NON-STATE ACTORS IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS:
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE AND PRO-INTEGRATION ADVOCACY

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Submitted to
Central European University
Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations
Department of International Relations and European Studies (IRES)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Budapest, Hungary
2014
ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the European Union, governmental and non-governmental actors have attempted to create regional institutions at the level of the Euro-Mediterranean geographic space, which encompasses the EU, North Africa and West Asia. These regionalist endeavors have produced outcomes like the Union for the Mediterranean, but have also resulted in the emergence of a Euro-Mediterranean sphere of non-state organizations. Previous research on these types of organizations, particularly foreign policy research, has largely addressed them as tools of EU-driven regionalism. This leaves open the question of why and how non-state organizations position themselves towards the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean region, and to what extent they become political actors at the regional level. In reaction, the present study approaches the Euro-Med as a hybrid political region characterized by internal heterogeneity, institutional volatility, and political polycentricity. Based on neo-functionalist hypotheses and assisted by insight from New Regionalism approaches, it argues that Euro-Mediterranean regionalism allows non-state organizations like NGOs, business associations, or networks of local authorities to (re-)orient towards Euro-Mediterranean regional politics. Empirical research to support this point relies on two comprehensive surveys, of non-state organizations and of regional inter-state contexts, as well as on case studies sustained by document analysis, stakeholder interviews and event observation. Findings indicate how regionalism has unleashed a wide range of Euro-Mediterranean non-state dynamics, including by advocacy groups of a pro-integration character, and illustrate the possibility and fruitfulness of applying neo-functionalist integration theory to the non-state field of hybrid macro-regions.
Acknowledgments

This dissertation is a direct result of the inspiration, feedback and support I have received from family, friends, and colleagues. Foremost, I would like to thank my parents for their help. I am also much obliged to my supervisor at CEU, Uwe Puetter, for his continued belief in the core ideas of this study, and for his patience with my struggles in implementing it. Academically, the feedback received from the members of my supervisory panel, Daniel Monterescu and Xymena Kurowska, was indispensable during the implementation of this study. Furthermore, the kind and insightful exchanges with Philippe Schmitter, Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, Ana Bojinović Fenko, Benedetta Voltolini and Holly Oberle were invaluable to my motivation to work on this project. I would also particularly like to thank Stefan Cibian for his unofficial mentorship.

Notably, this thesis has benefited from project funding in the context of the CEU-Sabancı Joint Academic Initiative. My thanks also go to the many staff members at Central European University who are doing a lot to make student life easier, and to Stefano Guzzini who first raised my awareness of the qualities of CEU.

In addition, I would like to acknowledge Adil Faitout, without whom my interest in Euro-Mediterranean affairs may not have arisen in the first place. I wish him and his family all the best in their quest for intercultural understanding.
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LIST OF KEY ABBREVIATIONS

EFP European Foreign Policy
EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
EU European Union
MENA Middle East and North Africa
UfM Union for the Mediterranean

Keywords: Non-State actors, Euro-Mediterranean, Regionalism, Regional integration, European Foreign Policy
INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is divided from the North African and Middle Eastern (MENA) riparian states of the Mediterranean Sea by countless political, economic, and cultural divides. Despite a resulting asymmetry in cross-Mediterranean relations, EU relations to the Southern shores of the Mediterranean have come to be institutionalized in various regional co-operation initiatives and organizations. In 2008, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was re-organized as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Furthermore, relations continue in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In addition to these overarching frameworks for cooperation, a multifaceted web of intergovernmental and non-state organizations oriented towards the Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-Med) geographic space has emerged. Frequently, Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation is assessed against European policy aims and compared to the European history of integration. Euro-Mediterranean regional policies and organizations have often been researched as “first and foremost an aspect of European foreign policy” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 278), of "that body of declarations, decisions, and actions, that are made by the use of all the instruments that the EC/EU has at its disposal, that are decided at the EC/EU level, and conducted in its name toward a country or an area outside its borders" (Bicchi, 2007, p. 2).

However, when studying the effect of Euro-Med regionalism on the non-state level, a focus on European foreign policy tends to reduce groups and organizations to ENP targets or beneficiaries, or to focus on their activities at local and national level only.

1 In the present study, the abbreviation ‘EU’ is used as an umbrella term including when making reference to previous EC / EEC policies.
Thus, Ana Bojinović Fenko deplores regarding riparian transnational groups that "what prevails is a research starting point of the Mediterranean being the European Union (EU) neighborhood area and not an area in its own process of regionalization" (Bojinović Fenko, 2009, p. 187). Based on an actor mapping, Šabič & Bojinović find that "[i]n contrast to the weak intra-regional intergovernmental institutional structure, many intra-Mediterranean international non-governmental organizations, networks, and think tanks are active in the region" (Šabič & Bojinović, 2007, p. 333). Furthermore, there are "numerous cases of persisting multidimensional regionalization processes by non-state actors, and innovative new types of actors, namely coalitions of state-market-civil society-external actors" (Bojinović Fenko, 2012, p. 409). Frequently, the perceived insignificance of non-state actors in Euro-Mediterranean affairs has been related to the weakness of regional intergovernmentalism, let alone supra-nationalism, as well as to the strong role of authoritarian governments in much of the Southern Mediterranean. However, Bojinović Fenko argues:

"Since inter-governmentalism was/is scarce, it is the non-state actors who have since 1970s taken 'the lead', constantly intensifying the local and regional civil society's cooperation in the Mediterranean affairs. One can observe Mediterranean international and local NGOs, co-operating in networks or independently, networks of research centers and epistemic communities, local communities and cities" (Bojinović Fenko, 2009, p. 191).

A number of studies have previously addressed individual non-state actors in Euro-Mediterranean affairs, mostly regarding the fields of civil society NGOs and networks. Schumacher compiled a volume “to provide for a more theory-informed and conceptual platform” on Euro-Med cultural and social co-operation (Schumacher, 2005, p. 285). Juenemann, in her research on the intermediary advocacy role of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, shows that transnational NGOs critically
address the EU and European states (Jünemann, 2002, p. 99). Feliu notes the expansion of human rights networks in Arab Mediterranean countries and highlights that those transnational networks

“which are more consolidated, continue to exert a major influence on cognitive frameworks, belief systems and values, with an ensuing homogenization of language and discourse at the transnational level” (Feliu, 2005, p. 379).

In addition, Feliu argues, human rights advocacy groups have contributed to “shaping international political organizations which in turn influence their activity, although this impact has been limited in the Mediterranean area” (Feliu, 2005, p. 380). Pace et al. discuss the value of parliaments to consolidate MENA civil society and to establish additional advocacy options (Pace, Stavridis, & Xenakis, 2004, p. 76). Thus, evidence of Euro-Mediterranean regional orientation exists with regard to non-state actors, but it has remained spurious and largely limited to research on civil society cooperation and the field of cultural dialog, with few exceptions addressing other fields like cross-Mediterranean business cooperation (Schmid, 2009).

Furthermore, while non-state organizations, notably from civil society, have usually been acknowledged in EU and governmental declarations regarding the Euro-Mediterranean, Johansson-Nogués notes that the UfM “follows the path already staked out by the Barcelona Process whereby civil society co-operation is encouraged, but provides no firm decision on how to derive concrete synergies from their work to assist the development of specific ambits related to the UfM” (Johansson-Nogués, 2011, pp. 30–31). Furthermore, she finds a “(virtually hermetic) separation between the intergovernmental dimension and other actors involved in Euro-Mediterranean co-operation” (Johansson-Nogués, 2011, p. 31), in line with her recognition of the limitations and internal contradictions of the EU’s promotion of Euro-Mediterranean civil society cooperation (Johansson-Nogués, 2006).
In order to obtain a wide-angle picture of non-state convergence around official Euro-Mediterranean policies and institutions, the research questions of the present study are a) why and how do transnational non-state organizations position themselves towards the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean region, and b) in which ways do they become political actors, possibly promoting integration at the regional level? To answer these questions, this study researches the regional constituency, organizational origin, geographical orientation, and operational capacity of different types of transnational non-state groups. Subsequently, its inquiry focuses on political or advocacy strategies employed by non-state organizations vis-à-vis regional institutions and policies, including the political channels and the levels of governance they address. Thereby, it attempts to understand how Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors relate to, or build on, prevalent regional agendas and logics of regionalism, regional cooperation or integration, for instance by exploiting functional pressures and perceived interdependences in their advocacy. To this aim, this study problematizes the asymmetries, hybridity, and polycentricity of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Finally, by addressing the role of non-state actors across Euro-Mediterranean political arenas, particularly regarding the revision of regional policies and institutions, it attempts to understand groups’ potential to promote processes of regional integration.

While the EMP is understood as an “experiment in ‘peripheral regionalism’” (Joffé, 2007, p. 222), Euro-Mediterranean politics have lacked attention from integration theory, probably due to its weak state of region-ness, as well as from New Regionalism, in the light of its EU-driven, formalized character. However, integration theory is promising for “the field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying

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2 The term ‘group’ in this thesis refers to the neo-functionalist understanding of ‘regional group formation’.
political cooperation" and common political institutions (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 4). Thus, in approaching the role of non-state organizations, this study draws on elements of neo-functionalist thought. This allows it to go beyond studies on the operational activities of Euro-Med non-state groups as well as beyond research on governmental or EU policy instruments aimed at supporting civil society. Thereby, its research geographically focuses primarily on the 'official' Euro-Mediterranean instead of the riparian Mediterranean space.

Neo-functionalism argues that government-driven regional frameworks unleash dynamics which lead to the formation and reorientation of transnational non-state groups, which in turn orient towards emerging regional centers. In more systemic terms, neo-functionalism recognizes that regional dynamics at the non-state level can affect the design, scope, and authority of regional institutions. Institutional outcomes of such processes can take various forms, including political spill-over, spill-around, or spill-back (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, pp. 55–57). In consequence, this study’s hypothesis is briefly that regionally constituted non-state groups orient towards new regional centers and, as regional actors, attempt to mobilize integration dynamics, functional pressures or internationally induced incentives vis-à-vis processes of policy or institutional revision. This study’s empirical research indicates that even sectoral non-state actors and groups which originate in the EU’s regional agenda promote the intensification of regional co-operation or integration. Thereby, integration dynamics are understood as the causes and patterns of motion, variable across time, which affect integration in a given region.

Based on this theoretical underpinning, non-state organizations can be expected to use opportunities that Euro-Mediterranean regionalism has unleashed. For instance, the private-sector Desertec concept advances renewable energy
production in North Africa. Its objectives link it to Euro-Mediterranean policy and institutional questions regarding energy and investment security as well as development. The Desertec concept has come to be situated at the core of the UfM Mediterranean Solar Plan. The related organizations constitute one of the case studies of this study.

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the development of Euro-Mediterranean politics and reviews approaches from history and foreign policy analysis that have been employed in studying Euro-Med affairs and specifically non-state groups. Based on the gaps identified, an alternative approach is suggested which takes into account the characteristics and particularities of the Euro-Med’s regional features. Chapter 2 substantiates the application of integration theory by developing a theory framework based on neo-functionalism. Based on the hypotheses derived from this, chapter 3 details the empirical research design of this study, especially regarding operationalization, case selection and data collection. Chapter 4, primarily based on survey research, sets the picture for case studies of non-state actors by discussing the structure of the Euro-Mediterranean institutional framework. Chapter 5 introduces the results of an extensive survey of regional non-state organizations. Chapters 6 to 8 discuss the case studies conducted based on document analysis, stakeholder interviews and event observation. Eventually, Chapter 9 compares the key characteristics of cases and identifies patterns and ambiguities in the activities of non-state groups, suggesting a reevaluation of applying integration theory to hybrid regions. This study is concluded by a discussion of avenues for further research on Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors and a reassessment of regional cooperation prospects.
1 APPROACHING THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Upon an introduction of the field of Euro-Mediterranean politics, this chapter will detail the research gap on non-state actors in Mediterranean Studies, primarily in the study of European Mediterranean policy. Subsequently, it introduces an argument for considering the Euro-Mediterranean as a region and for the application of integration theory, which has previously been timid on Euro-Mediterranean matters.

1.1 Euro-Mediterranean Politics

Hannah Arendt proposed already in the 1940s a Mediterranean federation which “could become a member of an even larger federation of European nations to which the North African states would also belong” (Axtmann, 2006, p. 107). While the Southern Mediterranean has lacked any perspective of EU membership after the rejection of Morocco’s application in 1987, a vision of a wider region encompassing non-Mediterranean countries re-emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. The North-South divide, particularly striking around the Mediterranean Sea, crystallized while scholars warned of a ‘clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) of the politically Western world and predominantly Muslim countries, including in the Mediterranean Maghreb and Mashriq. In addition, many Euro-Mediterranean policy issues center on the Mediterranean Sea itself, as a common resource under high population and environmental pressure (Soler i Lecha & García, 2009, p. 3).

While EU members' policy concerns about immigration from MENA countries have led to proposals of a Cordon Sanitaire model or of a Fortress Europe, the EU is also the dominant trade partner with Southern Mediterranean countries. As regards
energy, in 2005, 45.5 % of European imports of oil and refined products came from North Africa (17.5 %) and West Asia (28 %), and North Africa supplied 19 % of natural gas imports (Joffé, 2007, p. 258). Based on the existing levels of trade interdependence, optimistic analysts have expected that by 2020 the EMP countries “will do 50 – 60 % of all their trade within the zone” (Calleya, 2008, p. 53).

The Barcelona Process inaugurated in 1995 and its embodiment as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership adopted a norm promotion approach (Costalli, 2009, p. 337) with three stated objectives. These objectives were manifested in the political and security dialog, an economic and financial partnership, as well as a social and cultural ‘basket’. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has become a regional multi-sector field. It receives a large share of the €15.4 billion allocated to the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for the 2014-2020 funding period. ENI succeeds the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Further funds are allocated through targeted instruments, including the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). Additional resources have been allocated to UfM priority projects and programs through the Mediterranean-oriented program of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as well as by development agencies of EU member states.

Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has spun off various ambitious organizations and networks, including the intergovernmentally governed Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, the inter-agency Association of Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MedReg), the inter-institutional Euromed Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions, and the inter-parliamentary

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Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), which is composed of members of national parliaments and the European Parliament and equally defined by North-South parity. Furthermore, cross-Mediterranean interaction at the level of sub-national territorial entities and networks has been formalized in a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM). In addition, the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was intended as a step towards a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA) (Calleya, 2008, p. 39). Further key Euro-Mediterranean contexts include the 5+5 forum, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Maltese diplomat training program. Many of these institutions will be introduced in greater detail in chapter 4.

The EMP “succeeded in achieving closer political, economic, and cultural ties between Europe and the Mediterranean countries of North Africa and the Mashreq” (Calleya, 2008, p. 36). At the same time, there was widespread “dissatisfaction in Brussels and in European capitals over relations with the South Mediterranean” (Balfour, 2009, p. 104) due to poor compliance with EMP norms, lacking funding, and ongoing regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Union of the Arab Maghreb was often considered a competition instead of being complementary or even constitutive of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. At the same time, scholars considered the EMP a “structure which will increase the dependency of the weaker economies and serve the interests of the hegemonic European economies” (Seddon, 1999, p. 150). Notwithstanding, various organizations, political camps as well as public opinion supported closer engagement and partnership of the EU ‘network region’ with its Southern neighborhood (Youngs, 2002, pp. 31–32).

In 2007, France proposed a riparian Mediterranean Union (Union Méditerranéenne) with references to functionalist integration in Europe. After
controversy with other EU members, notably Germany, the project was renamed Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 and extended to all 27 EU member states and 44 members in total. The UfM has institutionalized a Secretariat located in Barcelona, Spain, governed by a Secretary General and Deputy Secretary Generals from both the Southern Mediterranean and from Europe. It has seen the implementation of a North-South Co-Presidency and has aimed at regular summits of Heads of State and Government and Foreign ministers. Senior Officials Meetings prepare and follow up on ministerial-level meetings, bridging a pre-2008 EMP gap between ministerial and technical co-operation. A Euro-Mediterranean Joint Permanent Committee follows track at a lower political level (Johansson-Nogués, 2011, p. 27).

UfM priority areas, in which projects are UfM-labeled, include the creation of maritime and land highways, maritime safety and de-pollution, energy development notably through the Mediterranean Solar Plan, civil protection and natural disaster mitigation, an initiative for business development and promotion, and higher education projects aiming at academic integration and exchange. These priority areas have been complemented by additional programs, e.g. on ‘women in society’ and youth cooperation.

The declaration resulting from the UfM’s foundational summit in 2008 states that the UfM aims to “pursue cooperation, political and socio-economic reform and modernisation on the basis of equality”. This also responds to demands from the Arab League, since its non-Mediterranean members had been excluded from the Barcelona Process, whereas all European Union had been included (Khader, 1997, p. 74). Indeed, UfM governance was originally marked by North-South parity in

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4 EU Neighbourhood Info Centre page on the Union for the Mediterranean. Reference access on May 20, 2014.
5 Joint Declaration of the 2008 Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.
decision-making, Secretariat governance and staff, and its co-presidency. The original UfM institution design thus represented “the widespread conviction, on both sides, that a more equal status for the Southern Mediterranean partners would prove conducive to a more intense and fruitful political dialogue and would allow for common decisions that would otherwise not be possible” (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009, p. 13). Notwithstanding, “it has so far proven to be a complex task to make inroads towards the principle of co-ownership” (Johansson-Nogués, 2011, p. 35).

Since 2011, revolts and regime changes in Arab states have triggered further redefinition of the EU’s Mediterranean Policy. In 2011, Spanish diplomat Bernardino León was named Special EU Envoy for the Southern Mediterranean. Commissioner Štefan Füle suggested a closer participation of the MENA region in the European internal market, respectively integration into the European Economic Area. The revised European Neighborhood Strategy of 2011 adopting what has been called the ‘more-for-more’ principle in the allocation of EU funding. This strategy involves funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as closer ties with NGOs funded through a Civil Society Facility and the new European Endowment for Democracy. The European Commission’s 2011 communication on a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ highlights the need to regionally mitigate negative spillovers and to better integrate the UfM with the External Action Service: “the UfM needs to reform to fully realize its potential” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011, p. 11).

1.2 Mediterranean Meanings

The study of the Euro-Mediterranean field of regional cooperation, particularly at the non-state level, necessitates an engagement with its political background as well as with the meanings it carries. Indeed, the history as well as cultural and social legacies around the Mediterranean Sea has been studied and discussed extensively. Moreover, the idea of ‘Mediterranean-ness’ is repeatedly brought up in public debates about the identity of especially the European Mediterranean countries. In France, this controversial debate has structured positions taken vis-à-vis the Europeanization of cross-Mediterranean cooperation.

The controversies about the character of the Mediterranean are illustrated by an influential volume titled ‘The Corrupting Sea’. Addressing Mediterranean history from a detailed yet comprehensive perspective, the authors conclude that “[t]here is certainly a [Mediterranean] history to be written of ideas about honour” (Horden & Purcell, 2001, p. 488). In turn, Horden and Purcell claim that for “anti-Mediterraneanists such as Herzfeld and Pina-Cabral […] nothing so well encapsulates the Mediterraneanist desire to make the region seem backward and exotic as the attribution of honour and shame to Mediterranean peoples” (ibid, p. 522). The values that follow discussions of the historical role of the Mediterranean diverge dramatically, between the notion of a shared ‘cultural cradle’, a uniting ‘lake’ for trade and cultural exchange, a ‘moat’ dividing cultures, and a source of conflict and corruption. Throughout history, empires and nation-states have used the Sea to further their influence. This makes for a meaning-laden and often troublesome history of North-South relations around the Mediterranean Sea, involving the frequent
ascription of euro-centrism respectively orientalism to scholars and political stakeholders.

In addition to debates about the social and symbolic nature of the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean notion has been challenged from political grounds, including from a postcolonial standpoint. Recently, the Euro-Mediterranean concept has been interpreted as the forging of a European-Muslim or European-Arab alliance in global politics. Schäfer argues that the “revitalization of the Mediterranean myth began in the early 1990s, apparently as a cultural counter-reaction to processes of globalization, but also on the basis of the euphoria in the context of the Oslo accords in the Near East peace process and of the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” [author’s translation] (Schäfer, 2007, p. 125). Based on a constructivist approach, she argues that “the Mediterranean as a cultural reference has developed a certain momentum” [author’s translation] (Schäfer, 2007, p. 255)

In turn, the promulgation of a perceived dystopia of ‘Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis’ (Ye’Or, 2005) and of ‘dhimmitude’ in Europe have inspired right-wing groups to fundamentally oppose the Euro-Mediterranean idea, fighting what they perceive as a cultural takeover of Western culture by Muslim immigrations or Arab states. Yet, this account has also been transformed into a utopian vision by individual other groups. For instance, the German-Arab Association regularly publishes a journal titled exactly ‘Eurabia’.[7] Broader accounts of the potential trajectories of Euro-Mediterranean regional affairs have also been linked to specific institutions and policies. Tocci, for instance, argued that “stability, as interpreted with regard to the regimes in the region, has often run counter to the very conditions that underpin state sustainability” (Tocci, 2011, p. 1).

The politicization of ‘Mediterraneanism’ as well as ‘Euro-Mediterraneanism’, in both academia as well as public political-cultural debates, constitutes an inevitable background to this study. Hence, the meaning of Euro-Med cooperation to stakeholders, as well as their contestation of it, will be part of the analytical framework to be used in this study, as to be outlined in chapter 3.

1.3 European Foreign Policy Studies and Non-State Actors

Much research on Euro-Mediterranean affairs has been conducted from a foreign policy angle. Four phases of European policy towards the Mediterranean are distinguished in Table 1.1 to illustrate its contingency and volatility since 1990, along the continua between regionalism and bilateralism, and between centralization and de-centralization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>pre-EMP</th>
<th>EMP</th>
<th>EMP + ENP</th>
<th>UfM + ENP</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Type</td>
<td>largely bilateral</td>
<td>Barcelona Process + Association Agreements</td>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>regional and inter-regional</td>
<td>isolationism; conditionality; privileged partnerships; sectoral regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Scope</td>
<td>largely Euro-Arab</td>
<td>regional, including Israel and Turkey</td>
<td>regional yet country-specific</td>
<td>regional, expanded membership</td>
<td>limitation to Mediterranean riparian states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-South Governance</td>
<td>shared fora; sub-regional initiatives</td>
<td>Brussels-centered</td>
<td>Brussels-centered</td>
<td>Co-ownership, parity, decentralized Secretariat</td>
<td>Informal institutionalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Euro-Med Policy Choices
The alleged multi-stakeholder, multi-level, and soft power character of EFP-making has been controversially discussed. Thereby, most of the field of EFP analysis converges around the assumption of distinctive features of European-level foreign policy, including a degree of EU-level actorhood, as well as on the necessity to link both national-level and EU-level policy-making processes in order to explain policy outcomes. In this understanding, EFP “is part of the European integration process, despite being a somewhat special case within the broader set of EC/EU policies” (Bicchi, 2007, p. 10).

The logic of European foreign policy has been addressed by the concept of Normative Power which claims to address the ideological and “ideational impact of the EU’s identity/role” (Manners, 2008, p. 238). Similar approaches have been applied to Mediterranean policy (Bicchi, 2006). Manners argues that misunderstandings about norm universality regarding an EU set of ‘ethics’ are rooted in their mere misrepresentation, despite intra-EU divergences on social preferences and questions of competence allocations (Puetter & Wiener, 2007). Risse and Börzel even argue that ‘one size fits all’, i.e. that the EU commits to mainstreaming and ‘exporting’ principles in its external relations. They recognize an EU strategy which “follows one single cultural script” (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p. 28). Yet, they argue that, for instance, the empowerment and decentralization of EU Delegations “should lead to a greater sensitivity to the varying political, economic, and cultural situations on the ground” (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p. 3). In this understanding, policies and strategies have been developed through ‘learning by doing’, thus the mainstreaming of ‘universalist’ norms is considered a conscious approach. This understanding is contested in other accounts on various grounds. Merlingen argues that there is a ‘dominative’ dimension to EFP, as “the EU’s self-styled mission for humanity
inscribes the very agency of those it seeks to empower in relations characterized by epistemic violence, the technologization of politics and administrative arbitrariness” (Merlingen, 2007, p. 436). In the light of clashing interests, the question arises “whether ENP is not mainly a political-institutional system that holds meaning first and foremost for the Union itself” (Laïdi, 2008, p. 14).

