “misrecognized” (Guzzini 2006). From this point of view, Bourdieu’s specificity in the analysis of symbolic power reveals three overlapping and analytically intertwined aspects. Power is a form of legitimation, secondly it embodies symbolic violence, and thirdly power can take the form of different types of capitals that are valued according to social conditionings typical to specific professional fields and their competitive struggles.

2.2.5 Habitus and the logic of practice

In the same spirit of the “practice” turn in IR followed by Mérand, Vincent Pouliot expands the constructivist research agenda on security communities by studying the diplomatic practical sense of security actors, i.e. the formation of transnational diplomatic security communities with an empirical interest in NATO-Russia relations (Pouliot 2008b). Especially, in the book project International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Pouliot 2010), the author proposes a fascinating practice-based analysis of post-Cold War security and diplomatic relations between two former bitter rivals, the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In contrast to the logics of consequences, appropriateness, and that of arguing, which suffer from the “representational bias” in emphasising what actors think and
not on what determines their thinking, Pouliot sees the *logic of practicality* as coming first ontologically speaking. However, social action may not be as straightforward as Pouliot describes it. The point is not which of the logics takes precedence, but how the logic of practice, “which defies logical logic” (Bourdieu 1990: 92), interacts with the other logics so as to produce social action.

Conversely, the work of Pouliot is particularly valuable for the present research, due to the extremely engaging micro-analysis of security actors’ practices and habituses and especially as regards the importance of practice in understanding the characteristics of a specific security field. This thesis follows in the line of Pouliot’s research and proposes a Bourdieusean-inspired framework that takes into account the structural conditionings and cultural knowledge of security making and emphasizes at the same time the centrality of agency in linking the security field and habitus within everyday security practice.

Instead of utilizing monolithic concepts of unified and coherent national strategic cultures that determine policy-making and action, or had-core realist approaches that cast strategic culture as merely a strategizing tool in the hands of “superhuman” security agents, Bourdieu’s theory of practice provides a particularly useful alternative approach to understanding how security is produced in practice. To this end, the thesis resorts to the above-described concepts of the habitus, the field, and the capital as the core elements of a praxis-inspired strategic culture.

According to Pouliot, a Bourdieusean-inspired analytical framework is capable of identifying the relevant security and diplomacy practitioners with the symbolic power
to influence the international security agenda and control the advent of violent conflicts. The interplay between such competing actors and groups in the case of NATO-Russia relations, as described in his book, is manifested in the competition over the monopoly of security articulations. Practitioners struggle over their symbolic positions within the international security field, with a view to influence the existing power hierarchy and the conditions that lead to shifts in the geopolitical *status-quo*. Thus, the Bourdieusean-inspired framework is able to encompass the dynamic mobility of such practitioners across diplomatic and security fields and their struggle over the top positions on the hierarchy ladder of power politics.

From this point of view, the present research follows in the steps of Pouliot’s academic work by looking at how security actors interact in a national security context and how they handle disagreements, past influences, new transformative moments so as to negotiate a new national strategic culture. According to the author, it “is practice enacted in and on the world, in real time and with actual consequences for the practitioner” (Pouliot 2010:16) that is of particular interest. Preferences and strategies, representations and beliefs, all have social origins and can be identified in the habitual dispositions of security practitioners.

In the Romanian case, the security actors in the post-Cold War context had to change their habits of security making from the traditional conscription and defence-based templates to NATO standards of flexibility, professionalization and international projection. In transitional post-Cold-War societies, the security field is as well in a constant state of transformation and reform, and the ideational parameters of strategic culture are undoubtedly under debate. Strategic culture thus can also be
understood in the everyday security practices of security practitioners and amounts to revealed patterns of discourse and action within practices.

As Bourdieu notes, culture (and for that matter strategic culture is no different) may provide the arena for symbolic communication, but it is a source of domination, symbolic violence and power relations institutionalized in specific hierarchies. Symbolic violence is “the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator...” (Bourdieu 2000: 160).

The value-added of such an approach is that it stresses the idea of strategic culture as a continuous process of transformation, the best way to exemplify this idea is by referring to the habitus as a cultural situation that is constantly subverted by innovatively strategic agents. Interests, ideas, norms, and identities are produced through social practices. For this end, the concept of habitus offers an interesting analytical potential in the examination of actors’ behaviour (neither being substantiated solely on instrumental rationality nor on ideational, normative-driven reflexivity). The habitus serves as an instrument of human dispositions, constituting (not determining) actors behaviour as it is manifested in practices.

2.3 Conclusion

The main strengths of a Bourdieusian theoretical approach are that it provides an analytical grid encompassing both structural and agentic variables, both cultural and rationalist explanations, and last but not the least, it focuses on the behavioural elements as revealed in practice that guide the actions of relevant security professionals in the security field. The concept of transitional security habitus was
proposed as a step forward in circumventing the Bourdieusean recognized immutability of the habitus, through making use of the interactive dimension of the habitus and thus by making possible social transformation.

To that end, the chapter emphasized the importance of the concepts of the field, the hysteresis effect, and the symbolic capital so as to permit the mutability and idiosyncrasy of social life in transitional contexts. By “borrowing” from Bourdieu's theoretical frameworks, the thesis emphasizes the practice dimension from where strategic culture stems from. As a consequence, the study focuses on the national political and decision-making bodies from a praxis-oriented dimension and it traces elements of change and reform in security institutions and in the Romanian field of security production.
3.1 Introduction

By using the concept of *transitional security habitus* proposed in the theoretical chapter and inspired by a Bourdieusean research agenda, the present historical section contributes to the overarching theme of a generalized state of *hysteresis* in the Romanian security field. The *hysteresis* is manifested in the ill-adaptation of security actors’ inherited Cold-War dispositions and practices to the new realities and conditions of the post-Cold War transition and security reforms. In more explicit terms, the concept of the *transitional security habitus* is used in the chapter to reflect the contrasting and shifting nature of the Romanian security actors’ *habitures* during transitional periods and security and defence reforms. These embedded transitional moves account for instances of ill-adaptation, uncritical mimesis, and haphazard behaviour from part of the Romanian security practitioners, lagging behind in terms of their dispositions so as to adjust to new and fluctuating realities.

The conventional wisdom is that as new personnel enter the ranks of established security professionals they will usually adopt the conservative framework of the established security practice. Successful socialization often entails a personal metamorphosis and security actors learn the procedures, institutional culture, and the techniques of security production. Such actors become socialized with an already established professional *doxa* (Bourdieu 1977: 159-170), a set of core values and discourses that a specific professional field articulates as its fundamental principles and which are considered to be intrinsically true and mandatory.
Nevertheless, when the established professional doxa is in flux and habits, practices, or ways of doing security are being transformed, either due to national reforms or international influences such as NATO and the CSDP, it is much more difficult to neatly follow the above described socialization patterns. By analysing the experience of security and military reform in Romania over its transitional period in the post-Cold War context, the chapter sets the building blocks for the argument that Romania's strategic culture is much more varied and much less homogenous than the theoretically-driven and conventional wisdom would allow. The case study of Romania’s security field provides an alternative understanding of socialization processes when security cultures are in transition and amenable to innovation, contestation, and reform.

This argument is also illustrated by the open-ended, qualitative interviews of young, seasoned, and pensioned security personnel from lower, middle, and upper military ranks, as well as civilian personnel within the Romanian security and defence field. The chapter resorts to interviews to contextualize the historical perspective in the analysis and to account for possible new transformative trends in the Romanian practice of security making and security actors’ habituses. The interviews are indicative of fundamental changes within the taken-for granted, traditional understandings of state-based defence to instances of international projection and professionalization.

The compatibility between practitioners’ traditional habituses and the new security configurations informed by either NATO or the CSDP adaptation pressures takes
centre stage in the research and sheds further light on the dynamics of inertia and change within the Romanian security field. Consequently, interview data is used for the purpose of illustrating the \textit{hysteresis effects} in security professionals’ \textit{habituses}, especially when having to mitigate for the transformation of their way of doing things from traditional defence-based templates to practices of international projection and civilian-military operations.

In the Romanian case, such reforms were represented by instances of \textit{hard emulation and isomorphism when adapting to NATO standards and procedure}. By using a longitudinal approach, \textit{the chapter follows the broad evolutionary span of the Romanian security and defence field from its Warsaw Pact participation, the early 1990s, to present day}, as well as the nearly two decades of constant and radical reforms. Of note are the tensioned security reform processes that led the transformation from Cold-War structures to NATO-dominated security mechanisms.

Special attention is given to the evolutionary pattern and the institutional background of NATO and the EU’s security and defence policy evolution during the Cold War. The chapter proceeds laying out the general lines of security reform and radical transformation of the European security context during the Cold War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and it sets the background understanding for the vast processes of security adaptation and change in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. It contextualized the important influence of the frozen conflicts at the proximity of Romania’s Eastern borderline, and the privileged position played by Moldova and the Transnistrian frozen conflict in the formulation of Romania’s security policy.
3.2 The Historical and Institutional Background of NATO and the CSDP

The creation of both NATO and the EU’s CSDP could be integrated within a chain of historical formative moments or critical junctures (Hall & Taylor 1996: 942) in the evolution of the transatlantic Alliance and the European Community. Such critical moments in the institutional progress of both NATO and the CSDP are particularly useful to pinpoint the recurrence of debates on the formation of an integrated transatlantic security and defence dimension on the one hand, and a distinct European security identity on the other hand with the creation of the EU’s CSDP.

In particular, three such critical junctures have triggered a type of feed-back mechanisms responsible with reinforcing the future creation of the EU’s CSDP: first, the post-World War II status-quo and the characteristics of a bipolarity-driven balance of power structure in the international system; second, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of a unipolar system dominated by a single superpower, the United States; and third, the violent Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. Within this broad timeline, these historical settings have brought forth specific transatlantic and European institutional developments in the field of security and defence. Nevertheless, the last critical juncture, culminating with the creation of the CSDP, marks the most substantial institutional change for the EU’s global power identity and thereby creates a branching point moment (Hause & Kernic 2006: 7, 942) from which the European security and defence dimension moved onto a new path.

The first formative moment, the end of the World War II, influenced a paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization of the European security and defence configuration,
Europe’s security architecture changing dramatically with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1948 by the United States, Canada, and a handful of Western European states was meant to secure a front of collective security and defence in the post-war context. While the principal reason behind the creation of NATO was triggered by the rising rivalry between the former World War II allies and the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union, the establishment of the Alliance was in reality part of a broader transatlantic effort. NATO’s role was to deter Soviet-led expansionism, prevent the restoration of nationalist militarism in Europe, and boost the peaceful political integration on the continent. NATO was organized in a civilian branch including the North Atlantic Council, the highest authority in NATO headed by a secretary general and consisting of the member states’ leaders who reached consensus in decision-making through unanimity.

This concerted effort was further enhanced by a large-scale economic aid package, the European Recovery Program or the Marshall Plan, proposed by the United States Secretary of State George Marshall. With the inclusion in NATO of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, the Soviet Union was prompted to counterbalance with its own regional security alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact, which included Soviet states and communist satellites from Central and Eastern Europe.

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6 A short history of NATO, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html
8 Ibidem
The inclusion of Western Germany under NATO’s and the US’ nuclear umbrella (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 99) further deepened the East-West rivalry and reinforced the collective defence arrangements of massive retaliation in the eventuality that the US or Western Europe was under attack. To this end, NATO implemented the strategic doctrine of “massive retaliation” (in the case of Soviet aggression, NATO would retaliate with a nuclear attack) for deterrence purposes and it would serve as a security umbrella allowing Western Europe to grow economically in the post-war reconstruction period. During the Cold War, NATO was also the institutional linchpin (Yost 1999) between the United States and Western Europe in terms collective security guarantees and functioned as an efficient deterrent to the Soviet Union.

The post WWII status-quo symbolized a crossroads for Europeans as regards the construction of a social order devoid of conflicts and resentments (Kerninc 2006: 7). Europeans were searching for peaceful coexistence solutions and conflict settlement through strengthening peace and security on the continent. However, due to the new arms race and the military competition between the United State and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, talks about the creation of a strictly European defence dimension started to take precedence in European elite circles.

A first step in this direction was taken in 1948 when the European defence cooperation was officialised within the Brussels Treaty Organization, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It marked an “unconditional mutual defence commitment” and put forward provisions for mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack. The analysis of institutions in context (Pollack 2005: 140) brings forth the specific nature of institutional responses to
exogenous developments. From this perspective, the Brussels Treaty was in fact the first European defence organizations set up in the aftermath of the WWII, responding to the emerging US and Soviet Union rivalry, and laying the grounds for a European security and defence cooperation framework known as the “Western Union”.

Other instances reflected renewed efforts in the 1950s to establish a European defence dimension. In 1950 the Pleven Plan (Anderson in Gänzle & Sens 2007: 7) (put forward by the French Premier René Pleven) proposed the creation of a unified European army. This idea developed into efforts to establish a European defence organization, called the European Defence Community (EDC). However, the United Kingdom did not share the same federal vision (Anderson in Gänzle & Sens 2007: 7) of the Europe’s future upon which then EDC was based, and the US did not favour the plan as it could have potentially undercut NATO’s raison d’être. The EDC collapsed in 1954 when the French Parliament failed to ratify the treaty.

The diverging opinions between member states, especially between France and UK, illustrating a doctrinal divide between national worldviews of what organizational form the EU should take, could be traced forward to current rivalries and disagreements concerning the CSDP’s transformation. The differences between French and English worldviews regarding the role of the EU and the institutional path it should take would become pervasive elements in the debate over a European supranational security and defence dimension. This sustained rivalry between France and the UK reflects the assumption that institutions define arenas (Sandholtz & Fligstein 2001: 13), but in doing so, they privilege some actors over others. Institutionalization is therefore never neutral: it is partly a process by which powerful actors seek to shape the rules of the
game in their favour, the UK and France, members of the European Union’s “Big Three” elite club besides Germany, playing a major role in setting the scope and constraints for the EU’s security and defence institutional development.

Another effort to develop a broader European defence and security dimension met with modest results. In the beginning of the 1960s, France once again presented an interesting project, the Fouchet Plan (Anderson 2007: 8), which envisaged fundamental changes in the process of the European cooperation. The proposed Plan provided for closer European foreign and defence policies, but it was met with discontent by the European Community’s member states. After the failure of the Fouchet Plan, in 1970 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process was established, consisting of informal but regular meeting of the foreign ministers of Community countries.

The EPC could be considered as the progenitor (Kerninc 2006: 11) of what later became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), emerging from a number of informal meetings at the Presidential level. It was the first institutionalized cooperation framework in high politics and foreign policy, a field that until that moment was considered a taboo subject by EU member states. During the Cold War period, the most important step as regards security and defence cooperation was made in the mid-1980s. The Single European Act (Kerninc 2006: 12) established a treaty basis for foreign policy cooperation, formalizing political cooperation in the security and defence field and representing the first timid attempt to put security and defence issues on the European Community’s agenda.
The second formative moment was constituted by the radical transformations engendered by the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved and many historical opponents of the past, i.e. Central and Eastern European Countries, became partners to West European actors. These unexpected transformations in the international system had an important impact on the European security and defence agenda, the post-Cold War European security configuration becoming a major issue of political and societal concern. Debates about security and defence issues galvanized radical transformation processes of European military alliances and security organizations such as NATO, as well as national armed forces.

Even though NATO’s initial raison d’être was to deter the potential Soviet expansionism and aggression in Europe, the institution survived beyond the end of the Cold War and expanded its reach to include former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. It played a fundamental role in the security sector reform of such states and substantially contributed to their liberal-democratic transition, while at the same time remaining the principal instrument of collective defence for its member states.

The end of the Cold War brought about for NATO new roles outside strictly speaking an instrument of collective security: with the Partnership for Peace and the special consultative frameworks with Russia, the engagement in crisis management and peacekeeping missions and operations in the international arena, and the overall cooperation frameworks extending beyond NATO’s traditional reach (Yost 1999). These developments offered a new impetus for re-evaluating the existing European
security architecture (Kerninc 2006: 13) and rethinking as well the EU’s traditional civilian, economics-oriented soft foreign policy.

Thus, in the creation of alternative structures for a European and/or North Atlantic security, the European security and defence agenda gained new momentum with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The Treaty, through the creation at the time of the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), made specifically vague references to the eventual establishment of a common defence policy that might lead to further European defence integration. Once again, overshadowed by the imperatives and incentives for a further economic integration, the security and defence agenda remained in the background, as member states showed little enthusiasm in bolstering a defence dimension for the European Union.

The hindrances faced in the formation of a European security and defence dimension reflect the broader difficulties in accommodating member states’ multiple “veto points” on such matters. Another important observation is that the modest attempts to create a security and defence dimension were directly dependent on the causal historical configurations, the contingencies and historical irregularities (Lecors 2006: 514) specific to the bipolarity era. The Cold War was not only reflexive of an embedded European dependence on the US security umbrella, but it also reflected the cumbersome process of creating a European Community and of integrating a multiplicity of views within the same institutional structure. These hindrances could account also for the particular civilian path the European Community had traditionally taken, with the orientation towards integration in the so called spheres of “low politics”, where cohesion could be reached with much more success.
The civilian dimension of the EU after the 1990s was put into question by an array of emerging new security concerns, ranging from regional instabilities and conflicts to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric warfare, terrorism, the end of Cold War bringing forth new types of security challenges. Outbreaks of various major international crises in the Gulf and the Balkans forced the European countries to rethink their traditional approaches to security and defence and to reconfigure the EU's civilian identity. The Balkan conflicts, constituting the third formative moment for the EU, were instrumental (Nugent 2006: 497) in indicating the EU's inability to stabilize its own backyard and also for highlighting that it is not always the case that “soft” double incentives, i.e. aid and trade, can yield successful results.

Once again, the United States' involvement stabilized the situation and highlighted the great discrepancy between the US and the EU in terms of independent capabilities to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. It also prompted a clear message from the United States that the EU must be involved in more burden-sharing (Biscop 2005b: 54) when involved in conflicts in the “near abroad”. The Yugoslav conflicts mobilized NATO's multinational force of 60 000 soldiers to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995 (Ingrao & Emmert 2009: 138, 185). In 2004, NATO's role was handed over to the EU (Reichard 2013: 256).

This third formative moment constitutes the actual milestone in the development of a security and defence policy, making possible the policy “breakthrough” (Nugent 2006: 497) within the EU’s policy framework. The revolutionary change took place in December 1998, during the Franco-British St Malo Summit, representing the
unprecedented alignment of security conceptions between the historically diverging French and British positions on security and defence matters. The two positions of the most important EU players, France and Britain, have been always almost opposed, tracing a divide between Europeanist and Atlanticist orientations within the EU, as reflected in the above-mentioned formative moments. Since this breakthrough, the security and defence policies have developed at a considerable and unexpected pace, culminating with the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The European member states, at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, decided to create a political and military structure which will allow the EU to conduct military operations. The European Council in Nice marked the formation of political and military bodies as permanent structures of the EU, the Political and Security Committee⁹ (PSC), the European Union Military Committee¹⁰ (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff¹¹ (EUMS). The St Malo moment was a critical point of juncture where two international actors pooled together their interests and transgressed their historic opposition concerning the EU’s security and defence future. Prompted by the insecurity-driven international status-quo, the evolving asymmetrical security threats in the EU neighbourhood, the realization of EU’s incapacity to secure its vicinity, the EU’s overall lack of defence capabilities, the clear message from the US that it will not always come to the EU’s rescue, France and Britain decide to make the strategic choices and create the CSDP.

Moreover, with the institutionalization of the CSDP, a new dimension was established that opened the possibility for institutional path dependence\textsuperscript{12}, the decision to create this policy providing further incentives for actors to perpetuate the institutional and policy choices they started in the field of security and defence. Actually, it could be argued that member states within the EU, by creating the CSDP and the entire array of institutions it has generated, have caused the potential for lock-ins (Pollack 2005: 140), whereby existing institutions may remain in equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change.

Consequently, the creation of the CSDP structure might prove to be very difficult to overturn in the future, developing what is termed as “institutional sticky-ness” (Pierson 1996: 123-163, 142-143). As well, many EU member states saw the added benefits in pursuing “deeper military integration on a bilateral and multilateral basis” (Khol in Biscop 2005: 5-6), even though such cooperation and specialisation moves had a clear impact on their national sovereignty and a loss of national military autonomy (Biscop in Biscop 2005a: 35).

Especially after the Central and Eastern European waves of enlargement, small and medium-sized member states were facing important challenges connected to deployment capacities and the participation in multiple and often simultaneous missions and operations (Khol in Biscop 2005a: 6). For example, some of the new

\textsuperscript{12} Paul Pierson’s and Margaret Levi’s definition “Path dependence has to mean, it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down the path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber behind is the one she tends to follow (quoted in Pierson 2000: 252)
EU member states such as Hungary and Poland opted to maintain a balance between “the requirements of territorial defence and out-of-area missions under NATO or EU aegis” (Khol in Biscop 2005a: 8).

3.3 The post-Cold War Context and the Transformation of the European Security Landscape

The role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy in shaping the post-Cold War security environment in Europe has been of critical importance. The central NATO document is the Strategic Concept\textsuperscript{13}, which offers the doctrinal framework for NATO’s objectives, internal coordination and political and military resources, assuring thus the efficient interaction parameters for the new Central and Eastern European member states. It has served as a guiding document that enshrined the Alliance’s security doctrine and displayed the shared representational frames of the members to be produced and reproduced in joint military and political exercises and operations.

For the former Soviet states, NATO became a fundamental guiding compass for the military and defence reform after the end of the Cold War, signifying “a source of doctrine, a space of interaction and contention, and a framework within which exercises and operations are most likely to be conducted” (Mérand 2008: 10). As a consequence, either due to the active incentives offered by the NATO membership and by being part of an international defence elite group of nations, or due to peer

pressure and isomorphic reasons, the post-communist countries adopted, be it
discursively or substantively, the language of modern warfare of international
projection and professionalized armed forces (Mérand 2008: 15). The transformative
post-Cold War context facilitated the military reform in a number of new EU member
states and triggered a complete restructuring of their military sector (Baun & Marek
2013).

As already mentioned, the end of the Cold War brought about new types of security
challenges unlike those of the bipolarity era. The European security landscape has
been unmistakably and radically transformed, especially in Central and Eastern
Europe. The prominence of such new security and defence risks prompted
encompassing and drastic reform processes of the Central and Eastern European
armed forces. As well, the post-Cold War Western status-quo was challenged by an
array of emerging asymmetric security issues. Outbreaks of various major
international crises and wars in the Gulf and the Balkans forced the European Union
countries to rethink their traditional approach to security and defence and to
reconfigure the predominantly civilian EU identity and global actor-ness.

For that end, at the request of the European Council in June 2007, the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2007 drew up a new Reform Treaty, The Treaty
of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon’s
proposals on security and defence have represented the policy and institutional
building compasses in response to a European “common” security strategy, the
European Security Strategy\textsuperscript{14} (2003). The Strategy could be considered as an important reference framework for the EU (Biscop & Andersson 2007) and the “first strategic document ever of the EU and therefore a milestone, not only for the CSDP/ESDP, but for EU external action as a whole” (Biscop 2005b: viii).

Inspired by the central guidelines set out by the European Security Strategy and its three major chapters on security environment analysis, strategic objectives identification, and relevant EU policy responses (Biscop, 2005b: viii, 15), the Treaty of Lisbon put forward a more comprehensive European way of thinking about security. Over the last decade, the European Union’s major military powers, under the aegis of the CSDP, have increasingly collaborated to build a more integrated, technologically and economically superior security and defence framework (Pohl 2014; Irrera & Attinà 2013; Merlingen 2012). These elements were also outlined in the European Security Strategy under the imperative of creating more capable and flexible military forces in response to new security threats (Biscop in Biscop 2005a: 29).

Conversely, new EU member states were faced with problems of “defence inflation” (Biscop in Biscop 2005a: 29-30) – with the yearly defence capabilities costs rising faster than annual inflation rates, national defence budgets have remained stagnant or have suffered important loses. On the other hand, with the opportunity for “Permanent Structured Cooperation”\textsuperscript{15} emerging out of the Treaty of Lisbon, an

\textsuperscript{14} The European Security Strategy was for the first time drawn up in 2003 under the authority of the former EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12 and 13 December 2003, www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf
institutional framework has been established by which a group of member states can move forward in security and defence integration. Two further observations regarding permanent and structured cooperation could be made: the framework increased the legitimacy and the political weight of the intervening member states and at the same time strengthened the profile of the EU as a security and defence international actor; but it also reflected, *inter alia*, a multi-speed Europe, and a tendency towards the formation of an in-group or a select club within the EU club.

