

DO REGULATIONS MATTER? IMPACT OF POLITICAL FINANCING REGULATIONS ON PARTY CORRUPTION IN CROATIA AND SERBIA

By Gorana Mišić

Submitted to Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Supervisor: Professor Ágnes Bátory

Budapest, Hungary January 2018

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Gorana Mišić January 31, 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As all acknowledgements state at an early point – this thesis would have not been possible without – well, many people. This project has certainly been the single largest test of my persistence, determination and patience (and functioning without sleeping as deadlines approach).

I was lucky to have the most amazing supervisory panel. Words will probably fail me to express what a great supervisor Ágnes Bátory was. I cannot count the hours of consultations and very bad drafts – Ágnes was the most patient and both critical and gentle commentator of my work. She always kept her door open whenever I had doubts, needed to discuss undeveloped ideas, struggled with theoretical framework and interpretation of my data. She knew when I needed a break and distraction, a push, criticism or advice. Not only was Ágnes an amazing supervisor, but also a great teacher and teaching mentor. It was with Ágnes that I did my first TAship, where she gave me the opportunity and freedom to create and experiment with different teaching methods. Thank you, Ágnes, for all the support and guidance, I learned a lot from you.

I am particularly thankful for insightful feedback from my panel members, Marie-Pierre Granger and Evelyne Hübscher. Thank you for your time, comments and advice which greatly contributed to the quality of my work. It often felt that all of you always had a clear idea of where my thesis is going – it was just me who still needed to find a way to get there. It is with pride (and a bit of bitterness) that I say that this great panel was one of the two whole-female panels at the CEU Doctoral School.

My special thanks are extended to Robin Bellers for academic writing advice and to our coordinators, Zoli and Kriszta, for great support and prompt answers to all emails – especially in the last few months.

For a long time, I was terrified even of the thought that I have to conduct interviews – what if nobody wants to talk to me, what if they never answer my phone calls and emails? I have to thank my interviewees, whose names are not disclosed in this thesis. I had the most enjoyable three months while doing interviews. Thank you for your time and talking openly about this sensitive topic; I learned so much from you. This was truly essential for my work.

Center for Teaching and Learning played such an important role in my development as a researcher and teacher. Through Helga's seminars, I fell in love with teaching, which turned out to be so much needed 'distraction' from writing. Getting a PhD does not make one a (good) teacher. No-one gets it right the first time they teach a course, but we can all learn and grow as teachers. Helga, Sally and Tünde were a great support and inspiration in this endeavour. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to work with and learn from you.

These years would not have been the same without working with Károly Jókay– an ingenious and dedicated teacher, and a true role model. Monday morning budgeting and public management classes were a great start of more than half of my weeks spent at the CEU. We made a good team.

I cannot express gratitude to my former boss and friend, Saša Šegrt. Saša is probably 'responsible' that I started working on this topic in the first place – back in 2012 when I came to Transparency International Croatia. Later on, Saša was a so much needed and appreciated reality check and commentator of my work. Thank you for the support and enthusiasm for my project.

This thesis also benefited a lot from feedback, conversations and suggestions from Bojan, Fernando, Karoly, Michael, Sanja, Tamara, Vladimir, as well as discussions at the CEU Anticorruption Research Group and ECPR Summer School on Political Parties. Thank you for your time and comments (especially the last minute ones).

A very, very, very special thanks go to my proof-readers: Freeman, Karoly, Michael, Sarah and Saša. You are my heroes. Thank you.

Past four years would have been unimaginable without the 'PhD circle' and friends from the 'Trash lab'. Ali, Angelo, Asli, Caitlin, Carl, Dani, Daniela, Ewa, Georgiana, Jelena, Man Kong, Margaryta, Oded, Olga, Renira, Sanja, Sarah, Sashi, Silvia, Tamara, Viktor, Vujo. I am thankful to Silvia and Carl for introducing me to the network science analysis. Sashi was a role model for writing discipline – had you been here longer I am sure I would have finished faster! Tamara and Sanja have been the most precious academic and personal support. Facebook probably lost count of the number of exchanged messages in our chat. Sanja has been a friend and academic partner since 2005: from a PPT on Keynes to a PhD – who would have guessed back then! Tamara, in addition to being an amazing editor and partner to discuss daily politics, is that friend who brings you pancakes with peanut butter and nutella from the other part of the city – because you are stressed with finishing the thesis and that's the only thing you want to eat. I am happy to have you both. I said this so many times already – if this PhD experience is worth anything, it's meeting all of you.