1.3.1 Our Size Fits All: EFP Analysis in the Euro-Med

The effects of unreflective normative policy have been researched in Federica Bicchi’s studies of EU Mediterranean policy. In Bicchi’s theory framework, policymaking has been characterized by stability as well as certain reversing moments during which “policy initiatives lead to significant innovation, not only in the format, but also in the principles governing the action, and the result is a paradigmatic policy change” (Bicchi, 2007, p. 1). Bicchi’s approach situates EFP making in a framework of “ideational intergovernmentalism” (Bicchi, 2007, p. 6), based on three conditions: a) a policy window of cognitive uncertainty at national levels, b) a governmental policy entrepreneur, and c) interaction among member states and EU institutions (Bicchi, 2007, p. 187). In a different study, however, Bicchi equally acknowledges a lack of “capacity of EU foreign policymakers to critically analyse the EU’s policy and adapt it according to the effects the policy is expected to have on the targeted area” (Bicchi, 2006, p. 288). Thus, “much of the EU’s action can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model because institutions tend to export institutional isomorphism as a default option” (Bicchi, 2006, p. 287). In this sense of the external projection of internal characteristics, it is an EU ‘milieu goal' to export regionalism and regional integration schemes, as well as to
negotiate preferably with other regional organizations in an inter-regionalist approach. Thus, the EU is conceived of as employing 'civilizing power'.

Thereby, Euro-Med institutions remain in line with the EU preference for regionalist institutional arrangements. For instance, the original UfM proposals were brought "back into the EU fold" (Balfour, 2009, p. 100) when actors chose “to make the UfM compatible with the Barcelona Process and the EU’s institutional decision-making structures and mechanisms" (Gillespie, 2008, p. 277).. Moreover, the intergovernmental UfM framework is homologous with the EU’s internal relative increase in deliberative intergovernmental coordination (cf. on the concept Puettter, 2012). Broadly, it has been argued that “the Mediterranean is a construction by the EU’s Neighborhood Policy” (B. Hettne, 2010, p. 22), and “a consequence of the EU’s policy of creating and relating to regions as the preferred counterparts in the Global South” (B. Hettne, 2010, p. 40). By applying both a rational as well as a “sociological-normative historical institutionalism”, Schimmang argued that “many of the UfM innovations reflect continuity” and follow path-dependencies (Schimmang, 2011, p. 118). While Historical Institutionalism, in its focus on processes of institutional continuity and incremental change during ‘critical junctures’ (cf. Pierson, 1996), is considered close to neo-functionalism, the latter allows for a focus on regional contexts, on concerted action of non-state and bureaucracy actors, and on actors’ task promotion. While Bicchi and others have acknowledged the unintended effects of integration dynamics, neo-functionalism allows substantiating these regarding the non-state level by empirical research.

The present study suggests three specific potential effects of norm diffusion on the role of non-state organizations in Euro-Mediterranean politics, to which the conclusive chapter of this study will return. First, a normative effect, as EU institutions
strive to export a) universalist norms, b) the concept of regionalism broadly defined, and c) a specifically ‘European’ interpretation of it. Second, a coopting effect, as Euro-Med non-state organizations, particularly civil society organizations, are addressed by EU Mediterranean policy and are frequently eligible to receive EU funding. Irrespective of their autonomy, this effect implies incentives for groups to align with the EU’s specific regional agenda and type of regionalism. Third, a social effect as the staff and leadership of Euro-Med non-state organizations tend to have prior experience with EU-level politics. In some cases, employees can be expected to be familiar with a neo-functionalist narrative of the history of European integration. The following section will review how non-state organizations have previously been addressed in the context of European foreign policy analysis.

1.3.2 Non-State Actors in European Foreign Policy

The role of non-state actors, particularly of NGOs, has been acknowledged for ‘arenas’ provided by International Governmental Organizations and the United Nations system (Guttormsen & van de Wetering, 2013; Reinalda, 2011) Research has also studied the role of transnational non-state organizations in European politics (Coleman, 2001; Michalowitz, 2007). However, the role of non-state actors in the definition and implementation of European foreign policy has been approached more rarely, and particularly seldom with a focus on regional integration perspectives regarding a given geographic target area. Dembinski and Joachim argue that “almost all [CFSP studies] neglect the existence and influence of private actors, such as interest groups, associations or NGOs as well as parliaments and local public actors” (Dembinski & Joachim, 2006, p. 2). While CFSP is thus often viewed “as a zone free
of influence from public opinion, party politics or organized interests” (ibid), research has indicated that “NGOs and interest groups concerned with foreign policy issues have in astonishing numbers established a presence in Brussels” (Dembinski & Joachim, 2006, p. 20). In their case study of armament sector regulation, Dembinski and Joachim find that

“NGO networks and think tanks lobbied governments and influenced their agenda by providing expert knowledge and policy advice. More importantly, these transnationally organized groups changed the rules of the game for Member States by maintaining connections to and exchanging information with parliamentarians and representatives of civil society at the domestic level” (Dembinski & Joachim, 2006, p. 26).

In the case researched, “states came to value the expertise and the communicative bridges NGOs could offer” (ibid). In 2008, the same authors noted that “NGOs interested in foreign and security policy moved their activities from the national to the European level to the degree to which the EU gained political competence for governance of these fields”, which is a finding quite in line with neo-functionalist expectations (Joachim & Dembinski, 2008, p. 43).

Similarly, Voltolini argues that in the definition of EU policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, non-state actors of various types are “very active on the input side, thus contributing to the formulation and shaping of EU external policy” (Voltolini, 2012, p. 5). Regarding her case, Voltolini remarks that the actors “involved in lobbying and advocacy activities with regard to EU policy towards the conflict are very diverse, but they all share the view that the EU can play a role in the conflict and that its policies can be influenced” (Voltolini, 2012, p. 21). Most of the relevant “NSAs are based in the EU, although only 28 percent of them has an office or a full-time employee based in Brussels” (Voltolini, 2012, p. 43). Yet, “many of them also based in Israel/Palestine or have a cross-national and trans-national outreach” (Voltolini,
Findings regarding actors’ locations and the geographic scope of their advocacy and public outreach are particularly relevant to research on regionalism, and will constitute a key part of this study as well.

The research reviewed in this section indicates that even if the field of foreign policy, while still considered an outlier of European integration at large, transnational non-state organizations can be expected to attempt to influence policymaking. The following sections will outline how the Euro-Mediterranean geographic space can be understood as a region, and why a regional understanding needs to take into account a number of its particular features before it can be employed in the study of non-state organizations. Based on these considerations, this study will introduce a neo-functionalist framework for bringing together the study of non-state organizations in foreign policy with the study of regionalism and regionalization.

1.4 Regionalism and Integration Theory

Beyond the specificities of the logic of European foreign policy, integration processes are understood in this study as “complex and multidimensional phenomena” (de Lombaerde, 2006, p. 1). Specifically, this study expects unintended outcomes of regionalist strategies and institutional logics. These have notably been addressed by classical integration theory, especially in neo-functionalist accounts.
1.4.1 The Euro-Mediterranean as a Region

To allow for the subsequent characterization and conceptualization of the regional context of Euro-Mediterranean politics, this section introduces key terms regarding trans-border activities and inter-state relations across a set of countries. The term ‘world region’ is mostly used interchangeably with ‘macro-region’. The politics at the level of macro-regions will be referred to as regional politics in the following. While the ‘region-ness’ of a geographic space is frequently compared to the EU, this reference is hardly suitable for the Euro-Mediterranean space given the EU’s extraordinarily high level of integration respectively confederation.

The geographical boundaries of regions tend to be contingent outcomes of processes of regionalization. Thus, community approaches conceive of a region as the effect of a feeling of ‘belonging together’ or as outcomes of region-building strategies or political regionalism. The notion of interdependence has been used for outlining regions in practice as well (cf. Keohane & Nye, 2001). While the study of regional integration faces frequent problems in case delimitation, for this study it is derived from the existing policies and institutions targeting the Euro-Mediterranean space. Notably, the Euro-Mediterranean space spans across the EU core, the MENA periphery, as well as Turkey and Israel as ‘intermediate frontier’ (Geyer, 2006; Björn Hettne, 2005, p. 277).

World regions continue to be an important level of politics. In today’s regional schemes and projects, “a variety of countries aware of the perils of isolation want to lead or link to their neighbours for a broad range of political, economic and socio-cultural purposes to be accomplished in the long term” (de Prado, 2007, p. 20). Even purely formal integration has “at least an effect on the political debate, vocabulary
and leadership and on the collective consciousness and imagination; but usually it goes much further than that” (de Lombaerde, 2006, p. 15).

Regionalism refers to a phenomenon or to an ideology, project, paradigm or strategy. According to Hurrell, “all regions are socially constructed but region-building is politically programmatic” (Hurrell, 2005, p. 53). The present study subscribes to a broad definition of regionalism: “the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development within a region: the urge by any set of actors to reorganize along a particular regional space” (Schulz, Söderbaum, & Öjendal, 2001, p. 5). Regionalism is frequently understood to include a community dimension or as a reference to practices of cooperation or coordination of actor strategy in a given geographic space. Thus, regionalism is an extraordinarily broad term which ranges “from promoting a sense of regional awareness or community (soft regionalism), through consolidating regional groups and networks, to pan- or subregional groups formalized by interstate arrangements and organizations (hard regionalism)” (Fawcett, 2004, p. 433).

Inter-regionalism largely refers to a parity-based 'group-to-group dialogue' in which the 'home region' of a member state matters to its institutional position. Broadly, it refers to a "systematic international phenomenon, namely linkages built among regions" or "formalized relations between regional organizations" (Björn Hettne, 2007, p. 107). More narrowly defined, inter-regionalism refers to regional organizations as actors on the world stage which partly take on roles previously unique to states, to which ‘regional realist’ approaches devote attention (Lähteenmäki & Käkönen, 1999). After all, "when regions assume actorness, a need will necessarily
also arise for more organized contacts between the regions" (Söderbaum & van Langenhove, 2006, p. 4).

*Regionalization* refers to a ‘region-building’ project in some accounts, or to the transformation of state institutions and non-state organizations when used in the ‘Europeanization’ context. The term has also been used with reference to global fragmentation towards a ‘world of regions’ (Katzenstein, 2005). Frequently, ‘regionalization’ is used interchangeably with politically driven ‘regional integration’, while in other accounts, the term implies a reduced importance attributed to intergovernmentally led inter-state integration. The definition of ‘regionalization’ adopted here is as

"a process of change from relative heterogeneity and lack of cooperation towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and identity in a variety of fields such as culture, security, economic development and politics, within a given geographical space" (Schulz et al., 2001, p. 5).

The term ‘continentalization’ makes explicit the difference of ‘macro-regionalization’ from regionalization at a micro or meso level. *Integration* beyond cooperation or coordination refer to “a process in which units move from a condition of total or partial isolation towards a complete or partial unification” (de Lombaerde, 2006, p. 13). Interstate integration has specifically been considered a “process of large-scale territorial differentiation characterised by the progressive lowering of internal boundaries” (ibid), potentially with a political component of joint decision-making (Lindberg, 1963). Integration is generally considered a voluntary process of legally sovereign states, formalized by treaty or declaration. Political integration can take place in the *institutional, policy, attitudinal,* and *security* dimensions (Lähteenmäki & Käkönen, 1999, p. 215).
On the basis of the key terms and concepts introduced in this section, the particularities of the Euro-Mediterranean region will be outlined in the following section. Awareness of these particularities is considered vital for the development of a theory framework to study the regional role of non-state organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean case.

1.4.1 Hybridity, Volatility, Asymmetry, Polycentricity

Beyond European foreign policy, inter-state interaction in the Euro-Med has features of a multidimensional process of intergovernmental regionalism with a partly integrationist rhetoric. A study of Euro-Mediterranean regional politics needs to take into account its specificities. Foremost, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has been considered a particularly “volatile regional process” (Panebianco, 2010, p. 163) due to the political instability of the MENA region, but also in the light of the frequency with which policies and institutions for the Euro-Med have been revamped. This volatility is fueled by the variety and fragmentation of regional and intergovernmental organizations which pursue their own Mediterranean policies or programs, including those external to the region (cf. Šabič & Bojinović, 2007).

Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean is extraordinarily heterogeneous in terms of domestic pluralism and the wealth gap, structured predominantly by the divide between its EU and MENA sub-regions. The Mediterranean Sea, geographically but also politically and socio-economically, marks this heterogeneity between the European ‘North’ and the North African and West Asian ‘South’. The North-South divide became one of the central global cleavages after the end of the Cold War (Calleya, 2008, p. 32). In contrast to the terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, this
distinction has a geopolitical and economic dimension, highlighting a gap in wealth, opportunities and security (cf. Adams, 1993).

Variance in integration state constitutes a dimension of Euro-Mediterranean internal heterogeneity. Coskun argues that the MENA sub-region has “the lowest relative degree of regional integration in the contemporary world” (Coskun, 2006, p. 1), thus being located at the other extreme from its Northern neighboring region. Armed conflict, political struggles and territorial disputes, for instance between Morocco and Algeria, have been an obstacle to closer South-South integration. Yet, most Southern Mediterranean states, with the exceptions of Israel and Turkey, are members of the Arab League, which holds observer status at the UfM. With the exception of Morocco, the North African UfM members are also members of the African Union. Moreover, the EU further advances an agenda of ‘South-South regionalization’ among the Southern members of the UfM. Culturally, Arabic is the common language of many Southern UfM members. Islam is by far the most widespread religion across the MENA states. For these reasons, the Euro-Mediterranean also has features of ‘inter-regionalism’. Its structured heterogeneity is reflected in the North-South parity approach of Euro-Med governance, the defining role of EU institutions and of the sum of EU member states, and the formal involvement of the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union.

Finally, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation could be called ‘cross-regionalism’, as its range covers parts of existing regional organizations. Even more so than in the case of EU governance which is characterized by membership overlaps and concentric circles (de Prado, 2007, p. 43; Nuttall, 2000), regional membership by Euro-Mediterranean range states include the EU, UfM, Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab
Maghreb Union and the African Union. Furthermore, Euro-Mediterranean governance oscillates between embeddedness within EU governance on the one hand, and organizational autonomy in the sense of the ‘Mediterranean Union’ model on the other hand. The prevalence of various cooperation formats situated at multiple levels of governance has created a polycentric regional context, which is of particular relevance regarding the choice of policy access points by non-state groups.

In sum of these considerations, the Euro-Mediterranean is considered a hybrid case of regional cooperation in this study. In reaction, this study’s theory framework is expected to take into account how non-state group react to the Euro-Med’s structured and inter-regionalist heterogeneity, and to the multiple influential EU roles as Euro-Med integration driver, multi-sectoral administrator, and interested stakeholder. Furthermore, the resulting analytical framework will need to be designed to take the region’s polycentricity into account in empirical research.

### 1.4.2 Neo-Functionalism and Euro-Mediterranean Institutions

Previous applications of neo-functionalism to the Euro-Mediterranean case have mostly referred to the theory as a benchmark to assess the ambitions and agenda of Euro-Med institutions. For instance, Moxon-Browne recognizes a functionalist spillover credo in the Barcelona Process, arguing that a positive integration outlook could be based on “reciprocity (based more on complementarity than on similarity) can be helpful to the integration process” (Moxon-Browne, 2003, p. 94). Regarding the EMP’s agenda of cultural exchange and region-building, Boening highlights its wider functionalist agenda and integrationist design which “is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP” (Boening, 2007, p. 14). Boening
argues that a neo-functionalist agenda can overcome obstacles, given that it was "historically successful in integrating neighboring countries" (Boening, 2007, p. 4). She assesses that

"the EMP's role in Mediterranean security is through deepening institutionalization (hence increasing trust among its partners through iteration and predictability) and political spill-over in terms of Ernst Haas' neo-functionalist theory" (Boening, 2007, pp. 11–12).

Gillespie argues that the original proposals for a Mediterranean Union, next to their intergovernmentalist aspects, "sounded functionalist in their emphasis on the creation of new agencies entrusted with areas of technical co-operation" (Gillespie, 2011, p. 1210). Similarly, Holden considers the project focus of the UfM as reflective of a "functionalist ethos" (Holden, 2011, p. 158), arguing that “[t]he UfM framework is contradictory as it suggests a new, flexible, functionalist approach to supporting regionalization and development [beyond shallow neo-liberal integration] but it also embodies all the complications that high-level political regionalism implies” (Holden, 2011, p. 167). This argument can be substantiated by official rhetoric: for instance, French president Sarkozy reminded the participants of the 2008 UfM constitutive summit that it would be beneficial to transfer the experience of European integration to the Mediterranean. Similarly, Bicchi remarks that “[t]he overall balance of the UfM on the dimension ranging from functionalism to politicization is simultaneously an increase in the politicization of Euro-Mediterranean relations and a step in the direction of depoliticization” (Bicchi, 2011, p. 14).

Panebianco considers the UfM project focus to be a reaction to recent regionalism inhibitors including territorial disputes and the low independence of regional bureaucracies. She acknowledges that “we should avoid to assume that regionalism implies only (or necessarily) cooperation towards integration and the
establishment of a peaceful area as it happened in Europe” (Panebianco, 2010, p. 157). The author notes that the

“UfM’s insistence on private actors and technical cooperation recalls some neo-functionalist assumptions. As it has been conceived, the entire project appears highly technocratic […] From the analysis of the Paris Declaration and of the Marseille final statement, it seems that a sort of spillover from the economic to the political realm is deeply wished by the European policy-makers” (Panebianco, 2010, p. 164).

However, Panebianco also believes that

“In the Mediterranean area nonstate actors are currently not able to act autonomously from the governmental level and many constraints limit civil society’s action. […] If state actors are able to control regional dynamics, there is no room for any spontaneous spill-over towards more regional integration” (Panebianco, 2010, p. 165).

The present study challenges the premises of this conclusion from two points.

On the one hand, from a theory perspective, it highlights how neo-functionalism has specified the ways in which even less autonomous non-state organizations converge around regional institutions and policies. Furthermore, it will point out how neo-functionalism has conceived of alternative pathways to the classical spill-over concept. This way, it attempts to move beyond the emphasis on integration inhibitors or ‘stumbling blocks’ which risks relegating dynamics of integration and disintegration to a black box. While acknowledging that neo-functionalism might have a European bias and the conditions for Euro-Mediterranean integration differ from the European case, this study argues that it is exactly the ‘EU-styled’ Euro-Mediterranean regionalism which has affected the non-state organizations converging around them.

On the other hand, from an empirical perspective, it attempts to identify the diversity in non-state actors’ reactions to regional policies and institutions. Given the variety in organizations’ background, resources, strategies, and levels of autonomy,
the Euro-Mediterranean non-state sphere is expected to produce manifold, potentially contradicting and unexpected dynamics at regional level.

Upon a political and historical contextualization of the Euro-Mediterranean region, this chapter has introduced existing approaches to Euro-Mediterranean politics, with a focus on European foreign policy analysis and the role of non-state organizations within it. Subsequently, it has pointed out the regional characteristics of the Euro-Mediterranean, suggesting an alternative approach to studying it. Based on this, it has reviewed and discussed the reflection of neo-functionalist theory in Euro-Mediterranean institutions, including the ensuing role of non-state organizations. The following chapter will argue how the application of neo-functionalist integration theory holds value for studying Euro-Mediterranean non-state politics. Integration theory is understood here to better address the regional-level feedback, by non-state organizations, of regionalist policies.
2 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM FOR EURO-MED NON-STATE POLITICS

Based on the preceding literature review, this chapter introduces a theory framework for approaching the role of non-state actors in the Euro-Mediterranean space. It also discusses modifications to neo-functionalist integration theory which are expected to enhance its applicability to the Euro-Mediterranean case, including those derived from insight of Comparative and New Regionalism approaches. In consequence, a set of concepts and hypotheses will be distilled as a basis for developing an analytical framework for this study.

While neo-functionalist thought has previously emphasized the role of non-state actors in regional processes, it has often ‘retreated’ to an application to European integration though it had been designed with an explicitly broader scope. At the core of neo-functionalism is its “basic tenet: integration leads to tensions, contradictions, and demands, which can only be resolved by taking further integrative action” (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 62). Thus, neo-functionalism addresses politics in regional integration, and specifically the “bargaining by regionally-oriented pressure groups” (Acharya & Johnston, 2007a, pp. 3–4).

In contrast to its classical functionalist predecessor (Mitrany, 1965), in which international task creation was central, neo-functionalism has approached integration in territorial, usually regional terms. Its more recent variants are less normative and teleological, acknowledging the neo-functional logic also as an actor strategy. The theory’s ability to grasp integrative as well as disintegrative dynamics, like transaction rate changes, which are induced or acted upon by actors including non-state groups, challenges the frequent juxtaposition of countervailing or stagnation forces and linear integration processes.
Again, a neo-functionalist understanding implies that government-driven regional frameworks unleash dynamics which facilitate the formation and reorientation of transnational non-state groups oriented towards emerging regional centers. In neo-functionalism, institutions are understood to shape actor preferences and identities, leading various actors to converge around regional institutions, with a potential feedback for their design, scope, and authority. Studying these processes and the levels of governance through which they operate aims to contribute to a better calibration of integration theory to 'hybrid' regions.

Neo-functionalism expects “that conflict between national actors is very likely to be forthcoming but that it is likely to be resolved by expanding the scope or level of central institutions” (Schmitter, 1969, p. 164). Neo-functionalism’s controversial spillover hypothesis builds on the recognition that "[f]rustration and/or dissatisfaction generated by unexpected performance (whether better or worse) in a sector for which specific common goals have been set will result in the search for alternative means for reaching the same goals" (Schmitter, 1969, p. 162). Spillover is understood to tend to an organizational accumulation of policy tasks and defined as a "process whereby members of an integration scheme—agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals—attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of commitment) or both" (Schmitter, 1969, p. 162).

In this definition, level refers to the commitment to mutual decision-making in terms of continuity and techniques. Factors underlying spillover include the "interdependence of functional tasks and issue arenas, latent or ignored in the original convergence, but capable of being mobilized by aroused pressure groups, parties, or governmental agencies whose interests become affected" (Schmitter, 1969, p. 162) and the
“creative talents of political elites, especially the administrators of regional institutions, who seize upon frustrations and crises in order to redefine and expand central organizational tasks” (ibid). In neo-functionalism, the various possible outcomes are informed, beyond economic spill-over effects, by integration tensions and contradictions. In addition, the neo-functionalist ‘externalization hypothesis’ stipulates that a collective external position leads to an externalization of integration outcomes. Finally, the ‘politicization hypothesis’ states that the “process of spillover has a cumulative tendency, i.e., it tends to involve more national actors in an expanding variety of policy areas and in an increasing degree of joint decisionmaking” (Schmitter, 1969, p. 166).

2.1 Adapting Integration Theory

Besides spillover, neo-functionalist accounts distinguish spill-around (“proliferation of functionally specialized independent, but strictly intergovernmental institutions”), retrenching spill-back, build-up (“concession by member states of greater authority to the supranational organization without expanding the scope of its mandate”) and muddle-about (“when national actors try to maintain regional cooperation without changing/adjusting institutions”) (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 55).

2.1.1 Political Spillover

In neo-functionalism, functional pressures or imbalances are likely to be translated to expressions of interest or support by actors, resulting in political strategies. Hence, these pressures are ‘mediated’ towards the resulting cooperation objectives,
institutions, decision-making arrangements, or policies. In this understanding, actors consider functional pressures to be persuasive and act upon them “when the original issue area and the objectives therein are (considered) salient, and when the interdependence with areas where further action is (regarded as) strong” (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 57). Neo-functionalism also takes into account countervailing forces which are "exacerbated by the economic, cultural, legal, demographic and other diversities between member states" (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 56). Countervailing forces like sovereignty-consciousness and domestic constraints are likely to be strong in the Euro-Mediterranean case, and the expansion of functional tasks at regional level is unlikely. While therefore, spillover in the original sense is expected to be a rare occurrence, in individual policy fields, it is possible that "the benefit of the first integrational step is sufficiently salient that it outweighs the concerns about later [undesired] spillover effects into other areas" (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 58).