While explicit mutual territorial defence guarantees were excluded from the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)\(^\text{16}\), the great diversity of threats to security made it increasingly difficult to draw distinct lines between international crisis management and national defence, and between differentiating stages in the security continuum. NATO and the EU currently have 22 members in common, but they are different institutional entities in terms of goals and scope, with different organizational structures, historical origins, functions, and political cultures.

The degree of cooperation between NATO and the EU remains one of the most interesting and difficult issues that affect the transatlantic Alliance’s security policy. The EU indeed collaborates closely with NATO, but the two organizations have different visions *vis-à-vis* conducting warfare and the pooling and sharing of resources. An important rift in the transatlantic partnership and the EU-NATO relations was triggered by the 2003 Iraq crisis, when the EU-US relations suffered the most and NATO was involved for the first time outside the Euro-Atlantic zone and

thus settling the “out-of-area debate” as regards NATO’s reach and its new role post-Cold War (Biscop 2005b: 106-107-108). The Iraq crisis further reinforced the fact that the EU needed to develop an autonomous capacity and deepened the debate on the EU’s as an autonomous strategic actor (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 101, 103).

A phrase that is often used to describe the relationship between the EU forces and NATO is “separable, but not separate”\(^{17}\): the same forces and capabilities form the basis of both EU and NATO mission efforts. NATO and the European Union have been working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond, the Berlin Plus agreements\(^{18}\) being such an example of cooperation. The two organizations have shared common strategic interests and still cooperate in a spirit of complementarity and partnership (Gross & Juncos 2010: 39). Beyond cooperation in the field, other key priorities for collaboration have been established to ensure that their capability development efforts are mutually reinforcing. However, there are differences in the strategic vision of these two institutions, which overlap with the differences and the historic-political heritage of the new EU member states’ security cultures.

The EU’s CSDP is more than a forum for collective defence and an intergovernmental military alliance such a NATO (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 99, 119; Dyson & Konstadinides: 2013, 49). The strategic differences between the EU and NATO are further reflected by the differences in strategic priorities between the US and the EU, with the implied necessity to rethink the partnership and to mitigate the

\(^{17}\) See NATO’s relations with the European Union, [http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html)

\(^{18}\) “Berlin Plus agreement is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreement between NATO and EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit. All parts are tied together through the so called ‘Framework Agreement’ ...dated 12 March 2003”, [http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm](http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm)
strategic differences between the traditional allies (Biscop 2005b: 109, 111). In terms of comparing and contrasting the EU and NATO, an important aspect to be underlined is the fact that the “EU’s counterpart is the US; NATO’s counterpart is one specific part of the EU: CSDP” (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 99).

A series of coordination agreements have been set up between NATO and the CSDP, for example the regular meeting between the High Representative and the Secretary General, between the North Atlantic Council and the PSC, and the NATO-EU Capability Group (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 103). With the enlargement of both organizations and with the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, NATO and the European Union now have 22 member countries in common.

Nevertheless, at the strategic level, differences in vision still remain, ranging from the EU member states’ internal divisions to the sometimes dissatisfied positions of strictly NATO countries such as Turkey, to persisting internal divides between the transatlantic partners (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 106). As long as the EU member states continue to vacillate between either the CSDP or NATO, this indecisiveness remains one of the fundamental obstacles (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 107) in the creation of an effective and cohesive EU security and defence policy.

Using NATO resources has been perceived as fundamental to any EU-led operations (which has not been the case for most of the CSDP civilian and military operations), the importance of the high interoperability between the EU and NATO being always reinforced in terms of equipment and strategic cooperation (Biscop 2005b: 111) in
international operations. The Berlin-Plus agreements\textsuperscript{19}, under which the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU has been reaffirmed, remain rather vague as regards the release, return, and control of NATO assets. They offer no \textit{guaranteed access} for EU-led crisis management operations, NATO agreeing only to discretionary \textit{assured access} (Lagadec 2012: 118-131). As well, it is conceived on an \textit{ad hoc} basis and put into action only twice with Operation Concordia and EUFOR Althea in the Balkans\textsuperscript{20}.

NATO has also reserved a formal “right of first refusal” (Biscop 2005b: 119) and the right to recall its assets and capabilities in EU-led ongoing operations. This has made the EU’s security and defence capacity highly dependent upon NATO and hence on the United States. The aim of the EU with the further development of the CSDP was to become autonomous strategically and at a military operational level, especially if it wants to be perceived in the future as a credible global actor and an international security provider. The EU has been uniquely placed to respond to international crisis-management challenges, given its comprehensive or holistic approach to security (Biscop in Biscop & Andersson 2007: 17), normative legitimacy, and niche capabilities designed for integrative civilian-military planning.

The integration in both the EU’s CSDP and NATO structures triggered complex response from the part of \textit{post-communist member states and their national strategic vision in the post-Cold War context}. An important distinction with most of such countries’ history is that the CSDP and NATO missions and actions were no longer limited to the agenda of defence ministries and required the coordination between

\textsuperscript{19} The Berlin Plus Agreement, \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm}

foreign affairs, development, and defence ministries (Biscop in Biscop & Andersson 2007: 19). They presupposed complex, multi-level, inter-ministerial, intra-ministerial cooperation with other policy fields, such as the ministries of foreign affairs, justice, and finance, not to mention further cooperation with the EU institutional structures and with other member states (Baun & Marek 2013).

Consequently, it should also be noted that the CSDP efficiency and operation expectations triggered complex solutions that required at the same time complex governance structures (Gross 2007; Britz 2007; Ginsberg & Penksa 2012; Merlingen 2012). The importance of NATO in understanding the changes in the security field post-Cold War of the EU new member states becomes also paramount, because it led to the development of a common security defence culture in Central and Eastern Europe. This commonality contributed to the denationalization of security and defence planning, as member states increasingly developed their security and defence fields in relation to EU standards of security making and NATO’s “common defence planning process” (Elliott & Cheeseman 2004: 120; Terriff in Elliot & Cheeseman 2004: 9).

The operational tensions between NATO and the EU are a continued subject of discussion, especially concerning the ways in which new EU member states mitigated their status within the Alliance with their adaptation to the EU integration process. In the case of Central and Eastern new EU member states and their post-communist, geopolitically-influenced *periphery* status, their preference for a strong Atlanticist orientation can be accounted for by the close proximity to Russia and old Cold War fears (Mankoff 2011: 145-150). NATO’s influence was primary and ground-
breaking in the case of new EU member states, which were accepted first in the
Alliance and only afterwards in the EU, Romania’s integration efforts in NATO being
such an example.

“Even though Romania didn’t have an external enemy or threat after the Cold War,
we still needed to thinks about the country’s defence and NATO’s collective defence
guarantees were the solution”, one policy officer stated during the interview
(Bucharest, June 2012). In the words of another interviewed senior military officer:
“My older colleagues and myself had to start learning anew the language of security,
we were like amnesiacs, so to speak, slowly becoming educated in NATO command
operations and procedures” (Bucharest, May 2011). Another interviewee expressed
that “What we took for granted in terms of security making during communism was
worth nothing, so back to the drawing board”. A retired general even mentioned that
“If we didn’t quickly learn NATO standards, our jobs were in danger” (Bucharest, May
2011). The hysteresis effects became especially evident in the case of such
accounts, where old habits and ways of doing security typical to the Cold War era
and the Warsaw Pact tactics were devalued in the NATO pre-accession period.

3.4 Romania’s Strategic Position in the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War

The security identity of The Socialist Republic of Romania (1947-1989) during the
Cold War, especially under the rule of its dictator Nicolae Ceausescu (1967-1989),
nicknamed by his admirers as the “The Genius from the Carpathians”, has been often
labelled as a curious case of opposition against Soviet hegemony. Internationally,
under Ceausescu’s lead, Romania proved to adopt a maverick (Miller 2012) position
within the Warsaw Pact (1955) – Romania was a Warsaw Pact member state
between 1955 and 1989 (Deletant & Ionescu 2004). Internally, Ceausescu was a ruthless leader employing extreme tactics to suppress the Romanian population, almost on par with those used by North Korean leaders (Friedman 2013). While initially the dictator was genuinely popular and considered to be a reformist set to avoid the Stalinist hard-line and to reinforce the Romanian national interest within the Warsaw Pact, Ceausescu’s rule was however one of the most gruesome in the Soviet Bloc and it became subject of a massive personality cult.

The Securitate (the popular term for the secret police agency of the Communist Party and one of the largest internal repressive forces in the Eastern Bloc) (Catalan & Stănescu 2004) yielded uncontested power with its almost ubiquitous presence in internal security and political affairs. It was responsible with the establishment of a terror regime for 25 years (Boia 2012: 74-75), led a massive and systematized campaign to eradicate any signs of dissidence or intellectual independence, and instituted high levels of censorship and strict social control. The level of suppression in the country reached the alarming point when one in three Romanians was an informant for the Securitate (according to the Council for Studies of the Archives of the Former Securitate CNSAS21).

Several significant developments during the Cold War have shaped Romania’s security and defence identity and still bear relevance for the current understanding of Romanian security *habitus*: on the one hand, Romania’s outlier participation in the Warsaw Pact significantly determined its post-Cold War security policy towards Russia; and on the other hand, Ceausescu’s personality cult associated with the

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wave of communist-dominated nationalist resurgence under his rule constructed a desirable narrative and engendered an inflated sense of importance in the country’s imaginary.

If the habitus is to be understood as a “the cultivation of particular schemas for understanding reality” (Gheciu 2005: 280), the world painted by Romania’s communist state propaganda as regards national security was marked by leadership megalomania, historical and national greatness, and last but not the least, a false sense of dissent within the Warsaw Pact.

Ceausescu transformed his rule in what political science terms as a Sultanism type autocratic regime (Linz & Stepan 2011), in which the use of the personality cult as “a national genius” marked the specificity of Romanian communism. Leading cultural figures and historians followed the Party-line and associated Ceausescu’s image to that of the Wallach medieval leaders, glorified Romania’s history in association with his personality, and made him out as the “the greatest man who had fought for Romania’s independence” (Varga 2011: 389) and national security. It is not surprising the fact that there still remain lingering residues of nostalgia in the nowadays Romanian imaginary for an illuminated political leader or President in charge of national sovereignty concerns, as well as paternalistic tendencies to associate the responsibility of national security with the national leading figure in charge of the Romanian army.

Due to Ceausescu’s apparent anti-Soviet stance and declared independence, the West had been willing to overlook Ceausescu’s vast human rights infringement acts
and the regime of terror instituted by the Securitate. His particularly good relations with the West culminated with his 1973 state visit in the United States at the invitation of President Richard Nixon, followed by other high-profile state visits (the 1975 visit at the invitation of President Gerald Ford and the visit in 1979 at the invitation of President Jimmy Carter\textsuperscript{22}). Conversely, several Western leaders visited Romania, from French President Charles de Gaulle in 1968 to the US President Richard Nixon in 1969.

The friendly US stance towards Romania changed radically during Ronald Reagan’s Presidency, partly due to the damasking reports of the political refugee and former Romanian general, Ion Mihai Pacepa, and his book “Orizonturi Rosii” (Red Horizons) (Pacepa 2011). This vacillation between displayed loyalties to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy internally (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008: 18) and the strategy to play the Warsaw Pact alliances against more pro-Western tendencies seemed to best characterize Romania’s security and defence position during the Cold War.

During the Cold War, Ceausescu established a skewed awareness of national historical greatness and a perceived international assertiveness, especially revealing being the incident of Ceausescu’s outspoken criticism and opposition against the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008: 18). This international incident underlined Romania’s stark position concerning the inviolability of national sovereignty, non-interference (Nünlist 2001: 6), and deeper historical fears concerning Romania’s own borderlines. Romania’s dissent in the Warsaw Pact was thus highly determined by perceived threats to its national security.

\textsuperscript{22} The Romanian dictator’s, Nicolae Ceausescu, state visit to the United States, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/o-vizita-sua-cum-un-sef-stat-roman-nu-va-mai-avea
and prompted the creation of an “independent national defence strategy and cultivated relations with the West, China, and the Third World” (Nünlist 2001: 6-7).

Romania’s Warsaw Pact participation and the Cold-War bipolarity dominated security 
*habitus* were characterized by a high degree of *Realpolitik* and the marriage of convenience (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008: 18) with either sides of the Cold War as dictated by particular events, such as the Czechoslovakia invasion. Ceausescu not only refused to send troops to take part in the invasion but he also mobilized limited military contingents at the northern borders with the USSR (Miller 2012). While Romania maintained “a large contingent at the Warsaw Pact Joint Headquarters in Moscow, and Soviet staff remained at the Romanian Defence Ministry throughout the Cold War” (Miller 2012), Ceausescu refused any Warsaw Pact troop deployments on Romania’s territory.

However, this double-handed game of intra-bloc dissent proved to be a dangerous bet for Romania, and added to increased international concern in the late 1980s over the regime’s extreme repressive measures, it marked the transformation of Romania from a “Cold War ‘darling’ to a pariah state” (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2008: 19). Herein was the paradox of Ceausescu’s maverick position in the international arena as regards Moscow: it instilled a false understanding that his resistance to Soviet power equalled liberalization, more openness, and pro-West tendencies.

Romanian analysts have been much less enthusiastic and harsher as regards Romania’s role in the Warsaw Pact, labelling it as insignificant, playing only “a minor role” and never being a major security issue for the Soviet Union (Miroiu, Nicolescu-
Quintus & Ungureanu 2004: 124). This is a more unbiased and realistic portrayal concerning the real scope of Romania’s security and defence influence within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. From a strategic political-military perspective, Romania’s position could be understood as insignificant, especially in terms of limited armed forces, “of military capabilities (…) active or first rank units, of military expenses, of its relationships with its allies and possible enemies, and of the hierarchic relations in its international relations subsystem” (Miroiu, Nicolescu-Quintus & Ungureanu 2004: 124-126).

Romanian national assertiveness during the Cold War and the patriotically influenced security habitus by the idealized figure of Ceausescu impacted the country’s transformation in the 1990s. After 1989, the transition period induced a security identity crisis and the inevitability of political and strategic reinvention, the hysteresis effect being manifested in the necessity to reconcile the loss of Cold War certainties with an ever changing European and international security landscape.

During the post-1989 uncertain times, one thing was increasingly obvious to military and political elites: long gone were the days of fervent communist propaganda, the elevated patriotic discourses about Romania’s key international role, and the assurances given by the Warsaw Pact membership. Cold War legacies were to plague Romania two decades after the fall of Communism, from haphazard economic and political reforms, lagging policy processes, an almost generalized streak of corruption, to the maintenance of old communist nomenklatura in key political positions.
3.5 Historical Considerations and the NATO-dominated Romanian Security Habitus

In 2004, Romania became a member of NATO and then further gained accession in the EU in 2007. After the Cold War, NATO’s own transformation impacted decisively Romania’s security reform, with NATO undergoing an identity crisis concerning its rationale since its archenemy, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. The NATO Council extended an invitation in 1993 to the then Romanian President Ion Iliescu to join NATO. Romania was given the unprecedented opportunity, as many Romania elites believed at the time, to become part of the only security infrastructure able to ensure the country’s security and stability in the long run.

The NATO membership represented the first real test for Romania after the fall of communism in the 1990s, the NATO integration process evolving along three main lines (Berdila 2005): NATO’s own growth after the Cold War, Romania’s historical position towards Western democratic integration, and Romania’s military reforms in the field of security and defence. NATO’s main strategy was to support former Soviet Union countries to cooperate within NATO’s security environment so as to preserve stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

After the 1990s, Romania had to restructure its army and to carry out NATO standards and interoperability objectives. The military reform process needed to streamline an obsolete military bureaucracy, adjust the size of Romanian armed forces, and integrate NATO assessment procedures to measures of efficiency. Moreover, Romania had to contribute actively in NATO combined exercises and make use of NATO’s Partnership for Peace training opportunities.
Two major waves of reform took place in Romania: the first one roughly comprising the post-communist years of general transition and reform, and the second one encompassing the pre and post NATO reforms. In the mid-1990s, the Romanian military went through a number of significant and fundamental changes as regards the philosophy, organisation and operation of the Romanian security field. The general transition of the Romanian military comprised gradual steps that centred on force restructuring, interoperability, personnel reductions, and modernization.

Throughout the 1990s, the resources selected to sustain the reform of the Romanian armed forces were not enough to cover all the costs of the transformation process. The main cause for such an economic deficit can be attributed to the financial complications generated by Romania’s democratic transition as one of the toughest in Central and Eastern Europe. Only at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, did Romania’s economic recovery allow an increase of investments in the security and defence forces. The reform process consisted of both quantitative and qualitative changes in the Romanian military. In terms of qualitative changes, the professionalization of armed forces became a top priority, requiring “a new managerial design of the cultural system, in order to increase the effectiveness of this domain of the military activity” (Stoica 2011: 105).

Taking into account the budgetary margins, it was impractical to continue the reform by both personnel restructuring and major military acquisition programs and, as a result, equipment modernization was significantly delayed until 2004. In the words of an interviewed senior military expert, “We didn’t have money to buy even second-
hand armament so we took the easy way out. We cut the personnel where it was possible and sacrificed the irrelevant staff.” (Bucharest, May 2011)

From 1989 to 2001, the Romanian Armed Forces wartime force structure was reduced from 850,000 to 230,000 in terms of personnel. In 2000, a reform plan called “Program Force 2003”\(^{23}\) eliminated the reserve forces, created rapid reaction components, active and territorial forces, and organized the integrated surveillance and early warning system for the Romanian security field. The plan set modernization priorities, derived from NATO’s interoperability needs, but did not noticeably define the mission-structure-capabilities relationship for the newly created forces.

As another security practitioner noted, “NATO had always been our role-model, and not only in terms of security reforms but also by encouraging our democratic change.” (Bucharest, May 2011) From this point of view, NATO acted in the Romanian context as more than an intergovernmental military alliance (Ghenciu 2005), by getting more widely involved in Romania’s domestic affairs and by socializing the Romanian security personnel with Western norms and values. NATO’s role as a security-making teacher was detrimental in the creation of Romania’s military professionalization and the establishment of a NATO-dominated security doxa.

In particular, recruitment and training underwent some radical transformation stages, changes being introduced in the educational and physical requirements of the military personnel. The doxa of Romanian security and defence over fifty years of Communism, as a taken-for-granted “truth” about what the military should do in a

\(^{23}\) See The Romanian Army, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ro-army.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ro-army.htm)
totalitarian regime, came under scrutiny. The communist doxic knowledge did not require justification because of in-depth ideological prerequisites. “We could not question what the communist nomenklatura said because it was punishable by death. Our primary mission was to defend communist ideology and then the state”, one retired high-ranking officer stated in an interview (Bucharest, May 2011). The heroic public image of the soldier was cultivated along with Ceausescu’s personality cult and his own brand of paternalistic, dynastic communism (Boia 2012: 74). Or more appropriately said, the typical Romanian soldier was indoctrinated within the socio-political imaginary as, on the one hand, the defender of the communist ideological identity against the imperialism of capitalism, and on the other hand as the noble defender of the Romanian state and its borderlines.

The reformists within Romanian security structures were interested in changing the old status-quo and taking privileged positions within the security and defence field. They felt that having been exposed to Euro-Atlantic security-making styles of working was beneficial to them so as to gain more cultural capital (knowledge and expertise) that will increase their chances to have their voices heard and become policy agenda-setters in the Romanian security field. Some interviewees (Brussels, October 2013) were aware of the constantly changing nature of Romania’s strategic culture, and they considered no longer a breach of loyalty to complain about the state-based, Cold War and old ways of doing security.

The inspirational and ideal model of security and defence practice was without question the NATO standard. This was reflected by the traditionalist and reformist voices as reconstructed from the interviews (Bucharest, June 2012), such security
professionals recognising that making alterations in their Cold-War-based *habitus* so as to adapt to NATO standards was in their best interest. Nonetheless, resistance was still present among military elites who followed the new rules of the game, but also showed difficulty in internalizing them. More importantly, conditionality from both the EU and NATO in terms of engendering democratic reforms and Western liberal norms (Ghenciu 2005) played an important role in transforming the Romanian society in general and the security field in particular. As one senior official underlined, "We were like students in a class-room, sometimes we were praised and sometimes we were chastised. We had to change both our ways of doings things and our way of thinking because we needed access in the Euro-Atlantic community." (Brussels, April 2013)

Especially revealing was the first Romanian strategic document that encompassed the peremptory national objective to rise up to NATO standards of military professionalization and capabilities, *i.e.* The Military Strategy of Romania24. The document pointed towards a NATO-dominated *habitus* (Ciocoiu 2004) as the desired ideal of security professionalization. The document has enshrined, unquestionably, an active-defensive strategy, based on four strategic concepts: restructuring and modernization of military structures, credible defence capabilities, enhanced and more operational partnerships, and gradual integration within Euro-Atlantic structures. However, among the four concepts, the reform and modernization of the military structures ranked the highest and subordinated the other three strategic

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priorities. Such reforms determined the military brass to undergo drastic reductions of departments and personnel, as well as a stark restructuring of hierarchies. They have naturally encountered elements of resistance (Keridis & Perry 2004: 95-95) on the military side, especially regarding civilian oversight and interference in what was traditionally considered an army-dominated decision-making field.

Despite an apparent consensus among Romanian security and political elites in favour of the NATO integration, the processes of reform, adaptation, and restructuring has hid deeper implications of power competition between the civilian and military field. Interviewed former superior officers in the Romanian Army (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) stated the difficulties of the military reforms during the elimination of mandatory conscription (1st of January 2007) and the NATO pre and post integration period. Several elements were mentioned during the interviews (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012; Brussels, April 2013; Brussels, October 2013):

An imbalance was created between the top number of higher and lower level officers compared with low numbers of operative soldiers, because of the changing nature of security threats that have been shifted from national borders to foreign theatres of action – “We were no longer needed first and foremost so to protect Romania’s borders...”;

The level of adaptability to NATO technical and operational standards was challenged by the long and burdensome learning process among the military personnel, especially in the case of senior officers – “All of a sudden, we had
to talk the NATO security language and learn NATO methods quickly, or else…";  

The selection of officers was not necessarily made through meritocratic processes, because a significant number of officers left ranks through compensatory monetary incentives or early pensioning – “After the reforms and the drastic cuts in the military personnel we had to make do with the staff that was left. We lost good career officers that chose the money over continuing their career…”;  

The emerging tensions between the old military elites and the newly NATO-trained personnel were ripe, due to the fact that the former still maintained high positions within the military hierarchy and were reluctant to surrender their authority – “It was a hard time of change for everyone, but especially for the senior staff that didn’t speak foreign languages and was slow to catch up…”;  

The army, as originally considered to be the holder of the highest position in terms of trust and credibility in Romanian society, lost its privileged position as the nation’s defender, because the civilian oversight and the press unravelled the doubtful way the military handled its patrimony and contracts – “From defenders of the nation we suddenly came under scrutiny…”.

A Bourdieusean interpretation points towards the importance of the expertise acquired by security professionals in different educational/training contexts and how
the newly assimilated knowledge is reflected in practice and acted upon by security professionals. The use of particular forms of know-how, or what Bourdieu terms as capitals, determines potential hierarchies between legitimate skills and expertise and also generates strong competitive relations between specific actors and groups that make up the broader spectrum of the security field.

This is precisely why the Bourdieusean concept of the field, seen as a battlefield of vested institutional interests, is extremely helpful in mapping out the overlapping and competing security capitals that determine hierarchies in the Romanian security field. How such actors managed to (re)convert their Cold-War type of expertise and translated their capitals across specialized security fields is an indicator of the security fields’ transition, transformation, and generalised hysteresis. The value of specific forms of expertise, either acquired through NATO or EU socialization processes, is indicative of particular power relations and tendencies to control the Romanian broader security agenda, especially during periods of constant change and transformation.

3.6 The Romanian Security Field, Relevant Institutional Structures and Strategic Articulations

Romania’s foreign and security policy has accommodated both the EU and NATO institutional influences and found structural and institutional proper responses for a reconfigured security doctrine in the post-Cold War context. The case of Romania is interesting because it has been one of the most outspoken Atlanticist countries, perceiving NATO as the principal hard security provider and the EU more as an institutional vehicle for economic security and stability.
In terms of institutional structures responsible with the Romanian security and defence policy, the national military strategy is not elaborated by the Romanian Ministry of Defence *per se*, being actually formulated by the Department of Policy of Defence and Planning\(^\text{25}\). The department represents a central structure of the Ministry of Defence that coordinates and oversees the accomplishment of all duties and obligations pertaining to Romania’s membership in both NATO and the European Union, it is responsible for the application of the integrated defence and planning policy, and last but not the least, it guarantees the coordinated cooperation of Romania with international political and military structures.