I am thankful to my non-PhD friends Ana, Ani, Anja, Ante, Brigi, Bruno Korea, Cecilia, Dóra, Elmina, Ildikó, Marko, Matija, Mercedes, Sonja and Željka for the support and encouragement over the last four years. Elmina was my most dedicated proof-reader in the last four years and Željka a kind host to all my short research trips to Zagreb. Marko tried very hard to motivate me to learn Cyrillic. He was the most appreciated help in filling in the forms to access the library archives. Хвала! My flatmate Mercedes was a great support during the intense writing period. Gracias for all the lunches and dinners (#juana) - and Gilmore nights (there, I said it). My sincere appreciation goes to my best friend, Anja. I believe we could compile at least two dissertations from the amount of exchanged messages and conversations in the past period. Anja was there through every personal, emotional, writing and academic despair and crisis during the past four years. I think it is safe to say that her advice and support kept me sane many times.

Nassim was both the most understanding and caring writing support - and escape from the academic craziness. Thank you for making me smile and being there for me.

A most sincere thank you goes to my parents, Sanja and Goran, and my sisters, Marina and Dora. Wanted or not, they know everything about corruption and party financing, papers, writing, deadlines and chapters. Without their unconditional love, support and understanding I would not have been writing these lines today. Volim vas.

In the end, I will just leave this here (who knows me will understand why) 🧼

Now back to serious business – party corruption.

ABSTRACT

The dissertation analyses the impact of political financing regulations (PFR) on party corruption after the 2011 regulatory framework reform in Croatia and Serbia. In looking at PFR as an anti-corruption tool, the core research question of the dissertation is: What is the impact of political financing regulations on party corruption in Croatia and Serbia - and through which mechanisms is this impact achieved?

The relationship between political financing regulation and related corruption has not been extensively researched. Overall, the literature on the impact of PFR on party corruption is oriented to large-N quantitative comparative studies, which inevitably involve the use of indicators and proxies. However, these indicators fail to capture what authors claim to measure: corruption indices are much broader than party corruption, and PFR indices and proxies do not include implementation. Moreover, the studies on political financing do not address the mechanisms of how the PFR impact came about. In other words, whereas the existing scholarship finds that PFR failed to tackle corruption, it is often not interested in explaining why this is the case.

To address this gap, the present thesis approaches the study of PFR impact on party corruption from a qualitative perspective. The thesis uses in-depth interviews and structured scenario discussions with relevant stakeholders. By focusing on qualitative data targeting specifically party corruption, rather than aggregate indices, and looking at the implementation of the regulations, rather than only the letter of the law, the thesis offers a more accurate understanding of PFR impact on party corruption. Moreover, the central assumption of the thesis is that to be able to fully understand the impact of regulations or lack of it, it is necessary to look into the motivations of the regulatees to comply. Following these motivations, we can better understand why certain regulatory approaches work – or fail to work. In this sense, the thesis theoretically draws on the regulatory literature combined with the political financing scholarship. Bridging the two bodies of literature is particularly beneficial for a more systematic research of the impact of PFR. Whereas the regulatory literature provides a theoretical framework for understanding motivations of political parties to comply with the regulations, as well as for approaches to regulatory enforcement and design, the political financing literature offers the basis for the analytical framework. In this sense, the present thesis contributes not only to unpacking the mechanisms that regulatory measures are assumed to work on, but also to a better understanding of how exactly PFR affects party corruption in Croatia and Serbia.

The findings show that regulations matter, but cannot work alone. PFR and transparency measures overall made money in party financing 'traceable'. Parties are more disciplined, financial reports are 'cleaner', timely and becoming more accurate over time, oversight is enhanced. Regulations matter for closing the known and existing channels of party corruption. However, political parties seem to adapt their behaviour, find the loopholes and new 'ways of doing things' in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas transparency measures closed some of the usual corrupt money channels, they incentivised others and changed the form of corrupt practices. Still, as the thesis shows, PFR and transparency measures have a potential to reveal corruption networks and can be a powerful tool in the hands of free media and strong opposition in holding governments accountable. In this sense, more research about party corruption in practice, compliance motivations of political parties, as well as compliance incentives could make regulatory responses to party corruption more targeted and effective.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT NOTICE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	i ii iv v viii ix x
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL FINANCING, PARTY CORRUPTION AND REGULATION	13
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN	45
CHAPTER 3: PARTIES, ELECTIONS, PARTY CORRUPTION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK	73
CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC FUNDING, DONATION CAPS, SPENDING LIMITS AND TRANSPARENCY MEASURES: EXPECTED EFFECTS VS. ACTUAL IMPACT	101
CHAPTER 5: OVERSIGHT, SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS: OVERSIGHT BODIES AND MEDIA MONITORING	146
CONCLUSION	194
APPENDICES	207
BIBLIOGRAPHY	235