Furthermore, mechanisms understood to guide the mediation of pressures include exogenous spillover based on to the "tensions and contradictions originating outside the integration process itself" (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 56). Social spillover occurs through elite socialization, whereas cultivated spillover refers to the mediation or creation of "integrative pressure exerted by supranational institutions" (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 60). This kind of policy entrepreneurship is supported by the cultivation of relations with non-state groups, potentially constituting advocacy alliances. Yet, the emphasis of the present study is placed on the concept of ‘political spillover’. Its key tenets emphasize political action by non-governmental elites (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, pp. 55–57), possibly in alliance with regional
bureaucracies, secretariats of intergovernmental organizations or technical committees.

2.1.2 Non-State Groups in Neo-Functionalism

Though neo-functionalism subscribes to a transformative ontology regarding regional integration, its epistemology and methodology focuses on the gradual intensification of co-operation and integration, including processes between major institutional revisions. This is in contrast to the event-focused approaches of Liberal Intergovernmentalism or Federalism (cf. Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009) which consider the regionalization of non-state groups respectively their shifting orientations or positions to be less relevant for preference formation at both the state and the regional level.

With its focus on incremental change, neo-functionalism attributes leeway to the political, social and even epistemic role of non-state actors in defining regional outcomes. A variable in neo-functionalism related to sub- and trans-national processes has been “regional group formation”, defined as the “formation and active participation of new non-governmental or quasi-governmental organizations representing some or all members and designed explicitly to promote the interest of complementary groups at the regional and/or national levels” (Schmitter, 1970, p. 856). The role of non-state organizations is considered to be relevant during intermediate ‘priming cycles’ of integration, and to further increase with the transition of a region to a stage of ‘transformative cycles’.

Furthermore, neo-functionalism addresses an effect that has similarly been considered an aspect of the Europeanization or transnationalization of non-state
actors. The theory expects that non-state actors transfer their cross-national political attention and agenda, and even their self-understanding, to the regional level. This is reflected by the chosen addressees of policy demands, by participation in regional-level politics, or even by a shift of loyalties to a new center. Thus, the “development of regional identity” can be applied to non-state groups; it is defined as “the extent to which participants or observers in regional processes come to regard such activity as rewarding due to material inducements, emotional-fraternal-symbolic ties, status satisfaction, etc., and, thereby, acquire a larger sense of loyalty” (Schmitter, 1970, p. 856).

Among the micro-foundations of Neo-Functionalism is the assumption of autonomous and rational actors. In this light, non-state actors can channel their demands, ideas and perceptions about integration dynamics and pressures to those intergovernmental or supranational arenas where decisions are ultimately made, potentially initiating political spillover, spill-around, build-up etc. In this understanding, non-governmental actors can affect the integrative respectively disintegrative stances of key actors in a region, thus going beyond their original operational or policy concerns. Types of actors in neo-functionalism include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, research institutes and networks, political parties, trade unions, private-sector corporations, business associations, interest groups, and networks of sub-national territorial entities, or coalitions and networks of these types of groups (cf. Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 49). Broadly defined, the term ‘non-state actor’ extends to transnational “interest associations and social movements that form around [the bureaucracies] at the level of the region” (Schmitter, 2005, p. 257).
2.1.3 North-South Heterogeneity

Neo-functionalism has specified a number of preconditions for integrative steps in a given space, including the background conditions of a high rate of economic transactions between units and shared elite ideology. Specifically, neo-functionalism “presumes that member countries are relatively developed and diversified in their productive systems and that they have democratic polities” (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 51). Most critical to the present study, the condition of internal pluralism refers to the

“extent to which functionally differentiated and formally organized groups within member states are organized and capable of articulating demands and influencing policy outcomes independent of control by authority groups” (Schmitter, 1970, p. 851).

As chapter 1 of this study has argued, integration preconditions are asymmetrically distributed across the Euro-Mediterranean. In particular, the region is constituted by sub-regions highly heterogeneous on the dimension of their respective sub-regional integration state, position in the global economic system, quality of democracy, and domestic pluralism. Related to this, sovereignty preservation is of particular importance to Southern Mediterranean governments (cf. Acharya & Johnston, 2007b).

Most importantly, the Euro-Med faces “the big disequilibrium of the three Ds (development, demography, democracy)” [author’s translation] (Khader, 1997, p. 67)]. Figures for 2012 illustrate the divergence in aggregated GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis between European countries like Germany (38,666 Int$), France (35,295 Int$) or Bulgaria (14,102 Int$), and MENA countries like Algeria (7,268 Int$), Morocco (5,193 Int$), Egypt (6,474 Int$), or Jordan (5,977 Int$)
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013). In a socio-economic clustering study, all MENA countries except for Israel are attributed to one group defined by their geographic and demographic size and by their medium rates of economic development (Portnov, Shechter, & Gradus, 2006, p. 174).

Foreign investment in MENA states remains low as well, and MENA investment as a proportion to global investment flows has declined with time (Joffé, 2007, p. 262). Trade among the Southern Mediterranean states has been at a particularly negligible level. Furthermore, whereas many European states figure on top of the Human Development Index (HDI), Egypt ranks 112th, Tunisia 91st, and Lebanon 88th (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). Numerous states of the MENA regions score particularly low regarding the ratio of GDP/capita and HDI rank, including Algeria which ranks 82nd for GDP, but 104th on HDI.

The political divide between the North and South persists across the Euro-Mediterranean as well. Southern Mediterranean states are significantly more fragile and conflict-prone than the EU and its member states (CIDCM, 2009). Demographic pressure in Southern Mediterranean states, combined with slow economic development, has spurred social instability and emigration. Individual countries in the MENA region entirely lack democratic features (CIDCM, 2009). Index figures and reports based on Freedom House country data, attempting to measure homogeneity in political freedom and democracy, illustrate the gap between EU members, all rated ‘free’, and the MENA region, the majority of countries in which are rated ‘not free’ (Freedom House, 2014).

As regions “cannot separate themselves from the wealth and power of their members” (Söderbaum & Sbragia, 2010, p. 580), and in the light of “a certain hegemonic will of some European leaders” (Costalli, 2009, p. 324), the Barcelona
Process had adopted a donor-recipient approach (Soler i Lecha & García, 2009, p. 3). At the same time, the involvement in regionalism can empower Southern states and contribute to “the management of unequal power, and the mediation of deep and abiding cultural differences and value conflict” (Grugel & Hout, 1999, p. 53). However, particularly with regard to policy outputs beneficial for Southern populations, this involvement can also entail the “control by the metropolis of various peripheral actors” (Zielonka, 2006, p. 11). Thus, this study inevitably needs to take into account the heterogeneous and asymmetric character of the Euro-Mediterranean.

Actor constellations in Southern countries are considered a traditional “dark spot” of neo-functionalism (cf. Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 63). This study mitigates this gap by devoting attention to non-state actors’ asymmetric distribution and by a research focus on their political transposition to the regional arena. Accordingly, it conceives of regional politics as a forum for North-South non-state alliances which include individuals or groups from MENA. It also attempts to grasp the strategies employed by non-state actors in tackling the effects of the Euro-Med’s heterogeneity. Moreover, its analytical framework will account for the potential intra-group contestation of a Euro-Mediterranean orientation.

In addition to the effects of the heterogeneity of the Euro-Mediterranean space, this study takes into account the specificity that neo-functionalism is placed in a double role as a theory as well as an institutional and organizational logic reflected in key components of Euro-Mediterranean institutions. This double role can be expected to be reflected in policy positions advanced by non-state actors. The present study accounts for both institutionally driven and indigenous integration dynamics, their consequences in the field of non-state engagement, and will discuss
their mutual constitution in the following. Related to this, the polycentricity of the Euro-Mediterranean implies a research focus on non-state organizations’ choices regarding political access points. In this respect, Euro-Med bureaucracies and EU institutions are expected to be addressed as ‘administrators’ as well as actors of European foreign policy.

### 2.2 New and Comparative Regionalism

While neo-functionalism is at the core of this study, the contributions of New Regionalism approaches are insightful regarding the heterogeneity of the Euro-Mediterranean case. New Regionalism scholarship tends to emphasize regional societal and cultural exchanges, even if informal or unofficial (cf. Acharya & Johnston, 2007a). Instances of new regionalism are defined, in one account, by their “increasing scope, diversity, fluidity and non-conformity” (Schulz et al., 2001, p. 1).

New regional relationships in today’s ‘third wave’ integration context are understood to lean towards deep multi-sectoral integration (Telò, 2007, pp. 2–4). Since the 1990s, North-South “trade blocs in which high-income countries and developing countries are equal partners” (Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 2) are considered to “display their own unique core-peripheral divisions” (Geyer, 2006, p. 26). As Albert and Reuber argue, “regionalisation can always also be framed as strategic regionalisation in the sense that it results from the practices of political actors” (Albert & Reuber, 2007, p. 553). Specifically, Schirm shows for the US and NAFTA that North-South regionalization is supported by non-economic foreign policy factors (Schirm, 2002, pp. 172–3). Similarly, the approach of the EU towards its neighborhood has been explained by the emergence of “strategic traders”, regionally
integrated trade blocs the set-up of which is mostly oriented at enhancing competitiveness (Telò, 2007, p. 10). In this sense, Northern or emerging centers compete for the provision of hegemonic stability to Southern hinterlands (cf. Murray & Brown, 2009; Radtke & Wiesebron, 2002). Nevertheless, the initiative for the EMP has been considered by Joffé as "perhaps, the first genuine attempt at creating an open realist system" (Joffé, 2007, p. 256).

Recently, a dialog of New Regionalism and neo-functionalist approaches, often considered ill-suited for accommodating IPE or constructivist approaches, has been recognized as fruitful: “careful treatment of accumulated insights from EU studies (including a proper re-inspection of classical integration theory) brings clear methodological and meta-theoretical benefits for the project of comparative regional integration scholarship” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 993). Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond argue that while “there is no inherent teleology in regional integration (such projects can advance, deteriorate, advance again, fall apart etc.), that should not blind us to the fact that such evolution is possible” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1000). In consequence, they ask “why should regional integration in the neo-functionalist sense be completely ruled out as a possible end point of contemporary regional projects?” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1001). This is specifically true as neo-functionalism already “took account of disintegrative dynamics and the possibility that spillovers did not occur automatically” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1007). One form of linking New Regionalism and Neo-Functionalism regards the “need to understand how formal and informal practices of regionalization coexist” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1001). This study attempts to address this challenge by means of its research focus on the interactions of non-state organizations and Euro-Mediterranean regional institutions. In addition, it
pays attention to those North-South specificities emerging from the heterogeneity and asymmetry of the Euro-Mediterranean.

2.3 Concepts and Hypotheses

The expected non-linear character of Euro-Mediterranean integration and disintegration dynamics implies looking beyond spillover automatism or linearity in this study's analytical framework. This expectation is underlined by the politicization of major conflicts and the persistence of authoritarian states in the MENA region. In consequence, its research is focused on political spill taxons. Questions regarding non-state actors addressed by this study relate to their respective regional composition and orientation, to their advocacy objectives including the potential mobilization of functional pressures, and to the level of governance they address. Shifting constitutions, orientations, expectations, and strategies of regionally involved actors are possible in this context, in certain cases even shifting loyalties towards the Euro-Mediterranean system of governance.

In neo-functionalism, increases in tensions as to cooperation objectives and their attainment prompt institutions to 'break out' from any encapsulation, and to be subjected to decisional cycles regarding their revision. During the entry points provided during these cycles, regional-level dynamics in economic or social transactions or functional pressures can be acted upon and instrumentalized by regionally constituted or oriented political actors to shape the direction, i.e. the spill taxon, and the dimension, i.e. the type of mechanism of institutional and policy revision. Euro-Mediterranean decisional cycles after 1995 can be conceived of as priming cycles for existing institutions as well as repeated 'initiation cycles' providing renewed impetus (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 54).
This study expects to both substantiate EFP analysis by contributing additional explanations of Euro-Med institutional revisions, as well as to provide an alternative regional approach founded in integration theory, which can subsequently be discussed in the light of Comparative Regionalist scholarship. Furthermore, the analytical framework of this study reacts to the polycentricity and heterogeneity of the Euro-Mediterranean by considering the impact of regional North-South specificities at non-state level, and by its attention to the multiple roles of European institutions vis-à-vis non-state actors. Based primarily on the notion of political spillover, this study inquires whether it can be empirically confirmed regarding a non-state organization that:

A) the group focuses its activities at the regional intergovernmental and institutional political processes and on organizations constituting ‘regional centers’ for the Euro-Mediterranean geographic space, whether explicitly or implicitly so.

B) the group seeks to become a regional political actor and to contribute to processes of policymaking or institutional revision respectively adjustment, for instance by attempting to shape the regional agenda or to build coalitions. The first condition for this is prior regional governance of a given field in the sense of formal competence, project structure, and funding allocation. The second condition is that an organization holds knowledge and capacity to address political access points.

B2) the group mobilizes and acts upon integration or disintegration dynamics, interdependencies and functional pressures, or upon institutionally induced incentives.

C) the group promotes the intensification or expansion of regional co-operation or integration within or across fields or sectors. The condition for this is constituted by
decisional cycles regarding Euro-Mediterranean institutions and policies which provide entry and access points.

While neo-functionalism theorizes the regional emergence and reorientation of non-state groups, the non-state groups in question are also considered potential reactions to government-led regional processes. In a circular, mutually reinforcing way, individual sectoral non-state actors are expected to promote regional cooperation or integration, even if they originate from EU-sponsored regional programs. Hypotheses will be disconfirmed if:

A) the organization’s Euro-Mediterranean geographic focus is less dominant than towards a specific sub-region, e.g. towards the geographic scope of the European Union, respectively towards the sum of its constitutive states or regions; equally, when organizations respectively their representatives have not ‘gone native’ regarding the Euro-Mediterranean space (cf. Checkel, 2003).

B) the organization’s advocacy orientation towards the Euro-Mediterranean is less dominant than towards a different geographic reference or if its positions regarding the concept and policies of the Euro-Mediterranean fully align with the official agenda of the key institutions involved. In turn, internal debates or contestations regarding the hegemonic concepts are considered supportive of the hypothesis.

B2) the group avoids reference to integration or disintegration dynamics respectively to functional pressures in specific policy fields; specifically, if stakeholders involved consider regional dynamics and pressures implausible or irrelevant for their work.
C) the organization is neutral about the prospects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation or integration respectively if it considers disintegration of individual sectors as desirable.

Based on the theory framework outlined thus far, the following chapter will specify the ensuing analytical framework as well as the strategies for data collection, with a focus on how neo-functionalist hypotheses have been implemented in survey, document, and interview research.
3 EMPirical RESEARCH DESIGN And METHODS

This chapter transposes the theory framework into an application in empirical research and analysis. It discusses the operationalization of relevant concepts in indicators and specific research sub-questions. Furthermore, it lays out the specific methods used for data collection in this dissertation research, with a particular emphasis on interview research. Empirical research conducted in the context of the present project has implied three layers of data collection: a) survey research on relevant organizations and actors that can be considered part of the Euro-Mediterranean non-state sphere, b) document analysis on organizations sampled based on survey research and c) stakeholder interviews, complemented by participatory observation at interaction sites. This data is complemented by statistics and datasets regarding social and economic transaction rates and policy interdependence.

The choice of this study to focus on the allegedly ‘hopeless’ Euro-Mediterranean region counters a selection bias of Comparative Regionalism towards ‘successful’ regions respectively the transaction patterns. Since this study focuses on politics regarding existing regional venues instead of the creation of their regional boundaries, case delineation is defined by the range of the Euro-Mediterranean institution so as to define a space “which can then (ex post) be ‘compartmentalized’” (de Lombaerde, 2006, p. 13). Thereby, an organizational view of the region is adopted, as opposed to an ‘inclusive’ perspective which embeds member states within research on regional institutional politics. Hence, regional governmental or quasi-governmental organizations constitute the units of analysis of the regional
in institutional dimension, to which the primary research on non-state organizations will be related.

3.1 Operationalization of Concepts: Indicators

To introduce empirical research on non-state actors, the following sections review the key topics of this study. Each of the related questions cuts across the various research strategies and methods employed, which are subsequently outlined. Operationalization is guided by a choice of theory-derived concepts, chosen with the dimensions of expense, accuracy, validity, and reliability in mind.

3.1.1 Formation of Non-State Organizations

The first ‘complex’ addressed in empirical research regards the formation and key operational characteristics of non-state groups. The mechanisms at work in this regard are expected to vary across type of group, sector of activity, geographic location, and embeddedness in regional funding systems. For this dimension, the central question is if an organization’s membership is transnationally constituted in was to allow it to claim regional representation. Schmitter has suggested operationalizing ‘regional group formation’ by the “classification of data on sectorial coverage, membership, degrees of voluntary support and participation, organizational vitality, and demand articulating activities of regional nongovernmental organizations” (Schmitter, 1970, p. 856). As neo-functionalism expects groups to form around an existing regional framework, empirical research of this study
addresses the conditions which shape a group’s political agency. To provide one example for interpreting empirical data, if a group’s origins can be traced to the involvement of regional institutions, but it has come to promote its own advocacy objectives, it will be considered a regional group. If a group has been newly constituted by members of other non-state groups, and this group from the beginning has a pronouncedly Euro-Mediterranean regional outlook, it will be considered a regional group of high likelihood to autonomous actorhood.

Data regarding the geographic and professional background of interviewees and their colleagues provides insight into the constitutive process of a non-state organization, and ultimately into the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean non-state sphere. Furthermore, such information is expected to contribute to an understanding of the reasons for which organizations subscribe to the Euro-Mediterranean concept, e.g. in terms of advocacy or access to funding. From a neo-functionalist perspective, this makes it possible to understand the rationales by which non-state actors orient or re-orient towards specific regional centers’ especially regarding their possibilities to ascertain benefits from this. Data analysis is also aimed at discerning embedded actors, organizations the agenda of which is aligned with official regional policy, from strategic actors, organizations which orient towards official regional policy with the aim of influencing its structures and content. Financial dependence on regional institutions is expected to be a key determinant of an organization’s character in this regard.
3.1.2 Regional Orientation

The second complex in empirical research regards the relation of non-state organizations to Euro-Mediterranean regionalism and to its institutions, organizations, and policy-making arenas. Data on these dimensions is expected to contribute to understanding a group’s regional orientation and auto-identification, its capacity for regional actorhood, and any strategic objectives envisaged by re-orientation. High degrees of Euro-Mediterranean orientation, as compared to alternative regional orientations, would confirm that regional cooperation schemes create regional dynamics beyond their direct scope.

Research on this complex emphasizes the role of contestation and on discrepancies regarding regional approaches across and within the organizations researched. In an abstract sense, questions are also geared towards the understanding of the salience of the Euro-Mediterranean idea, and the precise dimensions along which it is contested - particularly in its variant as promoted by the EU institutions and the UfM. To grasp the perception of potential gains from regional orientation, this research category also allows for insight on whether an organization seeks short-term benefits by political orientation towards regional centers or whether variations in regional interest implies a long-term change of a group’s perspective or self-understanding.

Regarding non-state groups’ regional orientation, the North-South particularities of the Euro-Mediterranean space are expected to be reflected by the roles of constitutive organizations or individuals of Southern Mediterranean background within the organizations researched. Furthermore, these particularities are expected to matter regarding the focus on individual countries as policy interfaces, e.g. Sweden with regard to intercultural dialog, Germany regarding industry involvement,
Spain as the location of the new UfM Secretariat, or Jordan as the origin of the UfM Secretary-General.

3.1.3 Regional Political Activity and Integration

The degree of an organization’s involvement in Euro-Mediterranean politics or policymaking will be assessed by studying its respective activities in policy monitoring, advocacy or negotiation. Thereby, the design of this study’s empirical research is geared to uncovering advocacy capacities and strategies, as well as the importance of levels of governance and regional centers as addressees of advocacy. In this regard, the question is to what extent a group identifies the Euro-Mediterranean as a target of its political objectives or demands. The awareness of regional access channels is considered a first precondition here. Primarily, regional centers comprise the EU institutions, particularly the EEAS and certain Directorates of the European Commission, the UfM Secretariat, and a few other key contexts like the Anna Lindh Foundation. Thereby, access points to regional centers range from the respective supranational organizations and intergovernmental negotiation contexts to individual units. Individual non-state organizations can be expected to prefer to address other types of access points, including national or sub-national governments or sectoral associations. Research on political activity focuses, then, on the strategies employed by organizations to mobilize, in terms of advocacy and agenda-shaping, or in terms of networking and negotiation in forming actor coalitions.

Research on political activity also aims to identify those processes of regional policy or institutional revision to which non-state actors have contributed. From a theory perspective, findings of high degrees of political activity would also hint at non-
state actors’ capacity for pro-integration lobbying. The presence of political spillover requires potential gains from integration to be high, groups to be able to ascertain the benefits of supranational activity and to know where to start lobbying, prior international governance of an issue (familiarization with policy process) as materialized by formal competences or by structures of program funding or project management, and functional spillover pressures or internationally induced incentives (cf. Niemann & Schmitter, 2009). Indicators include regional membership constitution, regional policy scope and orientation, relevant sectoral coverage at regional level, staff familiarity with regional policymaking, and an engagement with the regional framework.

Relevant indicators include a group’s access to policy-makers and resources used, its involvement in pre-adjustment interaction, agenda introduction of an issue, coalition-building, respectively the degree to which the original policy demands raised by a group are consequently reflected in an intergovernmentally defined framework or spin-off organization or program. For instance, if a group of business representatives maintains an EU policy unit, has issued policy papers or statements on rules-of-origin regulation, and held advisory status in a technical committee drafting the charter of a governmentally-induced rule-of-law policy program, the group has acted as a pro-integration force in the neo-functionalist sense.

A sub-complex of this research component regards non-state groups’ mobilization of perceived interdependence or functional pressures for Euro-Mediterranean policy redefinition, expansion, or for sectoral independence. Contrary to numerous interpretations of neo-functionalism, most variants of this theory have claimed that integration dynamics have to be acted upon in order to have an actual integrative effect. Research on the respective mechanisms in the Euro-
Mediterranean case focuses on the way groups argue their causes. Indicators are related to the extent to which a group a) takes policy stances which outspokenly or in their likely consequence promote increases in regional cooperation, and b) refers to integration pressures to support these demands. Thus, if a given group advocates a Euro-Mediterranean currency coordination regime by pointing to an increasing transaction ratio for trade across Euro-Mediterranean countries is increasing, relative to a systemic increase, for instance due to the existence of a free trade regime, it refers to an integration pressure.

From a neo-functionalist perspective, the development of a regional-level non-state sphere tends to create feedback for those organizations at the regional ‘center’. Unfortunately, “[i]t is definitely a complex if not impossible undertaking to identify the influence of an NGO on EU decision-making, let alone intergovernmental bargaining going on within the EMP” (van Hüllen, 2008, p. 15). Indeed, the influence of advocacy groups on foreign and regional policy is considered to be particularly difficult to trace (Voltolini, 2012, p. 35). Given the polycentricity of Euro-Mediterranean politics, the frequently abstract political objectives of non-state groups, and the character of intergovernmental negotiations prevalent in Euro-Mediterranean politics, only limited data can be gathered on individual policy processes. Instead, what will be attempted is to confirm theory expectations indirectly, also because NGOs’ advocacy tends to take the form of monitoring or of individual reports which affect policymakers indirectly through general discourse.
3.2 Collecting Survey Data

Data was collected to structure the surveys which have been conducted of Euro-Mediterranean and Mediterranean riparian non-state organizations (listed in Annex C1). Furthermore, intergovernmental and other international frameworks of relevance to the Euro-Mediterranean geographic space were surveyed to allow for research on their position vis-à-vis regional non-state organizations. Survey data collection has drawn on publicly available information, primarily from the web sites and publications of the organizations researched, from news media, and from academic sources.