According to the responsibilities of the Department, the primary objective of Romania’s defence policy is to ensure the military defence of the country, by accomplishing two interdependent tasks: assuring the cohesion of military and security reforms with the necessary funds for the promotion of governmental and military objectives; and the development of international military cooperation, by actively participating in political-military initiatives for peace-maintaining operations. The Department’s chief mission is to coordinate the Ministry’s activities in line with the latest changes in the international security context, being the key strategic planning milieu that is generative of innovation and reform.

In the words of a senior policy officer from the Department, “Since Romania is a new EU member state, we need to construct our own EU security agenda as well, and the security in the Black Sea Region, Moldova, and the Transnistria frozen conflict play a

fundamental role” (Bucharest, June 2012). Other interviewees emphasized the necessity to further integrate Romania within the CSDP structures as an added security guarantee to that of NATO (Brussels, April 2013; Brussels, October 2013). Several of their answers were primarily focused on the democratic and economic security that the EU brings to Romania and to the Eastern periphery, making reference to the EU’s soft power status.

More importantly, this viewpoint was counterintuitive to the usual mantra of a NATO-dominated habitus, allowing for sparse deviations from the Atlanticist orientation of Romania’s security policy. One interviewee stated that “Romania plays a very important role in the EU as a frontier state, together with Poland, representing the EU’s Eastern borderline.” (Brussels, October 2013) Several interviewed civilian professionals underlined the constructive and capacity-building influence of the EU in the Eastern neighbourhood (Bucharest, June 2012; Brussels, April 2013) by making reference to several programmatic EU strategies such as the Eastern Partnership. Notably, other interviewees stated that the expertise of specialists dealing with internal affairs issues needed to be coordinated with external and security affairs personnel so as to provide the relevant intelligence to assure an efficient management of the Eastern boundary (Bucharest, May 2011).

In general, the Romania political and security elites have time-and-again stressed that they has no interest in remaining at the limes of the West and that they were determined to cast the Romanian state as a catalyst of regional cooperation and a link of the Euro-Atlantic involvement in the broader context of the Black Sea region.

In the same vein of reasoning, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cristian Diaconescu, emphasized the geostrategic importance of the Greater Black Sea Region for both the US and the EU, stressing the necessity for positive transformation with the caveat of “regional ownership backed by American and European support”\textsuperscript{27}.

Nevertheless, one of the main reasons for the persistence or re-emergence of Cold War mentalities in the Romanian security field was the country’s proximity to the potential gun-powder barrels at its Eastern borderline and the impending eruption of the frozen conflicts, as it was the case with the Georgian war in 2008 and with the invasion of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Army in 2014. The corrosive influence of the existing frozen or protracted conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood has been made acutely obvious by the Crimean crisis, as they remain one of the most dangerous sources of insecurity at the EU’s Eastern Borderline.

Frozen conflicts have had a rapid escalation potential and an overarching insecurity impact, be it in the case of structural security, affecting the statehood, sovereignty and democratic process in the region, or in terms of asymmetric security threats such as the traffic of human beings, armaments, black economies, and the justification of a Russian “stabilizing” presence. The Russian monopoly on “peacekeeping” contingents that are supposedly brokering the ceasefire in the case of the frozen conflicts in the area (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as post-Soviet frozen conflict zones) is an important part of the broader security

\textsuperscript{27} Ministry of External Affairs, Declaration of former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Washington DC, Atlantic Council of the United States, 07.05.2009, \url{http://www.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en}
The problematique that the EU and NATO are currently facing in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Moldova’s security concerns and the closeness of the Transnistria frozen conflict\(^{28}\) have always been high strategic concerns on the Romanian security agenda, with the protracted conflict situated in close proximity to Romanian borders. The country has around 3.5 million inhabitants, out of which a reported 400,000 already enjoy visa-free travel due to their having already obtained a Romanian passport\(^{29}\). Romania has been very generous and proactive in granting Romanian nationality to Romanian-speaking Moldovans, in the bid to secure Moldova in its sphere of influence and to bring it closer to the EU.

Moldova’s structural vulnerabilities, contested statehood, and its fragile developmental trajectory towards democracy and stability have been a potential source of instability in the neighbourhood and an undeniable strategic priority for Romania. By far the poorest country in the region, Moldova has taken-up a tentative Western foreign policy orientation and slow-paced reforms after 1990, especially with

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\(^{28}\) Transnistria is a separatist or breakaway territory situated in the Eastern part of Moldova claiming its right to autonomy and sovereignty under the name of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. The Transnistrian frozen conflict is a insecurity legacy Moldova has inherited after the end of the Soviet Union and dating back to 1992, when the new fragile state was faced with the daunting task to maintain control over Transnistria (Trans-Dniestr or Transdniestria). Transnistria is a breakaway state with its capital in Tiraspol and it is governed as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR or Pridnestrovie), which declared its independence in the 1990s after the War of Transnistria in 1992. It is situated on a strip of territory between the River Dniester in the West and the Eastern border with Ukraine. The region is multi-ethnic, with the majority of the population being non-Romanian speakers and opposed to making Romanian the sole official language and it has considerable Russian military contingents due to formerly hosting the Soviet 14\(^{th}\) Guards Army. The presence of the Russian Army in Transnistria, though more limited since the 1990s, puts the region under the direct control and influence of Russia. The Transnistrian frozen conflict has had limiting effects on Moldova’s sovereignty and offers Russia great power leverage to turn around the Western orientation of the country.

the help of the EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan\textsuperscript{30}. Ignored and written-off by the West at the end of the Cold War, Moldova has now become an important frontline in the tensioned relations between the EU and Russia in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis.

As in the case of Ukraine, Moldova has been no exception to Russia’s overbearing influence. In a bid to consolidate its EU rapprochement and to move out of Russia’s sphere of influence, Moldova initialized its Association Agreement (AA) at the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership in November 2013 (Ivan 2014), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement\textsuperscript{31} signed at the end of August 2014.

The paradoxical situation presented to many Transnistrian companies mostly owned by Russians is that they would increasingly benefit from the DCFTA, but the regions’ political authority and budget is heavily dependent upon Russian support and the free delivery of gas (Ivan 2014). The EU’s or any Western or Romanian involvement in Moldova is seen by Moscow as a breach upon its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The blatant instrumentalization of the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Peninsula is another side of the Kremlin’s strategy to foster growing separatist and Russophile sentiments in the region.

In the post-Cold War context, the Romanian political leadership has always encouraged and assisted the Republic of Moldova on its way towards EU and Euro-

\textsuperscript{30} The EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans, \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/action-plans/index_en.htm}

\textsuperscript{31} The EU and Moldova Trade, \url{http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/moldova/}
Atlantic integration as a strategic measure to secure its Eastern borders. Moldova has faced stringent challenges from the Russian predatory foreign policy in the Transnistria frozen conflict, where Russia re-colonizes the breakaway enclave military and politically, a senior military official noted when questioned on the topic of the Transnistria frozen conflict (Bucharest, May 2011).

3.7 The Romanian Security and Defence Policy between NATO and the CSDP

The Romanian Security and Defence Policy in the last two decades demonstrated a committed Euro-Atlantic orientation, in which the Atlantic component and the strategic partnership with the United States have received privileged attention. This part will be extensively tackled in the empirical chapter dealing with the Romanian President Traian Băsescu’s symbolic power and appropriation of the country’s security and defence agenda.

Although Romania has participated under both the EU and NATO tutelages in various missions and in several coalition type missions, the only initiatives that were never refused by Bucharest were those initiated by the United States. In fact, during the entire NATO integration process, Romania has witnessed remarkable transformations, in terms of adapting to NATO organizational structures and in finding a new post-Cold War strategic expression, from a strictly collective defence mentality towards so-called “non-Article 5” missions of peace maintenance and crisis management.

By encouraging strategic multilateralism and bilateral partnerships as well as sustainable economic cooperation, Romania has been actively participating in
regional organizations and offering mentoring and assistance to neighbouring countries, *i.e.* Romania endeavoured to become a security and stability provider in the region - a military force provider and a *striver* country in terms of security creation (Korski & Gowan 2009: 45-46). Although the European integration was met with substantial support and enthusiasm by the Romanian public, the CSDP has elicited little if no interest in Romania at the moment of its launch, due to both the lack of information, low popular interest, and the increased popularity of the NATO membership (Daniel 2003: 71).

The CSDP has been perceived as an initiative meant to bolster the European Security and Defence Identity32 within NATO. What is more, Romania’s decision to enter a coalition type of intervention in Iraq, and the internal crisis within NATO at that particular moment, demonstrated the lack of trust towards European voices sustaining a European security and defence identity and was another reason to prove the necessity of an even closer US strategic partnership.

The blatant tendency to prefer participation in US or NATO lead operations can be explained by the low credibility of the CSDP among Romanian security and political elite as a short and long term guarantor of territorial defence, one of the most important Romanian objectives when security is concerned. Even though the CSDP

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has never been rejected as a complementary NATO security policy, the 2003 Iraqi invasion proved to be a moment of truth for Romania and its security and defence policy orientation, i.e. Romania declared once again its Atlantic preference and entered without any qualms in the so-called coalition of the willing.

During the height of operations in Iraq, the Romanian forces of approximately 730 people were involved in a variety of operations and missions, including interrogating prisoners in Bagdad, reconnaissance and surveillance missions, training, peace maintaining operations and the protection of Polish and British bases. Nevertheless, on January 2012, Romanian President Traian Băsescu delivered to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited in Romania a significant speech reasserting the importance of the CSDP to the Romanian security landscape. He stressed the fact that Romania will always remain an important contributor to the mission of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.

However, the President observed that this policy cannot succeed without a consolidation of the European Union’s external action, in particular through involvement in solving neighbourhood problems. By assessing Romania’s overall contribution to the framework of the Common Security and Defence, the President boasted at the time a staggering involvement, in 2011 Romania becoming the most important contributor to the EU civilian missions.

As an interviewed policy expert with the Romanian Ministry of National Defence of Romania stated, Romania has been able to take on the security obligations since the

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34 Press report, Speech by President Traian Băsescu at the annual meeting of chiefs of diplomatic missions January 19, 2012.
EU negotiating process has started, but with modest defence capabilities contributions – “Romania cannot compete in terms of military capabilities. This was one of the main reasons why we joined NATO in the first place. But we can surely contribute competent personnel for missions” (Bucharest, May 2011).

Nevertheless, even from the get-go, at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels (November 2000) Romania made its offer of additional forces for the European Rapid Reaction Force, in line with the forces provided for the Western European Union (WEU), including maritime and land forces, approximating about 1000 military personnel and four vessels. The following year, during the Capabilities Improvement Conference in Brussels (November 2001), Romania made a significantly increased new offer with a view to enhance its involvement to the achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goals. The new offer included personnel with some background in NATO Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the Romanian Supreme Council of National Defence deciding that these forces were the same as those made available for NATO-led Peace Support Operations.

The offer was thus conditioned by the necessities of financial and logistical capabilities imposed by the training and deployable costs of such forces in foreign theatres of action: land force – 5 infantry battalions and 1 infantry company, 1 paratrooper unit, 1 mountain troops unit, 1 military police unit, 1 engineer unit, 1

36 The Western European Union (WEU), http://www.weu.int/
clearing unit, 1 reconnaissance unit, 1 transport unit; maritime forces – 6 maritime and river vessel, out of which 2 rescue tugs, 1 mine sweeper and a frigate; air forces – 4 MIG-21 Lancer combat aircrafts and a 1 C-130 B carrier (Calin 2000: 71).

The Romanian offer amounted to about 3700 military personnel, coupled by the preparedness to contribute with 75 police officers to the European Police Headline Goal. Such figures demonstrated a great willingness to become further integrated in the European field of security and defence within the military and budgetary limitations of Romania’s security and defence program.

In terms of its capabilities contribution, Romania participated in two of the EU Battlegroups⁴⁰ (EUBG), namely HELBROC BG (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus) and ITROT (Romania, Italy, Turkey). The Romanian proposal⁴¹ for the 2007-2010 period included a company of infantry, an NBC “nuclear safety, bacteriological and chemical” decontamination platoon⁴², a platoon of civil-military relations specialists (CIMIC), two tactical psychological operations teams (PSYOPS), and staff officers (Ancut 2008).

Moreover, at a political level, the CSDP was dealt with as an important development in the process of the EU asserting its identity on the international scene. Yet, an interviewed senior security practitioner in the Romanian Ministry of Defence (Bucharest, June 2012) warned about the CSDP as being “a competing and

⁴⁰ Romania’s contribution to the development of European civilian and military capabilities, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2064
⁴¹ Romania contributes to EU “battlegroups”, http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles/displayArticle/articleID_8072/Romania-contribuie-la-%27grupurile-tactice-de-lupta%27-ale-Uniunii-Europene.html
⁴² Data from Weapons’ Diplomacy, http://stirile.ro/ro/print/diplomatia-armelor-57253.html
unnecessary structure to the NATO framework”. This position reflected the fact that the European and the Euro-Atlantic integration processes were fundamental national priorities in Romania’s foreign and security policy, with some traditionalist military advisors and political camps considering the security dual-track as redundant and counterproductive, and especially against the principle of national sovereignty. In the words of a retired senior policy officer, “Romania does not need more integration and adaptations right now, but actual hard security guarantees" (Bucharest, June 2012)

Consequently, throughout the Romanian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the EU accession process has led to a twinned consolidation of institutional reforms applied in the beginning of the 1990s, including the reformulation of competency requirements and recruitment procedures, remunerations, trainings and specializations, and career opportunities and structures. These innovations were of a most significant importance for the reformulation of capable foreign and security policy personnel.

By favouring the recruitment of new personnel with the aim of retiring the old-school security practitioners from the communist era, the comparatively young and inexperienced security actors gradually accumulated expertise under the tutelages of both NATO’s and the EU’s CSDP frameworks. Romania’s joining the EU created new opportunities and resources for the professionalization of the security and defence field, leading to impressive integration steps in the Common Security and Defence Policy structure.
In terms of developments in the field of the CSDP, several elements need to be mentioned: the high CSDP adaptation pressures on Romania’s security and defence sectors; the participation with capabilities in CSDP civilian and military missions; the Romanian contribution to the European research defence industry; and the professionalization of the Romanian armed forces for participating in autonomous CSDP missions\(^43\). A clear success story was Romania’s participation in the EUMM Georgia mission, with 19 experts ranking the 5\(^{\text{th}}\) in terms of personnel among the EU participants.

According to a press declaration of the former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Diaconescu,

“For Romania, the integration without syncope in the institutional architecture of a European mission with an innovative role in many fields proves once again the inter-operability and the adaptability of the Romanian experts, of their relevant expertise in post-conflict situations overlapping a general transition context, as well as of the consistent contribution we bring to the Common Security and Defence Policy”\(^44\).

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty represented a turning point for the development of an EU Common Security and Defence Policy, both at the level of principles, as well as the instruments. Romania took an active part in the deliberation vis-à-vis the


reform of the EU’s security policy and structure, Romania being actively involved in the security and defence dimension of the EU even before its accession in 2007.\footnote{The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \url{http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2041}}

As a new EU member state, Romania proved that it had the willingness to advance from declarations to actions,\footnote{Speech: Aurescu, Bogdan Lucian. 2013. “Romanian Contribution to CSDP. From the Lisbon Treaty to the European Council of December 2013.” \textit{Strategic Impact} 47 (2): 5-12.} by contributing with personnel to the EU’s missions deployed in the near and far abroad. In preparation for the December 2013 European Council, dedicated to the Common Security and Defence Policy,\footnote{Ibidem} Romania put forward a series of concrete proposals to revise the European Security Strategy especially concerning the Transnistria frozen conflict and the potential involvement of the CSDP in the Black Sea maritime security.

Currently, it could be said that Romania is an active contributor to the CDSP, both in relation to the political dimension, concerned with the support of the member states’ interests identified as common in the field of security and defence, and with respect to the operational dimension, being a dedicated player in many EU crisis management missions. It remains to be identified in what particular way the involvement in the European Union security and defence structures has impacted the NATO-dominated \textit{habitus} of Romanian security practitioners. A more extensive analysis of the above-mentioned tensions within the Romania security \textit{habitus} is to be found in the following empirical chapter dedicated to mapping out the \textit{habitus} of Romanian security actors during the transition post-Cold War as reconstructed from interviews.
The efforts made in the field of security and defence proved that Romania was ready to become an active participant in the political-military dialogue within EU military structures. The bellow table considers some of the most important developments made by Romania in the field of security and defence and concerning the CSDP. Such advancements were indicative of modest, yet consistent, commitments towards the consolidation of the European Union’s security framework, being a result of concerted efforts from the part of a multitude of individual and institutional actors in the Romanian security field.

**Table 3.7.2 The CSDP exigencies on Romania’s security and defence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Dimensions</th>
<th>Historical Developments</th>
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| **The participation in the CSDP** | • Following the endorsement of the Adhesion Treaty, on the 25th of April 2005, Romania participated in the political-military dialogue with the EU, according to its active observer status, at EUMC reunions with CHODs from member states and non-member states (May and November 2005 and 2006).  
• In 2006, the Romanian General Staff (GS) participated with military experts from the Strategic Planning Directorate (J5) in three working groups, concerning the “EU Long Term Vision (LTV) – defence capabilities needs” - organized by the EUMC (February, March and April 2006) and coordinated by the European Security Agency (EDA). Their contribution consisted of defining the Future Military Environment for 2006-2030.  
• A high level seminar concerning the LTV took place on June, 29, 2006, in Brussels. The LTV draft was adopted and then it was analysed by Defence ministers at the EDA Steering Board held on October, 3, 2006.  
• In 2007, the Romanian General Staff and Navy representatives participated in developing the Maritime Dimension Study, focused on identifying means of possibilities to contribute the CSDP tasks.  
• The Romanian General Staff and services’ experts participated in the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) Working Groups for the elaboration of the Scrutinising, Assessing and Evaluating Methodologies concerning regional security objectives. |
| **The institutional and political-military dimension** | Romania participated with military forces and capabilities in EU-led missions and operations, at regional as well as at global level. In support of fulfilling the EU assumed engagements, at the Romanian General Staff level, the following actions had been undertaken by the structures with responsibilities in this area: |

In January 2006, the Memorandum with Romanian EU force package, the General Staff and the Department of Policy of Defence and Planning Department (DPDP) Common Order, concerning the filling in of the Headline Goal Questionnaires (HGQ-2010) were elaborated and endorsed, together with the establishment of the Working Group, at the MOD level, so as to respond to requirements of the HGQ;

- Military experts from the General Staff and Services participated, between January and February 2006, in the trainings organized by the EUMS for fulfilling the HGQ-2010 requirements;
- The Romanian force package was maintained at the level of two battalions and increased to 2 brigades, after 2010. The HGQ-2010 endorsed by the Defence Planning Council, at the General Staff level, was transmitted to the EUMS, in March 2006, through the Romanian Mission at NATO;
- The Romanian General Staff participated with experts in March-April 2006 in three EUMS Working Groups for the elaboration and implementing of the Scrutinising Methodology, which defined the way of evaluating and scrutinising military structures made available to member states for the EU;
- In May and June 2006, the EU military forces and capabilities scrutiny reports were elaborated and filled in, and by the end of June, they were transmitted to the EUMS;
- In July 2006, Romania confirmed the data reported in the HGQ-2010, and the force package was included in the Supplement EU Force Catalogue;
- In October 2006, a Clarification dialogue concerning the Romanian force package took place. The participants were representatives from J5/GS, DPD/MOD and ROMISSEU;
- In January 2007, the Romanian force package was included in the EU Force – FC-07;
- On January 1, 2007, Romania became a full-fledged member of the European Union.

The Romanian participation in EU-led missions:

**Europe:**
- EUPAT (FYROM) – civilian mission;
- EUPM (BiH) – civilian police mission;
- EUFOR Althea – the most important EU led mission in BiH;
- EUBAM – Moldavia.

**Africa:**
- AMIS II - Darfur Sudan – civil-military mission;
- EUPOL Kinshasa - DR Congo – civilian police mission;
- EUSEC DR Congo - civilian mission, extended mandate - June
- Middle East/Asia:
  - EUPOL COPPS – civilian mission
  - EUBAM - Rafah
  - EUJUST LEX - Iraq
  - ACEH - Indonesia (AMM)

**The participation in EU civilian operations:**
- Operation “Proxima” (FYROM 2003-2005) – three police officers;
- Mission “EUPAT” (Bosnia-Herzegovina) – nine police officers;
- “EU COPPS” Rafah (Palestine) and “EU BAM Rafah” (assistance and monitoring the border point Rafah, between Gaza and Egypt) – four police officers.

To the EU police mission (EUMP) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, started in 2003, Romania contributed with six police officers.

- ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in December 2004; between January-October 2006, Romania continued its participation with a number of 82 military personnel.
- In the context of training the military observers for the EU support mission– AMIS
II in Darfur/Sudan, GS offered in 2006 a trainer for the Peacekeeping School in Koulikoro/Mali. (Romania’s participation represents a support gesture in developing the African Union crisis management capabilities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Updated Participation of Romania in EU missions 49</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Romania has taken part in several CSDP missions conducted in Europe, Africa and the Middle East:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Althea, EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUMM Georgia, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden, EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS, in the Palestinian territories.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>February 2011</strong> – Romania was the first among the Member States as regards the mission staff (227 experts) and second in terms of total contribution, including contracted staff (258 experts).</td>
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<td>This performance was achieved thanks to the efforts of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as national coordinator of participation in the CSDP missions, and to the contributions of the Ministries of Interior, National Defence and Justice, which have provided qualified candidates to fill in vacancies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With the withdrawal of the Romanian contingent of the EULEX Kosovo, which was concluded at the end of 2012, the Romanian participation in CSDP missions decreased.</td>
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<td><strong>July 2013</strong> – Romania was represented by seconded staff:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EUMM Georgia (33 experts),</td>
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<td>- EUPOL Afghanistan (20 experts),</td>
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<td>- EUPOL R.D. Congo (2 experts),</td>
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<td>- EUAVSEC South Sudan (1 expert),</td>
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<tr>
<td>as well as by 55 Romanian experts working in the CSDP missions as contracted personnel. 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“On the civilian side, Romania is currently among the main contributors (with both personnel and equipment) to the EU civilian crisis management operations. In July 2013, 56 Romanian seconded experts and other 55 contracted personnel were taking part in CSDP missions.” 51</td>
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**3.8 Conclusion**

The chapter addressed the question of how and to what extent had Romania’s security field changed during and since the end of the Cold War. The chapter contextualized the overlapping influence of the EU and NATO in the case of the

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Romania’s security and defence reform in the post-Cold War security setting. The study focused on mapping out the principal reforms undertaken in the Romanian security field and the national political and decision-making bodies responsible with tracing Romania’s strategic objectives.

Other elements played a central role in the empirical dimension of the research: the lingering Cold War mentalities contrasted to new ways of doing security through professionalization and reform; the Atlanticist or NATO-oriented Romanian strategic culture versus a more Europeanist or CSDP-oriented stance, reflected in Romania’s choices to participate in military or civilian missions abroad; the “Russian” factor and the Romanian security responses triggered by the vicinity to this regional power as reflected by the Transnistrian frozen conflict; and the continued reliance on outdated, territorial-based traditional concepts of defence redolent of the Cold War era in the face of professionalization and reform efforts.
CHAPTER 4 THE ROMANIAN SECURITY FIELD – THE HYSTERESIS EFFECTS OF THE ROMANIAN TRANSITIONAL SECURITY HABITUS

4.1 Introduction

The chapter accounts for a sociologically inspired micro-analysis that uses the logic of practicality (Pouliot 2008: 257-288) to reconstruct Romania’s transitional national strategic culture post-Cold War through the qualitative interviewing of security practitioners and civil servants in Bucharest and in Brussels. As already mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the Bourdieusean theoretical triad of the capital, the habitus, and the field are applied to empirically operationalize the logic of practice in the Romanian security field. The end goal is to unravel the tacit knowledge and the taken-for-granted nature of security behaviour from the interviewees’ answers.

For that purpose, this chapter contextualizes the Bourdieusean formula of \[(\text{habitus}) + \text{capital}] + \text{field} = \text{practice} (Bourdieu 1984: 101): it looks at the Romanian security agents’ practical dispositions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 120-21), their respective symbolic cultural capitals (Bourdieu 1984: 14), their habitus or the security professionals’ set of ingrained dispositions, and the configuration of the Romanian security field (Bourdieu 1985: 723-44).

The chapter focuses on the ways in which the reform of the Romanian security and defence sector has been reconstructed by the interviewees as regards the main obstacles encountered when adapting to NATO and the CSDP security templates. In doing so, instances of discrepancy (hysteresis) during the Romanian security transition are highlighted, as examples of non-alignment between security actors’
ingrained dispositions (security *habitus*) and the changing structural realities in the Romanian security *field*.