The non-state organization survey was conducted for the purposes of description, analysis, and case selection. First, it was intended to substantiate existing, fragmented empirical research on the reorientation of non-state groups towards the Euro-Med concept and institutions. Second, it allowed focusing on theory-relevant dimensions. Third, the survey permitted to select cases for research regarding non-state groups’ political actorhood. Previous surveys have applied different inclusion criteria or were specific to one policy field (Voltolini, 2012), including the online databases of the René Seydoux Foundation for the Mediterranean World, of the Anna Lindh Foundation, or those that are expected to be the outcome of a cooperative effort of EU institutions to map civil society structures. These previous surveys have nevertheless contributed to the selection of groups to be included in the present survey. Beyond these starting points, potentially relevant organizations have been identified based on other academic and policy publications, based on extensive web searches, and based on scanning link lists and partner listings on organization websites. Nevertheless, the database is likely to be

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8 Interview 5e4 with an EEAS official carried out in Brussels on April 11, 2013.
incomplete due to the short-lived nature of certain organizations or due to missing publicly accessible information.

### 3.2.1 Inclusion Criteria

A set of criteria was developed to decide whether to include individual groups in the survey conducted. Foremost, selection focused on the types of organizations understood in neo-functionalism as potentially regionalizing groups, as introduced in chapter 2. From among these organizations and networks, only those fulfilling a number of additional criteria were included:

1. A primarily Euro-Mediterranean orientation, in mission statement, operational practice, membership or several of these aspects. This criterion was considered fulfilled in case the Euro-Mediterranean focus is more pronounced than a national, European, or MENA focus. Alternatively, a Mediterranean riparian focus, oriented towards the broader region including Northern non-riparian states or at least all of riparian states, was considered sufficient. These criteria were considered fulfilled also if the respective group is a subdivision of an organization of a broader geographic scope, whether external or internal to the region. In contrast, those numerous Mediterranean riparian and other sub-regional organizations which lack a broader regional focus were excluded from this survey. This exclusion criterion is valid for criminal organizations and armed groups like Hizballah or Hamas.

2. A certain degree of formalization or institutionalization. This criterion is indicated, for example, by constancy of membership, by a permanent office or secretariat, or by permanent staff. Including this criterion makes sure that the
respective group has the potential to a hypothetical capacity for political agency. Thereby, media outlets and online projects have been included even if their political actorhood is likely to be limited.

3. A long-term operational perspective, going beyond projects or programs of a temporary nature. This criterion might be fulfilled by certain groups which are formally project-based, but de facto have been operating for longer than the usual duration of a contracted project. At the same time, it excludes organizations which are de jure operational, but de facto have been inactive for an extended period of time.

4. A certain degree of organizational independence respectively potential for political activity, in line with the neo-functionalist dimension of regional group formation. In order to prioritize in this survey, this criterion is defined as fulfilled only if a group is more than a subdivision or an outsourced initiative or project led by another already included group.

Projects and organizations which generally fulfil the inclusion criteria have been reviewed as part of the survey conducted but placed in a separate category and survey directory. These include the plentitude of local projects and initiatives of Euro-Mediterranean scope. While individual projects have developed their own structures in terms of offices or administrative staff, most projects are sustained by other organizations and are unlikely to develop significant political actorhood on their own. The same is true for the numerous regional mechanisms and financing instruments of the EU, the UfM, or of other intergovernmental organizations, although many of these programs have some organizational independence.
3.2.2 International Organizations and Interaction Contexts

In addition to the non-state groups surveyed, a number of international, often intergovernmental, organizations with a Euro-Med focus were reviewed and included in an additional directory. Their standing in the context of this dissertation is as a) addressees and access points of demands, political agency and advocacy by non-state groups as well as b) targets of policy changes induced by non-state actors. Given the hybrid and interregional nature of the Euro-Med, the role of the European Union institutions stands out: a large part of Euro-Mediterranean policies have been designed in Brussels, which makes EU institutions an addressee but also a contributor to Euro-Mediterranean policymaking.

Non-state groups can also channel their demands through national ministries, development agencies, or national Euro-Mediterranean offices. Furthermore, numerous single-task IGOs are involved in Euro-Med affairs. In this study, international interaction contexts of a specific Euro-Mediterranean regional relevance were surveyed. For this purpose, 'context' was defined as a potential site for intergovernmental interaction irrespective of its level, not necessarily corresponding to an organization or a formal institution. Additional interaction sites include IGO- or UfM-sponsored conference series of a formalized and regular character.

Empirical research at the level of Euro-Med institutions devotes primary attention to the shared interaction context post-2007 when Euro-Mediterranean politics was transformed by the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean. Furthermore, particularly after the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty, this timeframe falls within a period of extended EU foreign policy competences and European interaction leeway in the Southern Mediterranean (cf. Costalli, 2009, p. 337; Telò, 2007, p. 4). The notion of 'critical junctures' implies that a given policy or institutional
adjustment was subject to a contingent choice. Critical junctures, offering opportunities to ‘seal off’ institutions, emerge within a context of institutional continuity, which applies to the Euro-Mediterranean institutions due to its path-dependency and institutional isomorphism. In this understanding, the EMP and now the UfM dispose of an equivalent to an *acquis communautaire* (Aliboni, 2008).

Research on institutional revision is further inspired by integration research guides (de Lombaerde, 2006; cf. van Langenhove, 2006, pp. 48–49). The following dimensions inform insight into the direction of institutional adjustment: their membership rules; their scope; their level, i.e. their formal authority; their governance, i.e. their rules on membership, decision-making and operational implementation; their stated purpose, mandate, mission and strategy; the resources at their disposal; their autonomy from other frameworks of a similar policy scope; and their agendas in individual policy fields.

### 3.2.3 Directory Dimensions

Both for non-state and for inter-state organizations, data was collected from the organization’s websites, other websites, news reports, organizational leaflets and existing academic publications. For each entry, the group’s name and the name’s acronyms were noted in the original language as well as in English. To this, a code was assigned which indicates both the group’s type and a sequential number (e.g. m21). The type of the group’s internal organization and their field or sector of activity was indexed, including the group’s specific political outlook where relevant. In addition, the Directory includes the group’s year of inauguration respectively.
beginning of operation. The constituency of the groups was indicated in terms of
types and number of members and their primary stated geographic constitution. The
geographic location of the group’s headquarters, secretariats, head offices or
councils constitutes a further survey category. Organizational features affecting the
operational capacity of an organization were included in the database as well, e.g.
regarding the Presidency, Supervisory board, and Council. The number of an
organization’s staff, working in its secretariat, headquarters or representations,
constitutes a quantifiable dimension of the survey. The specific organizational format
of the organization was indicated based on its self-description, its key organizational
affiliations and partnerships, its institutional alignment, and information on its sources
of funding. Finally, the URL of the group’s website was included in the resulting
Directory, including information on the website language versions primarily consulted
where relevant.

3.2.4 Case Selection

Among the objectives of the non-state organization survey was to select cases for in-
depth research. Case selection was based on the survey inclusion criteria and
focused on two categories of cases. On the one hand, ideal type cases represent a
specific type and sector, dimensions which tend to correlate. Preference was given to
prominent instances of the respective combination of characteristics. These types of
cases are considered politically important as well (cf. Boyatzis, 1998). On the other
hand, outlying cases provide a contrast on certain dimensions. Selection criteria
imply that sampled organizations have regionally oriented stakes, but that their
potential to materialize these stakes through regional political activity remains to be assessed.

Neo-functionalism highlights the role of certain types of non-state actors regarding regional integrative processes. This study's categorization of non-state actors along the dimensions of type, sector, year founded, geographic location and staff size allows for subsequent theory-guided comparison regarding facilitating factors of regional political involvement. Sector, in this regard, is understood as a category at the intersection of neo-functionalist theory and policy practice on the side of regional institutions, which tend to overlap. This way of categorizing groups will subsequently allow for insight into whether organizations are clustered by sector or type, and to what extent they ally across sectors in advocacy.

3.3 Document, Interview, and Observatory Research

This section introduces the methods for data collection and analysis applied on each of the case studies as well as for cross-case research. These comprise document analysis, stakeholder interviews and observatory participation at regional events. Interviews, event documentation, and most other documents which constitute empirical references in this study are referenced by footnotes and listed in Annex C2, Annex C3 respectively in a List of Cited Documents at the end of this study. In contrast, larger documents or reports are referenced like academic documents. Table 3.1 illustrates, for one dimension of this study’s research, how the research question has been transposed to a theory, research design, and method.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Materialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Question</td>
<td>Non-State Involvement in Euro-Med Politics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Neo-functionalism and its political spillover component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Group seeks to become a regional political actor and to contribute to processes of policymaking or institutional revision / adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Non-State Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Awareness of regional political channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Source</td>
<td>Interviews with non-State stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Processing</td>
<td>Analysis of interview data regarding primary access points for advocacy and perception of key venues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Research Structure

Documents were collected for case organizations regarding, on the one hand, their organizational origin, self-understanding, and operational scope; and on the other hand, regarding their specific policy objectives and agenda, as well as political activity and strategies employed. Text documents going beyond the general survey were collected from publicly available web sites, news media, and brochures as well as through personal contacts in the form of internal documents.

Regarding the non-state level, documents include organization charters, mission statements, policy papers, strategy outlines, press releases, and committee agendas. Reverse inferences were drawn from institutional documents about non-state organizations’ involvement, particularly regarding the allocation of government or IGO funding. In addition to text-based documents, statistics and macro-indicators on trade and energy patterns as well as on migration and tourism were consulted in order to be able to contextualize organizations’ references to perceived integration pressures.

Regarding the regional institutional level, documents include protocols and agendas of summits, meetings and conferences, policy papers and evaluation documents from intergovernmental and technical bodies or committees, declarations and press releases by governments and regional organizations. The latter types are
intended as a proxy of policy or institutional revision at the level of regional politics. A press review of major European news media conducted previously implicitly adds to the document database of this study.

3.3.1 Interview Research and Transcription

As the most extensive component of this study’s empirical research, semi-structured interviews were conducted by telephone and face-to-face. In case neither face-to-face nor phone interviews were accepted by the interviewee, standardized questionnaires were employed. 52 individual stakeholders contributed to this research as interviewees or questionnaire respondents, sometimes in multiple separate interviews (listed in Annex C2). Moreover, participation or observation at a number of political events and conferences (listed in Annex C3), and visits to organizations’ offices has contributed to a better insight into actor constellations and agendas. Interviews were conducted with stakeholders based in the EU countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK, as well as the non-EU countries of Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. Face-to-face interviews were scheduled in Berlin, Barcelona, Madrid, Tarragona, Marseille, Paris, Brussels, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Amman.

After a series of ‘piloting’ telephone-based interviews, a set of complementary guides for semi-structured interviews was developed for each of three target groups and mirrored in English, German, French, and Spanish so as to be able to accommodate interviewees’ language preferences. Thus, a total of 24 different guides were used for different purposes, but structured along the same research
questions. The English-language reference versions of two interview guides and of one questionnaire are replicated in Annexes D1-3.\(^9\)

Three target groups were distinguished in interview research: a) decision-makers and staff working in external relations or advocacy from among non-state organizations and related organizations, b) potential addressees of non-state actors in EU institutions, UfM institutions, and governmental organizations, and c) interviewees from academia with insight into the dynamics researched. The interview guides of categories a) and b) were designed so as to provide complementary information regarding stakeholder interaction. In individual interviews, questions slightly diverged from the guides due to the stakeholder’s organizational affiliation. Interview questions partly aimed at narrative and process-oriented, partly at category-structured answers. For all interview guides, questions were designed to substantiate findings from survey research and document analysis, along categories derived from a neo-functionalist understanding of the regional role of non-state organizations. Key interview topics in the ‘non-state’ guides address the process of constitution of the respective organization, its policy-related activities and access points, and the strategies used in the dissemination and advocacy of policy positions. Key topics in the interview guides for officials and diplomats included relations to non-state actors, their policy input and the position of non-state organizations within Euro-Mediterranean politics.

Interviews were recorded by software tools or by voice recording hardware if permitted by the interviewee. Otherwise, interview notes were taken. The confidentiality and anonymity status of each interview was confirmed at the end of the conversation or in follow-up correspondence. Interviews were subsequently

\(^9\) Interview guides and questionnaires in the other interview languages can be requested from the researcher.
transcribed in English irrespective of the original language. In order to standardize transcription, a guide including editorial codes was developed (Annex E). To retain the original statements made by interviewees, language-related mistakes were left uncorrected in interview transcripts and in-text quotations. Each transcript document contains information including the interviewee’s name, position, unit, and previous positions; organizational affiliation and geographic location; the version of the interview guide; the interview format and date, the original language, as well as the confidentiality and anonymity status. To identify patterns across interviews, the non-narrative parts of transcripts have been either categorized or coded in the OpenCode software.

3.3.2 Interview Guides

Regarding the constitutive process of the interviewee’s organization, questions were asked about the origins of the people involved, especially regarding their professional backgrounds. Furthermore, questions targeted the background of the organization’s interest in Euro-Mediterranean politics. Answers regarding the geographic background of people are telling about whether or not a specific group, and ultimately the Euro-Med non-state sphere, is indeed constituted from across the entire geographic space. Conclusions contribute to understanding of the degree to which organizations adopt the Euro-Mediterranean label with a specific purpose, e.g. for political influence or access to finance. This makes it possible to discuss the forces drawing non-state actors towards regional centers.

The organization’s regional orientation and identification was tackled by questions regarding the perceived meaning of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean concept’,
especially regarding the relation to the regional concept promoted by the European Union and the core institutions of Euro-Med politics. Further questions targeted the contestation of these concepts within the organization. Another set of questions was intended to control for the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean to the interviewee and his or her organization, particularly with regard to the prioritization of a Euro-Mediterranean over a Mediterranean riparian or another geographic reference, and the benefits emerging from this choice. Grasping the specific understanding of ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ by organizations allows understanding the salience of the concept, and the dimensions along which it is contested. Furthermore, it has opened routes for a critical reflection regarding the North-South dynamics. From a neo-functionalist perspective, high degrees of regional orientation, as compared to alternative options for geographic orientation, would confirm that regional cooperation schemes create regional dynamics beyond their direct scope. The respective assessment further allows for conclusions on how integration theory needs to be adapted to the study of hybrid regional arrangements. Additionally, this category of questions allows for insight on whether organizations seek short-term benefits by political alignment with official policy or if a varied regional interest implies a long-term change of a group’s self-perception and perspective.

The third set of questions was designed to grasp the policy-related activities of the interviewee’s group. Questions aimed at the frequency and importance of producing advocacy documents, as well as on the choice of primary addressees from among the various potential access points. Further questions were targeted at the strategies used for advocacy of policy positions, e.g. regarding the intensity of direct personal contacts to policymakers at various levels. When relevant, a related set of questions attempted to create insight into the effects of the advocacy work conducted
by the interviewee’s group. In particular, this was done by asking about examples of contributing to changes in regional policies or institutions. Indications regarding the degree of involvement by reporting, lobbying, or negotiating, and regarding the political or advocacy character of a group’s reorientation, allow assessing whether a Euro-Med non-state political system exists at all. Furthermore, answers to these questions help to substantiate which processes and policies at the level of regional institutions have been impacted or triggered by the non-state actors in question. From a theory perspective, findings of high political activity provide hints that non-state actors are capable of becoming a pro-integration force at Euro-Mediterranean.

A final set of questions attempted to infer the interviewee’s overall attitude regarding the desirability and likeliness of cooperation or integration at Euro-Mediterranean level. Questions asked targeted the interviewee’s perception of the future of the Euro-Mediterranean space, the preferred future institutional format, and – where relevant – the ways in which the organization is perceived to contribute to it. Depending on answers that are part of this set, conclusions can be drawn on both the potential and the actual integrative impact of the organizations researched. From a neo-functionalist standpoint, an affirmative assessment of the answers would confirm that the development of a non-state sphere at the regional level tends to create feedback for the governmental organizations at the ‘center’.

All of these aspects of interview questions were studied in conjunction with the findings of the survey and document components of this study. When interviews were conducted with regional-level officials or with national diplomats, a different set of questions was employed. After asking the interviewee to clarify her or his relation to Euro-Mediterranean politics, questions were first asked regarding the interviewee’s experience regarding the institutional or intergovernmental level of Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation. In the following, relations to non-state actors were addressed by questions regarding personal and institutional contacts to non-state organizations of various types, and regarding the desirability of involving non-state groups. In cases of close contacts, interviewees were asked about any experience of non-state organizations that provided input and the effects of this. This interview guide also included questions, in shortened form, that attempted to identify the interviewee's perception and vision regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and integration. Answers contribute to an understanding of the 'everyday relevance' of the Euro-Mediterranean as a field or arena of politics. The integrative function of non-state actors can be assessed from a neo-functionalist standpoint. This set of questions also allows for a critical evaluation of this research dimension, by placing the visions and objectives of non-state interviewees in contrast to the interaction patterns, successes, and potential conflicts identified by government and official interviewees.

Individual questions prompted many interviewees to reflect about their institutional position and about the impact of their work, which led to self-critical replies in some cases and to assertive replies in others, particularly regarding their respective evaluation of the current 'state of affairs' of Euro-Med politics and even more so regarding the prospects of future regional cooperation.

The following chapter will provide an overview of the international organizations and interaction contexts which shape non-state actors' activities in the Euro-Mediterranean space, and which provide references and access points for advocacy.
4 EURO-MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS

This chapter introduces the core institutions and policymaking contexts of Euro-Mediterranean relevance with regard to their role as policy access points, addressees and arenas of non-state activity. It focuses on the institutions of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy. Particular attention is devoted to political and institutional developments that began with the constitution of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, and to subsequent policy changes, often in reaction to regime changes in Arab countries. Particularly in this latter aspect, the chapter goes beyond previous publications, drawing on survey and document research as well as media reports.

4.1 European Initiatives as Policy Access Points

The parallels in institution design between the EU’s internal intergovernmental policy dialog and the formats for Euro-Mediterranean intergovernmental dialog involving non-EU partners can hardly be overlooked. Besides policymaking at the EU level, individual institutional contexts relevant to Euro-Mediterranean politics are detached from Brussels politics and involve only a sub-group of EU member states. In most formal as well as informal contexts, EU institutions maintain a key role as initiator, stakeholder, or major sponsor. Indeed, the calibration of the Euro-Mediterranean institutional balance has frequently been contested, illustrated by the question of whether Euro-Mediterranean politics should be conducted primarily in Brussels or at and around the seat of the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona.
In addition, non-state actors can be expected to address individual national governments when promoting their agenda. While relevant Ministries and agencies can be expected to be of importance, individual governments also operate focal points of various types regarding all or some of the dimensions of Euro-Mediterranean affairs. These include a specific ‘Inter-ministerial Mission for the UfM’ in the case of France, the Mediterranean House (Casa Mediterraneo / Mediterraneocasa) in Spain, and the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme in the case of the Foreign Ministry of Denmark.

Pointing out the intensity of international relations in the Euro-Med, Cardwell argues that an understanding of the EU turning its internal governance outward allows to see that “the complex and extensive relationships between the EU and the partner states demonstrates that such a [governance] system has indeed emerged in the Mediterranean” (Cardwell, 2011, p. 230). In a similar vein, Emerson argues that Euro-Mediterranean governance represents the potential for the EU to exert its “considerable experience in the organization of multi-tier governance between itself, the member states and the regions, and increasingly also in the extension of this system beyond its frontiers in the regions and states of the periphery” (Emerson, 2008, p. 8).

4.2 Primary Contexts since 2008

Prior to discussing the results of this study’s survey of international interaction venues, this section introduces the functioning of the Union for the Mediterranean respectively of Mediterranean policymaking at EU level. Both the EU and the UfM are expected to provide access points for non-state organization.
4.2.1 The Union for the Mediterranean

The UfM Secretariat has operated from Barcelona, Spain, since 2010, led by its Secretary-General, Fathallah Sijilmassi, since 2012. Among the purpose of the UfM institutions is the provision of venues for intergovernmental policy dialog. The Paris Declaration of 2008, by which it was inaugurated, envisaged biannual Summits of Heads of State and Government as well as regular Foreign Affairs Ministerials. In 2013, for instance, four sectoral Ministerials were scheduled to take place.\(^{10}\) Besides the role of its Northern and Southern Co-Presidencies, Summits and Ministerials, the more quotidian type of UfM intergovernmentalism operates through Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), e.g. to approve individual projects or budgets, but also regarding its mandate.\(^{11}\) UfM SOMs take place in regular intervals, usually ranging from one to two months, complimented by expert SOMs held at specific occasions. In addition, the number of ad-hoc events organized or co-organized by the UfM Secretariat, often involving high-ranking officials, has increased since 2008.

The involvement of EU institutions in UfM governance was formalized in 2012 when the European External Action Service (EEAS) permanently assumed the Northern UfM Co-Presidency in 2012, and the European Commission “seconded an official to the UfM Secretariat”.\(^{12}\) This move abandoned the previously envisaged rotation system of the UfM Presidency and diverts from the original UfM design, which allowed for Euro-Mediterranean states to be represented at an equal footing and, on the European side, to be spearheaded by Mediterranean riparian states. The

\(^{10}\) Anonymous interview 5e2 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
\(^{11}\) Interview 2r1 with a UfM official carried out on November 14, 2012.
\(^{12}\) UfM interview with Marcus Cornaro, Acting Director of the European Neighbourhood Policy, published on October 8, 2012.
involvement of the EEAS and the European Commission creates an overlapping triple EU impact on Euro-Mediterranean policy through the ENP, through bilateral and inter-regional frameworks, and through the multilateral UfM. After its inauguration, it was envisaged that “the Commission’s input towards the UfM will essentially address its regional and transversal activities relative to the Mediterranean” (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009, p. 8).

Empirical research indicates that government and EU stakeholders regard the various Euro-Med intergovernmental frameworks as complementary and tend to work in several of them in parallel. This has entailed competence struggles, e.g. between the EEAS and individual Commission Directorate-Generals, or between Brussels and Barcelona. Yet, venues are use in parallel. A French diplomat stated that “while we are [designing the new concept for Euro-Med relations], we have to use all the tools that we, the UfM Secretariat, the 5+5, all the components of these Euro-Med relations are very useful”.14

Beyond the influential EU member states and the EU institutions, Jordan and Egypt have maintained key roles in the UfM context. Egypt held the first Southern Co-Presidency and has been a coordinator of the Arab position within the UfM context. Jordan holds the Southern Co-Presidency and has also coordinated a ‘non-aligned’ group, composed by Israel, the Balkan UfM members, and Turkey, which maintains a leading role within the group as well, according to a diplomatic source.15 Egypt and Jordan can be expected to be of particular interest to non-state organizations that attempt to approach the UfM through its member states.

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13 Anonymous interview 5e2 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
14 Interview 3g1 with a French diplomat carried out in Paris on January 21, 2013.
15 Anonymous interview 2g4 carried out on November 20, 2012.
4.2.2 Intra-EU Intergovernmentalism

The EU’s role in Euro-Mediterranean politics continues to be shaped through its internal mechanisms of intergovernmental policy coordination. Thereby, work within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Foreign Affairs Council formations is sustained by the various Council working groups of relevance to Euro-Mediterranean affairs, particularly by those categorized as ‘Foreign Affairs’. Among those groups are the geographically oriented groupings Mashreq/ Maghreb (MAMA) and Middle East/ Gulf groups, but also those covering matters of development and trade policy. In addition to its general work, the MAMA group is also the relevant working group for the coordination of the EU position within the UfM, though within individual government ministries, competences for MAMA policy and for UfM policy are frequently located in different units or departments.¹⁶ Frequently, intra-EU interaction in these contexts has a Euro-Mediterranean regional orientation instead of a bilateral or country-specific focus.