The assumption is that where there is a stable organisational culture, new recruits tend to adapt to already established *doxic* professional patterns, but when the field is in transition, there is much more leeway for hysteresis and innovation. The case of the Romanian security field puts forward a new brand of consultancy-oriented security technocrats, as one interviewee in Brussels put it (Brussels, October 2013), gifted with a wide range of expertise stemming from their foreign academic and NATO-oriented training or the European Union policy practice. Such new transnationalized players have the tendency to challenge the already established security structures and doxic patterns, thus becoming, though at a modest level, more successful in carving policy openings, windows of opportunities, and demands for new ways of security making.

The main empirical gain given by the micro-analysis is that it offers a niche account of security reforms in a country such as Romania, by bringing into focus the most important processes and factors that shape the dynamics of a transitional security field. From this point of view, in order to better understand the reform trajectory of the Romanian security development post-Cold-War from the perspective of the new institutional arrangements, policies and doctrinal reforms in security-making, a practice-oriented approach captures the sometimes syncopated and often hit-or-miss nature a of the transitional security field.
The main argument of this thesis is that Romanian security reforms post-Cold-War have developed under the aegis of a generalized state of hysteresis or, in other words, there is an endemic mismatch between the Romanian security professionals’ dispositions and their respective positions in the game of security making. The historical chapter demonstrated that in the immediate aftermath of the Cold-War and during the several reform stages from the NATO membership to the EU and the CSDP integration, one constant thread defined the *habitus* of Romanian security professionals, namely the security practitioners’ capacity to constantly reinvent their professional identity and to adapt to new changes.

This analysis is based on the concepts of hysteresis and that of the *transitional security habitus* and it follows three guiding themes as they emerged out of the interviewing process: first, the theme of Romania’s security apprenticeship and the country’s choice between a pragmatic, NATO-oriented, Atlanticist position and the rhetorical support given to the European Union’s CSDP efforts; second, the issue of lingering Cold War mentalities in security making, coupled by Romania’s aspirations as an emerging regional power and the Russian factor within the Wider Black Sea Region; third, the reconfiguration of the Romanian security field, with new skills *versus* old skills of doing security as they became delegitimized and conversely legitimized during the general transitional dimension of the Romania’s security field.

These three overarching themes were used as heuristic tools so as to organize the information gathered during the interviewing process. The chapter’s main contribution, confirmed by the gathered data, is that it uncovers the pervasively transitional and arbitrary nature of the Romanian security field, matched by an
equally transitional security habitus. The concept of the transitional security habitus comes to express the generalized state of hysteresis between positional and dispositional levels, and thus generating an apparently normalized image of ordered chaos between objective and internalized structures.

4.2 Romania’s Security Apprenticeship – the Influences of NATO and the EU

“Practical mimesis” (Bourdieu 1990: 73), according to Bourdieu, is different from pure imitation, because it implies more than a conscious effort to imitate certain models, it implies practicing, doing, and acting – through apprenticeship and practice, the pupil acquires the competence of the master. Vincent Pouliot, when addressing the issue of power relations as apprenticeship “in and through practice”, “in which the master’s competence is felt by the apprentice as a relation of immediate adherence to the very nature of things” (Pouliot 2010: 47), refers to the relations of authority established between actors that are interested in emulating the ways of doing things and good practices of superior actors. At a structural level, Romania in the post-Cold War context, as the good apprentice that it has always proven to be in various historical situations, has strived to diligently adhere to the two models of security production of both NATO and the EU.

One interviewee has surprisingly described the above-mentioned situation by poignantly and bitterly referring to the 19th century Romanian thinker and critic, Titu Maiorescu, “during its history, Romania has always suffered from an imagined inferiority complex and tried to import presumed foreign and better forms of government” (Brussels, April 2013). The same interviewee continued to note that it is
not surprising that Romania has found itself, yet again, in search of new models of
government; and security making has not been an exception from the case.

In his famous article from 1868, “Against the current direction in Romanian culture”,
Titu Maiorescu, one of the most respected Romanian thinkers and critics of the age,
inscrutably diagnosed Romanian society as possessing, in terms of modern
institutions, the entire Western civilization. The caveat was that these institutions
were all but dead shells and empty models, pretentions without basis, ghosts without
body, illusions without truths. This tendency to institutionally emulate external
structures was further illustrated by the words of a policy expert: “this is how Romania
survived all these centuries and adapted to new changes” (Bucharest, June 2012).

The question of “who we are” within the broader European and transatlantic security
field, another military official noted (Bucharest, June 2012), is reflected in the “what
we can deliver” question. During the post-Cold War transitional decades, the
Romanian security field has been in search of a defined security identity within the
scope of limited military capabilities and outdated armed forces. Romania currently
participates in both the EU’s institutionalization in the field of the CSDP and the
security cooperation within NATO structures, this being an invaluable opportunity to
contribute to international security beyond Romania’s limited military capabilities.

This often implied the uncritical adoption of certain Western military models without
taking into account Romanian material capabilities and cultural affinities. A Romanian
military commander pointed out: “The Romanians make more reforms than the entire
European Union, but these are more *feuilles volantes* (flying papers) than concrete practices” (Bucharest, May 2011).

And in the tradition of a Bourdieusean understanding, security practices in the Romanian context, as several interviewees seemed to agree, have not followed a rational, organized or structural pattern of development, but rather a hit-or-miss and cursory one, a “bricolage” (Mérand 2008: 134) type of security planning and reform during the adoption of external governance models (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012).

From this point of view, it is interesting to note the sometimes ironical references that were made by several interviewees concerning the implementation end of their work, *i.e.* “it is sometimes an utter head-ache to decipher what politicians want”, “we play it by the ear” “between you and me, they don’t know what they are doing” (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012), such practitioners being at the receiving end of sometimes contradictory judgments and policy directions emitted by political figures or decision-makers, who seem to be divorced from the ground-work realities of the security making practical process.

This insulation of day-to-day practice (Pouliot 2010: 122) from decision-making processes and politics was high according to several interviewed practitioners (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012). These concerns could also be read as a case of “chair” envy, such practitioners, in a Bourdieusean reading, not being endowed with enough symbolic capital\[^{52}\] in comparison to political influencers so as

\[^{52}\] Symbolic capital understood as “the means of imposition and inculcation of durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure.” (Bourdieu 1994: 9)
to significantly determine and influence the Romanian security policy agenda and objectives. This observation only comes to reinforce the previously mentioned “bricolage” and idiosyncratic nature of Romanian security practice.

On a side note and related to the politics versus security nexus, the case of the Romanian Presidency and its personalized image, mainly due to the dominance of the executive in the formulation of Romania’s security objectives, is particularly interesting; the analysis of his almost overwhelming institutional and symbolic power is further discussed in the following chapter. The role played by the Romanian Presidency and the political personality of the President Traian Băsescu are indicative of what Bourdieu terms as the “mystery of the ministry” (Bourdieu 2001), namely when a certain agent is awarded with enough symbolic leeway so as to act and speak in the name of many, thus literally coming to embody the state and its agency/performativity.

On a general note, the answers given by security practitioners and civil servants that were active in the Foreign Ministry departments concerning the choice between NATO and the EU have put forward sometimes discrepant views on the topic (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012). Nevertheless, most views reflected the shared assumption and the usual mantra of a strong Atlanticist commitment under NATO’s security umbrella. Such views were in line with the Presidency’s official position and declarations that Romania has been overtly supporting the Alliance and recognizing it as the principal hard security guarantor under the Article 5 collective defence prerequisites.
Quite interestingly, many interviewees seemed to wonder just why there was a deliberate differentiation between NATO and the CSDP, “The CSDP is also essentially relying on NATO defence and military assets, because the EU member states have not reached sufficient levels of defence development” (Brussels, April 2013), a senior military official pointed out, by specifically using the already cliché expression describing the interlinked relationship between the EU forces and NATO.

From a pragmatic point of view, it was implied in some of the answers that access to NATO resources is fundamental to any EU-led operations, and Romania has more invested interests “cultivating a relationship that is more beneficial to long-term goals in line with NATO’s Smart Defence” – the same military officer observed (Brussels, April 2013). “Romania has always emphasized a double security guarantee (US/NATO and EU/CSDP) against any possible regional threat”, one civil servant in the Romanian Ministry of National Defence affirmed (Bucharest, June 2012). When pressed to specifically explain what it is understood by “possible regional threat”, the civil servant preferred to remain vague concerning the possible resurgence of a regional hegemonic actor in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Another policy officer from the same ministry pointed out that “too much dependence on an Atlanticist security policy could erode the credibility of Romania as an EU member state; the more so as the US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan has delegitimized itself in terms of the incapacity to deliver peace and stability” (Bucharest, June 2012). “The missile shield that Washington is ready to provide for Romania does not feed Romanians and protect them from poverty”, the policy officer
further elaborated, this issue pointing out the dangers that a heavy dependence on a distant power might entail for the security strategy of a country such as Romania.

Concerning the EU integration process and the CSDP framework, several interviews projected the general impression that there were no actual practical or doctrinal hurdles encountered in the implementation of the *acquis* surrounding the CSDP framework (Brussels, April 2013; Brussels, October 2013). Bucharest-based respondents mentioned several recurrent instruments through which their department was involved in CSDP-related activities (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012): periodical consultations on European affairs; the participation in the decision-making process concerning the management of military and civilian aspects of security crises; the involvement in the current activities of EU security organisms such as the General Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, the EU Institute for Security Studies; the participation in the Western European Union Security and Defence Inter-parliamentary Assembly; and the participation in EU-led crisis management operations and exercises.

A significant difference was noted by many interviewees concerning the CSDP actions and requirements, which were no longer strictly circumscribed to the realm of defence ministries (Bucharest, June 2012). Nevertheless, most military officers maintained the scenario that NATO was the appropriate vehicle for territorial defence against possible threats, reflecting pervasive mistrust tendencies and Cold-War mentalities and discourse.
As one senior officer pointed out, “Of course NATO is the best choice for us security-wise, I am referring here more exactly to the US which is our best bet, in case ‘you know who from the East’”, he further added in a low voice, “decides to stretch its muscles. Just look at Georgia!” (Bucharest, June 2012). It should also be noted that Romania was first accepted in the NATO “secure” family before becoming EU member states, thus partly accounting for NATO’s vital and grounding-breaking mentoring role in the Romanian security affairs.

*The lack of a strong Romanian strategic culture within the post-communist political setting*, as documented in the historical chapter of the thesis, and the influence of NATO in (in)forming Romanian security practitioners strategic vision, can account for the significantly NATO-dominated habitus of security practitioners. Several interviewees (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) accounted for the institutional tensions created by this exogenous influence in the national realm across ministries and agencies over the monopoly on strategy, framing, policy, and budget, with some security practitioners advocating for more clear-cut priorities and a stronger Romanian strategic vision and independence from NATO. Conversely, “The CSDP framework of cooperation implies deeper responsibilities from the part of the new EU member states, members of more than a military alliance such a NATO”, a senior civil servant believed (Brussels, April 2013).

By adapting to the high operability requirements, Romania and other new EU member states’ needed to transform their national strategic vision from purely state-based defence force templates to a more professionalized security framework, with clear emphasis on quality, reduced numbers, professionalization, flexibility,
diversified skills adaptable to civilian missions, rapid reaction and mobility (The White Paper of the Government: Romanian Armed Forces in 2010 – Reform and Euro-Atlantic Integration, 1999). The external influence of both NATO and the CSDP framework clearly impacted and determined the Romanian security field by delineating the required standards of professionalization and competency.

Several interviewees mentioned the importance to participate in NATO missions and operations in Afghanistan (Brussels, October 2013) to complement their security skillset, mentioning the “Enduring Freedom” Operation, as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As stated by the National Defence Minister Mircea Dusan, Romania has been among the first 5 nations in terms of contributions in this theatre of action, Romania being the first country in the ISAF framework to have under orders an USA subunit.

This comes to confirm the level of professionalism of the Romanian military and the experience they gained during NATO mission in the Balkans – as standardization and interoperability were the key words mentioned during the interviews, as expertise gained through participation in aerial patrols, ground operations, and maritime missions. A senior military officer reiterated the fact that the Romanian armed forces acquired the necessary NATO standards certifications, with a view to ensure the best contribution to NATO missions and operations but also to achieve what is considered

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to be “the highest level of security achieved by Romania in its entire history” by the current Romanian National Defence Minister. Romania has expressed its willingness to participate to approximately one third of the total project developed under NATO’s Smart Defence umbrella.

The concept of “Smart Defence” was also mentioned during the interviewing process when referring to the conceptual framework of the Alliance, being especially attractive as a doctrinal input due to its pragmatic dimension, the prioritized efficiency of military capabilities, costs, and the overall avoidance of the duplication of efforts with the EU’s CSDP.

On the other hand, the participation in the CSDP missions was considered to be of second-order importance by the interviewees (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) in terms of expertise acquirement, mentioning among others the collaborative framework between the Romanian National Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, who all contributed personnel to the missions. Worth mentioning were the following finer points as regards the CSDP skillset: the needed expertise listed for civilian or low-intensity operations; the preparedness of the personnel required from social skills employed in the civilian management of crisis; the complex understanding of stabilization and reconstruction processes in collaboration with experts and local representative; and the harmonious integration of civilian staff in military objectives and operations. The last element seemed to elicit the most interest as it was the most referenced.

56 Ibidem
57 Ibidem “Romania obtained a significant experience in this field. It is an active member in several projects such as the NATO Airborne Early Warning – NAEW, The Alliance Ground Surveillance – AGS, and the Strategic Airlift Capability – SAC.”
58 Romania’s Participation in CSDP Missions, http://www.mae.ro/node/1884
A preliminary conclusion could be drawn: Romanian security practitioners’ view on the EU-NATO relations could be qualified as being profit-driven, namely two organizations that provide complementary models for enhanced national security and common defence, serving as training ground for improving expertise to be later reconverted in symbolic capital at home.

On a different note and in the good spirit of a pupil with two masters, in military terms, Romania’s NATO membership brought a higher defence budget, a defence reform and new and better capabilities able to act according to the tasks of the Alliance. The apprenticeship tendency has also been mirrored in the CSDP involvement: even before its accession to the EU, Romania participated in two battlegroups (Balkan Battle group ad Italian Romanian Turkish Battlegroup), it used the CSDP framework for developing civilian capabilities with a view to civilian or civil-military operations, and used the opportunity of the European Defence Agency\(^\text{59}\) to develop its defence R&D programmes (Phinnemore 2006).

As already mentioned, Romania was characterized as a *striver* country (Korski & Gowan 2009: 45-46) in terms of contributing to the EU security framework: data demonstrated that Romania has proven its commitment to the CSDP by leading, along with France and Italy, in terms of civilian personnel deployed. Throughout the interviews in Brussels, the rhetoric of Romanian bureaucrats concerning Romanian’s participation in CSDP missions and operations mentioned from “our participation is solid and diverse”, “we currently have seconded experts in six civilian missions and in

two military operations”, “we rank the third among the EU members states in terms of contribution to civilian missions”, to “out of the 218 experts seconded by Romania and currently deployed in EU civilian missions, almost 200 are deployed in EUMM Georgia and in EULEX Kosovo” (Brussels, April 2013; Brussels, October 2013). Nevertheless, with the withdrawal of the Romanian contingent from the EULEX Kosovo at the end of 2012, the degree of the Romanian contribution to the CSDP registered a significant downward spiral\(^60\).

4.3 The Politics versus Security Nexus in the Romanian Security Field

Generally speaking, home-based interviewed military officers were more or less sceptical than civil servants in their assessment of Romania’s role within the CSDP framework (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012), while at the same time associating the EU with their dislike of politics and propagandistic promises of reform and civilian oversight. While the general professionalization of the Romanian armed forces under NATO’s influence was seen as a positive outcome, the reduction of personnel and the civilian/political interference in military affairs was quite surprisingly associated with Romania’s general transition process. “We had enough of reforms, restructuring, and cuts under so-called modernization attempts by our *enlightened* political leaders”, one senior colonel noted (Bucharest, June 2012). On the other hand, interviewed civil servants in the ministries of foreign affairs and national defence were more interested in the long-term advantages of the CSDP (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012).

\(^60\) Romania’s Participation in the CSDP Missions, [http://www.mae.ro/node/1884](http://www.mae.ro/node/1884)
Several Brussels-based Romanian bureaucrats (Brussels, April 2013; Brussels, October 2013) went even further and acknowledge the EU’s role as a civilian power. EU and the fact that, according to one interviewee, “The EU is THE institution capable of providing varied skill-sets in the conflict-prevention, resolution, and reconstruction cycle.” (Brussels, April 2013) Elements mentioned included power-sharing, state-building, political and social engineering, legal and human rights interference, economic and financial support, and civil society building.

The analysis lends weight to the assumption that senior military officers and seasoned security practitioners have been more inclined to have an Atlanticist-oriented, pragmatic habitus, while younger, more cosmopolite and bureaucratic-minded civil servants both in Brussels and in the national Romanian political arena were more open to Euro-centric dispositions. One policy maker bluntly admitted that “older military officers are less enthusiastic about diversifying their skill-set” (Bucharest, June 2012), while one senior military officer observed that “these young bureaucrats are too uncritical about what the EU can do for us in terms of security” (Bucharest, June 2012).

Several interviewees (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) remarked that a country such as Romania needs to accommodate both the EU and the NATO institutional influences and to find both the policy and institutional proper responses for its security doctrine in the long run. This demonstrates that new dimensions of security, besides those of the hard defence, military ones, could also take centre stage in a more fluid and encompassing Romanian security field.
If indeed, the relational aspects between the CSDP and NATO are expressed in terms of planning and a difference of vision, then an interesting point to look at is the very framing of this planning and strategic culture. Hence, a Bourdieusean-inspired theoretical framework could prove to be extremely useful in terms of pinpointing the tensions between security sub-fields, the symbolic power of different security professionals in monopolizing Romanian strategic culture, as well as the complementary, or competing dynamic between a NATO-based strategic culture and the input of Romania’s new participation in the CSDP missions.

From this point of view, the value-added of a Bourdieusean approach in the study of the tensions between security subfields helps the understanding of the main research question focused on the extent and the ways in which the security field of Romania has been influenced and transformed by the double-folded influence of the EU and NATO in specific institutional and policy areas. It is to be expected that NATO possessed the coveted legitimacy and extensive resources that have been highly valued by Romanian security practitioners from the military/defence subfield. As a result of their NATO-socialization, they have been engaged in a symbolic power struggle with other security subfields such as the political realm.

Interview answers (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) pointed towards the fact that, as far as the Romanian security practice was concerned, the hysteresis and antagonisms with regards to NATO and the CSDP models of security making were most evident in the military versus civilian/political echelons of security practitioners, the bone of contention or the objects of struggle being the civilian tendency to politically control the military.
On the one hand, senior military officers were more inclined to stick to the traditional doxa and ways of doing things, and surprisingly enough, NATO still represented to them a familiar, almost Cold-War-like “Us versus Them” simplification of the complex international security arena (Bucharest, June 2012). Some of the interviewed senior officers (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) were referring to NATO’s role in Eastern Europe in a language sometimes redolent of a by-gone Cold-War era. The caveat is that such senior military hardliners still occupy, due to seniority, the highest positions in the Romanian military hierarchy.

On the other hand, the new wave of younger civil servants, socialized by the admission stages in the EU with a more Euro-centric discourse, and more familiarized with the various policy intricacies and the institutional maze of the Union, could be less inclined to rely on the old Cold-War inherited dispositions. As an interviewed policy expert in European integration and regional cooperation with the Romanian Ministry of National Defence stated, “Romania has been able to contribute in the broader area of CFSP and to take on the demanding obligations of membership since the negotiating process.” (Bucharest, May 2011).

When asked to identify the main factors leading to a more limited involvement in the area of the CSDP, the same expert offered objective and structural reasons as the main cause of a gap between Romania’s aspirations towards playing a major role in the CSDP framework and the grass-root reality. Quite surprisingly, the same structural limitations did not necessarily impede Romania’s commitment to the NATO cause.
4.4 Efforts to Re-construct the Content of Security post-Cold War

The Romanian transitional security habitus has been deeply marked by what Huntington referred to as the “expertise” of the profession (Huntington 1957), or in other words, the more fluid and competitive the security habitus becomes, the more proficiency and symbolic capital the security practitioner acquires. The old Cold War competences and soldiering skills, conversely, represented a rigid and taken-for-granted security habitus, which needed to be surpassed and challenged by Romanian security practitioners so as to adapt to 21st century security making requirements.

Interview responses revealed that the Romanian security field was still plagued by the spectres of communism and Cold-War paranoia, albeit not at the intensity of the confrontational situations or explosive disagreements from the past (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012). Seasoned Romanian security practitioners, during the interviewing process, displayed a down-to-earth, pragmatic discourse, playing down the communist legacies in the Romanian security mentality, but still keeping with the tradition of a hawkish, Realpolitik perspective when discussing Romania’s role in the Wider Black Sea Region and its relation to the Eastern Neighbourhood.

From this point of view, one official dealing with Romania’s foreign policy towards Russia stated that “the past is the past, the relationship is normalized and stable, but we, the Polish, the Hungarians do not forget” (Bucharest, May 2011). This is an instance of the remnants of the old confrontational rhetoric, the Cold-War hostile
language and discourse aiming to value the role of the Army (Pouliot 2010: 101) as the institution responsible of national territorial safety.

The inherent tensions present in the Romanian security habitus stemmed from the transformation and the reform of the Romanian security dispositions from outdated Cold-War representations to postmodern understandings of security making. One of the major concerns of the Romanian transition was the reform of the civil and military relations, including the establishment of a genuine democratic control of the Armed Forces. From a security practitioner’s point of view “in theory, we knew that the military echelons needed to undergo drastic reduction of departments and personnel, but, in practice, the process of reform and adaptation to NATO standards has had deep and sometimes sad consequences for our military forces. Necessity won, though.” (Bucharest, June 2012)

One important misperception was that the military were supporters of the Ceausescu regime and the dictatorship, though the military actually played a key role in the 1989 revolution and in Ceausescu’s overthrow, by turning their arms and aligning with the revolutionaries. The restructuring of the Romanian armed forces and the military institution had the advantage of several positive historical precedents: as already mentioned in the historical chapter, starting from 1968 and following Romania’s refusal to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Romanian armed forces were required to adopt a national-oriented military doctrine that centred around national values rather than communist ideology; the national doctrine was based on defence principles sustained only by nationally-owned resources, resulting in the fact that the training, functioning, and organization of the military reclaimed a national
character; Romania had the right to plan the national defence of its territory with national means.

Moreover, Romania’s contribution in the manoeuvres carried out by the Warsaw Pact was limited and at best symbolic, namely staff exercises (Leebaert & Dickinson 1992: 144). Consequently, even though communist principles were upheld, national values were also essential hallmarks in the training of the military in contrast with the Warsaw Pact military art principles – the Romanian armed forces joined the Romanian revolution in December 1989 and partly demonstrated that patriotic sentiments outranked communist alliances.

Nevertheless, the post-Cold War transformation and reform in the Romanian security field highly impacted the professional doxa and the territorial-based security making. These demands were then translated into symbolic capital and became important criteria for advancing within the military ranks. The fall of communism and the waves of national reforms, coupled by adaptation pressures to become competent members of international organizations, have presented numerous challenges to the existing doxic knowledge.

The introduction of a new skill set of postmodern security practices has constantly pressured the Romanian military to transform the raw physicality, the sometimes exalted nationalism, and the automatism of the job into more nuanced practices of doing security. In order to probe this perspective, several officials were asked whether they thought that the new reforms on the Romanian security agenda were seen as challenging and whether they showed enthusiasm for the concrete progress
being done (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012). The general impression was that the security and defence reform process, though sometimes done in the muddled “Romanian-style” – one civil servant noted (Bucharest, May 2011), was a necessary evil so as to bring Romanian military forces into the 21st century.

The re-composition of the content of security as seen through the eyes of the interviewees implied the deeper understanding of the Romanian armed forces in the 21st century beyond the traditional role of national defence against potential external threats. The point of contention was the realization that the new roles undertaken within NATO and the EU structures did not undermine the traditional role of the Army but they complemented it. It represented thus a new modus vivendi and philosophy for security making in stark contrast with the old ways of doing things.