In addition to bilateral and multilateral formats led by EU institutions, the EU’s relations to the League of Arab States as well as to the Gulf Cooperation Council have become increasingly routinized, with a Ministerial held in 2012 pledging intensification of relations. The European Commission has also advocated strengthened links with the Arab Maghreb Union, thereby encouraging North African sub-regional integration.¹⁷ This objective was further manifested in a Joint

¹⁶ Anonymous interview 5g2 with a government official carried out on April 11, 2013.
¹⁷ EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of August 15, 2013 titled ‘Commissioner Füle and Secretary General of Maghreb Union discuss ways to implement EU’s proposals supporting integration in the Maghreb’.
Communication in 2012.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, numerous large-scale programs and projects funded by the EU, primarily through the ENP instruments, have developed permanent structures over time or were already provided with them from the very beginning. Due to the funding involved, these can be expected to constitute both the aims of non-state activity as well as access points.

\textbf{4.3 Intergovernmental Contexts and Non-State Activity}

Survey research has produced a database of inter-state, inter-agency and inter-parliamentary contexts targeting the Euro-Mediterranean or Mediterranean region. Neither the inter-state nor the non-state Directories underlying this study are annexed to this dissertation due to their size and complexity.\textsuperscript{19} However, the names and acronyms of surveyed organizations and contexts are reproduced in Annex F to this study.

The survey of inter-state contexts produced a database of around 50 distinguishable entries which constitute potential addressees and arenas for non-state actors’ advocacy and orientation. The most relevant among them of these are highlighted here due to their potential significance in case studies. A prominent Euro-Mediterranean interaction venue can be found in the 5+5 scheme, which is also known as the Western Mediterranean Forum and dates back to the early 1990s. It is based on a structured but informal dialog of Mediterranean riparian states. The 5+5 format comprises five Mediterranean EU member states and five interlocutors from

\textsuperscript{18} Joint Communication on ‘Supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb’ of December 17, 2012.

\textsuperscript{19} Full copies can be requested from the author.
the Southern Mediterranean which correspond to the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Union du Maghreb Arab; UMA). The 5+5 scheme has recently been revived, specifically with its 2012 summit.\(^{20}\) Today, 5+5 is a multisectoral format, primarily at the level of Ministers. While originally, annual reunions of Foreign Ministers were conceived of at its core, other ‘configurations’ of Ministerials have regularly taken place meanwhile, covering topics of the Interior, migration, defense, tourism, transport, education and environment. Moreover, individual Summits of Heads of State and Government have been organized, notably in 2003 and 2012. In addition, there is a parliamentary dimension to 5+5, particularly at the level of the Presidents of Parliaments. While there is no Secretariat for the 5+5 format, meetings and Summits have been organized by specific offices and committees of the host countries, recently backed by the UfM Secretariat.\(^{21}\) In addition, interaction at SOM level relies on the national focal points of participating states,\(^{22}\) as well as on the involvement of both the European Commission and the EEAS.\(^{23}\)

As regards the inter-parliamentary dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA – UfM), previously Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), is significant due to its visibility and omnisectoral scope. Inaugurated in early 2000s based on its predecessor frameworks, it brings together 280 parliamentarians from across the Euro-Mediterranean range, including 49 Delegates from the European Parliament. Venues of its assemblies rotate, but it is constantly chaired by a Bureau of 4. Furthermore, it has seen the development of various committees and working groups, and has come to be engaged with the UfM

\(^{20}\) Website for the 5+5 Malta Summit of 2012. Reference access on November 20, 2013.

\(^{21}\) EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of April 23, 2013 on a 5+5 Dialogue Ministerial Conference.

\(^{22}\) Interview 2g2 with an Italian diplomat carried out on December 8, 2012.

\(^{23}\) Interview 3e1 with an EU official carried out in Brussels on January 23, 2013.
Secretariat. In addition, in 2013, a first Summit of Presidents of Parliaments from across the UfM member states was held in Marseille. Inter-parliamentary cooperation across the Mediterranean Sea also occurs in the context of the riparian-only Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean which succeeded the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) in 2006. Its Secretariat in Malta sustains the Parliamentary Dimension of the 5+5 format as well. Individual parliamentarians have joined each other in specific formats like the Circle of Mediterranean Parliamentarians for Sustainable Development (COMPSUD), supported by a Secretariat hosted by the Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE), or in the Euro-Mediterranean Forum conference series. In this study, the inter-parliamentary dimension is expected to provide valuable venues for non-state organizations’ access to Euro-Mediterranean agenda-setting.

A second key dimension of Euro-Med international affairs joins individual government Ministries, units or agencies across the range states. These inter-agency contexts tend to have agendas for cooperation in specific sectors, sometimes with a degree of autonomy from their constitutive governments. Inter-agency contexts are prolific in fields related to infrastructure. Besides the riparian Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy Conservations (MEDENER) and the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Regulators (EMERG) regarding electronic communication, the Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MedReg) and the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO) are expected to be relevant to private corporations in their Euro-Mediterranean endeavors. In other cases, inter-agency contexts have been set up as networks or in
the context of individual projects, as in the case of cooperation in policy training (Euromed Police) in which various governmental entities participate.

Inter-institutional contexts are considered a third key dimension of Euro-Mediterranean inter-state context. These are most frequently driven by the respective European-level equivalents. Since 1995, Euromed Summits of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions have been institutionalized and provided with a Charter in 2012. In 2010, cooperation at the level of local and regional authorities was formalized in the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly of Local and Regional Authorities (ARLEM), which is constituted by 84 representatives from more than 30 countries and coordinated by a Secretariat hosted by the Committee of the Regions in Brussels. Inter-institutional contexts are expected to provide opportunities for advocacy and involvement by non-state organizations, particularly for those that engage with questions of Euro-Med governance.

Besides the key dimensions of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation introduced thus far, further European institutions sustain Mediterranean programs or offices as well. The European Investment Bank (EIB) launched a Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) in 2002, with a significant staff numbering around 50. The EIB maintains specific FEMIP offices and has additionally seconded staff to the UfM Secretariat, with which it has set up joint programs and the InfraMed fund. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has expanded its scope to Turkey in 2009 and to four MENA countries in 2012, in the context of the multi-stakeholder Deauville Partnership aimed at supporting system transitions in the Southern Mediterranean. It maintains a Permanent Representation in Jordan and further MENA offices, aiming at an investment value of €2.5 in 2015. Also, a whole range of institutions and government agencies, foremost the European
Commission, is involved in matters of promoting trade across the Mediterranean, most notably with the objective of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA, sometimes EMFTA or EU-MED FTA). In addition, the formally independent but governmentally financed European Endowment for Democracy was launched as a targeted facility for civil society support in the European Neighborhood, in the light of regime changes in Southern Mediterranean states.

Furthermore, various field-specific organizations have been intergovernmentally founded in conjunction with the EMP respectively the UfM or in parallel to these frameworks. The Anna Lindh Foundation operating in matters of cultural dialog has, since 2005, forged a network of 4,000 NGOs from across the Euro-Mediterranean, largely organized in national networks. Headquartered in Egypt with a staff of around 30, it has launched high-profile programs like Young Arab Voices or DAWRAK-Citizens for Dialogue. Since 1990, the University of Malta has hosted a Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies which was based on an international agreement and financed by Switzerland, Malta, and Germany. An IGO called the Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE) maintains a robust office in Cairo and has, since 1992, involved Arab and European governments and agencies. From among these contexts, the Anna Lindh Foundation is expected to be of notable interest to NGOs.

Intergovernmental organizations and contexts of a geographic scope beyond the Euro-Mediterranean have frequently developed a Mediterranean dimension as well. The role of the Western European Union’s Mediterranean framework has largely been absorbed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Mediterranean Dialog which involves seven MENA states. The Organization for Security and Co-

24 EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of March 1, 2013 about the Citizens Exchange Programme.
operation in Europe (OSCE) operates a security-focused Mediterranean Partnership as well. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has launched several initiatives on governance and development matters. A Red Cross Mediterranean riparian program is coordinated from Barcelona. The Council of Europe (CoE) has engaged with the Mediterranean through its North-South Centre and a targeted financial instrument. Already since 1987, the CoE-initiated European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement has involved a number of Southern Mediterranean countries, and has evolved into an intergovernmental platform with its own Secretariat in France. Furthermore, the G8 group sustains its Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), the most recent outcome of which is a Gender Institute.

United Nations organizations were pioneers in specifically confronting issues specific to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has been in force since 1975, has involved 21 Mediterranean states and the EU, and has since then spun off so-called Regional Activity Centers (RACs), with a staff totaling more than 80 people in offices across the region. Recently, ties to the UfM have been forged through the MedPartnership which also involves the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Geographically broad Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) have targeted the Mediterranean specifically for its ecosystem relevance, including the conservation-oriented African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (UNEP / AEWA).

These programs or policy schemes of ‘external’ organizations are expected to be of interest to sectoral efforts by non-state actors.

In addition, various multi-stakeholder frameworks involve both governmental or intergovernmental organizations as well as non-state groups. The Global Water
Partnership has a Mediterranean dimension (GWP-MED) and involves around 90 organizations and network of various standing. The UfM itself has launched the Horizon 2020 initiative on de-pollution of the Mediterranean. The Marseille Center for Integration was founded as a think tank a coalition of governments, local authorities, the EIB and the World Bank. Due to their multi-stakeholder nature, these contexts are expected to constitute natural access points for non-state activity.

Finally, high-level meetings of a less formalized character can provide arenas for non-state actors’ involvement in Euro-Mediterranean politics. There are countless events and conferences of an explicitly Euro-Med scope. Some of them have been institutionalized to some extent, for instance the intergovernmental Mediterranean Forum (FOROMED) as well as the multi-stakeholder Mediterranean Economic Conference and the EuroMed Social Dialogue Forum.

Most of these organizations and contexts constitute potential subjects of non-state actors’ activities, and potential access points for advocacy. To a large extent, their key venues, headquarters, or Secretariats are concentrated in European and MENA capitals, thereby providing options for ‘physical’ access by non-state organizations as well. Indeed, a number of these contexts employ a considerable number of staff which allows for inter-personal interaction with non-state groups in direct meetings or at conferences and events.

At the same time, non-state organizations of specific geographic backgrounds can be expected to address governments from outside the UfM region as well as other regional organizations, specifically the Arab Maghreb Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, regarding individual issues. The following chapter will introduce the results of the non-state dimension of the survey conducted, including their range of activities, and discuss the resulting selection of case studies.
5 Mapping and Categorizing Euro-Mediterranean Non-State Organizations

This chapter presents the research results of the survey conducted of Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors. Survey research contributes insight regarding the (re-)orientation of non-state groups towards the Euro-Mediterranean level in different policy fields. This regards groups' organizational structure, membership composition, and stated purpose. Based on the resulting organization directories, the selection of cases for in-depth document and interview research is outlined in this chapter.

5.1 Survey Results

The survey conducted has systematically identified 170 regionally oriented non-state organizations and contexts of relevance to this study. Their names and acronyms are reproduced in Annex F. To gather data regarding each organization and context, the existing literature and organizations' websites were systematically scanned. In addition, relevant combinations of web search keywords were applied to identify relevant groups. In addition to the indexed organizations, countless other groups with a potential stake in Euro-Mediterranean politics operate at national, local, and global level. The researcher's language skills allowed reading documents only in English, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Hungarian to a level sufficient for the purpose of conducting this survey. This restriction is expected to skew the results of the study to some degree, particularly when it comes to geographic aspects.

In 2007, Šabić and Bojinović had published the results of a survey focusing on groups relevant to the Mediterranean riparian field of regionalization (Šabić &
Bojinović, 2007). The present survey covered primarily Euro-Mediterranean groups and focused on theory-relevant characteristics. Its results confirm that non-state actors dispose of an increasing potential to matter politically at the Euro-Med regional level, and permit the selection of case studies. In some sectors, the organizations surveyed are well interlinked, for instance in the formalized field of local government cooperation, characterized by parallel fields of activity and by individual cities which have spearheaded cross-Mediterranean cooperation within more than one among the existing networks.

5.1.1 Types of Groups

The analytical framework employed for this study, based on neo-functionalism, has been based on the expectation of organizations developing a Euro-Mediterranean orientation across types and sectors. Indeed, the central non-state directory of this study comprises the most diverse types of groups.

Research has covered 50 think tanks, research institutes, education and training facilities that operate a distinguishable structure, e.g. the Istituto Affari Internazionali, the Euro-Mediterranean Seismological Centre, or the Euro-Mediterranean Risk Society. Some of these organizations are attached to universities while others are formally independent. Pertinent coordination bodies cover the Euro-Mediterranean region as well, such as the Community of Mediterranean Universities, or FEMISE for economics.

A number of 41 ‘typical’ non-governmental organizations, frequently with an orientation towards questions of policy or governance, were surveyed for this study. These include the EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform, the Mediterranean
Foundation, or the Euromed Civic Encounter. Several large-scale transnational NGOs and networks, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network or the Euro-Med Non-Governmental Platform, coordinate NGO cooperation across the Mediterranean or promote cultural dialog. Other groups are regionally inclined in their outlook, but are constituted primarily within one country in which they function as Euro-Mediterranean hubs. For instance, the Mediterranean Foundation (Fondazione Mediterraneo) based primarily in Napoli, Italy, coordinates regional policy and cultural dialog in numerous initiatives. In France, the René Seydoux Foundation for the Mediterranean World is a leading organization at the national level. The Euromed Civil Encounter in Spain constitutes a national-level hub for activities, but is also embedded in the Anna Lindh Foundation. NGOs frequently work in specific fields, e.g. the Foundation of the Women of the Euro-Mediterranean or the environment network Medmaravis. Certain TNGOs walk the line between NGO and research network, e.g. the Foundation Space of Knowledge Europe-Mediterranean (WEM) which also promotes cultural dialog.

In addition, 34 business or professional associations and large corporations were included, e.g. the Mediterranean energy observatory, Euromed Capital Forum, or Euro-Med Center of Mediation and Arbitration; moreover, a number of corporate networks or sections and trade union networks. While the number of private corporations with a specific Euro-Mediterranean program remains relatively low, various companies and joint ventures have started to engage in the Euro-Med space at a regional level, among them the Desertec initiative and the French AREVA. They are complemented by regional business and trade associations, for instance the Mediterranean Union of Enterprise Confederations, or field specific networks like the Euro-Med Irrigators Community. Various country-specific economic cooperation
initiatives such as the Germany-based *Euro-Med Association for Cooperation and Development* have an economic as well as a cultural exchange outlook. Trade unions have mirrored this business group expansion, yet truly Euro-Mediterranean initiatives are still scarce and only four were included in this survey, notably the Euromed Trade Union Forum, the Association of Solidarity Europe and Mediterranean Cooperation.

Moreover, 13 networks of sub-national territorial entities, i.e. regional, municipal or city governments were included in the survey. There is a multitude of such coastal Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean networks, such as MED-CITIES or the Standing Committee for the Euro Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities. A further 15 organizations were characterized as ‘other types’: primarily professional, regionally oriented news platforms like EuroMed News or networks of political parties. Finally, four cases of Mediterranean branches of non-state organizations originally ‘external’ to the Euro-Mediterranean were reviewed, as well as 13 examples of multi-stakeholder conferences or conference series. Numerous individual programs and long-term projects were included in the database, but with a different standing. Thereby, certain long-term projects with governmental, private, or mixed funding have developed substantial structures in investment promotion or environmental research.

Though staff figures for each organization were difficult to obtain, survey data indicates that considerable numbers of people work for the organizations surveyed as their primary occupation. For instance, for those business or professional organizations and networks for which information was gathered, the survey indicates an average staff number of 8.8 per organization. For transnational NGOs, this figure is at 10.2. In addition, many organizations maintain routinized working groups, hire
consultants, and employ researchers or temporary project staff. Yet more people are directly involved through organizations’ governance structures. At the same time, many directory entries represent networks which rely on staff of their member organizations to conduct their work. Nevertheless, these figures permit to extrapolate that a four-digit number of people works for Euro-Mediterranean non-state organizations. At least for larger organizations, this implies a considerable hypothetical capacity for tangible regional actorhood.

5.1.2 Founding Date, Location and Constituency

Survey findings confirm the growth of the specifically Euro-Mediterranean non-state field across its sectors. The inaugurations of each the Barcelona Process, the Anna Lindh Foundation, and the Union for the Mediterranean may have triggered the founding of additional non-state organizations. Moreover, based on organization’s histories and press releases, their increasing formalization and extension can be observed, in the sense of geographic outlook, membership or staff size. Table 5.1 lists the years of formal inauguration for currently existing organizations of three selected categories for which information could be clearly discerned. The comparability of these figures is limited as various organizations can be expected to have ceased operation meanwhile, and since most of them build upon predecessors. A tendency for increasing numbers can be identified nevertheless.

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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNGOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
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Table 5.1: Founding Dates of Non-State Organizations
Figures on the primary location of organizations’ offices can serve to indicate the centrality of certain countries and cities to Euro-Med politics. Table 5.2 indicates the figures for organizations with a discernable and permanent legal seat or physical location of its headquarters respectively secretariats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Mediterranean: 102</th>
<th>European non-Mediterranean: 33</th>
<th>MENA: 19</th>
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<tr>
<td>- France: 41, of which 17 in Paris and Île-de-France, 16 in Marseille</td>
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<td>- Italy: 27, of which 8 in Rome</td>
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<td>- Spain: 19, of which 7 in Barcelona, 4 in Madrid</td>
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<td>- Malta: 6</td>
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<td>- Greece: 5</td>
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<td>- other countries: 5</td>
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<td>- Brussels: 12</td>
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<td>- Germany: 13, of which 5 in Berlin</td>
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<td>- other countries: 7</td>
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<td>- Tunisia: 5</td>
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<td>- Morocco: 4</td>
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<td>- Egypt: 4</td>
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<td>- other countries: 6</td>
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Table 5.2: Location of Organizations’ Headquarters or Secretariats

These survey figures indicate that the majority of organizations are indeed based in European Mediterranean countries. Of those, 41 are based in France, 27 in Italy, and 19 in Spain. At the same time, 12 of the surveyed organizations are based in Brussels, 13 in Germany, and 7 in other non-Mediterranean countries of Europe. The geographic concentration of organizations in European countries is likely due to the overall ‘Northern’ bias of the Euro-Mediterranean concept, and presumably related to the concerns of groups regarding restrictions to pluralism and staff safety in many Southern Mediterranean countries. Yet, 19 organizations are headquartered in Southern Mediterranean countries, notably Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. In addition, various organizations that are primarily based in Europe operate representations or antenna offices in MENA countries. Moreover, even those entirely based in Europe tend to employ staff of Southern Mediterranean origins. Maintaining the key venues for cooperation in Europe also provides an opportunity to ‘outsource’ activity from politically restricted environments in Southern Mediterranean countries (cf. Feliu, 2005).
It is possible to discern certain cities as political hubs of Euro-Mediterranean politics. They are frequent locations of conferences, host Euro-Med organizations, or have been the center of key political initiatives in the field. The Paris region in France as well as Marseille and its neighboring regions constitute notably centers of activity, while Barcelona and other towns of Catalunya are well-placed in the light of the location of the UfM Secretariat. Brussels is a political hub due to the EU institutions, and because non-state groups’ offices are sometimes hosted by organizations of similar nature but of an EU-level outlook. A number of organizations with a primarily Mediterranean riparian membership nevertheless designate themselves Euro-Mediterranean. Some have established additional representations in Brussels for reasons of visibility and funding. Finally, MENA countries with clusters of Euro-Med activity include Tunisia and Morocco, both classified as ‘privileged partners’ by the EU as of 2014, and Egypt which additionally hosts the headquarters of the intergovernmentally governed Anna Lindh Foundation.

The survey conducted also identified Euro-Mediterranean networks which cut across sectors and types of organizations yet are frequently clustered around cities and institutions which constitute network hubs. This could be further studied by employing Policy Network Analysis (PNA), in which networks are conceived of as “clusters of different kinds of actor who are linked together in political, social or economic life” (Peterson, 2009, p. 105). While non-state actors can be tied together, including with governmental actors, in ‘policy communities’ (Peterson, 2009, p. 108), they can also constitute looser yet long-term, interest-based advocacy coalitions.

The type of membership of non-state groups varies: in some cases, members are individuals; in others, it is national-level associations or local groups; in yet others, it is mixed. Several groups considered as Euro-Mediterranean with a
membership from across the range of UfM member states nevertheless maintain a stronger member base in riparian countries. At the same time, membership from non-Mediterranean European countries is growing across the organizations surveyed. There are incentives for expansion of their membership beyond the countries forming their original constituency, most often from a Southern European constituency towards both non-Mediterranean Europe and the MENA region. The rationales for non-state organizations’ choices to do so will be discussed in detail in the following case study chapters.

5.1.3 Embeddedness into Institutions

The stimulation of integrative dynamics has, at times, been part of EU strategy or vision. Certain Euro-Med institutions were arguably founded with neo-functionalist ideas in mind. EU Mediterranean policy shapes the activities of numerous non-state groups, and sometimes – whether consciously or not – non-state groups support an integration agenda in their advocacy or on-the-ground activities. This interpretation indicates a two-way relationship between intergovernmental organizations and non-state groups. Many surveyed non-state groups receive EU funding and link to the EU’s Mediterranean policies, and several indeed originate from it. These groups tend to promote an integrative agenda in fields like human rights or energy security. Others organizations are expected to promote regional cooperation or integration bottom-up. In most cases, the group’s relationship to regional institutions is likely to be more complex, with multiple confounded and potentially conflicting roles.

Neo-functionalism does not presume that integration-promoting non-state groups homogeneously adopt or promote the specific regional concept or vision of a
regional ‘center’. Nor are EU funding or political ties a prerequisite to become a regionally oriented actor. Even if a non-state group is supporting certain Euro-Mediterranean policies and receives EU funding, it is far from clear that it will adopt the EU or the UfM policy perspective one-to-one. Vice versa, there are many Euro-Med groups which started out with little dependence on EU funding or even few political ties, but which have nevertheless come to be regionally oriented.

Details regarding the prospective operational autonomy of organizations will be discussed based on case study results, going beyond the pertinent survey indicators and looking at organizations’ policy practice more closely. Autonomy varies along a continuum ranging from quasi-IGOs via EU-founded groups, EU-funded or EU-supported independent organizations, cooperating groups, detached groups detached to organizations opposed to the currently existing regional frameworks. An organization’s disposal of operative resources is expected to correlate with a better inter-organizational network across the Euro-Mediterranean field of politics.

The interrelations of the landscape of Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors with the region’s institutional geography, constituted by riparian organizations, IGOs and various external actors are in the focus of this study. In some sectors, non-state organizations are particularly strongly interlinked. For instance, in the formalized area of cooperating local governments, membership of territorial entities in various organizations overlaps, fields of activity parallel each other, and individual ‘pioneering’ local authorities have spearheaded cooperation in more than just one cooperation context.

The Euro-Mediterranean concept, often considered an intangible idea of a couple of political leaders, has been adopted as a reference by manifold organizations; as something worth working with, towards, or even against. While
survey results indicate that the EU is a key source of funding for certain formally autonomous organizations, and has induced their existence in some cases, both these and those funded from different sources engage with the broader ‘regional geography’ or are directly linked to Mediterranean policy-making. Hence, the effect of funding on actors’ agendas is unclear at the most.

5.1.4 Survey Conclusions

The survey conducted is significant for mapping purposes and for case selection, but also in its inherent relation to theory and concepts applied in this study. The tendencies of intensification, the specific formation or reorientation or Euro-Med non-state actors can be observed particularly well in the NGO field, the sector of environmental protection, in the research sector, and in business cooperation. From a neo-functionalist perspective, this emerging non-state sphere has brought about actors with field- or sector-specific interests disposing of a potential to navigate regional-level policy access points and to argumentatively employ the foundations of the existing regionalist agenda. First, a considerable number of groups subscribe to identities, ideas and interests regarding the further development of the Euro-Mediterranean ‘region’. Second, many have an operational capacity to actorhood in terms of resources and staff, and represent members from both the region’s ‘South’ and ‘North’ - a basis for regionally driven and oriented demands and advocacy. Third, many groups refer to the terminology of cooperation and integration in their policy demands.

The groups surveyed constitute a relevant subset of groups with a stake in Euro-Med affairs, but they operate in a context of contending interests and ambitions
by competing actors from outside the Euro-Med field of politics. For instance, pro-EU advocacy groups might conceive of the Euro-Mediterranean idea as institutional competition to their primary organizational target. Institutions supporting global free trade might conceive of the Euro-Med as yet another attempt to create regional trade barriers. Interests and political claims of these kinds will be discussed in the case study chapters wherever relevant.

5.2 Selected Cases

Based on the case selection criteria introduced in chapter 3, non-state organizations and networks were selected from the survey directory to form a sub-sample for case studies. Cases partly consist of several organizations in case they are related or affiliated. The following chapters will discuss research findings regarding the individual cases and organizations one-by-one, but clustered based on the group’s respective type and field of activity. Chapter 6 will start with the national networks of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF). Since these networks tend to be constituted of a variety of local or national NGOs and other types of non-state organizations, this case study offers particular insight into the differences in national traditions of Euro-Mediterranean non-state involvement. The chapter will continue with the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), a regionally constituted NGO network. Based primarily in Copenhagen and Brussels, it is active in monitoring, advocacy, and network-building. Furthermore, the chapter will address Euromed Permanent University Forum (EPUF) based in Spain, which was selected as an instance from the field of education and research policy. In conjunction with EPUF, the emerging system of the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) currently based
in Slovenia will be discussed. Next, the chapter will devote attention to a non-profit organization called 14 km working in project management and cultural dialog, founded in 2012 by seven individuals with international backgrounds from Germany, Egypt and the UK. 14 km offers an example of a small and recently founded case, and is thus expected to constitute a contrasting case. Finally, chapter 6 will discuss sub-regional environment groups as a contrasting case, Greenpeace Mediterranean and the MEDCOAST network. Greenpeace Med constitutes a regional branch of a global non-state organization, operating a head office in Istanbul, represented in Tel Aviv and Beirut as well. MEDCOAST specializes in the field of marine conservation, research and training and offers insight due to its distinctive regional orientation towards the riparian regions of the Mediterranean but also the Black Sea region.

Chapter 7 will discuss findings regarding three cases from the private sector, starting with the Desertec Foundation, the Dii consortium, as well as the Desertec University and Academic Networks. Dii aims to regionally roll out a regional solar energy production scheme in North Africa. Though based in Germany, it has regionalized its member base, and is at the core of the UfM Solar Plan. The MedReg and Med-TSO organizations, which work in the same field, will be discussed as part of this case as well. The chapter will continue with the Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCAME), a regionally oriented association constituted by more than 200 members from over 20 primarily Mediterranean countries. ASCAME is of particular interest due to its focus on Euro-Med economic cooperation and its resulting relations to UfM priority projects and initiatives. Finally, the Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development (EMA) was included into the sample as a case of a recently emerging Euro-Mediterranean business group based in a non-riparian state. EMA is an Incorporated Association
promoting economic cooperation and development in the Euro-Mediterranean space, with a focus on German-Arab business and trade relations.

Chapter 8 will be limited to a study of networks of Territorial Entities (TE) across the Euro-Med space, embodied by the Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities (COPPEM), the Euromed Cities Network (ECN) and the Mediterranean Commission of the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG-COMMED). This case study will discuss these networks’ relations to the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) and to overarching regional institutions. In this context, it also takes into account funding programs which target the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation of local and regional authorities.
6 REGIONAL NETWORKS AND SUB-REGIONAL NGOs

Chapters 6-8 will introduce empirical research results on the selected cases, beginning with regional networks and sub-regional NGOs. These chapters are subdivided primarily into sections on individual organizations or sets of organizations, with further sub-divisions based on the analytical framework of this study.

6.1 Anna Lindh Foundation National Networks

The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF / Fondation Anna Lindh, FAL) used to be the flagship organization of the EMP’s civil society component and has retained a similar role after the inauguration of the UfM. ALF at large is an International Governmental Organization given its governance structure and funding. At the same time, it is also a network of civil society organizations, intended to involve and incorporate a variety of networks and organizations operating primarily in the field of cultural dialog. National ALF networks tend to be constituted by a variety of locally or nationally oriented NGOs, despite the fact that network heads are often appointed by the government of the country in which they are based (Johansson-Nogués, 2006, p. 8). The present case study discusses the specificities of national-level NGOs and networks which constitute the ALF, focusing on their relations to Euro-Mediterranean regional politics. In line with the overall research approach of this study, it applies a neo-functionalist perspective to the regional role of ALF networks.
6.1.1 Group Formation and Character

The Anna Lindh Foundation was inaugurated in 2005 based on an impetus originating from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and was named after the former Swedish Foreign Minister. It is headquartered in Alexandria, Egypt, from where its offices coordinate activities in the fields of education, youth, media, intercultural dialog and related fields. The status, origins, and outreach of the ALF national networks vary significantly across countries, with more active networks based in larger countries and in the Mediterranean riparian states. Altogether, organizations represented by these networks across the Euro-Mediterranean space represent around 4,000 individual non-governmental organizations. Thereby, most of these individual groups have a local, regional, or national scope of activity, though there are also members which, by themselves, already have a regional or specifically Euro-Mediterranean organization. Furthermore, individual national networks are constituted by members belonging to sub-networks of a pronouncedly Euro-Mediterranean orientation, as in the Spanish case. Governance of the Anna Lindh Foundation is frequently addressed in the regional structures of the ENP and UfM.\textsuperscript{25}

In a Memorandum of Understanding of 2012, the UfM and the ALF “agreed on a greater exchange of information between both institutions, on regular invitations to each other’s activities, and to a greater strategic partnership”.\textsuperscript{26}

This study’s theory framework expects groups to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean regional outlook if they identify potential gains from their involvement, particularly where an intergovernmental framework already addresses relevant sectors of

\textsuperscript{25} Anonymous interview 1g1 with a national diplomat carried out on October 24, 2012, following up on a questionnaire reply of September 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{26} EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of June 21, 2012 on a ‘New cooperation agreement between UfM and Anna Lindh Foundation’.
cooperation. Empirical research has identified a range of reasons for individual organizations’ involvement in the national or transnational structures of the ALF respectively for their engagement as coordinators of a national network. In the case of the Danish national network coordinator, the Centre for Culture and Development,

“part of the question is that we’re, of course, interested in the regional cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa because some of the countries are in our portfolio of support mechanisms already, or they were before; we wanted to further engage with partners in the Middle East and North Africa; but the pragmatic reason, say, why the CKU was, or became the head of network, or the coordinator of the Anna Lindh Foundation network in Denmark was that we were actually asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.27

In the case of the UK network of the ALF, many constitutive NGOs are rooted in the field of conflict resolution or in cultural dialog. Several others have a background in broader development-related work, regarding human rights issues or social participation. Others’ focus has been on UK-Arab cooperation or on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Accordingly, geographic orientations of constitutive organizations range from country via sub-regional to broad regional foci. The present coordinator of the UK network had been an advisor to the ALF’s education program and has worked in his current position since 2010 in a “more political role”.28 The Egyptian network is highly diverse as well, including liberal and atheist groups just as well as Brotherhood and even Salafi groups.29

In France, the ALF network is presided by the Forum Femmes Méditerranée (FFM; Mediterranean Women Forum) as of 2013. Dating back to 1992 as a group, FFM had received funding from the Anna Lindh Foundation from 2006 on, for a regionally implemented project called ‘Verbe au Féminin’. Inspired by the annual

27 Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
28 Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.
29 Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.
Euro-Med Civil Forums, in 2010 the organization joined the Steering Committee, a body consisting of twelve member organizations. Subsequently, it was elected to coordinate the French network in 2011. The French network’s activities go beyond the activities of most other national networks, including outreach by newsletters, participation in high-level events etc. As opposed to many other national networks, the French network maintains a separate website. FFM, as the national network coordinator, conceives of its role as “an interlocutor for the ALF who takes into account the needs and expectations of the members and who associates them with the decision-making process regarding the choices and the life of the Foundation” [author’s translation].

Regarding another ALF network, an interviewee explained “that we found that Anna Lindh Foundation was a great opportunity to develop our vision and to have relation with others and to try to improve our work and to try to have more experience. The co-coordinator of the German ALF network is based at an academic institution, the Centre for Cultural and General Studies. Therefore, she explained that

“We have always said that a true core interest of our academic work, whether in research or in teaching, or with regard to the relation to civil society, is constituted by questions of intercultural understanding, what I can also learn to understand better. This means one needs to be able to talk not only about but also with each other at a truly international level, and that was a very basic motivation to really take the opportunity, to actually join Anna Lindh” [author’s translation].

30 Website of the Mediterranean Women Forum of Marseille (Forum Femmes Méditerranée de Marseille).
31 Anonymous interview 5n3 with representatives of a non-state organization in the ALF network carried out on April 7, 2013.
33 FFM website pages on the Anna Lindh Foundation. Reference access on February 10, 2014.
34 Anonymous interview 7n3 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on February 3, 2014.
35 Interview 7n4 with a German ALF network coordinator carried out on February 17, 2014.
Regarding other members of the German ALF network, the same interviewee highlighted their idealism: “it is many, many small, partly also incredibly involved and indeed idealistic small institutions which operate, which all contribute something to it”.

In sum, network structures differ regarding their respective membership numbers and type, as well as regarding their scope and internal procedures. For instance, while the Egyptian network presidency had previously largely been determined by the national MFA, it was elected for the first time in 2012, jointly with the election of a Board of Trustees. In June 2013, another election was conducted “under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Anna Lindh Secretariat in Egypt” which subsequently led to a change in the national Presidency, now held by the Maat Foundation.

6.1.2 Euro-Mediterranean Orientation

The organizations coordinating ALF national networks are situated in a contradictory position: on the one hand, they are supposed to maintain links and to represent government-led, official structures for the Euro-Mediterranean space. On the other hand, many NGOs or civil society organizations of a narrow scope of operation and limited resources are closely embedded in local or national membership structures. Several interviewees pointed out that in this context, their organization’s ALF involvement puts them at risk of portrayal as ‘traitors’ or as ‘corrupt’ by other

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36 Interview 7n4 with a German ALF network coordinator carried out on February 17, 2014.
37 Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.
38 ALF news article of June 22, 2013 titled ‘Maat Foundation is the New Head of the National Egyptian Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation’.
segments of their local civil society due to their participation in Euro-Med cooperation.\textsuperscript{39} Organizations based in Arab countries specifically face attacks on the grounds that ALF involvement might be interpreted as recognition of Israel due to the country’s involvement in the Foundation.\textsuperscript{40}

At the same time, individual organizations or sub-networks are able to choose to act inside or outside the ALF structures, depending on the issue and on stakeholders involved. For instance, in Denmark, “the Anna Lindh Foundation network does not look that, say, huge or like with all the key organizations, but that is because they are organized in other networks as well [e.g. linked to the Danish Arab Partnership Program] who are then closely coordinated with the Anna Lindh foundation”.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite such contradictions, organizations generally recognize Euro-Mediterranean shared challenges and approve of the relevance of the regional concept:

“the Anna Lindh Foundation network is the only, say, structure where we can also say that, I mean, all the way through Europe to the Middle East and North Africa. It’s also very important, so symbolically I think it’s very important. […] where the Anna Lindh Foundation emerged as an initiative that a lot of government, NGOs, research institutes and so on that thought was a really great idea and supported it symbolically”.\textsuperscript{42}

In a similar vein, the ALF network coordinator in the UK emphasized that he was attracted by the idea of the wider regional outlook of ALF-based cooperation, including as regards a socio-economic perspective on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, all while acknowledging that “we’re still drawing a perimeter

\textsuperscript{39} Anonymous interview 5n3 with representatives of a non-state organization in the ALF network carried out on April 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{40} Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
The same interviewee pointed out the role of non-state networks in regional cooperation: "it would be good if we [our societies] were informed by a broader vision [...] not just wealthy, white affluent people". Another interviewee argued that awareness of regional interconnectedness implied regarding political stability and migration that "either they [the Europeans] deal with the work or with the consequences" in the South, thus "I believe in cooperation".

Thereby, the ALF national networks also provide focal points for exchange on a horizontal basis, as individual country-level networks interact with each other and formally agree on cooperation in individual cases.

"what the Anna Lindh Foundation can do is to say that there’s a regional perspective there that’s also very interesting and that is… for example, it’s very interesting to see what initiatives Belgium or the UK or France or Spain have in the Middle East. [...] So what we try to do with the Anna Lindh Foundation is to have a very close European cooperation as well.

To further horizontal cooperation within the ALF framework, the same interviewee hopes that “we will have a larger platform where we can have a policy debate, where we can have a more strategic approach as to how we, how we share information and knowledge also on the regional level". Similarly, the French ALF network maintains close horizontal ties with a variety of other networks, primarily from Mediterranean riparian countries. This network has linked to its peers based in Germany, Poland,

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43 Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.
44 Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.
45 Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.
46 Anonymous interview 7n3 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on February 3, 2014.
47 Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
48 Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
the Netherlands, and other countries as well, even if language diversity complicated relations in certain cases.\textsuperscript{49}

Despite the Euro-Mediterranean focus in the work of ALF member organizations, there is considerable variety among national networks compared to inherently regional associations as discussed in other parts of this study. For instance, the Danish ALF network coordinator explained how the strategic importance of the Euro-Mediterranean concept might be questioned: “that symbolism, you say, by always connecting [cooperation] around the Mediterranean Sea can be a little bit... yeah, it’s a different approach that most NGOs and organizations working with [MENA] have up here”; nevertheless, he argues regarding the so-called ‘cartoon crisis’ that “we tend to focus on how it separated people and separated the two regions [...] but actually there was an enormous attendance to learning Arabic on free classes here in Denmark. The Quran was sold in numbers had never been seen before”.\textsuperscript{50}

Similarly, members of the UK network tend to support the overarching Euro-Mediterranean concept with its institutions as well as further integration with a “more global view”.\textsuperscript{51} Yet, approaches to the region among non-riparian ALF network members are perhaps more diverse than the approaches of those organizations based in Mediterranean countries. Questions regard the ethics of close government relations in the ALF framework and matters of funding or efficiency.\textsuperscript{52} In contrast, an

\textsuperscript{49} Anonymous interview 5n3 with representatives of a non-state organization in the ALF network carried out on April 7, 2013.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.

\textsuperscript{51} Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.

\textsuperscript{52} Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
interviewee from among a riparian ALF network even emphasized approval of individual UfM approaches to regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{53}

In the case of a Southern Mediterranean ALF network, an interviewee highlighted the symbolic importance of involving non-Mediterranean countries of Europe as well, stating that “we met with many other European, not Mediterranean but European colleagues and partners, and we are so proud about these relations and about this diversity”.\textsuperscript{54}

The variety of backgrounds of national network members and coordinators illustrates the multitude of possible reasons for engagement in the context of the Anna Lindh Foundation. However, member organizations tend to strongly identify with the Euro-Mediterranean regional outlook and frequently have had previous exposure, in terms of funding or project cooperation, to the regional institutional structures in place. At the same time, individual documents and interviews indicate a degree of skepticism towards the potential of individual institutions, particularly regarding the mission and capacities of the UfM as a framework for regional cooperation. Nevertheless, even the most critical voices approve of the very existence of regional policies.

\section*{6.1.3 Regional-level Advocacy}

This study’s theory framework expects individual non-state groups to seek regional actorhood, including with an aim of influencing policy processes. The Anna Lindh Foundation is active mostly through its events, workshops and publications, 

\textsuperscript{53} Anonymous interview 5n3 with representatives of a non-state organization in the ALF network carried out on April 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{54} Anonymous interview 7n3 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on February 3, 2014.
coordinated from its headquarters in Alexandria. It also supports activities of its constitutive national networks and their respective coordinators. At the same time, it operates as a transmission belt for national-level NGOs’ demands and positions in a number of occasions. The very matter of organizing national networks of organizations with partial stakes in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation affairs offers them a stronger voice. A representative of CKU, the Danish ALF network coordinator, pointed out that

“we have a close dialog with the Ministry, and all the NGOs and semi-governmental organizations working with the Middle East, I’d say, have a pretty close dialog, a lot of seminars where things are happening and, I mean, speakers coming from the region to visit and I mean, there’s a lot of knowledge sharing and a lot of these processes going on”.

Thereby, feedback is passed on to the national Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as well as to the headquarters of the ALF:

“What we’ve been trying to do also with the meetings with Sweden and Finland is also to tell the people in Alexandria, at the headquarters of the Anna Lindh Foundation, I mean, if they need help from us, we would also like to participate the other way, so that we can streamline the organization”.

The UK network coordinator points out that contacts to the British Foreign and Cooperation Office (FCO) are poor compared to other networks who “have a government contact they know personally” and who therefore dispose of “lobbying opportunities”; the UK coordinator had approached the FCO regarding the British contributions to ALF funding and “the answer was a straight no”. In addition, he talked only to the Egypt desk officer instead of being able to address regionally oriented contacts within the Ministry. However, in 2011, the FCO agreed to fund new

55 Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
56 Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
57 Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.
regional initiatives. For instance, the Young Arab Voices initiative was implemented by the Anna Lindh Foundation and the British Council and “aims at developing skills and opportunities for youth-led debate across the Arab region”. Furthermore, “there has been a higher degree of connection, with the same FCO representative attending a number of ALF events during 2012/13, to the degree that for the first time there is the beginnings of a sense of relationship”. As outlined regarding the ALF at large, UK network organizations demand easier mobility of people, including those participating in ALF-related activities. The UK network had also been part of broader regional political encounters, for instance as a member of the ALF delegation to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The Egyptian ALF network maintains frequent contacts with the ALF headquarters: “we fight”. This includes the struggle for government support of ALF activities, for instance by abandoning the practice of last-minute changes to visa letters. In addition, the Egyptian network coordinators have been in contact with EU and UfM representatives over regional policies, and have engaged in regional-level exchanges regarding a potential role in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament.

The German ALF network co-coordinator explains that structural questions are “introduced, but not by a written exchange, but truly rather either through the network meetings or […] smaller groups of experts”. The interviewee confirms that criticism “is also being taken very seriously, particularly now during the last year or through

58 Web page ‘About Young Arab Voices’. Reference access on December 11, 2013.
59 Interview 4n1 with the British ALF Network Coordinator carried out on March 8, 2013.
60 Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.
61 Interview 7n4 with a German ALF network coordinator carried out on February 17, 2014.
various developments”\textsuperscript{62}. Thus, many national networks have found channels to advance their points regarding regional affairs. In turn, a Turkish diplomat noted, it is an "established practice to invite some NGO representatives from time to time to our ALF Board Meetings to get their first hand remarks and inputs or to find solutions to their demands"\textsuperscript{63}

6.1.4 FFM and the French National Network

While the Forum Femmes Med, coordinator of the French ALF network, remains locally rooted, its activities are conducted with a regional outlook. FFM is a member of the Euro-Mediterranean university and science network on women and gender (Réseau universitaire et scientifique euro-méditerranéen sur les femmes et le Genre, RUSEMEG) which it has supported in its activities\textsuperscript{64}. In the context of RUSEMEG, clear references are made to the UfM-labeled Women Empowerment project.\textsuperscript{65} Furthermore, FFM also cooperates within the Euromed Network France (Réseau Euromed France, REM), which has been the French network of the Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform since 2005.\textsuperscript{66}

FFM, in its role of French ALF network coordinator, contributed to re-emphasizing the essential topic of women’s rights on the agenda of the UfM, after the institution had previously given priority to projects and policies of limited scope instead of socio-political initiatives. During the Forum of the Anna Lindh Foundation

\textsuperscript{62} Interview 7n4 with a German ALF network coordinator carried out on February 17, 2014.
\textsuperscript{63} Questionnaire response 2g1 received from a national diplomat on November 12, 2012. Reference reflects the Ambassador’s personal assessments.
\textsuperscript{64} Website of the Euro-Mediterranean university and science network on women and gender (Réseau universitaire et scientifique euro-méditerranéen sur les femmes et le Genre, RUSEMEG).
\textsuperscript{65} Summary of the RUSEMEG colloquium of February 9, 2014.
\textsuperscript{66} Website of the Mediterranean Women Forum of Marseille (Forum Femmes Méditerranée de Marseille).
that took place in Marseille, France, in April 2013 with around 1,500 participants. In this context, FFM participated in a RUSEMEEG event which was also attended by the French Minister for Women’s Rights. FFM used the opportunity of the ALF Forum to convince various stakeholders of “actively supporting the initiative of the Women Mediterranean Forum for the creation of the Foundation of the Mediterranean Women”. The ALF Fora thus allow network members to voice their position regarding the Euro-Mediterranean agenda as well as regarding the work of the ALF itself. In the 2013 Forum’s conclusions, specific calls were made for “a think tank for women in the Euro-Mediterranean and a Foundation of Mediterranean Women” or, at the more local level, for “educational kits and train teachers and social workers.”

The perspective of a Foundation of Mediterranean Women subsequently “has been mentioned buy Mrs. Najat Vallaud Belcace of France’s minister of women’s rights during his closing speech [mistakes left uncorrected].” Eventually, the Foundation of the Women of the Euro-Mediterranean (Fondation des Femmes de l’Euro-Méditerranée) was launched, among others, by FFM, RUSEMEEG, and IEMed, and pronouncedly supported by the French government. Among the purposes of the Foundation is to promote and co-implement the UfM-labeled project "Developing

68 Documentation of the Anna Lindh Mediterranean Forum, Marseille, April 4-7, 2013.
69 RUSEMEEG event brochure of April 2013 for ‘Crises actuelles et enjeux démocratiques en Méditerranée à l’épreuve du genre’
70 FFM press release of April 17, 2013 titled ‘The mediterranean civil societies mobilized around the Women Mediterranean Forum […]’.
71 Conclusions of the Anna Lindh Forum 2013.
72 FFM press release of April 17, 2013 titled ‘The mediterranean civil societies mobilized around the Women Mediterranean Forum […]’.
73 Synopsis from April 7, 2013 of an event in Marseille (‘Crises actuelles et enjeux démocratiques en Méditerranée à l’épreuve du genre’); Report of September 8, 2013 titled ‘Constitution à Barcelone de la nouvelle Fondation des Femmes de l’Euro-Méditerranée.’
Women Empowerment”. By the Conclusions of the 2013 UfM Ministerial on ‘Strengthening the Role of Women in Society’, Ministers expressed

“their support to all levels of government and to the efforts of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including civil society organizations, in particular women’s rights organisations and human rights defenders, and to networks of women and men engaged in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment as stakeholders”.

The Ministerial further highlighted previous agreements and supported an embedding of pertinent projects into the UfM project label system. The success in placing the topic of women’s rights on the agenda of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation through French non-state as well as governmental activity falls in line with the Hollande Presidency’s emphasis on “a France who upholds women’s dignity and freedom”. The EU’s changed focus on the Southern Neighborhood after the ‘Arab Spring’ contributed to this renewed emphasis, as emphasized by Commissioner Füle:

“Women’s participation in public, political and economic life, on an equal basis with men, is one of the primary values at the heart of the Arab spring”. Potentially the most visible among the manifestations of this commitment is the intention to launch, in 2014, a specific Euro-Mediterranean women’s TV channel called Nissa TV.