It is to be assumed that the metamorphosis from a civilian to a military officer involved also some major shifts in the habitus in terms of values and attitudes, the training received being deposited in their mind and bodies, with an acute understanding of the Self / Other paradigm between the security fields per se and other socio-political fields. Nevertheless, a particularly interesting point was the way in which younger military personnel rationalized their career choices, from more idealistic and honest justifications like serving their country, prestige or professionalism to more pragmatic reasons such as a safe and relatively well-paid occupation (Bucharest, June 2012). The opportunistic streak was again present, with either symbolic or material advantages as the main carrots for professionalization and a military career.
In the eyes of several interviewees, their career goals were marked by the importance of field experience in NATO, EU or coalition missions, considered as high markers of prestige and possible rewards in terms of both symbolic and economic capital. It was made clear during the interviews that sometimes the motivation for foreign deployment was not necessarily a result of a newly acquired habitus, namely of new ways of doing security and their normative motivation (Bucharest, June 2012). Nor was it an aftermath of clearly understanding the rationality behind the country’s ambitions and aspirations to catch up with other Western European countries in terms of international projection.

The motivation to be deployed abroad under the umbrella of international missions was mostly considered to be a personal opportunity so as to gain substantial pecuniary and symbolic rewards, and hence it was a worthy sacrifice to risk the participation in conflict zones. This type of reasoning for external deployment could be considered as an integrative dimension of a transitional security habitus, where dispositions are not yet cemented and values are in flux. Nevertheless, voices in the national media have also been extremely critical concerning the small amount of payment received by Romanian soldiers in comparison to dangers in theatres of action such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

A cursory review of Romanian history demonstrated the fact that the tumultuous past, “the previous patterns of proto-democratic society and military and the royal dictatorships” (Mannitz 2012: 209), plus the communist heritage, all led to the creation of different, often contradictory ideologies within Romanian society and the military itself. One of the most important ideological influences in the Romanian
military doctrine was the “struggle of the entire people” (Mannitz 2012: 209), emphasizing the elements of trust and solidarity in the Romanian armed forces as guarantors of national defence and as key players in nation-building practices.

This has been demonstrated by countless opinion polls listing the trust of the people in the Army as only secondary to the Romanian Orthodox Church in terms of a trusted institution. Nevertheless, one of the drawbacks of such a doctrine predominantly focused on a national mind-set and national objectives such as self-defence is that it entered in a clear contradiction to the NATO and the CSDP frameworks of foreign deployment and sending military troops abroad.

External power projection and reforms were seen as lesser objectives for the Romanian military, due to the fact that the justification of territorial self-defence was missing. Even though Romania had participated in peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s, it was only after the NATO membership and the 2006 National Security Strategy that power projection was institutionalized as an important Romanian military objective. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the motivation of Romanian soldiers for foreign deployment was not necessarily related to post-materialist factors such as national pride or patriotism, but related to more materialist incentives such as economic rewards and rank.

When given the opportunity to express their views, some interviewees were willing to criticize and distance themselves from certain practices of the Romanian military (Bucharest, June 2012) – provided their anonymity was preserved, commenting on common public interest themes such as corruption, lack of professionalism, and
technological backwardness. Interviewees that reached the age of pension and were participant in all three stages of transformation, from the pre-communist era, the early years of reforms, to the NATO era, displayed mixed feelings regarding the reform of the Romanian security and defence ethos.

On the one hand, the “more mature in age” traditionalists formulated strong judgements, based on their habitus, regarding the reform of the security and defence sector, distinguishing between the not so candid political/civilian oversight of the military’s activities and the real necessities to have up-to-date technological assets. The unpopular initiatives of political accountability and civilian oversight over a formerly sovereign security and defence field were viewed with suspicion but also with caution, as the need to learn the new constraints and risks was important so as to avoid wrong moves and navigate the national security field.

In order to illustrate this point, a former military officer explained: “Look at the way in which they cleaned house, you either catch up with NATO standards or you are out” (Bucharest, June 2012). The main concern, expressed by the majority of the interviewees, was the development of raw military capabilities and the necessity to advance new strategic core values and priorities. Also, the general feeling was that practitioners were conflicted and ambivalent regarding the reform process and confirmed the assumption of a generalized hysteresis in the Romanian security field between actors’ dispositions and their confusion and struggle for certain positions within the security hierarchy.
According to interviewed civilian personnel in the Ministry of Defence (Bucharest, May 2011), both the CSDP and NATO frameworks necessitated complex restructuring solutions that Romania has yet to fully develop so as to reach its full potential as a genuine security contributor. In the case of Romania’s post-communist and geopolitically-influenced position as a EU border country, the above complex institutional and bureaucratic solutions have been constantly challenged by more pressing, *Realpolitik* objectives.

Interviewees mentioned several times (Bucharest, May 2011; Bucharest, June 2012) that the Army considers other security subfields as subservient to a higher national security purpose, which has been primarily upheld by the Romanian Army. Interviewees pointed out that there are increased difficulties in turning from territory-based defence to expeditionary missions, this implying pooling from the expertise of other sub-fields.

One senior military officer even went on to suggest that “indeed, we need to make changes and to make adequate resources available for such operations. But you must understand that restructuring our forces will always be made under the encompassing umbrella of the military by bringing in non-military personnel if necessary.” (Bucharest, May 2011) He went on to emphasize the necessity for Romania to participate in more peacekeeping operations, “which means bringing in computer specialists for communications purposes, medics, psychologist, police, human intelligence and special operations forces”. Inter-institutional boundary-blurring thus was an important side-effect of the structural transformation efforts of
the Romanian Armed Forces, the professionalization processes opening up the military to the influences coming from the civilian realm.

4.5 Geopolitics and Regional Leadership in the Black Sea Area

On the topic of Romania’s regional security objectives, several security practitioners stressed Romania’s role of regional cooperation catalyst – “a link of the Euro-Atlantic involvement in the broader context of the Wider Black Sea Region”.

The main goal would be, according to a Romanian policy expert, “that of providing the EU with a secure, democratic-oriented and prosperous neighbourhood” (Brussels, October 2013).

On the other hand, a senior military officer noted that “The EU has sometimes at sugar-coated discourse of civilian power and good neighbourhood politics, but the EU must also deal with several dire facts of which we all are very clear about!” (Brussels, October 2013). Romania’s increased participation in the CSDP could mark transitional patterns towards a new Europeanist strategic culture and the transgression of the Cold-War realism of its security strategy – this idea was mainly preferred by the civilian personnel with a more Brussels-oriented habitus (Brussels, April 2013; (Brussels, October 2013). This comes to show the power of socialization patterns and exposure to certain transnational epistemic communities.

A member of the Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union supported the perspective of regional ownership at the EU’s Eastern borderline and believed that “among the things that we most gain by our double participation in both
NATO and the CSDP is a better chance for Romania to become a regional leader” (Brussels, April 2013). Most of the interviewees asserted a proactive involvement in the Wider Black Sea region, stating that Romania is indeed, in a the words of an interviewee “ready to assume a regional role in the Black Sea area”; “it has been keen to make use of the new EU gained membership status and the EU’s cooperative framework to forge and foster ties in the region” (Brussels, April 2013).

One security professional noted that Romania has developed independent regional initiatives, giving the example the Black Sea Forum61, and it has been vocal about the important security challenges the region poses to both Romania and the EU.

In terms of its geostrategic positioning, another interviewee mentioned that “Romania could be the most suitable state for moderating the power equilibrium in the Black Sea region” (Bucharest, June 2012).

Confronted with a plethora of shareholders and stakeholder in the region, the Black Sea Region calls for “a suitable and neutral mediator” the interviewee further stressed, Romania naturally positioning itself in this role by being a riverine country, because of its geostrategic position, due to its consistent social and economic progress and its committed the EU and NATO membership, and last but not the least, because of its political stability and interests in the local ownership.

61 The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership was created on June 5, 2006, following the model of a non-institutionalized, flexible arena for dialogue and cooperation in the region. Russia's reluctance to send an official delegation to the Forum, resuming only to the presence of its ambassador, was motivated by the fact that the existing frameworks of cooperation in the region are more than enough to foster regional cohesiveness. The analysis of this incident is disquieting, in the sense that the Russian message was as clear as one can get, no other country is mandated to assume a leadership position in the Black Sea cooperative process. Russia’s stance illustrates its monopoly in the region’s agenda setting. The political message of such an action could read as follows: it is not for “lesser” countries to take major regional initiatives on their own without consulting with Russia first; and no regional project can be successful without Russia as a major participant.
In addition, there was a shared belief among interviewees that the security of the Black Sea Region has been a towering strategic concern for Romania. Nevertheless, the means through which the Romanian strategy was to be achieved remained under discussion, with some interviewees preferring a *Realpolitik* approach, with a clear-cut emphasis on the US strategic partnership and a more assertive NATO involvement in the region, over the multilateral cooperation model and the softer EU policy towards its Eastern neighbourhood.

In this case, the transitional security habitus was particularly affected by the efforts to surpass the conflict-based mind-frame and pattern of regional interaction, caused by the previous experiences of regional stand-offs, nationalistic and distorted interpretations of history, and the rhetorical use of cultural or economic interests.

“There is a need for a political culture of cooperation and solidarity” in the Black Sea Region (Brussels, October 2013) – one Brussels-based civil servant pointed out, and the rejection of the “obsolete concept of the spheres of influence” in security terms between the major players. Nevertheless, a senior officer observed that “one of the reasons for the persistence and re-emergence of a new Cold War schizophrenia is because of the country’s proximity to potential gun-powder barrels at its Eastern borderline, the eruption of the frozen conflicts, as it was the case with the Georgian war”. (Bucharest, June 2012)

Seeing itself as the rightful hegemon in its own territorial backyard, Russia’s interest is to protect and expand Russian influence by preventing the emergence of “unfriendly” regimes in its neighbourhood, one interviewed security professional
mentioned (Bucharest, June 2012). Russia’s “return to this region”, the security professional stressed, “is an added instability factor, due to its drift back to authoritarianism and its energy leverage potential”.

Neighbouring governments have to deal with the consequences of the power disparity between them and the Russian power colossus, and according to the interviewee, “the EU’s policies towards Russia failed to achieve concrete objectives”. Another senior officer observed that a coherent strategy is needed to deal with Russia, “because building security and stability on Russia’s borders through democratic integration and collective security in the Black Sea Region is seen as a threat by Moscow” (Bucharest, June 2012). Russia has always considered that further implication from either the EU or NATO in the region should not warranted, as the existing regional frameworks are well-equipped in their present composition (limited to “regional” countries) to ensure regional cooperation. In terms of Russia’s own involvement in the existing regional organizations, the same senior officer continued, “it considers them as merely vehicles for its interests”.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Romanian security agenda was faced with several geopolitical challenges: the conflicts in the Black Sea Region have become a security liability, due to a mixture of several factors, such as cultural conflicts, territorial disputes, minority rights, religious differences, soft security threats, as well as a fierce competition for energetic resources. It could be argued that Romania’s increased participation in the CSDP and NATO structures, according to most of the interviewed military brass, would mark transitional patterns towards a new Transatlantic and Europeanist-oriented Romanian strategic culture.
Moreover, the issue of brand new capabilities and modern operability standards were the main issues stressed by such interviewees, suggesting a lower interest from a military point of view to take anything for granted beyond material capabilities. Most of the interviewed military officers did not in fact question that in the short run, Romanian and Russian relations are stable, but the lingering suspicions still remained as regards the long-term risks. One senior military officer even laughingly said that “I was raised and trained during the Cold War era, what you expect?” (Bucharest, June 2012)

Nevertheless, beyond the reforms and the Cold War rhetoric, the profound feeling of “the need to reinvent the old habits”, “the necessity to turn distrust into trust”, “we have to rely on our American and European allies”, was expressed in most responses on the civilian side of the interviewees and hinted at a deeper rift in the Romanian security field concerning Romanian’s future in terms of security and defence and the ingrained dispositions of trust and mistrust in international organizations.

4.6 The Professionalization of the Romanian Security Personnel - The Content of the New Security Ethos

Being encouraged to participate in overseas joint military mission and exercises, Romania had to respond to considerable adaptational pressures to re-construct the national security ethos. To shed further light on the adaptational dynamics mentioned above and the levels of inertia or reform, the focus falls predominantly on Romania’s transitional security field, the relevant actors involved, and their transformational
agency when it comes to competing security frameworks and the training received during their professionalization.

The life style, the symbolic capital (honour, authority and prestige), the levels of Brussels-ization or NATO-ization, as reflected in the answers of security professionals, are particularly revealing. Joining NATO and the EU has created new opportunities and resources for the professionalization of security and defence, leading to significant developments in the new security ethos and the practices of security making.

A new set of legitimate skills and expertise favoured either NATO or the EU background knowledge, military cooperation and information-sharing, new security practices and know-how becoming validated in the eyes of security practitioners. In the words of a senior official, “we needed to first and foremost professionalize our personnel.” (Bucharest, June 2012) To this end, many of the practitioners interviewed were actively trying to participate in as many missions abroad, trainings, workshops, seminars, and conferences on a variety of topics on security and defence. The EU and NATO standards and operations were considered by the majority of interviewees as fundamental benchmarks in the professionalization process of the Romanian security personnel.

Interview data has shown that symbolic value was given to competencies acquired through EU and NATO training facilities and it was a wide-spread agreement that a new class of security professionals was being educated in the spirit of transparency, permanent cooperation, and professionalization. “We can now access a domain that
was before forbidden for criticism, study, and debate. We learned that security can be more transparent" a senior official noted. (Bucharest, May 2011).

Rhetoric aside, the internationalization of Romanian security practitioners was accomplished by participation in Commandants Conferences organized by NATO Defence, the CSDP orientation courses in Brussels, bilateral cooperation programs, international conferences, workshops and working groups on defence and security issues. Interviewees repeatedly confirmed that expertise embodied the most important symbolic capital in the Romanian security field.

With Romania becoming part of important CSDP structures, as the Satellite Centre of the EU (EUSC) in Torrejon (Spain), the Security Studies Institute of the EU (ISS) in Paris or the Brussels-based European Defence Agency (EDA), new skills and know-how were needed to reach acceptable levels of competency and professionalization. Depending on its interests and needs in the military equipment field, one senior officer noted (Bucharest, May 2011), Romania got involved in programmes meant to develop protocols and trained personnel for last generation capabilities in order to add more value to these efforts.

When asked to describe their levels of openness to other international structures, interviewees mentioned that daily collaboration, “doing things together”, or in other words practical military-to-military cooperation (Pouliot 2010: 122) within NATO and EU cooperation frameworks, all lead towards a new security ethos. This new security ethos was different in terms of transparency from the formalism, rigidity, and secrecy of Romanian security and defence bureaucracy. Nevertheless, during the
interviewing process, tendencies of suspicion and opacity were encountered, being most of the times attributed to professional secrecy or the high prerequisites of the job. Romanian bureaucracy for that matter, generally referred to as “huge”\textsuperscript{62}, implied a slow pace of absorption of good practices and the deep inefficiency of this apparatus, established under the clientele’s criteria, and not on the basis of competence or meritocracy.

Bourdieu, from this point of view, was quite critical of state bureaucracies, “the apparatus depends most on those who most depend on it because they are the ones it holds most tightly its clutches” (Bourdieu 1991: 216). In the case of the Romanian security field, some of the senior military personnel were also inclined to resent the reform initiatives of professionalization, to protect the already established institutional hierarchy, and to preserve the privileged position of agenda-setters.

The principal method stated in the Military Strategy to achieve such goals was through educational and training programs for officers in accordance with NATO standards, procedures, at both tactical and joint levels, pertaining to the NATO/PfP Regional Training Centres. Special attention was given to dispatching as many officers as possible to attend NATO colleges in NATO member countries for the professionalization of Romania’s defensive force.

Moreover, the professionalization of Romanian armed forces was in high demand especially due to the fact that the complexity of NATO missions required niche skillsets in the fields of informatics, cybernetics, and in the use of high-tech military

\textsuperscript{62} Romanian state bureaucracy, \url{http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/huge-bureaucracy-prevents-romani-news-221529}
equipment. Hence, NATO emulative instances were manifested in practices, training backgrounds, and institutional frameworks, with commands and forces composed of carefully designed NATO structures – highly effective, efficient, flexible, and most crucially, compatible with NATO benchmarks and interoperable with NATO armed forces.

A military officer praised the opportunities given to him to participate in conferences, NATO military trainings and simulation trainings and exercises in home-bases, “I was given a chance to learn NATO procedures at the Romanian National Defence College and the Simulation Training Centre” (Bucharest, June 2012). Both the institutions, mentioned several times by the interviewees, were cornerstones in the Romanian security and defence training program, by both improving operation command and control skills and ensuring that the Romanian armed forces could integrate to any EU or NATO operation.

As previously observed, the defence policy of Romania was elaborated by the Department of Policy of Defence and Planning63, responsible with the coordination and planning of Romania’s participation in both the EU and NATO operations. The official discourse delivered by the Department’s representatives (Bucharest, June 2012) was that the system of linkage officers reflected Romania’s concern with a steady and enduring dialogue with Romanian international partners: in the view of developing optimum reaction capacities, political and economic progress, and operative requirements in the European Union security field.

An interesting empirical focus that came out of the interviews was constituted by post-reforms institutional boundary-blurring between military/civilian and internal/external security nexuses and how they inform changes within the national strategic cultures of new EU member states after processes of Brussels-ization or NATO-ization or both. The majority of interviewees from the Department demonstrated a sophisticated level of reflexivity regarding the above-mentioned supposed socialization rivalries between the EU and NATO and admitted that security and defence was no longer a locus of military operations, but a more complex technocratic process.

“Now a soldier needs to be a professor in English, a gendarme in training, a communication specialist, and a psychologist on top of it. We are overloading soldiers with civilian functions”, an official observed (Bucharest, June 2012). One senior expert mentioned that learning English by personnel from “key-positions” was peremptory, the end-goal being that to possess the linguistic competency required by the work environment in both the EU and NATO structures (Bucharest, June 2012).

In the words of a security specialist, “I believe that a professional army is indeed a solution to the security demands of the 21st century, but what is often forgotten is that developing such forces is easier for large and rich countries” (Brussels, April 2013). For smaller or poorer countries these reforms and a professionalized small, well-equipped army pose serious problems of costs and sustainability.

Such professional soldiers must be enticed with competitive remuneration and, from this point of view, conscript soldiers are relatively cheaper. Especially because
Romania has the most Eastern European Union border under its tutelage, some interviewees pointed out a need for an efficient management of the Eastern borderline against the threats of illegal immigration, the traffic of human beings, organized crime, terrorist threats, and transnational criminality in general.

4.7 Conclusion

The chapter has argued that it is high time for opening up the space for a richer theoretical inquiry so as to analyse the possible advancements or lack of thereof in the security sector Romania. The advantage of a Boudieusean analysis over more materialistic understandings of structures rests in the fact that it can shed further light on the interactional and historical processes that make certain capitals more relevant than others and empower agents to perform better in certain contexts. The degree of power possessed by such actors thus fluctuated according to time and space coordinates, the post-Cold War transitional context giving value to the professionalization process and reforms applied under the influence of both NATO and the EU.

From this point of view, this chapter recognized the importance of status and prestige in the symbolic power struggle over Romania’s security agenda. The elements that played a central role and created tensions between the security actors’ dispositions and the structural positions within the Romanian security field were: the post-reforms institutional boundary-blurring lines between security subfields; the professionalization of the security personnel according to higher standards of training and expertise; and the construction of a new organizational ethos emphasising civilian oversight and more complex or fluid security practices.
During the transitional stages of post-Cold-War reforms, the main concerns of most security professionals were centred on the East-West relations and geopolitical risks. The focus was put on Romania’s regional aspirations, on laying the grounds for a national strategic culture, and on becoming a competent ally in the international arena to international and European partners. Overall, the answers revealed that an unsolidified and transitional security habitus was predominant, with the main dispositions developed to be those of adaptability, change, and the constant honing of transferable skills through education and training. The most important currency in the Romanian security field was the capacity to creatively adapt to changes and reforms under structural limitations and the restrictions of scarce military capabilities.
CHAPTER 5 SYMBOlic POWER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL APPROPRIATION OF THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter traces and signifies the public rhetoric and practice for the case of Romania’s foreign and security policy during the Romanian President Traian Băsescu’s two administrations. The main point of reference and inquiry is the relationship between the totalizing Presidential discourse in the field of Romania’s security and defence policy and its effects on policy innovations and power hierarchies in the Romania’s security and defence field.

The Presidency becomes in the case of Romania a locus of monopolizing symbolic power, with Traian Băsescu’s attempts to navigate the power relations of the foreign policy and security field so as to control and arrogate exclusive agenda-setting powers in the field of foreign and security policy. In the words of a security expert, “the language of strength that Băsescu uses in security issues is the only language most of the Romanians listen to”. The Presidential appropriation of the Romanian foreign policy and security discourse or, in other words, the “Băsescu wave” starting from his rise to power in 2005 until the nowadays 2014, marks the specificity of the Romanian political landscape and the turn towards a more assertive Romanian external security position.

64 Traian Băsescu (born 4 November 1951) has been the President of Romania since 2004. After being a merchant marine officer during the 1980s, he became directly involved in politics in 1989 and in 1991 was appointed Minister of Transport, a position he held until 1992. That year he was elected to the Romanian Parliament with the Democratic Party (PD) and in 1996 he assumed again the Ministry of Transportation. In 2000 he was elected as Mayor of Bucharest and one year later he was elected leader of the PD. In 2004 he was his party’s candidate for President managing a spectacular comeback in the second round after losing the first by 7%. He was re-elected to a second term in 2009.” See the President’s profile at http://www.epp.eu/party-leader-traian-Băsescu
In this chapter, the analytical endeavour proposes a synoptic overview of the idiosyncratic factors in the Romanian foreign and security policy behaviour, *i.e.* the Presidency and political elites, during the prolonged leadership of Băsescu’s administrations and their influence on the Romanian foreign and security policy decision-making processes. The main contention of the chapter is that there is a *gap* between the propagandistic and over-optimistic policy rhetoric of the Presidency concerning Romania’s participation in the European Union’s foreign policy framework and the actual practices and contributions made in the field.

This particular snapshot of the institutional and discursive appropriation of the Romanian foreign policy and security agenda by one political personality further contributes towards the overarching theme of the research, by pointing towards another instance of the *hysteresis effect* and the production and reproduction of domination in the Romanian transitional foreign policy and security field. Therefore, the *hysteresis effect* provides an explanation of how the domination of the Romanian transitional foreign policy and security field by the institution of the Presidency was produced during the Băsescu administrations.

By using the concepts of symbolic power and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991), the chapter discusses how a particular typology of charismatic leadership makes use of discursive practices so as to establish a symbolic monopoly over the directions in foreign and security policy. The chapter starts from the contention that Max Weber had a clear theoretical influence on Bourdieu’s thought and follow-ups with the argument that Bourdieu has moved passed the Weberian understanding of power.
Bourdieu sees his theorization of the state as an expansion of Weber’s understanding of the state, as the holder of the monopoly over physical violence.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu delineates the state (Bourdieu 1994:3) as the institution that “successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population.” Hence, Bourdieu develops Weber’s definition to highlight the symbolic element as well as physical violence. This definition points to Bourdieu’s understanding of power per se, which is noticeably influenced by Weber, i.e. power has to be legitimized so as to be exercised in any permanent and effective manner. Bourdieu is inspired by Weber in theorizing the state as essentially concerned with monopolizing the means of violence over a given territory, but he goes further than Weber to encompass the monopolizing action also to the means of symbolic violence.

Consequently, Bourdieu’s examination of the state emphases its symbolic dimension, the state being conceptualized in terms of interests and beliefs, agents’ strategies and their position in a specific field. According to Bourdieu, the “symbolic dimension of the effect of the state” is reflected in the interests and strategies of bureaucrats, by generating a “performative discourse”, which concomitantly constitutes and legitimates the state as the repository of symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1994:16) in the power struggle. Pleas to public order, transitional reforms, foreign policy and security and defence developments, and the public good are seen as originating from the strategies and interests of state agents.

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65 The state is also defined as the “holder of the monopoly of symbolic violence.” (Bourdieu 1989:22)
From this point of view, Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic power offers an added analytical purchase in the research of the changes in the decision-making process as far as Romanian foreign and security policy is concerned. The emphasis is given to the country’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the key topics that encompass an adaptation to NATO, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) during the Romanian President Traian Băsescu’s administrations.

The practices of the Romanian Presidency\(^{66}\), namely to control and set the agenda in security-related reforms and decisions, become effective in the Romanian foreign and security field only as they acquire recognition and hence legitimacy (Bourdieu 1994:4-8). The monopolization of power over symbolic violence and its “particular symbolic efficacy” (Bourdieu 1994:4) by the President becomes another distinctive hysteresis effect in the Romanian foreign and security policy field, i.e. the struggle over statist capital\(^{67}\) (Bourdieu 1994:4). “Statist capital” is a form of power that permits the Presidency to exert symbolic violence over the diverse fields and over the different specific capitals, and particularly over the rates of conversion between them (Bourdieu 1994:4).

Gaining “statist capital” is a process by which the institution of the President acquires symbolic power over other forms of capital and their reproduction (Bourdieu 1994:4), where the struggle for power becomes in reality a struggle for control over relations of

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\(^{67}\) The state is seen “as the space of play within which holders of capital (of different species) struggle in particular for power over the state, i.e. over the statist capital granting power over the different species of capital and over their reproduction (particularly through the school system).” (Bourdieu 1994:5)
power in different fields (Bourdieu 1994:4). The particularity of the state is not the amassing of legitimate physical violence, as Weber would have seen it, but the actual monopolization of legitimate symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989: 21).

The intended effect of such monopolizing tendencies was to consolidate the institutional position and political popularity of the President within the broader national socio-political context. The unintended consequences of such hegemonic struggles were the consolidation of a more focused external and security policy in the case of a transitional state such as Romania, and the formulation of a pragmatic engagement with its external partners, including the European Union.

This chapter also speaks to the agent-structure debate, by examining the structural factors contributing to an explanation as to why certain forms of capital are more important than others in certain types of relations within the Romanian security field. In line with the previous chapter, emphasis is given to symbolic capital as the most significant form of capital in Romania’s transitional security field. A sociological approach to discourse analysis taking lead from the Bourdieusean conceptualization of discourse as an indication of a broader socio-political context is considered for the purpose of teasing out the different position-takings, themes, and strategies of discourse engaged by the Romanian President.

The chapter takes the following argumentative steps: it starts from a conceptual discussion of symbolic power, symbolic capital and the typology of charismatic leadership, used as heuristic devices to tease out the idiosyncratic particularities of what the symbolic power of the Romanian Presidency does in the field of foreign and
security policy; the chapter continues with the identification of the main structural and contextual factor that lead to the establishment of a hegemonic Presidential discourse in the case of foreign policy and security making, special attention being given to the institutional dynamics in the Romanian executive that led to a concentration of agenda-setting power in the hands of the President; lastly, the chapter proposes a cursory analysis of the principal discursive themes and the practical implications of Romanian’s foreign and security policy in the context of NATO, the CFSP and the CSDP integrations, serving as illustrations of the gap between Presidential rhetoric and external and security practice.

5.2 The Romanian President’s Symbolic Power and its Idiosyncratic Characteristics

By paraphrasing Guzzini’s interrogation “What does “power” do?” (Guzzini 2005: 508-512), the question to be asked is what exactly does symbolic power do within the broader socio-political context of representations and applied to the case of the Romanian articulations of foreign and security policy. Seen through social discursive lenses, the discourse itself is not an effect of the person speaking or an institutional policy setting, but an aftermath or an element of a power struggle over legitimate representations that become embedded in an institutional structure. Here, the chapter recognizes performativity in the broader agent-structure debate, with an emphasis on how the Romanian Presidency, starting from Băsescu’s election and rule from 2005 until the current moment, has employed diverse strategies to shape Romania’s transitional security field.
According to Bourdieu, there is no such thing as a symbolic power without the symbolism of power (Bourdieu 1991: 75-76), meaning with this the characteristics of authority materialized in the institutional locus of authority, the officialization of the holder of authority, the linguistic competences possessed, the leader’s charisma, all such markers of authority delineating the symbolic efficiency (Bourdieu 1991: 75-76) of the discourse of authority.

Symbolic power in a Bourdieusean reading is deeply rooted in the particular understandings of the context, making such interpretations seem natural and thus obfuscating the power relations they entail. In this respect, symbolic violence serves the purpose of trickling down such interpretations to those who are on the receiving end of a power order. Symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991: 72), seen by Bourdieu as a recognized power and functioning under the specific symbolic logic of distinction, is to be understood as the symbolic resources available to an actor on the basis of recognition, honour, prestige, and functions of an authoritative embodiment of symbolic value.

The chapter offers a performative interpretation of symbolic power as an effective use of a hegemonic sphere of influence by the Romanian Presidency over the field of the transitional security policy, through politicization practices and the control of the state bureaucracy. As a security expert stated, “Băsescu has credibility with the public in matters of security policy because he has always had a strong nucleus of electoral, political and bureaucratic support” (Bucharest, May 2011).
The aim of such moves made by President Băsescu is the consolidation of legitimacy and authority within the domestic political landscapes and the gain of popular support, the President aspiring to become the sole mediator of Romania’s integration in NATO and the EU’s foreign and security framework and, in particular, the main formulator of foreign and security policy directions. A policy officer explained, “the return to Europe for Romania meant that it finally quenched its longing to belong again” (Bucharest, May 2011).

The examination highlights the central role of the Presidency in the strategic use of charisma and symbolic power regarding an assertive Romanian foreign and security policy in the regional geopolitical context. The end goal was the consolidation of his electoral popularity and notoriety in matters of internal politics. In the words of an interviewed senior official, “Băsescu’s external tantrums serve well his authoritarian tendencies at home.” (Bucharest, May 2011)

Furthermore, as pointed out in the historical chapter, the EU integration process has prompted an intricate and polyvalent array of implications for Romania in its relation with the European and transatlantic partners, and particularly with its engagement with the East and the Middle East. Such structural institutional and policy implications comprised the necessity to constantly assess, adjust, and rethink Romania’s strategic foreign and security policy objectives and instruments, so as to be able to better tackle the emerging challenges and risks in the security field and its duties as an EU and NATO member state.
In the case of President Băsescu’s charismatic authority, the principal idiosyncratic traits identified reside in his image of an anti-corruption vigilante, a high-flyer in moments of crisis, a born thespian, a skilled handler of media-candy melodrama, and a cry-baby in front of the cameras. As one interviewee ironically put it, “Băsescu can shed a tear in the public eye faster than a seasoned actor on the stage” (Bucharest, June 2012). Political opponents have considered him an astute manipulator, being capable to easily take symbolic control over the chaotic transitional political landscape through conventional and unconventional political strategies. As another interviewed senior official summarized, “he is a President-player and his idiosyncrasies keep the public entertained” (Bucharest, June 2012).

The appropriation of the symbolic power of the state (Bigo 2011: 252) is a strategy that implies the language of reform, pragmatism, and the use of the neo-liberal agenda for power consolidation purposes. It is irrelevant whether the Romanian President is a genuine corruption fighter, national saving hero or a beacon of a reaffirmed foreign, and security policy voice in the Wider Black Sea Region or in international. What does matter is the fact that the Romanian public and his followers believe that such powers exist.

In a Bourdieusean understanding, the President’s symbolic power is derived from the institution of Presidency, from the status of the leader of the nation, from his charisma, and from his reputation of justice enforcer. Moreover, the charismatic traits of President Băsescu infuse its symbolic influence and agenda-setting powers with bolstered performativity, charisma, in the Weberian interpretation (Weber 1989). The President becomes a driving and creative force and representing the desire for
disruption and change in the prevailing transitional Romanian socio-political context. In this regard, an interviewee bitterly observed, “Băsescu can get away with almost anything because of his personality and popularity” (Bucharest, June 2012).

In the symbolic struggle over the power to produce and impose the legitimate vision of the world (Bourdieu 1989: 20), the charismatic leader will invariably prevail and thrive, especially in transitional, troubled political contexts. As in the case of the Băsescu administrations and in the political spectacle that the Romanian context generates, the charismatic leader needs to continuously perform and be performative in reconfirming and reinforcing his leadership performance and legitimize this authority in the eyes of the followers.

The conceptual affinity between the Bourdieusean concept of symbolic power and the Weberian notion of charismatic authority is particularly relevant in the context of this research. Charismatic authority is unstable, demonstrated in the case of President Băsescu by his recent decline in popularity, the natural entropy of the leader’s charisma (Fagen 1965: 275-276) occurring in part because his image of infallibility cannot be maintained in the face of numerous failures and because the demands of ruling need a more rationalized and competent involvement in state affairs. As one interviewee put it, “even though he survived his impeachment because Romanians din not participate in the referendum, Băsescu still suffered a loss of image that could affect him in the long run” (Bucharest, June 2012).

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68 “Romanian President Traian Băsescu has survived a referendum on his impeachment, after turnout fell below the 50% needed to validate the vote.”, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19034173](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19034173)
It is particularly important to ascribe performativity, suggestiveness, and communicability to power and to describe the performative side of power (Adler & Pouliot 2011: 20) as being able to “impose a particular focal point, which further reinforces one’s advantage in bargaining” (Adler & Pouliot 2011: 11). In the Bourdieusean explanation of symbolic power, such an attribute of performativity can be translated in the symbolic capacity to speak *from* authority and *with* authority, due to the legitimacy of the institutional position from where the symbolic power is exerted and the credibility of the actor engaged in symbolic discursive practices.

From this point of view, discursive practices such as “securitizing moves” (Buzan, Waever & Wilde 1998), “sovereignty games” (Adler-Nissen 2008), or significant symbolic utterances, point towards deeper seated structural factors, such as the locus of legitimacy and authority of the actor, the rules of the game in the socio-political context, and the linguistic market being addressed.

In the Romanian case, the grasp of the Romanian Presidency on symbolic discursive practices in the field of security and defence policy is made possible, in Gramscian terms, by practices of hegemony (Cox 1983) and the imposition of the President’s way of life, his language, his politicized bureaucracy and state apparatus organized almost in an organic historical hegemonic bloc (Gramsci & Forgacs 2000) and populating Romania’s internal and external politics.

The Presidential foreign and security policy decisions fall under the category of *idiosyncratic* factors, as single individuals (Pearson & Rochester 1998: 204) are indeed capable of shaping events. Those who rely on the great man (or woman)
theory, or other explanations of security policy that focus on individual decision makers, emphasize the role of idiosyncratic factors in manipulating symbolic power.

Leader’s personalities impact foreign policy performance in many ways, ranging from grand designs to their choice of advisers and the way they organize their advisory system. Idiosyncratic factors are important, having a special impact on the *modus operandi* of foreign and security policy, particularly on the degree of assertiveness and propensity to use force displayed by a country.

5.3 Structural and Contextual Factors and the Establishment of a Presidential Symbolic Power

Within the field of the Romanian state, the formulation and implementation of foreign and security policy is shared between the cabinet and the Presidency, with the Romanian EU accession occurring at the end of the 2004 electoral cycle and the struggle of political parties in the already strained governing coalition to capitalize on the success of such a momentous achievement.

According to the opinion of an interviewed senior expert on European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest, June 2012), the Romanian President Traian Băsescu, an open supporter and former leader of the Democratic Party (PD), attempted to increase his popularity and capitalize on Romania’s success in the European Union’s enlargement project, which he attributed to his actions of corruption eradication within the central governmental structures.

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The expert further rhetorically asked, “There should be some prerequisites of a neutral stance as the President of country, but nothing is normal in this country. Why are we not surprised…”. Thus began the first institutional and political turf wars over the country’s foreign and security policy in the prolonged stay in power of Traian Băsescu during the course of his two administrations. Interestingly enough, the strategic moves of appropriating the Romanian foreign policy and security discourse were aimed at further consolidating the symbolic power of the Presidency and its performativity as the locus of authority and further on as the tutelage and reinforcement of the President’s former political party the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL).

Băsescu’s position-taking as the leading force in Romania’s foreign and security policy and the cementing of his former political party PDL as the major political party in Romania, were made at the expense of their partners such as the Liberal Party (PL) led by the Prime Minister at that time, Calin Popescu Tăriceanu. Moreover, the same inside expert reported the existence of clashes over personnel.

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71 The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) was formed in 2007 when the Democratic Party (PD) merged with the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD).
72 The totality of the security field, understood as the field of social positions and the field of discursive position-takings, is constituted by a double movement: whereby the agent is positioned by the system of positions, which is ordered by various antagonisms (class, political affiliations, symbolic capital, institutional status, …); and he further positions himself discursively within the system of symbolic position-takings in such a way so as to maximise privileges and navigates a field of social contestation, conflict, contention, contest, and competition. And one move continually reproduces the other, the agent being continually pressed up against the system and the system being continually pressed against the agent. Bourdieu also stresses the existence of two types of political models in the composition of the political realm: the powerful, dominant one that advocates the adoption of an original style by politicians, of a distinctive and unique approach that may lead to some unpleasant compromises; and the one whose only purpose is the “broadening of the party’s clientele”, the strengthening of the party’s positions in view of a basic renovation from top to bottom (Bourdieu 1991: 191).
73 “Calin Popescu Tăriceanu was sworn in as Romania’s prime minister on 29 December 2004, one day after a centre-right coalition government proposed by him was approved by the country’s parliament. He replaced Adrian Nastase of the Social Democratic Party in the post.”, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/infoBios/setimes/resource_centre/bio-archive/Tăriceanu_calin
appointments within the coalition, for example no ambassadors to the USA and UK could be nominated during 2007-2008, and the Foreign Secretary post was as well disputed.

Under pressure from the leader of the Liberals, the Prime Minister Tăriceanu, the then holder of the position of Foreign Secretary, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, a member of the Liberals but also a keen supporter of the President and his informal protégé, submitted his resignation and was replaced by the Liberal candidate, Adrian Cioroianu, a close associate of Tăriceanu. Nevertheless, in the Băsescu political world, Ungureanu became the head of Romania’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

Such tensions were less straight-forward in the new power configuration since Băsescu’s second election in 2008, with the President proving again his almost Machiavellian mastermind qualities and managing a merger between his former party PD and the disenchanted fractions from the Liberal Party, with the result of a new Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) leading the cabinet. In other words, means of expression adopted by political actors vary in accordance to a politician’s position and expectations.

This is precisely the reason why, when Bourdieu refers to reproduction and representation, he claims that “the subjective hope of profit tends to be adjusted to the objective probability of profit” (Webb et al. 2002: 23-24). The probability of profit of such a leader resides in the symbolic capacity he possesses, his practical work, and his expertise to navigate the political landscape and gain more symbolic power.
Another instance of Presidential position-taking was in relation to the current Prime Minister Victor Ponta\textsuperscript{74}, resorting to derogatory epithets such as “irresponsible, childlike, kitten, infantile” so as to discursively discredit him in his external and diplomatic activity. While the prerequisite for a coherent and mature foreign and security policy are those of unity and predictability, the President has shown a blatant penchant for antagonizing potential spot-light seeking political rivals.

Symbolic power is construed as a relational imposition of ones will and understanding of the world through overt/direct or covert/indirect practices of persuasion, domination, or coercion. Charismatic authority, by comparison, is a quality that heightens power, rather than being itself a form of power. In the symbolic struggle for the production of and monopoly over the legitimate control (Bourdieu 1989: 21-22) of foreign and security policy, the charismatic President puts into action the symbolic capital that he possesses, his credentials, his position as leader, his expertise and doxic experience as sea captain in the Romanian navy\textsuperscript{75}. These are coupled by his persuasive political demagogy and hegemony over symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991: 57), as the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning upon the public in such a way that they are seen as legitimate.

From this point of view, the Romanian President has been exceptionally effective in positioning himself as a visionary that offers innovative solutions to major social problems, going for muscular discourses and supposedly radical change in foreign

\textsuperscript{74} “Victor Ponta became Romania’s third prime minister in less than six months when his left wing-dominated Social Liberal Union (USL) alliance took charge in May 2012 after topping its predecessor in a confidence vote.”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17776564

\textsuperscript{75} Press release – President Băsescu reminisces on his more happy and glory days as a navy commander, http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/politic/traian-Băsescu-eram-mai-fericit-pe-vremea-cand-eram-comandat-de-nava.html
policy and security making. Such discursive strategies employed were more effective under structural conditions of social stress, transition, and crisis in Romania’s political context, and induced significant social and organizational changes based on ideological values. As it was pointed out in the historical chapter, the transitional situation post-Cold War context and the dire socio-political special conditions facilitated the emergence, out of societal crises, of a so-called “national saviour”.

As noted by an interviewed security professional, “Romania has always reinforced the myth of the leader saviour, just look back to Ceausescu’s ‘father of the nation’ self-proclaimed role and President Iliescu’s paternalistic tendencies and benign pensioner image” (Bucharest, June 2012). Ideological visions embrace end-values such as peace, equality, freedom, honesty, respect, human dignity, human rights, independence from domination, and individual and collective efficacy.

The Romanian President Traian Băsescu won the hearts of Romanians with the “saviour-of-the-nation” type of electoral discourse of anti-corruption and justice rhetoric during both his electoral campaigns. “Such end-values are self-sufficient and cannot be exchanged for pragmatic values such as wealth, economic security, and the security guaranteed of NATO”, an interviewed expert poignantly noted (Bucharest, May 2011). In respect to the last issue, the President has been a keen advocate of such Realpolitik type of thinking, capitalizing on the public opinion and the political class shared view regarding Romania’s volatile security at Europe’s periphery, its vicinity to Russia and the frozen conflicts, and the lingering Cold-War fears and frustrations.
What is more, the intensity of Romania’s participation in the Iraq coalition “of the willing” proved Romania’s particular inclination towards a certain type of alignment, where external legal legitimacy or democratic debates were neglected when European partners called for it. There still remains the question that at the political drawing line of the Iraqi war the Romanian participation in the coalition may have proven itself to be in the detriment of Romania’s commitment to the CSDP and further damaging in its relations with Russia.

An interesting study-case is offered by the 2007 foreign and security policy turf war between the Romanian Prime-Minister at the time Tăriceanu and the President over maintaining troops in Iraq. In 2007, the Romanian Prime-Minister Tăriceanu announced the return of the Romanian troops in Iraq, even though this possibility was not discussed within the Country’s Security and Defence Council (CSAT), the Parliament, or in the presence of the allies. The Romanian President Băsescu vehemently rejected this position and the CSAT decided the maintenance of the Romanian presence in Iraq.

Surprisingly, any debate on the matter was blocked from that moment on, and the episode was considered to be a proof of political internal divergences, a black stain on Romania’s reputation among the coalition members, and also possibly endangering the privileged relation to the United States. The cause for concern was not triggered by the lack of transparency in the decision-making process, nor the authoritarian blocking of any democratic debate or discussion by the Romanian Presidency, but it centred on the fear of endangering Romania’s credibility as an US ally.
The event proved to bolster even more the President’s internal credibility as a tough decision maker and discredited and weakened the Prime-Minister’s institutional position. It has to be noted that the President, as the commander of the national forces and the President of the Country’s Security and Defence Council, through this institution in particular, has extended his executive powers in setting the security and defence policy agenda of the country, by reserving exclusive power to send troops abroad. The next move was to confirm in 2008, after a CSAT decision, the consolidation of the Romanian position in the coalition and the commitment to remain a member until the last American soldier withdraws from Iraqi soil until 2011 or whichever time.

This political event is especially interesting as an example of Bourdieusean turf competition for security and defence agenda setting between several important political actors. The problem of the lack of parliamentary control over the Romanian security agenda became increasingly poignant during the President Băsescu’s long-held preference for a committed US strategic partnership and in the detriment of a more Europeanist orientation.

Ironically enough, despite the overbearing Atlanticist orientation of the Presidential discourse, Băsescu has always appropriated, at each opportunity, the Romanian advancement made concerning the CSDP missions\textsuperscript{76}. Nevertheless, the constant

\textsuperscript{76} Press release, President Băsescu’s speech at an annual meeting on Thursday with chiefs of diplomatic corps accredited in Bucharest (2011): “Romania became in 2011 the most important contributor to the civilian missions of the European Union as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. We have set to support the initiatives for a more coherent, result-oriented security and defence policy in 2012, including getting the eastern partners involved in the European crisis management system,”. http://mpvienna.mae.ro/en/romania-news/1279
remained that the Common Security and Defence Policy is a complementary product to NATO, in the conditions in which NATO has always responded first to calls which were directed to the EU, here the Balkan crisis being the reference point. Moreover, at a political level, the CSDP has been dealt with as an important development in the process of the EU asserting its identity on the international scene, yet, time and again, the office of the Romanian Presidency stressed the risks of emphasising the risk of duplication to the NATO framework.  

5.4 Principal Discursive Themes for Branding Romania’s Foreign and Security Policy

The foreign and security practice is not as straight-forward as discursive approaches envisage presenting it, i.e. the transformation of an issue into a security problem or securitization as an extreme version of politicization. The holder of the sceptron, in Bourdieusean terms, or more broadly speaking the delegated state security agent that holds “the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1991: 239), is nothing without the interplay between the locus of its production and the audience/symbolic market on which the discourse is delivered.

By rhetorically appropriating the reform developments during NATO and the EU integration processes, the Presidential fractious, yet charismatic and populist style of divide et impera, has profited from the somewhat fragmented and transitional institutional set-up in the case of foreign and security policy. The Presidency consolidated its position as the sole articulator of a coherent and continuous Romanian foreign and security policy.

Under President Băsescu’s administrations, Romania pursued broader integration within the European Union institutional framework, with special attention being given to Romania’s and the EU’s foreign and security policy in the immediate Eastern neighbourhood. The topics of the Transnistrian frozen conflict and the political developments in Moldova have become a discursive trope in Băsescu’s foreign and security policy articulations. The theme has been also a building block in the construction of the President’s symbolic capital, as a forceful contender and policy formulator within the broader European Union framework, raising awareness about the potential risks at the EU’s eastern borders, and being critical regarding the EU’s forbearance and general non-committal stance in the Eastern neighbourhood, partly because of the Russian presence.

One particular fact, which is worth drawing upon while analysing the Presidential input in terms of strategic priorities and policy focus, is Romania’s relation with Russia. The President’s declaration on the topic of maritime security (December, 2013)\(^78\) stressed the fact that Romania advocated in the European Council that the European Security Strategy (2003) should include the Black Sea Region. Transnistria and the frozen conflict at the borders of the EU were among those situations identified as potential regional conflicts and having a potential direct and indirect impact on both the EU’s and Romania’s security interests in the long-run.

At the Annual Meeting of the Heads of the Romanian Diplomatic Missions, the President pinpointed Romania’s strategic priorities, ranking the East of Europe as a top security priority for Romania. Also, the President declared that Romania cannot remain politically impassive towards the Transnistria conflict and its potential disruptive effects to the Republic of Moldova’s future integration in the EU – “We will make a political offer to the Republic of Moldova if it does not succeed in assuring the country’s security and sovereignty, a country that is European, a part of Europe and not the Eurasian Union”\textsuperscript{80}. The President’s declarations concerning Moldova position him as the main facilitator of Moldova’s EU integration and are meant to fuel popular nationalist dreams of a Romanian-Moldovan reunion, “May God help us with Moldova’s integration in the European Union”\textsuperscript{81} the President declared.

The Black Sea region has represented one of the basic priorities of Romania’s foreign and security policy, according to the Presidency, Romania being faced with a clear choice in terms of its position in the Black Sea: the promotion of the Black Sea region in the EU being the sought chance of Romania to regional affirmation. The Presidency formulated ambitious aims at asserting the country as a generator of policies within the Union, especially in the field of external and security relations in the Eastern Neighborhood and energy security.

The year 2007 had marked the passing from the stage of assimilating the \textit{acquis} to the stage of generating the \textit{acquis} and constructing a political Union. Of course, such

\textsuperscript{79}Press release – The President’s discourse at Annual Meeting of the Heads of the Romanian Diplomatic Missions, The Office of the Romanian Presidency (15 January 2014), \url{http://www.Presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=13875&_PRID=s}

\textsuperscript{80}Ibidem

\textsuperscript{81}Press-release, President Băsescu quote on the Republic of Moldova’s EU integration, \url{http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/politic/Basescu-ii-raspunde-vicepremierului-rus-el-cum-se-trezeste-face-o-declaratie-la-adresa-romaniei.html}
an approach was spelled as a challenge of playing a two-hands security game, but is seemed that this two-tiered approach best fitted the mind-frame of Romanian security strategists and the President Băsescu’s pragmatic formulation of Romania’s foreign and security policy.

In the words of the Romanian State Secretary of Strategic Affairs, Bogdan Aurescu\(^\text{82}\), another of the President’s prized protégés, Romania has always attached a great importance to regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region\(^\text{83}\), but at the same time Romania has emphasized that for both the regionalization and the internationalization of the region to happen, security and stability criteria still have to be met.

The Romanian State Secretary has pinpointed three important criteria or guiding principles: effectiveness, complementarity, and inclusiveness – these principles, according to Aurescu, reflecting both hard security and soft security imperatives. The ideological underpinning of Romania’s foreign and security orientation was expressed in a pragmatic position towards cooperation in the region, by involving both the EU and NATO in the effort of stabilization and security-building without the risks of duplication.