The 2013 ALF Forum in Marseille also agreed on a number of overarching points, regarding the role of civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean space as well as regarding the ever-present limitations to the mobility of both participants and project addressees: “Successful work requires mobility for Euro-Med citizens in order to allow for the manifold peer-to-peer cross-culture activities (between teachers and

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75 Draft Conclusions of September 12, 2013 of the Third UfM Ministerial Conference on ‘Strengthening the Role of Women in Society’.
76 Speech of François Hollande of March 7, 2013.
77 Speech by Commissioner Füle of September 4, 2013 on ‘Strengthening the Role of Women in the South Mediterranean’
pupils, among students, among journalists as well as for artists-in-residence). An efficient Euro-Med youth platform is needed”.78

6.1.5 The Euro-Med Civic Encounter: a national intermediary

In Spain, a highly developed national-level network, the Euromed Civic Encounter (Encuentro Civil Euromed, ECEM), brings together 21 non-governmental civil society organizations with an interest in Euro-Mediterranean or Mediterranean regional affairs: “those social and civic agents which work with a global vision of the Mediterranean” [author’s translation].79

The ECEM network covers various fields of non-governmental cooperation. It was first founded in 2003, initiated by the development-oriented ‘Association for Cooperation in the South’ (Asociación para la Cooperación en el Sur, ACSUR),80 but implemented jointly with Spanish state institutions. ECEM’s history is closely linked to the Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform, which was launched in 2002 as a regional-level umbrella platform for civil society cooperation.81 Administered from Paris, it comprises 88 organizations as well as individuals. This Platform was first organized by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) which is also an associate member of ECEM. IEMed, dating back to 1989 and based in Barcelona, has itself has been a node for Spanish non-state organizations, has hosted the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), and has been at the core of major policy changes. For instance, the Executive President of IEMed emphasized in an

78 Conclusions of the Anna Lindh Forum 2013.
79 Section titled ‘¿Qué es el Encuentro Civil Euromed?’ on the website of the Encuentro Civil Euromed. Reference access on January 2, 2014.
80 Roundtable interview 6n2 with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.
interviewee that “the Statut Avancé of Morocco with the European Union, that was an idea which originated here”.\textsuperscript{82} This statut was promoted in conferences, a working paper (Lannon, Braga de Macedo, & de Vasconcelos, 2007) and a policy brochure (IEMed, 2007).

ECEM was formalized by gaining juridical personality in 2008. Since then, it has served the coordination of the various interests of civil society organizations in Spain and thru 2010, has received spurious financial support by the European Commission.\textsuperscript{83} As of 2013, ECEM maintains a Technical Secretariat in Madrid. Chiefly, it seeks to deepen the involvement of Spanish civil society in regional civil society networks, as well as in Euro-Mediterranean affairs broadly speaking. Hence, its geographic scope is pronouncedly twofold: on the one hand, acting towards Spanish state institutions; on the other hand, towards the Euro-Mediterranean regional range.\textsuperscript{84} ECEM clearly identifies with an outlook of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Indeed, an interviewee believes that a consensus is emerging that the non-Mediterranean states of Europe are directly affected by social and political developments in the Southern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{85}

Despite a geographical alignment with regional institutions, ECEM members criticize the European institutions for their vision of the MENA region as a market\textsuperscript{86} and argue that they can afford to criticize them due to their autonomy from government or EU decisions. Indeed, the ECEM President stated that “it is difficult to share the vision of the Euro-Med of the European Commission, Union for the

\textsuperscript{82} Interview 7n2 with the Executive President of IEMed carried out in Barcelona on December 19, 2013.
\textsuperscript{83} Roundtable interview 6n2 with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.
\textsuperscript{84} Section titled ‘Qué es el Encuentro Civil Euromed?’ on the website of the Encuentro Civil Euromed. Reference access on January 2, 2014.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview 6n3 with an ECEM Board Member carried out on October 16, 2013.
\textsuperscript{86} Interview 6n3 with an ECEM Board Member carried out on October 16, 2013.
Mediterranean”, as these institutions “do not adjust to [a different] reality”. 87 Another ECEM interviewee deplored that the official agenda of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has a “tendency to exclude political questions”. 88 This criticism extends to part of the NGO sphere centered on Euro-Med politics.

ECEM has had frequent direct exchanges with the Anna Lindh Foundation, including through mutual invitations to events as well as cooperation on selected issues or projects. As one interviewee highlighted, ECEM’s cooperation with the ALF is a question of visions and philosophies. 89 In addition to its direct interaction, ECEM is linked to the ALF network through the Barcelona-based European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), which is the official coordinator of the Spanish ALF network while at the same time holding the status of associate member of ECEM.

The Encuentro Civil Euromed has also independently pursued activities of a regional orientation, building on its “Mediterraneanist” self-understanding. 90 ECEM regularly participates in regional-level civil society conferences and meetings, some involving government officials as well. To substantiate its network, it has sent missions to Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco, among other countries. Furthermore, ECEM has issued a variety of publications and communications on the role of civil society cooperation in the Mediterranean, as well as on topics of domestic policy and international relations. For instance, in 2010, ECEM issued a booklet on its own history and outlook covering around 150 pages, titled ‘In the Mediterranean. Civil

87 Roundtable interview 6n2 with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.
88 Roundtable interview 6n2 with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.
89 Roundtable interview 6n2 with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.
90 ECEM Work Plan 2009 – 2010
Society and Political Power’ (Encuentro Civil Euromed, 2010) [author’s translation], though this publication was financed through government funding.

Various additional publications and studies were commissioned by leading member organizations of ECEM. The Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions published a report on ‘Unions and Political Transitions in the South of the Mediterranean’ (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 2013) as well a specific report on ‘Egyptian Autonomous Unions’ (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 2012). The Workers Trade Union (Unión Sindical Obrera, USO) in Spain also produced a political opinion piece on ‘Euro-Mediterranean double standards’.  

The Euro-Mediterranean Civil Society Observatory (Adarve) was developed by ECEM, though it has its own membership consisting of 17 organizations, and has been financed by the Spanish MFA through the Agency of International Cooperation for Development (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, AECID). Adarve monitors civil society developments across the Mediterranean, with regard to actors, events, and media reports. Findings are represented on an exhaustive website, offering also a database of around 900 local or national civil society organizations from across the entirety of Euro-Med countries.  

ECEM as a network is openly political, which is represented in Adarve as well, as the observatory devotes “special attention to the context of political change and current popular uprisings”.

91 USO opinion piece of November 12, 2010, titled ‘Las dobles morales euromediterráneas’.
93 Presentation section of the Website of Adarve, Euro-Mediterranean Civil Society Observatory. Reference access on January 1, 2014.
ECEM has defined an advocacy role for itself, regarding both the Spanish and the Euro-Mediterranean regional level. One interviewee argued that through these activities, the ECEM and its constitutive organizations have been able to influence the agenda of Euro-Med affairs, particularly when it comes to the social and labor rights, at least by being part of broader pressures in this direction; the examples of international pension agreements and of women’s rights were mentioned in this regard. In line with this, a Spanish diplomatic source stated that “we maintain a close relationship and cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean Civic Encounter (ECEM)”.

### 6.1.6 Regional Actorhood

This section has shown both the drastic differences across national networks of the Anna Lindh Foundation as well as their communality in their stated commitment to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation frameworks. While individual constitutive NGOs act primarily at the local or regional level, they largely agree on the desirability of regional cooperation and integration.

In various cases, networks of member organizations have acted with a political outlook ranging from technical issues to broad social topics. Thereby, both the Anna Lindh Foundation as well as regional institutions constitute addressees for advocacy or criticism. In individual cases, illustrated here by the example of the French case, national network coordinators have successfully attempted to shape the official agenda and to build coalition with a perspective on influencing regional policy and on

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95 Interview 6n3 with an ECEM Board Member carried out on October 16, 2013.
96 Questionnaire response 6g2 received from diplomatic sources on October 21, 2013.
developing Euro-Mediterranean institutions. Thus, the regional outlook, high-level contacts and political activism of individual ALF member networks, including those of a local original orientation, supports the hypothesis of actorhood regionalization. The neo-functionalist expectation of groups’ orientation towards regional centers is illustrated specifically by the convergence of national NGOs within the ALF network towards a Euro-Mediterranean orientation.

6.2 The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network

The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) is a regional network of non-governmental organizations active in the field of human rights policy. The network’s range of activities includes monitoring, advocacy, and network-building. Founded in 1997 at the initiative of NGOs and political foundations from both shores of the Mediterranean, it is now transnationally and regionally constituted from over 60 member organizations based in over 20 countries in Europe and MENA. The network employs a staff of about 20-30 people in its head office in Copenhagen, its representation in Brussels, as well as at its ‘antennae’ in Morocco and Jordan. Besides funding from its members or from political foundations, it is co-funded by the European Commission as well as EU member states. In the light of this financial background and of its organizational origins, it remains linked to governmentally sponsored processes of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

6.2.1 Group Formation and Character
The present study contributes to previous research on the EMHRN by focusing on the network’s political advocacy from a theory perspective. In addition, the comparative character of this study allows contrasting it with other cases as well as with previous research. EMHRN has been considered an intermediary between civil society and governments respectively regional institutions. The network disposes of resources to act in monitoring human rights policy both in the ‘South’ and in the ‘North’ and is capable of promoting its conclusions among the relevant institutional addressees.

The network defines itself as a “constructive interface between the EMP institutions, human rights organizations in the region and other relevant agents involved in the Barcelona Process” (Jünemann, 2002, p. 98). Its Brussels office serves to “follow and influence more effectively developments within the EMP”, e.g. through contacts with European institutions and other NGOs (Jünemann, 2002, p. 99). By demanding the use of conditionality as a tool to promote human rights and by operating as a consultant, the EMHRN attempts to pressure the EU to “stick to its commitments” (ibid).

Van Hüllen applied the dimensions of status, membership, purposes, internal working, and funding to the EMHRN and finds that a “great part of the EMHRN’s activities is dedicated to lobbying the (inter)governmental dimension of the EMP, including the Partner States, the EU’s and genuinely Euro-Mediterranean institutions and processes” (van Hüllen, 2008, p. 12). In particular, the European Commission is identified a primary addressee: “the EMHRN is certainly recognised as an actor in the Barcelona Process, at least by other NGOs and EU institutions. However, it is difficult to discern in how far its activities have an impact on the policy formulation within the EMP” (van Hüllen, 2008, p. 24).
6.2.2 Euro-Mediterranean Orientation

The EMHRN was at its origins a reaction to the visions surrounding the Barcelona Process, all while its political activity has become more varied with time. From a theory perspective, it is nevertheless necessary to inquire into the extent to which the network identifies and aligns with the official regional vision. Indeed, the inherent instability in using the Euro-Mediterranean regional reference has been discussed within the network, including by means of a member survey. Thereby, the geographical reference was strongly confirmed due to a perceived added value of Euro-Med cooperation among network members. An interviewee elaborated that this might be due to the network’s exchange of people and opinions, due to regionally shared concerns in the field of human rights, and due to the joint leverage on EU and Euro-Med institutions.\(^\text{97}\)

Despite this strong, shared Euro-Med reference, the network’s specific geographic scope is subject to discussion, including regarding the involvement of Israel as discussed for the ALF case. Yet, the EMHRN has achieved remarkably long-standing and close cooperation across members. For instance, Israeli EMHRN members offered assistance in the case of an imprisoned Turkish network member. By the same token, the involvement of non-Mediterranean Europe in the EMHRN has remained largely uncontested, partly due to a renewed interest in the context of the Arab regime changes, and due to the perception of the European Union as a unit by Southern Mediterranean partners, as interpreted by an interviewee.\(^\text{98}\)

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\(^{97}\) Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.

\(^{98}\) Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.
EMHRN subscribes to the overarching idea of intensifying regional cooperation. While this is an abstract ideal in a region as complex as the Euro-Med, interviews have highlighted increasing socialization of EMHRN members based in different countries, an increasing recognition of shared or even regional policy issues, and an understanding of the linkage of developments in Europe to those in the non-EU Mediterranean. At the same time, the increasing heterogeneity of political trajectories in Arab countries constitutes a challenge to this consensus according to an interviewee.99

6.2.3 Regional-level Advocacy

The statutes and key strategies of the EMHRN set out for the network to intervene “with the relevant states European institutions to ensure the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership implements [its] principles in concrete terms”100. The network’s 2006 strategy paper states that in its advocacy, the network “directs its attention towards the mechanisms of the EMP, the ENP, the EU as well as towards all partner state representatives” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2006, p. 17). It aims to promote its policies towards these entities by disseminate reports and policy papers, public information, by stakeholder meetings. To this aim, the EMHRN also intends to “[s]trengthen the capacity of its members to deal with the mechanisms and instruments of the EU, ENP and the EMP through training” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2006, p. 18). In this context, the EMHRN has forged cooperation on broader policy or institutional issues with other human rights NGOs or networks, e.g. through joint communications. Six NGOs of a geographic scope

99 Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.
beyond the Euro-Mediterranean hold Associate Member status of EMHRN, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the World Organization against Torture.

EMHRN has demanded reforms of EU and Euro-Mediterranean policy and institutions. In June 2011, the network released critical reviews of the Mediterranean human rights policy of individual states as well as of European Council policy towards the Mediterranean, urging EU policymakers to favor mobility and free movement of individuals from the MENA region in the EU countries\textsuperscript{101}. EMHRN has also demanded a Euro-Med ‘civil society support mechanism’. In a position paper on the recent ENP review, EMHRN has called for a stronger human rights focus of European foreign policy as well as for specific reforms: “concrete policies and measures for in-depth reforms and in support of all democratic forces must also be taken”\textsuperscript{102}, supported by financial resources, legal instruments, and by mainstreaming the principle of conditionality. This would entail, according to the EMHRN, a respective review of the ENP Action Plans.

Interviewees confirmed the continued focus on regional advocacy despite a more important role of the national and bilateral dimensions in advocacy. Regional EMHRN advocacy operates mostly through its Brussels office, in personal contacts to policymakers in the Commission, the European External Action Service or the European Parliament.\textsuperscript{103} Specifically, contacts operate through the Commission and EEAS Cabinets, more permanently through the respective human rights units or desk


\textsuperscript{102} Position of the EMHRN in view of the forthcoming review of the ENP of April 2011.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.
Advocacy on EU-level decisions has, however, also been channeled through local contacts to EU Delegations in the Southern or Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in the context of Association Council meetings. Furthermore, an interviewee explained that advocacy regarding regional policies operates by addressing individual EU member states which obstruct a given decision. The Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean tends to be sidelined as an EMHRN addressee. While there have been meetings with EMHRN representatives, and while the UfM includes a division on civil society, EMHRN considers Brussels or national capitals to be more promising venues for advocacy. In addition, EMHRN has pledged to extend its advocacy work to relevant meetings at United Nations level as well. Given its varying access points, depending on issue and actor structure, the activities of the EMHRN constitute ‘venue shopping’ with a focus on regional issues and regional policymaking. In consequence, the practice of EMHRN advocacy encompasses reporting, the dissemination of press releases or direct mail, networking at events and through direct contacts, as well as capacity building and training for local network members.

Specifically, the EMHRN has demanded the complete revision of “structures, policies and projects of the Euro-Mediterranean regional bodies and institutions.” Specifically, it has suggested the establishment of a human rights committee within the Euro-Med inter-parliamentary dialog. The network integrated its proposals in a 2005 report titled ‘Towards a Genuine Involvement of Civil Society in the Barcelona

104 Interview 1n3 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on October 22, 2012.
105 Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.
106 Interview 1n3 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on October 22, 2012.
107 Position of the EMHRN in view of the forthcoming review of the ENP of April 2011.
Process’. Indeed, the European Parliament has adopted several relevant, regionally oriented declarations following EMHRN suggestions. The Anna Lindh Foundation, a top-down quasi-NGO in the field of cultural dialog has drawn on EMHRN work. The Polish Council Presidency’s proposal of a European Endowment for Democracy also appears to have been inspired by EMHRN demands.

EMHRN opinions were also consistently consulted in the recent processes of reviewing the European Neighborhood Policy and Action Plans. Specifically, EMHRN successfully advocated a stronger focus on human rights and on gender equality in the 2011 ENP revision. Furthermore, while advocacy has often failed to yield the desired results in terms of a human rights focus of Euro-Med cooperation, routinized consultation processes and an interest in EMHRN opinion also constitute advocacy, as emphasized by EMHRN as well as by representatives of EU institutions and national governments.

6.2.4 UfM: A Refocus of Activity

In its 2012-2018 Strategy Document, EMHRN specifically refers to the Euro-Mediterranean as a region. It pledges to offer to its members “[a]ccess to governmental and inter-governmental institutions and policy processes”, the “[p]ossibility to influence regional policies and debates”, as well as the “dissemination of [members’] work to a broad regional audience” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 5).

108 Interview 1n3 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on October 22, 2012.
109 Interview 1n4 with a staff member of EMHRN carried out on June 29, 2012.
110 Anonymous interview 3g3 with a national diplomat carried out on January 24, 2013.
The Strategy Document deplores, however, that “when the UfM was established, the human rights dimension of the EuroMed process more or less disappeared” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 6) and that “there is today almost no one at the receiving end for dialogue, advocacy or regional reporting on regional EuroMed rights and democracy issues” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 8). From this disappointed evaluation of current institutions, the Document concludes that although

“the EMHRN’s identity and regional mandate will remain historically rooted in the Barcelona process, and although its geographical mandate will remain unchanged, future work can solely be built on the fact that human rights organisations in the EU and South and East Mediterranean believe in a common destiny, wish to work together, learn from one another and help one another in protecting and promoting human rights around the Mediterranean and in the EU” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 8)

EMHRN pledges that it will nevertheless “strengthen its regional identity by sharpening the profile of its thematic work”, including by attending to “human rights issues of regional concern” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 9).

To reconcile its regional and national advocacy, the network defines the objective of its advocacy work to ensure “that EMHRN and member policies and recommendations are fed into policies and practices of the EU institutions, EU member states and South and East Mediterranean partners” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2012, p. 18). While the document acknowledges that the network has “become known and respected for its work on the EU institutions and the added value this brings to human rights work” (ibid), the 2012 Strategy Document also sets out to diversify EMHRN funding and to increase national-level advocacy.
6.2.5 The EMHRN as a Regional Intermediary

The difficulty to trace influence in the making of foreign policy affects researchers as well as policymakers, as highlighted in an interview with a national diplomat.\textsuperscript{111} Empirical research indicates that the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean, regionally constituted membership in the EMHRN has remained largely uncontested, leading to a sustained advocacy focus on regional political processes and institutions. At the same time, the perceived difficulties constituted by the institutional framework currently in place have triggered a certain disengagement from traditional interlocutors, all while maintaining the network’s original geographical outlook. At a time of fundamental redefinition of European policy towards the Southern Mediterranean, EMHRN has increasingly become an autonomous advocacy actor towards the respective political venues, which include, but are not limited to, the key institutions and decision-making arenas of Euro-Mediterranean politics. In the case of the revamped ENP, specific policy results can be attributed to the sustained human rights focus of the EMHRN. Thus, the case of the EMHRN confirms this study’s hypothesis as regards the regional re-orientation and actorhood of non-state organizations.

6.3 EPUF and EMUNI: Euro-Med Education Politics

The Euromed Permanent University Forum (EPUF) represents the academic and research dimension of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. EPUF is a Higher Education grouping for cooperation, representation, and advocacy. It is constituted by more

\textsuperscript{111} Anonymous interview 5g1 with a national diplomat carried out on April 10, 2013.
than 100 governmental and private institutions of higher education – primarily universities and research networks – from across the Euro-Mediterranean space, including from non-riparian states including Belgium, the UK, and Estonia. Member institutions or networks pay an annual contribution of around 600€, as of 2013.\textsuperscript{112}

6.3.1 Group Formation and Character

Education policy has been part of the EMP, especially following the Cairo Declaration in 2007. However, the Paris Declaration initiating the UfM in 2008 primarily outlined the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean University as one of the UfM core initiatives, and devoted merely one sentence to other objectives in the field of education: “Particular attention should be paid to enhancing quality and to ensuring the relevance of vocational training to labour markets”.\textsuperscript{113} Even its short section on higher education and research reportedly entered the Declaration only at a relatively late stage of negotiations.\textsuperscript{114}

EPUF was first initiated at a Rectors Conference in Tarragona, Spain, in 2005. At this conference, the rectors which attended “consolidated themselves, particularly in the area of higher education and research, as an element, as a basic pillar of Euro-Mediterranean relations”.\textsuperscript{115} The 60 participants of the first Rectors Conference

\begin{quote}
"initiated a call to all the rectors of the Euro-Mediterranean universities to constitute themselves in an association in order to [] be able to pressure the European Commission as well as governments of the European countries, particularly the Mediterranean ones, to make progress along this line that the"
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112} Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
\textsuperscript{113} Joint Declaration of the 2008 Paris Summit for the Mediterranean.
\textsuperscript{114} Report by the EPUF Executive Secretary titled ‘A New Phase in the Attainment of the Founding Objectives of the EPUF’, September 28, 2013.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
rectors had called the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Area”.¹¹⁶

EPUF was formally inaugurated at the following Rectors Conference in 2006 at a forum in Tampere (Finland). Besides its governing bodies, its General Assembly and Management Committee, the Forum has been administered by a small Executive Secretariat staffed by four people located at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili in Tarragona, Spain. Since November 2006, it had been registered as an international non-profit association under Belgian law and with an official seat in Brussels, but in 2013, its juridical seat was transferred to Spain for legal reasons.¹¹⁷

6.3.2 Euro-Mediterranean Orientation

Guided by this study’s theory perspective, empirical research has intended to gauge the extent of EPUF identification and orientation towards the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation context. EPUF organized Euro-Mediterranean University Forums annually from 2006 thru 2009. Further work was situated at the level of the Executive Secretariat and the network’s working groups, most prominently the group on the ‘Cairo Process’ aimed at “the approximation of Euro-Med Higher Education systems”.¹¹⁸

The Forum links the future of Euro-Med cooperation to readjustments of the European approach to the Mediterranean region: for instance, its Secretary-General points out that “the majority of Egypt’s society is frustrated; and this is going to change; but if Europe does not help with this process, we are going to have a grave

¹¹⁶ Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
¹¹⁷ Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
¹¹⁸ Section on working groups on the EPUF website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
problem”\textsuperscript{119} Thereby, the general geographical scope of the Euro-Mediterranean concept is supported within EPUF: “there has never been this difference inside EPUF. There has never been a conflict in this direction”\textsuperscript{120} Much work at the level of EPUF addresses Euro-Mediterranean policies that would support and benefit higher education in the Southern Mediterranean and, partly, in Southern Europe. However, EPUF involves university members from non-Mediterranean, European countries as well, following the understanding

“that it was not possible to move on with a Euro-Mediterranean process of higher education only with the riparian countries of the Mediterranean, but that it was necessary to involve all European countries, especially those which from a university standpoint […] have more prestige in the world: Germany, the Nordic countries, Great Britain, the Netherlands etc. Therefore, since the first moment, there was a clear conviction that the Mediterranean process was linked to [INC] the entire European Union and to the countries and universities of the Center and North of Europe which also participated in this project” [author’s translation]\textsuperscript{121}

EPUF’s broad regional membership base as well as the existing coverage of the education sector in Euro-Mediterranean regional policy discourse presumably contributed to its regional policy orientation, in line with the expectations of this study’s theory framework.

\subsection*{6.3.3 Regional-level Advocacy}

Given the broad geographic understanding of EPUF as well as its advocacy character, this study’s theory framework would expect it to seek to become a regional actor in Euro-Mediterranean politics. Indeed, EPUF sets the aim for itself to “become

\textsuperscript{119} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{120} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{121} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
a network of reference acting in a concerted effort (lobbying) towards the European Institutions in order to achieve the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Area (EMHEA).”

Thereby, it situates itself within the existing regional frameworks, specifically the UfM, and positions itself as their primary interlocutor on matters of education policy. EPUF conceives of itself as a network for joint advocacy. In its origins,

“EPUF did not want to convert itself into a network of Euro-Mediterranean universities, because there were already other networks, for example UNIMED [Mediterranean Universities Union]; but because we did not want to convert ourselves into another networks, our objective was more political, an objective of political pressure, of the construction of this Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Area, which was not exactly a network with the objective, for instance, of assembling projects to present to the European Commission. […] we did not want to be another network but that we wanted to be a pressure group, particularly towards the Commission”.

Already in its early phase of existence, EPUF forged contacts to governments and regional institutions. Research indicates that these contacts were used for advocacy by EPUF and the rectors involved. The Tampere Rectors Conference was held in the context of the 2006 Finnish Council Presidency. Afterwards, “there has been direct contact with the European Commission, with some Ministries of European countries and of the South of the Mediterranean” and with the EMPA though EPUF’s Executive Secretary deplored decreasing interest since 2011.