As far as the Romanian political scene has been concerned, there has been a shared belief across the political spectrum that the security of the Black Sea Region is a

\(^{82}\) “A career diplomat, Bogdan Aurescu was appointed Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 February 2009. Between August 2010 and February 2012 he was Secretary of State for European Affairs, also coordinating the Security Policies Directorate. Between March and June 2012 he was Secretary of State for Global Affairs. Since June 2012 he is Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs.”, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2028

strategic top priority and an economic prospective in terms of the energy market. As an interviewee pointed out, “We must look to the East for profits in energy.” (Bucharest, May 2011) Nevertheless, the means through which the Romanian strategy is to be achieved remain under discussion for the internal political forces, with some preferring a Realpolitik approach of the hawkish Presidential style over more sophisticated and diplomatic formulations of foreign and security policy. However, it is to be noted that the Romanian executive has always been quite aware of the economic potential this region has to offer in terms of business incentives.84

From this point of view, Moldova’s security conundrum with the Transnistria frozen conflict85 has always been a Romanian security concern. Băsescu has always encouraged and assisted the Republic of Moldova on its way toward the EU and the prospect of the Euro-Atlantic integration and he has spared no declaratory efforts to contribute to the resolution of the Transnistria conflict.86

Actually, in accordance to the President’s vision, Romania has always encouraged a more proactive EU involvement in the conflict, due to the EU’s status of “honest broker” that can employ a number of soft and hard policy options, without ostracizing Russia. Moreover, as President Traian Băsescu pointed out, a hands-on NATO-EU-

84 Press release – President Băsescu addresses the clear economic and energetic advantages in the Eastern Neighbourhood, while at the same time criticizing the EU’s foreign policy “tool-box” used in the region, without clear strategic priorities. http://m.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/politica/traian-Băsescu-la-congresul-ppe-proiectele-energetice-europene-nu-se-pot-opri-la-granita-de-est-a-romaniei-citeste-discursul-integral-al-presedintelui-281173.html

85 Transnistria is a separatist or breakaway territory situated in the Eastern part of Moldova claiming its right to autonomy and sovereignty under the name of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

86 Press release - President Băsescu stresses the fact that without the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the Republic of Moldova will not conclude its negotiations with the European Union, http://www.mediatax.ro/politic/Băsescu-fara-rezolvarea-conflictului-transnistrean-republica-moldova-nu-va-incheia-negocierele-pentru-ue-11129487
OSCE engagement with Romania playing an important mediating role could be crucial to spurring resolution in this conflict.

Nevertheless, the Romanian position post-Georgia war regarding the status of the breakaway Transnistrian territory, clearly expressed by President Traian Băsescu in Chisinau on August 20, points to his stark opinions regarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, *i.e.* by referring to the Kosovo independence case (Romania opposed this), Băsescu stated “...At present, sovereign and independent countries are dismantled in the name of the collective rights of the minorities (...) This is what happened with Kosovo (...) and the things foreshadow a similar direction in South Ossetia and, should I dare say it, in Abkhazia”\(^\text{87}\).

It is quite ironic that similar arguments have indeed been recently used by Russia in the Crimean Crisis to protect Russian minorities. Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s legitimate right to protect Russian-speaking minorities in satellite countries. Moscow advanced the argument that its military intervention in Crimea was a humanitarian response to defend Russian speaking minorities in the region under the claim of the “responsibility to protect” principle, whose freedoms and human rights were at stake.

The discussions of revamping the missile defence plans in Europe by the Obama Administration, *i.e.* the SM-3 interceptor configuration intended to protect all the EU members from Iranian short- and medium-range missiles – the Romanian President,

\(^{87}\) Press release, Romanian President: Kosovo issue foreshadows similar direction in South Ossetia (2008), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/21/content_9563328.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/21/content_9563328.htm)
Traian Băsescu, presented the decision of the Country’s Supreme Defence Council to host a base on its territory (February, 2010).

Nevertheless, several political voices have been heard at the time regarding this fundamental decision and Atlanticist-oriented move to support the most reliable security ally of Romania. Actually, the worries regarding the missile defence system reflected the power configuration of the Eastern European regional geopolitical configuration. This consolidation of the Atlanticist support was discursively sold as bringing important security advantages to Romania, i.e. as mentioned by President Băsescu in the first post-decision press declaration, “It is the biggest gain [presumably in security terms] that we have”.

On the other hand, Mircea Geoana, a former Romanian foreign minister, the former head of the Romanian Senate, and the former leader of one of the major oppositional parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), has drawn attention to the risks implied by such a decision and the potential of antagonizing Russia. If indeed, according to President Băsescu, the shield is not meant to be “against Russia”, then why was it

88 Press release – President Băsescu underlines the fact that the anti-missiles shield is able to protect the entire Romanian in the case of a hypothetical attack, [link]

89 “Mircea Geoana was the President of the Romanian Senate since December 2008 and served as the Chairman of the Romanian Social-Democratic Party (PSD) between 2005 and 2010. Prior, he was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Romanian Senate and member in the European Integration Joint Committee of the Romanian Parliament. Mircea Geoana ran for the Presidency of Romania in 2009. In an unprecedented narrow and contested election, he received 49.6% of the casted ballot. Previous to his political career, Mircea Geoana had a successful diplomatic activity. Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Romania to the United States of America at age 37, in February 1996, he was the youngest ambassador in the Romanian diplomatic corps. From 2000 to 2004, Mircea Geoana served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. He also served as OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2001 and during 2005 he was the personal representative of OSCE Chairman in office for Georgia.”, [link]

90 “Traian Băsescu questioned, especially, the sincerity of the official Russian representatives who plead for a solid and viable solution of the Transdniester issue” stated the deputy director of the Department of Information and Press in the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, Maria Zaharova, quoted in a press release ‘Such attacks we consider incorrect and lacking any basis’ the representative of the Russian diplomacy added.”, [link]
necessary to make such a public and emphasized justificatory and defensive discourse in the first place.

Actually, the President has always been a firm promoter of Romanian “national pride”, fostering the image of regional leader and broker at the confluence of Western and Eastern interests between Russia, the EU, and the US. Two chief concepts can be identified in the Presidential rhetoric: the advancement of stability and security in the Black Sea Region, the reinforcement of security protection in the Black Sea as Romania’s foreign policy and security trademark, and the country’s stark Atlanticist orientation. This type of rhetoric is clearly redolent of American-influenced preventive interventionism, especially considering the protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region. The obvious questions emerging out of such a strong Presidential rhetorical stance are related to the actual legitimate authority of such interventionist strategies in the Eastern neighbourhood and their practical feasibility and regional-level implementation.

Between the desire to be taken seriously as a regional security provider and the President’s rhetoric falling in line with US or NATO expansionist interests in the post-Soviet space, there is much to be left to the communicational and political inferences of the President’s security policy. Compared to the EU’s Eastern foreign and security policy engagement and its sophisticatedly moderate policy outputs, the Presidency’s rhetorical outbursts and tongue-in-cheek language are curtailed more towards a domestic, electoral audience.

Such discursive tendencies are meant to bolster the Presidency’s symbolic power in terms of stimulating the voters’ appetite for nationalistic and authoritarian identity politics. The above-mentioned tendencies underline another instance of the generalized state of hysteresis in Romania’s foreign and security field, reflecting an endemic mismatch between the Presidency’s rhetorical outputs and their actual feasibility in practice. Furthermore, the appeal of authoritarian-oriented rhetoric points towards deep internal structural social, economic vulnerabilities coupled by a generalized nation-wide identity-search.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter highlighted the fact that the Romanian Presidency used symbolic power as the performative power to shape the various collective representations, which struggle for hegemony in Romania’s transitional foreign policy and security field. Two essential directions, influenced by the Presidency in Romania’s foreign and security policy were identified, first the clear Atlanticist position in terms of security issues and the strategic interest in the Black Sea Region. Such an examination highlighted the central role of the Presidency in the strategic use of charisma and symbolic power as regards to an assertive Romanian foreign and security policy in its Eastern Neighbourhood, having as end goal the consolidation of the Presidency’s institutional position and political popularity within the broader socio-political context.

92 President Traian Băsescu’s foreign policy, http://www.cadranpolitici.ro/?p=2529
6.1 Introduction

The European institutional security landscape after the end of the Cold War has been unmistakably and radically transformed in Central and Eastern Europe. Debates about security and defence galvanized radical renewal processes of the Eastern European militaries and defence industries and markets. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War “democratic imperialism” was put into question by an array of emerging new security concerns, ranging from regional instabilities and conflicts to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.

The end of the Cold War brought forth new types of security risks, dissimilar to the traditional Cold War ones specific to the bipolarity era. The modest attempts to create competitive security and defence sectors in Central and Eastern Europe were directly dependent on specific regional security configurations, more exactly on the contingencies and historical irregularities (Lecors 2000: 514) specific to the Cold War era and the strenuous democratic transition processes unfolding in this part of Europe.

NATO’s cooperative framework and the EU’s institutional structure have allowed Central and Eastern European states to aim beyond their stated raw military power or political influence on many specific issues, even though they may be still considered marginal or second order actors in the international milieu. The choice of focusing on Central and Eastern European new EU member states, i.e. Hungary, and Poland, is
accounted for by several analytical arguments. The lack of strong military traditions within the post-communist political setting and the influence of NATO in primarily shaping their strategic vision makes their security and defence reform *hysteresis* prone; Romania’s regional geopolitical proximity to Hungary and Poland is important in terms of determining their relations as different security actors influencing the regional security environment due to their earlier accession in both NATO and the EU; as well as concerning their affiliation to the Visegrad Group93, Russia’s proximity, and their interests in the Black Sea area.

Consequently, Hungary’s and Poland’s security sector transformation is contrasted to the EU’s and NATO’s influences so as to trace and signify instances of *hysteresis* in their security transition process. This chapter seeks to address the potential internal dissent (Heiss & Papacosma 2008) and tensions in policy choices or lack of them that have plagued the transitional contexts of such states after the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact (Bischof, Karner & Ruggenthaler 2009).

Bourdieu’s concept of *hysteresis* (Bourdieu 1990,) will serve as a guiding analytical tool in terms of illustrating the ways in which reform tensions were mitigated in the case of the security fields’ transitional stages post-Cold War. The *hysteresis effect* offers an explanation of how the two newer EU member states made sense of the reform dynamics within their security sectors after the fall of the Berlin wall, by tracing the structural discrepancies and difficulties between the previous political context and the new one.

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93 See The Visegrad Group, [http://www.visegradgroup.eu/](http://www.visegradgroup.eu/)
The degrees of variation or cross-case similarity between Hungary and Poland as compared to the case of Romania are accounted for in what follows by: the particular post-Cold War security *status-quo* in Central Eastern European regional security configuration; the social, political, cultural and economic profile of each country; the post-communist institutional legacies of each country; the possible temporal and critical juncture points, reforms, and external pressures; and the common image of the regional hegemon, Russia, and its vicinity.

The choice for Poland and Hungary is accounted for by their former membership, along with Romania, in the Warsaw Pact as well as their spearheading the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Eastern Bloc – Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, while Romania become part of NATO in 2004 and an EU member state in 2007.

From this point of view, Romania was a late-comer in the security and defence reform game, its transitional trajectory being impacted to a certain degree by the example set by Hungary and Poland. To shed further light on the adaptational dynamics mentioned above and the levels of inertia or reform experienced by these countries, the focus falls predominantly on their security sub-fields and the relevant security reforms they experienced after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Before the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact (Faringdon 1989) served as the collective defence framework among eight Central and Eastern European communist states and its overarching goal was to contain NATO in Europe and to safeguard the communist orthodoxy within its members. The more networked and open the security
and defence field of military professionals is to outside civilian influences, the more likely it is that those actors will be willing to socially interact and reform their strategic doctrine according to democratic standards and civilian oversight.

From this point of view, this chapter pays special attention to the ways in which Hungary and Poland responded to both NATO’s and the EU’s CSDP frameworks in terms of their security sectors reform after the Cold War and the programmatic outputs that shaped their reform processes and national security strategies.

The CSDP military and civilian missions have served as one of the best platforms for Central and Eastern European member states to get more involved, to become more socialized with the EU’s newly discovered projective agenda, i.e. its international power projection through the CSDP missions – expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability in peace-keeping scenarios. The creation of the EU’s crisis management capacities (Britz 2007) offered interesting opportunities to the less experienced/muscular member states in the field of security and defence.

In the case of the Eastern Bloc states, one can observe a disparity between the domestic institutional frameworks and the NATO and the EU conditions and requirements, with clear incentives if not clear strains to create new institutional practices and to re-evaluate old security strategies. Hence, the focus is on how Eastern European member states handle these pressures and opportunities, what elements lead to new institutional developments at the domestic level, which are the

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94 Projection is seen as the basis for intervening in failed states, warring situations, rapid deployment of forces, by using both force and rehabilitation tools. (Bigo in Dobson, Huysmas & Prokhovnik 2006: 85)
main obstacles to these adaptations, and what makes new member states become more open to change and in what specific areas in the field of security and defence.

From this point of view, the selection of the cases of Poland and Hungary is justified as regards the potential to evaluate, through the use of secondary sources, the potential of generalizability of the previous findings from the in-depth analysis of the Romanian case, which was based on intensive field research. By reconstructing the practical logic from secondary sources certain discourses and historical or policy documents used in the spirit of triangulation (Pouliot 2010: 71), the analysis can paint a sharper and more comprehensive image of transitional security context in Central and Eastern Europe.

The two cases offer prospective policy-relevant insights concerning stages of adaptation and change within transitional security context, especially from the perspective of the symbolic competition and power struggles over national security agendas. Such tensions bring to the fore instances of hysteresis in the case of Central and Eastern European states, in which what is taken for granted in security making, the doxa, is being put into questions by waves of reforms and change in security standards under the influences of NATO and the EU.

The post-Cold War security status-quo and the transition of Central and Eastern European states, reread through Bourdieusean lenses, brings to the fore explicit instances of symbolic power struggles over doxic practices (Pouliot 2010: 235) in security making. The institutional and policy reforms in these countries security reforms underwent different stages of resistance and accommodation, but one must
look at how such changes have been enacted in practice and what type of *hysteresis effects* they triggered.

By combining inductive and historical techniques of inquiry along with Bourdieu's conceptual framework, this chapter aims to chart the potential for symbolic power struggles and *hysteresis effects* in the cases of Hungary and Poland, with a view to better understand the broader Central and Eastern European security context and its impact upon Romania's security reforms.

The overall goal is to highlight new dimensions of symbolic power struggle and the degree of hysteresis (Pouliot 2010: 91) for two other Central and Eastern European states besides Romania and to account for instances of similarity and difference between them.

The importance of NATO as a teacher (Pouliot 2010: 142) in understanding the changes in the security field post-Cold War of the EU new member states becomes paramount as was in the case of Romania, because it led to the development of an overarching Atlanticist-oriented security culture in Central and Eastern Europe.

The following Table 6.1.1 presents a synoptic overview of the most significant programmatic policy documents and events in the security reform of Hungary and Poland, and it is meant to chart chronologically the important policy steps taken by each country in their security policy transition.
Table 6.1.1 The Security Sector Transformation of Hungary and Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUNGARY</th>
<th>POLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>EU Accession 1st of May 2004</td>
<td>EU Accession 1st of May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary’s National Military Strategy (2013)</td>
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</table>

6.2 Hungary’s Security Transition post-Cold War

Hungary is currently a NATO ally and an EU member state, promoting its security interests as part of both international institutions, while at the same time remaining focused on the stability in the regional security context of Central and Eastern Europe.

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and especially towards the rights of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. During the Cold War, the dissidence of Hungary in the face of communist rule culminated in November 1956, following Imre Nagy’s governmental declaration to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact (Reinalda 2009: 368). This historical revolt was readily crushed by the Soviet troops that entered the country and removed the government, killing in the process thousands of Hungarian citizens.

After the stifled uprising, Hungary generally followed the lead of the Soviet Bloc in terms of its foreign and security policy, but it was also the first country to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and it was heralded as the “most successful” (Dunay 2003) country in the transition process in the 1990s. The incident of the 1956 revolt sets apart Hungary in terms of its communist experience during the Cold War and marks the country as a special case of resistance within the Warsaw Pact.

As well, it sets the tone for Hungary’s peaceful transition to democracy in 1989 with the majority of Hungarians wanting independence from the Soviet Bloc and the political elites predominantly inclined towards reforms and a multi-party system. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact dissolution, out of the Central and Eastern European bloc, three countries demonstrated more readiness to become part of NATO, in 1997 membership proposals being extended to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance.

After the 1990s, Hungary avidly pursued integration within NATO, which it joined in 1999, and it became a member state of the European Union in 2004. At the same time, Hungary had to mitigate the tensioned internal political debates and the
external relations with its neighbouring states (Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine) over Hungarian minority rights and the unresolved territorial claims over the Trianon Peace Treaty (Dunay 2003: 13-14). As a member of NATO (Almási & Kádár 2005: 259-274), Hungary has been enjoying the full-fledged advantages that come with this status: NATO’s collective defence guarantees, the protection of its territorial integrity, and the cooperative platform to adjust to the security challenges of the 21st century through capabilities development and the participation in NATO crisis-management missions.

In line with most of Central and Eastern European states, Hungary has acknowledged during its armed forces modernization process the ever-increasing importance of the EU’s CSDP. But it has always stressed the primacy of NATO’s framework of collective defence (Biró 2005), as a leading compass in Hungary’s security and defence policy and contribution to regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe. From this point of view, Hungary’s role in NATO was that of a “NATO island” (Almási & Kádár 2005: 263), from where best practices, transitional security experiences and reforms were transferred to the neighbouring countries who became NATO members in 2004, such as Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

The expectation is that the Hungarian security and defence reform process produced less haphazard or cosmetic policy choices and did not experience decision-making fragmentation, but the evidence demonstrates that the transformation was faced with the same challenges encountered by Romania during its security sector transition (albeit a few years after Hungary). The notable differences were that Hungary had a better starting point after the Cold War, mainly due to its proximity to the West, its
more temperate regime change, and more successful transition to democracy and a liberal market.

Contrary to the above expectation, the Hungarian security reform in the 1990s was characterized by permanent restructuring efforts (Martinusz in Gyarmati & Winkler 2002: 271) and strenuous transition stages from the Soviet-based military heritage, all such transitional steps being heavily reliant on tensioned historical legacies. The case of Hungary's transition in the security and defence field was not devoid of instances of hysteresis effects: there were balancing difficulties between the communist military legacies and NATO security developments, the introduction of civilian oversight and civilian expertise within military ranks, coupled by the later efforts towards the EU integration process.

Especially problematic was the institutionalization of civilian checks and balances concerning the military and the hiring of skilled civilian and military personnel within the Ministry of Defence, with two “incompetent” groups of security actors (Dunay 2003: 24-25) competing over Hungary’s new strategic culture right after the end of the Cold War. The hysteresis effect was manifest in a “cats and dogs” (Dunay 2003: 25) game between both civilian and security “professionals” that not only had to mitigate for turf wars between themselves but they also had to adapt to the new doxa of professionalized security making post-Cold War. Like in the already discussed case of Romania, the currency of competency and professionalization became the most prized symbolic capitals for security actors be them civilian or military that composed the personnel of the Ministry of Defence, as the most important institution in charge with the Hungarian defence review.
Education and training aspects became important in the professionalization of the military personnel (Danov 2001), with the Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University playing a significant educational role with the faculty of military sciences and that of command and management services (Danov 2001: 20-21). Such security elites were faced with the daunting task to steer a dated and burdensome sector towards higher standards of international projection, cooperation, and interoperability. At the same time, they had to deal with the fact that security and defence issues were not high ranking priorities on the transitional agenda, especially without having the powerful incentive of clear traditional external military threat to legitimize (Dunay 2003: 34) fast-paced security reforms.

During the transition process and in the face of the opportunities presented by NATO and the European security and defence cooperative framework, both political and military elites started to envision more ambitious military stances for Hungary (Gyarmati & Winkler 2002). The upgrades in the early 2000s from conscripted and inflexible forces to professional contractual armed forces (Biró 2005: 8) were not as straightforward or smooth as the reformers originally envisioned. The transition implied a heavy restructuring of command structures along with the creation of new institutional frameworks of command and military projection that created conflicts among certain sub-security fields.

Conversely, the reduction of the military patrimony and the new acquisitions in the defence sector resulted in instances of corrupt practices (Dunay 2003: 21). Several reform stages are worth mentioning as regards Hungary’s security reform trajectory
post-Cold War, ranging from the late 1990s’ security policy and legislative developments, the early 2000s’ restructuring of the exiting armed forces according to NATO standards, to the late 2000s’ further upgrade and integration in line with NATO and CSDP advancements.

The role played by the EU’s CSDP took a second order status as compared to NATO’s overwhelming influence in the defence review process, but it also engendered specific institutional and strategic response concerning the adaptation to EU-led peace operations. Like in the case of Romania, Hungary has always emphasized the role of NATO as the primary platform for security and defence cooperation (Ondrejcsák 76-90: 83) with on-the-side rhetorical commitments and ambitions to become also an influencer in the EU’s security and defence framework. In terms of Hungary’s participation within EU-led peace operations, as shown in the below Table 6.2.1, it can be observed that the contribution was at best tentative.

The analysis reveals a comparatively similar attitude to that of Romania as regards hard security assurances from NATO, with a secondary influence given to the EU’s developing civilian-military capabilities. In terms of Hungarian Defence Forces’ latest active participation within the CSDP framework, almost 30% of Hungarian troops on foreign missions, approximately 200 personnel, are serving in EU-led operations\(^96\), having contributed the most troops with the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Table 6.2.1 Hungary’s Participation in Peace Operations as of May 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Multi National Force - Iraq</th>
<th>NATO Operations</th>
<th>EU Peace Operations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary was</td>
<td>In December 2004,</td>
<td>Hungary signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO in 1995 and has been a member of NATO since 1999.</td>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina: As of 10 June 2009, Hungary was contributing 158 troops to EUFOR ALTHEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>providing 88</td>
<td>Hungary ended its participation in the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF).</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (KFOR): Hungary was contributing a total of 195 personnel to KFOR.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>personnel to the following:</td>
<td>The country had previously deployed 300 troops since August 2003.</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan: Hungary was contributing a total of 337 troops to ISAF and ~21,000 small arms and 150,000 rounds of ammunition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
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While there was an overwhelming effort to meet the interoperability requirements of both NATO and the EU in terms of operational capacities and resources, there still remained deeply embedded problems as regards inherited Soviet-based practices.

and dispositions. One way to tackle such concerns was the issuing of doctrinally important strategic documents, which, formally at least, marked a discursive shift from Soviet-based ideological rationale.

Nevertheless, they also implied radical practical changes in “staff practices and decision-making procedures; fundamental changes in the relationship and function of different rank categories, such as offices and non-commissioned offices (NCOs); (...) radically new approaches and methodologies in personnel and financial management; and (...) a thorough re-evaluation of the military’s role in society” (Martinusz in Gyarmati & Winkler 2002: 283). The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary underwent several stages of revision from its first security strategy in 1992, going forward with the adoption by the Parliament of the Basic Principles of the Security and Defence Policy in 199898, to the 2002 and the 2004 National Security Strategies put forward by the Government.

The resolution of the Parliament from 1998, concerning the update of Hungary’s Basic Principles on security and defence, emphasized the fundamental role played by this democratic institution in laying the programmatic grounds for the modernization of Hungarian military forces. The Parliament was responsible with the definition of Hungary’s principal strategic interests in line with its commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration and set the tone, at least on paper, for more healthy civilian-military relations.

Nevertheless, the update process initiated by the Parliament targeted structural and financial reforms within military ranks that seemed “to favour position over rank and to reward officers serving in higher headquarters more than officers in command of operational forces” (Betz 2004: 42). This situation is quite similar to that of Romania in terms of favouring more security practitioners in higher decision-making echelons within military ranks rather than personnel in charge with outdated military bases with obsolete Soviet-type of equipment.

The conservative Fidesz - The Hungarian Civil Alliance that gained power in 1998 under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán spearheaded the Basic Principles resolution. For the first time the government accomplished the formal and high-level cooperation between security sub-fields with the creation of the more flexible and overarching national security cabinet of the Hungarian government (Dunay 2003: 18-19).

The following National Security Strategies elaborated by the Government from 2002 and 2004 did not change the fundamental objectives outlined by the Basic Principles (Almási & Kádár 2005: 267), further introducing up-to-date issues linked to NATO and EU developments, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the 2003 Iraq invasion. Notwithstanding the abundance of such strategic documents, Hungary was still facing coherency problems in the national military strategy and a general lack of a strategic vision (Martinusz in Gyarmati & Winkler 2002: 288).

Similarly to the case of Romania, the main reasons for this situation were the absence of a national long-term vision beyond obtaining NATO and EU membership,
coupled by sectoral and fragmented security reforms resembling oftentimes ad-hoc patch-works when dealing with successive reforms of the military. “None of the defence reforms started with the development of a national military strategy” (Martinusz in Gyarmati & Winkler 2002: 289).

The latest National Security Strategy from 201299 is in a sense a timely response to the above criticism and puts forward a comprehensive strategic approach as part of both the EU and NATO: it lays emphasis on asymmetric security problems associated with a globalized international system such as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction; it prioritizes the rights of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states; it states the importance of energy security especially in the context of global economic crisis; and finally it mentions, albeit in a more declaratory manner, Hungary’s strategic partnership with the EU in terms of its “substantial” contribution to crisis-management activities under the CSDP (page 19).

The purpose of the above programmatic documents was to lay the grounds of the Hungarian national basic strategic interests, as well as to spell out the major security and defence challenges and risks Hungary was facing. As it was adopted in 2002 (Government Resolution no. 2144/2002) (Almási & Kádár 2005: 267), the strategy stressed the importance of the Euro-Atlantic integration, the division of sectoral strategies in terms of specific fields of security interest, and marks the last major shift from the collapse of communism.

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In 2004, Hungary adopted a new National Security Strategy (Government Resolution no. 2073/2004) (Almási & Kádár 2005: 264) and identified new international security challenges in terms of asymmetric security threats such as terrorism and illegal migration. It also recognized the need for investments in more flexible capabilities, coupled by the obligation to participate competitively in international cooperative frameworks.

The strategy was doctrinally constructed in line with, at that time, NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and the EU’s European Security Strategy from 2003, and it targeted the Hungarian Home Defence Forces’ capacity to conduct rapidly deployable expeditionary military operations (Betz 2004: 122), as well as the increased investment in flexible and competitive defence capabilities.

From this point of view, the experience of Hungary in terms of creating 21st century armed forces capable of taking part in multi-actor, broad-spectrum, civilian-military peace operations is no different from the rest of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Dunay 2003: 35). The reform process stretched the Hungarian security and defence sector beyond its limits and galvanized a wide array of capitals. As contrasted to the Romanian case, the reform of Hungary’s security and defence field called for the similar mobilization of intellectual and material resources and elicited comparable turf competitions between the civilian and military branches of the security and defence field.

As already mentioned, during the transitional years post-Cold War, the strategic priority was to upgrade the comparatively big and sluggish armed forces (Biró 2005)
according to NATO’s interoperability and projection standards. In line with the Minister of Defence’s Directives number 65.2002 (Biró 2005: 6) prerequisites, the year 2002 marked an important stage when the new elected government carried out central reforms and defence reviews (from 2002 to 2003) that affected the Hungarian armed forces and laid the grounds for the creation of capabilities, missions and tasks up par with NATO and Western allies. The General Staff under the Ministry of Defence was predominantly responsible with the implementation of the national defence review, the reduction of military expenditure, and the reform of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces.

Nevertheless, the General Staff experienced “sharp disagreements” (Biró 2005: 7) with the Ministry of Defence in relation to its integration within the Ministry and concerning the reduction of Hungarian Defence Forces. The tensioned relations between the two defence institutional structures sharing policy implementation responsibilities were manifested in competitions over setting the agenda as regards personnel reductions and in streamlining the waste of resources (Biró 2005: 7-8). This was a clear instance of turf wars and hysteresis effects in a transitional security context, where institutional roles were being redefined and losses had to be tackled with among competing structures so as to avoid redundancy and tasks duplication. What is more, these tensioned relations between the two security sub-fields, the predominantly civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the other predominantly military personnel of the General Staff (Dunay, 2003, 25), were a welcomed attempt to push Hungary towards establishing a genuine civilian oversight over the military.
6.3 Poland's Security Policy Reform after the end of the Cold War

Poland’s experience with the reform of its security and defence sector is in many ways similar to that of Hungary, with Polish political and military elites undertaking a series of programmatic structural changes in line with Western, NATO-oriented security templates. However, from the very beginning and in contrast to the Hungarian security reforms, Polish elites paid more “attention to questions of military significance” (Betz 2004: 33) after the end of the Cold War.

Poland manifested from early on high ambitions to take over a regional leadership role and become a security policy agenda setter and regional power in both NATO and the EU. In part, this can be explained by Poland’s bitter and war-fraught history and struggle for independence, coupled by the country’s exemplary resilience and strive for freedom in the face of numerous foreign occupations. During the Cold War, Poland was at the forefront of dissidence against the communist regime, with the Polish shipyard workers Solidarity movement (Ash 1999) and under the leadership of Lech Walesa setting the tone for the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s.

The country subsequently went on to become an example of successful liberal-democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe with the end-goal to never fall victim to Realpolitik big power machinations and to preserve its new-found independence. A catch-up power (Parkes 2013) after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland has sought to maximize its new found independence with its pursuit of the Euro-Atlantic integration.
In light of the above, the expectation is that the *hysteresis effects* during the security reform process in Poland would be much less frequent and intense, with the transition process in the security and defence field going forward more smoothly as compared to the cases of Hungary and Romania. Nevertheless, the transformation of Poland’s armed forces faced similar difficulties and hurdles in terms of mitigating with resistance during the security reform process and at the same time meeting the exacting demands, standards and obligations associated with the status of a NATO and EU member state.

As in the case of Hungary, Poland’s national security strategy was shaped by a series of programmatic documents starting from the early 1990s, serving the purpose of normative guiding compasses for the clear definition of national security interests and goals, as well as policy implementation road-maps for security practitioners. The Polish National Security Concept and Defence Doctrine from 1992 were put forward by the two, often conflicting, institutions, The National Security Office and the Academy of National Defence (Kubiak 1994: 90), and marked a radical change from the Soviet-based security and defence doctrine typical to the bipolar era. The new doctrines prompted the reform process of the Polish security sector with at least one year before Hungary’s Basic Principles of Security Policy were promulgated in 1993.

The topics addressed by the documents covered the problems of Poland’s security deficit after gaining its sovereignty and the establishment of a Western-style security system in accordance with: the promise of NATO’s collective defence guarantees; the threat of regional instability and local conflict; and last but not the least, the
neighbouring insecurity situation with regards to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (Kubiak 1994: 90-91).

Alike to the cases of Hungary and Romania, professionalized personnel to lead the reforms to the letter of the strategies was however lacking, Poland being faced with the “intractable problem” of “insufficient quantity and quality of expert staff available to assist and advise” (Betz 2004: 119). In the case of Romania, the lag behind in terms of professionalized security practitioners was exacerbated by the predominantly ex-communist dominated, corrupt governments in the 1990s, with former communist state security collaborators still occupying the higher echelons of the Romanian armed forces.

The reforms prompted by the 1992 strategy completely restructured the Polish armed forces, reducing the numbers from around 400,000 in 1988 to 150,000 by the end of 2003 (Edmunds, Cottey & Foster 2013: 41-42). As well, instances of incoherence and hysteresis during the reform process were observed, with high ranking military officials stating that “our army has been in the process of reforms for many years now. Necessary as they were, those reforms were superficial, partial, and not based on a final vision” (as quoted in Edmunds, Cottey & Foster 2013: 41). In the early 1990s, quite expectedly and akin to the perceptions in Hungary and Romania, NATO represented for Poland the hallmark of security assurance and an incontestable guarantee of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

As well, the creation at that time of the Visegrad Group (Kubiak 1994: 97) of which Hungary was also a member, further cemented and institutionalized a sense of
regional solidarity by encouraging multilateral economic cooperation between Central and Eastern European countries. Almost a decade later and after gaining NATO membership, a new Security Strategy and a new National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland were adopted in 2000 (Edmunds, Cottee & Foster 2013) by the ministries of foreign affairs and defence respectively.

The documents laid the grounds for more seasoned national strategic goals and threat perceptions, and more importantly, they enclosed updated approaches to the reform of armed forces and military capabilities (Betz 2004: 40). One ranking issue stood out from the new National Security Strategy, namely Poland’s stated aspiration to become an active member in the Alliance and to play a “significant role” (Betz 2004: 41) in promoting NATO’s political and defence agenda in Central and Eastern Europe and especially towards Ukraine.

From this point of view, Poland’s strategic interest in its Eastern Neighbourhood is comparably similar to that of Romania and its vested concerns regarding the instabilities in the Black Sea Region and especially towards Moldova and the Transnistrian frozen conflict. Both countries sought to advance their national security agendas through the Alliance’s umbrella and the EU’s soft power guarantees.

Poland perceives its *limes* status at NATO’s Eastern periphery in a similar way to Romania, seeing itself as a frontline country responsible with externalizing stability and security beyond its borders. It could be also said that Poland’s evolution from a euro-sceptic country to an active participant within the CSDP framework differs from Romania’s experience as an uncritical euro-enthusiasm.
Nevertheless, both countries were pragmatic in their security policy orientation and advocated for promoting burden-sharing and avoiding unnecessary duplication (Zaborowski 2008: 8) between NATO and the EU. Conversely, in contrast to Romania, Poland’s Atlanticism has been toned down and became more realistic (Chappell 2010: 240) with the increased development of the EU as a potential security actor in its own right.

Typical to the *hysteresis* scenario during transitional stages, the above reform policies elicited mixed institutional reactions and turf competitions in the executive branch, with the Cabinet of Ministers controlling the drafting and approving of the strategies as “state policy” (Betz 2004: 41) while, according to the Presidency, they were not state policies until signed and approved by the President. Similar to the case of Romania as regards the increased competencies of the Presidency over the armed forces, the role of the Polish Presidency in the civil-military relations is very important (Betz 2004: 127), with the immediate consequence of creating further inter-institutional tensions and rivalries during the security reform process.

Compared to Hungary, where the prominence of the President in determining the security and defence agenda is not as major and rather ceremonial, the Polish President has considerable authority and combines “the functions of a military inspectorate with advisory and protocol functions” (Betz, 2004, 127). In terms of civil-military relations, the aim of the above reforms was to achieve better parliamentary and executive control (Gogolewska 2003: 42) of the armed forces, through the division of labour and responsibilities, but the reality was that “the development of
civilian expertise in defence policy was always very low on the political agenda of successive ministers of defence” (Gogolewska 2003: 45). Notwithstanding the numerous obstacles, the civil-military transformation of Poland was much more successful than in the cases of Hungary and Romania, the civilian oversight managed to exert more successful democratic control over the armed forces (Gogolewska 2003: 49).

Several ground-breaking moments are of particular relevance in the transitional process, among which the National Security Strategy from 2003 is one of the most important, due to its core programmatic status for the following strategies and policy developments (Edmunds, Cottey & Foster 2013: 39). The 2003 strategy officially marked the end of the territorial-based doctrine and cemented the multilateral expeditionary model of security making (Edmunds, Cottey & Foster 2013: 40).

In accordance with NATO and the EU strategic priorities, Poland identified in the strategy several ranking non-tradition security challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and energy security in relation to Russia. From this point of view, like in the Romanian case, Russia is a significant trope within Poland’s national strategy because of geopolitical reasons and as well as its proximity to Belarus.

Romania has followed a similar strategic posture and in many ways emulated Poland’s strategy to create a double security umbrella with NATO on collective defence and the EU as a potential diplomatic avenue to address preventively and with soft power tactics Russia’s return to the region. Poland’s National Security
Strategy from 2007 is indicative of such a double-folded security assurance, putting forward a new approach to the national security strategy by correlating the doctrinal influence of NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999) and the EU’s European Security Strategy (2003). As its Hungarian counterpart, Poland approached the issue of security in managerial terms and addressed the new international security risks and challenges in a sectoral manner.

Poland’s latest programmatic document, the White Book of Strategic National Security, published in 2013 as a result of a completed National Security Strategic Review, was meant to be an synopsis of the country’s advancements with security and defence reforms, as well as a standard for national defence spending in the context of shifting international security configurations.

The advancements proposed by the strategy fall in line with Poland’s aspirations to become a military leader and promoter of regional stability in Eastern Europe (Chappell 2010: 241) as an active participant within both NATO and the EU. It targeted also improving political efficiency in implementing measures to improve expeditionary capabilities and established a prospective timespan up until 2022 to advance an integrated and holistic approach to the blurring lines of external and internal security and to harmonize Poland’s security strategy with NATO and EU standards.

102 Ibidem
Like in the cases of Hungary and Romania, the end goal for Poland was to consolidate its double-membership status within both the Alliance and the EU, in addition to tackling the remaining national obstacles to security and defence development. Without any doubt, Poland perceives its role as a regional leader and “the region’s advocate in Brussels” (Kurowska & Németh 2013). The EU is seen as a potential avenue for security cooperation, but only in the case of the civil-military field (Chappell 2010: 226) and as long as the hard security and defence domains remain under NATO’s purview.

The Figure 6.3.1 below demonstrates that Poland has participated in a wide-array of international operations as compared to the cases of Hungary and Romania – although the comparison has to consider Romania’s late-comer status within both the EU and NATO.
6.4 Conclusion

The analysis of Hungary’s and Poland’s security and defence sector transformations, their earlier and more advanced reforms as compared to the case of Romania, demonstrates that they were faced with similar, though less prominent, problems and difficulties during their armed forces’ transition. Political and security actors in Central and Eastern Europe were faced with comparable structural difficulties in terms of a lack of political will and economic resources to implement reforms (Gyarmati &

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Winkler 2002), coupled by the resistance of conservative militaries to civilian oversight (Gyarmati & Winkler 2002).

The processes of transformation in the above cases present different degrees of what Bourdieu has named *hysteresis effects*: through the isomorphic emulation of NATO and EU standards; by implementing formal but not exactly substantive security reforms; due to the endemic phenomenon of corruption in post-communist societies; because of budgetary limitations and the second-order status of security reforms as compared to economic or political ones; and the lack of will or competence from part of Central and Eastern European elites. This resulted, often times, in what could be labelled as and armed forces’ professionalization *in form* but haphazard and cosmetic *in reality*, and especially “idiosyncratic and *sui generis* in practice” (Betz 2004: 33).

Both countries relied on NATO as a primary platform for international projection and national protection, as well as exhibited turf wars between governmental security sub-fields regarding the setting of the agenda during the transition process. Poland was more hawkish and outward-looking in terms of pursuing its security and defence interest in the region by advancing its agenda and utilizing the platforms of NATO and the EU, whereas Hungary displayed a more inward-looking security policy and primarily emphasized the Hungarian minority rights abroad.

Romania, as compared to Hungary and Poland, was a much slower reformer and sluggish in implementing transitional steps in the field of security and defence, Hungary and Poland being overall leaders of the liberal-democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO played the role of teacher for its Central and
Eastern European apprentices, security practitioners in Romania, Hungary, and Poland taking lead from NATO standards and training experiences to build their expertise and professionalization. The EU, on the other hand, has been relegated most of the times to a second order status in hard security-making. The EU has also been acknowledged by all three countries as a potentially interesting and developing platform for civil-military operations and not to mention for the broader economic security and stability of Central and Eastern Europe.

The determining factors of such differences could be accounted for by socio-political and economic differences in terms of the transitional experiences in the case of these countries, their geographical proximity to the West, the different communist contexts and legacies, on top of more efficient governmental policies and successful reforms. As in the case of Romania’s security sector transformation, Hungary and Poland experienced their security sectors’ reforms under the prerequisites of political democratizations and the transition towards liberal market economies.
CONCLUSION

In contrast to most representations and patterns of security and defence socialization put forward by the mainstream strategic culture literature, the thesis demonstrated that in the absence of established and homogenous national strategic cultures, transitional security contexts present unique and idiosyncratic features. The processes of socialization are by comparison dependent upon the practices of security actors adjusting to shifting and constantly transforming security fields.

Adaptation to change becomes a professional survival tool and an ingrained disposition in the hands of such security practitioners, as they learn to navigate the intricate policy and institutional landscape during the post-Cold War transition from traditional defence templates to professionalized armed forces. The thesis thus put forward a Bourdieusean-inspired framework that emphasized the voice of security practitioners and their view on shaping the security and defence profile of a new Euro-Atlantic member state such as Romania.

The research considered that interest-based or ideational variables were not enough to fully determine the security actors’ transitional security habitus, the role of tacit knowledge and practices having thus a constitutive and explanatory potential as well. Consequently, the thesis advocated for the importance of social practices in understanding the intersubjective dynamics between national security structures and actors’ interests, ideas, norms, and most importantly, practices. In contrast to approaches that circumvent the practical dimensions of security making, the thesis
emphasized the role of the logics of practice in guiding the in-depth, micro-analysis of the Romanian security field post-Cold War. For that end, the research focused on:

The ways in which Romanian security actors made sense of the policy reforms and the external influence of both NATO and the EU in practice;

How the hierarchy in the Romanian security field was established during symbolic power struggles and institutional turf wars;

Which were the most important capitals that determined the privileged, agenda-setting power positions of security practitioners;

And how successfully and to what extent had the Romanians security field been transformed since the end of the Cold War.

By contextualizing the ways in which the double-folded influence of NATO and the EU impacted the Romanian security and defence reform process post-Cold War, the analysis found that the role played by NATO was ground-breaking and programmatic in the transformation of Romania’s national security and defence strategy. The research put forward a cartography of the main reform processes undertaken in the Romanian security field and demonstrated that NATO expertise and standards went unquestioned by the Romanian political and military elites, responsible with drafting Romania’s new strategic priorities and objectives.
While the legitimacy of NATO security guarantees and the necessity of professionalization were uncontested and taken for granted, the reform process triggered however deeply lagging, haphazard and idiosyncratic reactions within the ranks of Romanian security practitioners. The thesis established that the main reasons behind such erratic and chaotic behaviour were:

- The coexistence of lingering outdated territorial-based Cold War legacies of defence along with new ways of doing security as regards armed forces professionalization and flexibility;

- The Romanian security elite’s inclination towards strong Atlanticist or NATO-oriented strategic prerequisites versus more Europeanist or CSDP-oriented ones;

- Due to Romania’s geopolitical positioning and proximity to Russia, the necessity of NATO’s Article 5 guarantees was considered the only credible national defence assurance;

- The fundamental role played by NATO in reforming the security and defence sector of former communist countries in Central and Eastern European.

From this point of view, the case of the Romanian security field was particularly interesting in terms of the ways in which security practitioners responded to considerable adaptation pressures from both NATO’s and the EU’s cooperative frameworks. As demonstrated in the research, such actors had to mitigate in practice
with their lack of professionalization and training, with the transformation of the Romanian conscripted armed forces’ into rapid reaction and flexible forces, and with the requirements to participate in overseas civil-military operations and exercises.

Coupled to such challenges, the interviewing data showed that the Romanian security practitioners referenced their now devalued doctrinal legacy of the communist and Warsaw Pact era as compared to the importance of new skills and expertise necessary to become functioning security professionals in NATO and the EU security and defence structures. The influence of NATO was major in shaping the security practitioners know-how and skills as NATO standards were adopted during the modernization of the Romanian security and defence sector.

The Bourdiusean-inspired theoretical framework advanced in the thesis focused on the behavioural elements as revealed in practice, by taking into account both structural and agency-driven variables shaping security practitioners behaviour. The added value of such a theoretical framework was that it highlighted inertia and change within the Romanian security field in both dimensions of practice and discourse: on the one hand, by clarifying why certain security habits and dispositions remained entrenched; and on the other hand, by emphasizing why other practices transformed because of the interplay between transitional conditions and the agency of actors with their specific symbolic and material resources.

The new concept of transitional security habitus was proposed in the thesis as a step forward in bypassing the Bourdieusean formal immutability of the habitus, by resorting to the relational element of the habitus and by allowing for a theory of its
social change. The theoretical standpoint was that the concept of habitus, when analysed in line with the other Bourdieusean concepts of the field, hysteresis, and symbolic capital, can sanction variability and idiosyncrasy in security behaviour and practices.

By making-use of Bourdieu’s conceptual toll-kit, the present study answered questions related to where does strategic culture stem from in post-communist contexts or how it influences and shapes the thinking and statesmanship of social actors in practice, especially during transitional stages or policy reforms. The concepts of symbolic power and symbolic capital were applied so as to analyse a particular typology of leadership in the Romanian security landscape. The added gain of a Bourdieusean-inspired research design was that it was able to flesh out the discursive practices used by security practitioners so as to establish a symbolic monopoly over the directions in national foreign and security policy.

From this perspective, the thesis has brought forward the fact that symbolic capital, translated in knowledge, training, and expertise, played a key role in the struggle over the meaning and value of resources during the transitional stages in the Romanian security field. The analysis distinguished the importance of NATO-based training and expertise in the symbolic power struggle over specific changes in the national security strategy and policy reforms. The ambitious transitional process entailed also the carving of a national security identity in line with becoming a capable ally for both NATO and the EU.
The thesis demonstrated that a generalized sense of hysteresis during the post-Cold-War reforms was present and it displayed perplexing consequences for the Romanian security field. The lack of security expertise as reflected in practice or an overarching doctrinal guidance became the common norm, as actors could not behave according to rules of common sense if there was no central, agreed upon, national security strategy in the first place.

The interview data showed that the ranks and status positions craved by security actors were occupied by those who were capable to manipulate and adapt to the fast restructuring pace of reforms, in spite of their lack of expertise or definitive strategic guiding principles. Furthermore, it was made evident that when the territorial and defence-based traditional habitus of security professionals could not keep up with the policy reforms and the newly introduced NATO security standards, hysteresis effects appeared in practice and more quixotic and chaotic behaviours and interactions emerged.

Consequently, the discrepancy between the dispositions of actors in terms of their transitional security habitus and their position within the Romanian security field involved that the hysteresis effect was an important hurdle in the establishment of a doxa or a shared common-sense in security making. As it was demonstrated by the micro-analysis of the Romanian security field, the principal strategies used by Romanian security actors as shown by the interview data fell in line with the logic of a transitional security habitus:
The main dispositions developed were those of an increased capacity to adapt to change, which led to the generalized hysteresis upshot of creative professional survival tactics and constant professional reinvention;

The transitional security context called for the constant development of transferable skills and symbolic capital as generated by mostly NATO-based education and training;

Such important skills were the symbolic currencies in the hegemonic struggle to establish and shape the various collective representations throughout the Romanian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defence;

Tensions were prevalent in the Romanian transitional security field due to the civilian oversight and transfer of expertise in the military sub-field.

The project also addressed how a particular typology of charismatic leadership made use of power practices so as to establish a symbolic monopoly over the directions in foreign and security policy. By making use of the concept of symbolic power as applied to the case of the Romanian Presidency, the thesis found that the Romanian President Traian Băsescu acquired an overwhelming performative power to shape the various collective security representations and established a symbolic monopoly over Romania’s transitional foreign policy and security policy.

The analysis showed that under the influence of the Presidency, the Romanian transitional security field took on two clear-cut dimensions: a strong Atlanticist
orientation in terms of security and defence guarantees on the one hand, and a specific national strategic interest and geopolitical concern in the Black Sea Region’s power configuration on the other hand. The scrutiny of the Romanian security field underlined the dominant role played by the Presidency in the strategic use of personality markers and symbolic power.

Finally, the analysis of Hungary’s and Poland’s earlier and more progressive security and defence reforms confirmed that they have faced comparably similar problems and difficulties during their armed forces transformation post-Cold War. Political and security actors in Central and Eastern Europe were being confronted with equivalent structural difficulties in terms of a lack of expertise and economic resources to implement reforms, in addition to the resistance and opposition of conservative militaries to civilian oversight.

The processes of transformation in the above cases present different degrees of what Bourdieu has named *hysteresis effects*, resulting in what could be considered security reform *in form* but hit-or-miss and superficial *in reality*. Like in the Romanian case, both countries depended on NATO as a primary security and defence mentor, as well as exhibited turf wars and symbolic struggles between governmental security sub-fields as regards the direction of their national security agenda.

The cases of Hungary’s and Poland’s security reforms and their relatively similar transitional experiences offer potentially interesting generalizable conclusions and transformation patterns concerning the stages of adaptation and change within transitional national security contexts in the Central and Eastern Europe.
Even though transformations in the Central and Eastern European security landscape have not gone unnoticed in the last years in the academia, more research is needed on the double-folded influence of NATO and the EU on national security policies. Future research could be dedicated to Central and Eastern European countries and their security policy in the context of Russia’s geopolitical revisionism in the region. The meagre trust that Russia has gained since the end of the Cold War with Central and Eastern European countries has suffered greatly after recent events, Russia’s credibility as a reliable international partner decreasing dramatically.

An interesting future study point inspired by a Bourdieusean analysis could reveal the ways in which security actors from such countries make use in practice of their NATO-dominated and the CSDP-influenced security habitus in relations to Russia, as the recent Crimean security crisis has had a different geopolitical impact for Warsaw and Bucharest than for Paris, London or even Brussels.
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