Key documents released by EPUF include the Tarragona Declaration of 2005, the Alexandria Declaration of 2007, the Marseilles Declaration of 2008, and the UfM Rectors Declaration of 2010. The Alexandria Declaration regarded higher education

122 EPUF website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
123 Report by the EPUF Executive Secretary titled ‘A New Phase in the Attainment of the Founding Objectives of the EPUF’, September 28, 2013.
124 Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
125 Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
126 Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
policy and was presented to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Higher Education and Research in Cairo, where EPUF had gained advisory participant status. The Marseilles Declaration, in contrast, was oriented towards the French Presidency of the EU. EPUF states to pursue the drafting of a ‘EuroMed Universities White Paper’ aimed at “real proposals for public policies in the framework of the UfM” as well as the provision of advice to universities regarding their assessment processes in quality assurance. EPUF has also critically scrutinized the work of regional institutions in the field of education, especially the UfM.

6.3.4 Declarations and Reports

The Tarragona Declaration of 2005 was the first major document issued by EPUF. Local research institutions from Catalunya were at the heart of this initiative. Besides other actors from the education sector, the just previously established Anna Lindh Foundation had attended the Mediterranean University Forum from which the Declaration emerged. The Tarragona Declaration specifically points out the required involvement of sub-state actors in the envisaged Euro-Mediterranean cooperation objectives: “such a project goes far beyond intergovernmental ties, and necessarily involves the education systems and civil society” (Mediterranean University Forum, 2005, p. 12); furthermore that “university participation in the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership appears to be very necessary and urgent” (ibid). Thereby, reference is consistently made to the example of academic example at EU level, which is consistently highlighted in public perception as perhaps the most impressive result of European integration history.

127 ‘Future projects’ section of the EPUF website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
128 Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
The Declaration states that EU universities “are interested in developing a dynamic and functional concept of inter-university cooperation that matches the growth in efficiency and competitiveness within the European Higher Education system” (ibid). The ‘Euro-Mediterranean area of Higher Education and Research’ (EMAHER) was outlined with almost the same set of objectives as subsequently adopted in the 2007 Cairo Declaration, though individual objectives from the Tarragona Declarations were excluded from it. Outreach of the Tarragona Declaration was already stipulated in the document proper: “We will also make the Declaration available to the proper authorities and institutions so they can consider it during the extraordinary conference to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process in November of this year” (Mediterranean University Forum, 2005, p. 17).

The 2007 ‘Alexandria Declaration’ of EPUF followed up on the Tarragona Declaration as well as the 2006 Tampere Declaration and was intended as input to the first EMP Ministerial on higher education and research to take place in Cairo. Reminding governments of their previously stated objectives, it argues that universities contribute to a free society and refers to the European integration experience to support its points. The Declaration argues that the very vision of the contribution of academic mobility to Euro-Med academic systems “is certainly the outcome of a successful experience –the Erasmus university exchange programme- which has made a great contribution to Europe”.\(^{129}\) The Alexandria Declaration recommended to consolidate EU exchange programs, to draft a White Paper on Euromed universities, to “adapt systems aimed at simplifying visa issue procedures”, “to increase support for University initiatives aiming to create synergy with civil

\(^{129}\) 2007 Alexandria Declaration.
society” including ALF-driven initiatives, a joint committee including government representatives to follow up on these proposals.\textsuperscript{130} Specific proposals regarding the EMAHER addressed the matters of credit and degree accreditation, double degree standards, and mobility matters including obstacles owed to EU migration legislation.

In the 2007 Cairo Declaration, the EMP Ministers in charge of higher education and research partly agreed with the shortcomings of the existing frameworks identified by EPUF. The Declaration committed to “facilitating the mobility and employability of students and researchers” in the region and already recognized the “Slovenian initiative for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean University”.\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, the Cairo Declaration also specifically included the aim of “Promotion of a Permanent Euromed University Forum”, in the light of the objectives shared by sectoral Ministers and EPUF to “promote the comparability and readability of Higher Education systems in the Euromed area”.\textsuperscript{132} Regarding the Euromed University Forum objectives, the document stipulates to support the implementation of its vaguely defined objectives, among them to further involve civil society in education.

One year after the Cairo Declaration, EPUF issued the Marseille Declaration in 2008, acknowledging that “[d]uring 2007-2008, Euro-Mediterranean universities have been present for the first time on the agendas of the Barcelona Process and later the Union for the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{133} EPUF attributed this success to its own work:

“This is doubtless the fruit of the work carried out by EPUF, as well as the result of the awareness of social and political estates and the importance of our role in the stability and progress of the Mediterranean area”.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{130} 2007 Alexandria Declaration. \\
\textsuperscript{131} Cairo Declaration of June 18, 2007 titled ‘Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education & Research Area’. \\
\textsuperscript{132} Cairo Declaration of June 18, 2007 titled ‘Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education & Research Area’. \\
\textsuperscript{133} 2008 Marseilles Declaration. \\
\textsuperscript{134} 2008 Marseilles Declaration.
\end{flushright}
Specifically, EPUF “proposed the creation of the EuroMed Commission of Quality Assurance during the first follow-up meeting of the Cairo Declaration, organized by the European Commission in Brussels in June 2008” on which it insisted again in the Marseille Declaration. \(^{135}\) Importantly, the Marseille Declaration was also the first after the consolidation of the UfM, to which it related optimistically at the time: “With the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, new horizons for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation have been opened up. It is a chance that we cannot miss: we must engage ourselves in requiring new policies committed to improving higher education”. \(^{136}\)

The Marseille Declaration was directed “to the French Presidency of the European Union, to the Presidency of Union for the Mediterranean and to the European Commission”. \(^{137}\) Yet, EPUF acknowledged potentially detrimental effects of the UfM on processes formerly initiated by the Forum: “in the moment the Union for the Mediterranean constitutes itself, first around the Declaration of Paris and then of Marseille, universities are not considered at all”. \(^{138}\)

Eventually, in 2010, EPUF’s ‘High Level Experts Committee’ released the anticipated report titled ‘The Contribution of Euro-Mediterranean Universities to Social Progress’, which was presented to the UfM Rectors Conference organized in Barcelona. This contribution revisited trends in university transformation, transposing them to the application at Euro-Med regional level in matters of governance, research, quality assurance, and mobility (Euromed Permanent University Forum, 2010). This report backed and substantiated many positions EPUF had previously defended vis-à-vis policymakers. It was widely circulated, with 2,000 copies.

\(^{135}\) 2008 Marseilles Declaration.
\(^{136}\) 2008 Marseilles Declaration.
\(^{137}\) 2008 Marseilles Declaration.
\(^{138}\) Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
presented to the European Commission, Parliament and the UfM, and sent to “all Euro-Mediterranean Ministries of Higher Education, hence to all the member states of the European Union and the member states of the Barcelona Process, now of the Union for the Mediterranean; and to the European Commission and to UNESCO”.139

Thereby, in its internal communications, EPUF has pointed out the role of several MEPs in conveying its points to the European Commission, as well as the support received from the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Government of Catalunya.140

In this report, EPUF defines its aim “to become an element of pressure capable of initiating a new process similar to the Bologna Process”, stating that “[u]niversities in the north, south, and east of the Mediterranean should not be left aside, as this movement extends beyond the borders of ancient Europe” (Euromed Permanent University Forum, 2010: Preface). Acknowledging previous advancements, it claims that such a process “requires the commitment of the UfM, the governments and the European Commission to become true and, most particularly, the engagement of universities” (ibid). While the preliminary nature of the report is acknowledged, a number of policy recommendations are spelled out in an Executive Summary. Specific proposals targeted at policy-makers include an “inter-university council for the Union for the Mediterranean, made up of all the universities in the 43 member states, whose mission will be to supervise the creation of the euro-mediterranean higher education area and to work towards overcoming the problems derived from different national laws” (Euromed Permanent University Forum, 2010, p. 9), a “UfM body for research and higher education to contribute to spreading scientific research and to guaranteeing quality as well as linking recent graduates with public and

139 Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
140 Report by the EPUF Executive Secretary titled ‘A New Phase in the Attainment of the Founding Objectives of the EPUF’, September 28, 2013.
private employees” (ibid) as well as previously emphasized policy demands regarding quality control, mobility, and government investment.

A ‘Final Communication’ eventually emerged from the conference of 130 rectors and representatives of Higher Education institutions from across the Euro-Mediterranean space, to which the ‘Social Progress’ report was presented.141 This Communication was primarily directed towards the 2nd Ministerial Conference on Higher Education, Research and Innovation. The Communication specifically demanded to “promote the work of the EPUF as the main driving force of the UfM Inter-Universitary Council”, which has remained a hypothetical institution.142 The Communication further introduced the proposal to “establish the UfM Observatory for research and higher education” and the creation of an online information portal143. For evaluation and quality assurance, the Rectors proposed “creating the appropriate bodies that will be sponsored by the UfM” as well as “a clear commitment between the UfM and the FEMIP”, the Facility for Euro-Med Investment and Partnership of the European Investment Bank.144

In 2013, a General Assembly of EPUF amended EPUF’s statute so as to relocate its Secretariat from Tarragona to a university based in Barcelona.145 Following this General Assembly, a workshop was conducted jointly with the ISLAH project,146 a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at supporting structural reforms to increase the employability of university graduates in Morocco and Tunisia, which was

142 Final Communication of the UfM Rectors Conference, June 29, 2010.
143 Final Communication of the UfM Rectors Conference, June 29, 2010.
144 Final Communication of the UfM Rectors Conference, June 29, 2010.
145 Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
146 Islah Project website. Reference access on April 13, 2014.
also attended by Ilan Chet, Deputy Secretary General at the UfM Secretariat in charge of higher education and research.\textsuperscript{147}

Advancements at the level of regional policies were made particularly in 2013 regarding the extension of Euro-Med cooperation in the field of education, mostly at program scale. For instance, the Fatima al-Fihri program is a university partnership of truly Euro-Mediterranean geographic scope, funded through the Erasmus Mundus scheme. It offers mobility grants to undergraduate students as well as to administrative and academic staff, specifically targeting Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.\textsuperscript{148} Another example of a program operating under the Erasmus Mundus umbrella is the al-Idrisi program.\textsuperscript{149} These programs constitute manifestations of the Inter-Regional Program for student and university exchange previously suggested in declarations. Funding for Euro-Mediterranean academic exchange has increased as well, particularly via the Tempus and Erasmus Mundus programs. For instance, in 2012, “the Erasmus Mundus budget was doubled which meant that more than €35 million was available to fund 10 partnerships”.\textsuperscript{150} Moreover, a new dialog with Southern Mediterranean countries on higher education was launched in 2011, with a policy focus beyond academic mobility. It aims at the “modernisation and reform of higher education systems and promote their voluntary convergence towards the Bologna Process and the emerging European Research

\textsuperscript{147} Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
\textsuperscript{148} Fatima al-Fihri program website.
\textsuperscript{149} Website of the Al Idrisi II program. Reference accessed on May 20, 2014.
\textsuperscript{150} EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of December 6, 2013. More information can be found on the EU web page on the ‘Southern Partnership’.
and Higher Education Area”. In April 2012, the European Commission pledged €40 million to a region-to-region ‘partnership in research and innovation’. 

More generally, the ERASMUS+ program suggested by the European Commission for the 2014+ Financial Framework offers new opportunities for Euro-Mediterranean academic cooperation as well, and was indeed welcomed by EPUF. At an EPUF workshop in 2013, it was pointed out that ERASMUS+ will have some elements which particularly concern Euro-Mediterranean higher education, notably regarding credit mobility. Furthermore, UfM Deputy Secretary Ilan Chet pointed out that the Secretariat’s activities in the field of education policy are being extended from their previous focus on the two EMUNIs so as to also include study programs targeting nationals of Arab countries, particularly to one program organized by UNI-MED.

6.3.5 Integration Pressure

This study’s theory framework would expect EPUF to mobilize integration pressures in its advocacy work. This expectation is confirmed by the Forum’s rhetorical reliance on the successful experience of academic mobility and integration at EU level. This was done with specific policy goals in mind, considering Euro-Mediterranean academic mobility to be a process that would “consolidate a very important area of

\begin{footnotes}{\footnotesize\begin{itemize}
\item Press release of July 2, 2012, titled ‘Commission launches new dialogue on higher education with Southern Mediterranean countries’.
\item Press release of March 2, 2010, titled ‘EU strengthens the European Neighbourhood Policy with increased funding for the period 2011-2013’.
\item Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013.
\end{itemize}}\end{footnotes}
research and science in the world, which the Euro-Mediterranean space would be”.\textsuperscript{154} This demand also had a clear-cut integration outlook:

“what we told the Commission was… we said ‘if we achieve a projection of the universities of the South of the Mediterranean in the North of the Mediterranean, and a mutual recognition of degrees, and the mobility of researchers and students from the North and the South is facilitated, we are going to build what the ERASMUS project has achieved in Europe’ – which is to further unify Europe, at the basis of achieving that the next European leaders of businesses, universities, all types of industry and commerce, in public positions, have traveled and have lived in another place in Europe”\textsuperscript{155}.

EPUF has consistently emphasized that there are already high levels of student mobility from the South to the North, i.e. from the MENA countries to Europe, and that the challenge is to construct a Euro-Mediterranean framework, governed by specific institutions that would assist in degree recognition, quality control etc. In this sense, EPUF has based its position on perceived pressures for joint integrative policies. Along similar lines, EPUF’s Executive Secretary also warned that unless it invests into Euro-Mediterranean university cooperation, “Europe will have a much graver problem in the future. It will not only be a problem of the South of the Mediterranean, but also for the European Union itself”\textsuperscript{156}. In November 2013, then, the UfM Secretariat announced that it is working “towards the elaboration of a Euro-Mediterranean Student Mobility framework initiative”, due to be presented in 2014 jointly with universities and networks including the Anna Lindh Foundation.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{154} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{155} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{156} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{157} UfM Secretariat news article of November 27, 2013 titled ‘UfM promotes student mobility across the Mediterranean region’.
6.3.6 EMUNI as an Intermediate Academic Institution

The follow-up to the inauguration of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 entailed a focus on cooperation in research and education. In this context, an intergovernmental decision was made to found Euro-Mediterranean universities. The first institution to be formally founded was the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in Slovenia\footnote{EMUNI website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.}; a second institution is to be based in Morocco. The institution based in Slovenia has developed a provisional academic program and forged ties to both other university networks in the Euro-Mediterranean as well as to the UfM.\footnote{Interview 6i1 with an EMUNI staff member carried out on October 10, 2013.}

In 2007, EPUF still recommended to “support” and “welcome the Slovene initiative to set up a Euro-Mediterranean University in Piran”.\footnote{2007 Alexandria Declaration.} In 2008, EPUF asked “EMUNI to cooperate and work together with other existing initiatives in order to build a project that is integrative and can be a model at the level of scientific excellence”.\footnote{2008 Marseilles Declaration.} In 2010, the President of EMUNI participated in the UfM Rectors Conference\footnote{EMUNI article of June 29, 2010 on the Rectors Conference in Barcelona.}, and in 2011, EPUF’s Executive Secretary participated in the EMUNI General Assembly in Lisbon\footnote{Press release of November 2011 retrieved from the EPUF website.}.

Yet, links between EPUF and EMUNI have remained limited.\footnote{Interview 6i1 with an EMUNI staff member carried out on October 10, 2013.} Subsequently, EPUF has been critical of the UfM focus on EMUNI and similar ‘top-down’ institutions.\footnote{Report by the EPUF Executive Secretary titled ‘A New Phase in the Attainment of the Founding Objectives of the EPUF’, September 28, 2013.} EPUF’s former Executive Secretary points out that due to this new focus, “EPUF stays a bit at the margins of the process” and argues that “this Higher Education Area does not end with the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean
University\textsuperscript{166}. Moreover, the choice of Slovenia as the host country of EMUNI was criticized, arguing that “Slovenia is a non-central country” of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.\textsuperscript{167} This critique reflects the assessment of EMUNI by respondents of the IEMed 2009 survey, indicating that “the three most often mentioned priorities [...] do not correspond to the activities it has undertaken in the first stage” (IEMed, 2009, p. 90).

Notwithstanding, cooperation was agreed between EPUF and the Center of Research and Studies for the Eastern Mediterranean (CREMO).\textsuperscript{168} CREMO was the outcome of the Euro-Med Academic Consortium Agreement (EMACA), established in 2008 as an academic partnership to be based in Greece. It was founded under the auspices of EMUNI. Furthermore, an UfM official pointed out that regarding higher education, “in principle we want to work with every organization” stating even that he “would be more than happy to do projects with EPUF”.\textsuperscript{169} However, the official emphasized that “the main thing is to get budget, because without a budget, we are progressing but very slowly, and we could do much more things”.\textsuperscript{170}

**6.3.7 Regional Actorhood**

EPUF has been founded in conjunction with initiatives supported by EU governments and in line with EMP policies. Nevertheless, it has been largely a bottom-up initiative of universities from across the region. EPUF has reacted to the polycentricism of

\textsuperscript{166} Interview 3n3 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out on January 8, 2013.
\textsuperscript{167} Interview 7n1 with a former EPUF Executive Secretary carried out in Tarragona on October 28, 2013.
\textsuperscript{168} Website of the Centre of Research and Studies for the Eastern Mediterranean (Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale, CREMO). Reference access on December 15, 2013.
\textsuperscript{169} Interview 7u1 with a UfM official carried out on January 8, 2014.
\textsuperscript{170} Interview 7u1 with a UfM official carried out on January 8, 2014.
regional politics by adopting a strategy of venue shopping across actors of relevance to Euro-Med politics. It has proposed specific policies and institutional reform at the regional level of the Euro-Mediterranean. While EPUF has criticized specific regional policies, its regional-level advocacy has largely attempted to forge close ties to policymakers at the regional decision-making venues, including the UfM Secretariat. Furthermore, it has suggested itself as an interlocutor for the implementation of its own demands. EPUF supports policy harmonization, envisaging potential integrative effects on the long run. In this sense, EPUF is a prototypical regionally oriented advocacy group, in line with the expectations of this study's theory framework. EPUF's insistence on the importance of education policy objectives has come to be reflected in individual Euro-Med Ministerial declarations as well as in UfM projects.

6.4 14 km as a Sub-Regional NGO

Besides major networks and alliances, countless sub-regional organizations have a potential for adopting a Euro-Mediterranean outlook. One of them, a non-profit organization called 14 km, was founded in 2012 by seven individuals of various national and educational backgrounds from Germany, Egypt and the UK. The organization states that they “got together for one cause: to bridge the cultural gap and overcome the socio-economic distance between Europe and Africa”. The organization was founded locally and in a bottom-up manner:

171 Social media page of 14 km. Reference access on December 12, 2013.
Coming from very different backgrounds and nationalities and thus living interculturality in our work, 14km members challenge conventional thinking about North-South-relationships in their daily work.\textsuperscript{172}

The unusual acronym by which 14km is identified refers to the distance between Europe and North Africa at the Mediterranean Strait of Gibraltar. 14 km has started working in project management, funding acquisition, in project implementation and facilitation. Additionally, the organization has hosted a number of events in the field of cultural dialog. This organization operates in a network approach and partners with a number of local NGOs and media organizations. Its original cooperation partner in Egypt had been an NGO called the New Horizon Association for Social Development.

14km states that it is funded through its acquired projects, though the group accepts donations due to its non-profit status. Thus, 14km is a ‘development network’ in terms of organization type, registered as a Foreigners Association (‘Ausländerverein’) due to the fact that most association members are not EU citizens. The decision to situate its official seat in Germany was attributed by a group member to “the easier possibility to request funding in Germany when registered here; and to work here and simply to be able to contact people here”.\textsuperscript{173}

14km was founded more recently than most other organizations discussed in this study. It also has a significantly smaller scope of operations, though it envisages expanding it in the future. Due to its character of linking individuals from MENA as well European countries in one organization, it has faced management challenges:

\textsuperscript{172} Vision and Mission’ section of the website of 14km. Reference access on May 25, 2013.
\textsuperscript{173} Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
an interviewee explained that its approach “appears to be so new that we do not really fit into structures yet”.\textsuperscript{174}

14km shares idea that its work is “supposed to be about bringing Europe and North Africa closer together, as it’s already written in our name”.\textsuperscript{175} While the association has avoided specifically applying the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ in its own communications, its geographical outlook roughly overlaps with that of regional institutions. In addition, an integrative vision is shared by 14km:

\textit{“we think that exchange and exposing people to each other is the best means to minimize prejudices or skepticism; that people feel rather as inhabitants of a closely connected space than as parts being completely separated culturally; so of course, we hope that things are moving into that direction”}.\textsuperscript{176}

At the same time, the association is still in its early phase of developing networks in multiple countries. As of 2013, its activities have extended to cover projects in Germany, Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, and Jordan. In addition to its network aimed at its operational activities, 14km also intends to develop its inter-organizational links with companies, government institutions. The group has previously followed the activities in Egypt of the Netherland and UK chapters of Oxfam as well as of Save the Children. The UK chapter of Oxfam is engaged in Egypt through its advocacy advisors which tend to be local experts.\textsuperscript{177} The operational vision of 14km highlights Southern co-ownership of any implemented projects. At the same time, a group member explained that

\textsuperscript{174} Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
\textsuperscript{175} Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
\textsuperscript{176} Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
\textsuperscript{177} Oxfam web page on advocacy. Reference access on February 3, 2014.
“also during conversations with people from donors, I noticed that they think it’s great because this is also exactly the problem – that some German organizations which would like to do something but are not so well connected locally and then maybe just come up with something that might not be received well locally. So in this sense, I have the feeling that there is consensus on it to work this way, but that sometimes in practice, it’s difficult.”

14km has also become a member of the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Furthermore, it has extended its regional ties by partnering with the Maat Foundation for Peace, Development, and Human Rights which was elected to be national coordinator of the Egyptian ALF network in 2013. A 14km interviewee pointed out that the aim of the association is to “simply bring together people, so we have not planned any publications or so; but I mean, one does not work politically only through publications”. At the same time, the same interviewee suggested that the political character of many projects in Southern Mediterranean countries which receive official funding needs to be nuanced depending on the context: “I have the feeling that there is a lot of uncertainty [even among donors] about how to actually tackle it”.

Thus, 14km has largely remained a project-oriented organization. Nevertheless, despite its small scale and sub-regional character, it has chosen to adopt a geographical and political outlook compatible with, if not aligned with, the official Euro-Mediterranean cooperation agenda.

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178 Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
179 ALF Germany Network Member List. Reference access on December 13, 2013.
180 ALF news article of June 22, 2013 titled ‘Maat Foundation is the New Head of the National Egyptian Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation’.
181 Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
182 Interview 1n2 with a member of 14km carried out on October 16, 2012.
6.5 Sub-regional environmentalism

Greenpeace Mediterranean and MEDCOAST are two Mediterranean, sub-regional networks focused on environmental policy and activism. Greenpeace Med is particular to this study as a regional branch of the globally active Greenpeace network dating back to the 1970s. Greenpeace Med, like its roof organization, is active in environmental advocacy, but is organizationally outsourced from the broader Greenpeace network. It operates a head office in Istanbul, and is represented in Tel Aviv and Beirut as well. From a theory perspective, this raises the question of whether such organizational origins nevertheless allow for an organization to orient its activities towards a broader regional cooperation framework.

The ecosystem health of the Mediterranean Sea is a key topic for the Mediterranean, which is a sea under particularly heavy environmental and population pressure. The related issue of water scarcity is consistently named a major policy issue (cf. IEMed, 2009). It has already since the 1970s been addressed institutionally by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) and its various offspring. More recently, the topic has been reflected in the ‘Water and Environment’ division and priority projects of the UfM Secretariat. On the matter, the UfM shares a holistic, cross-sector approach:

“The Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean aims at countering these threats by developing major impact projects and focusing on the main regional priorities, namely the protection of the marine environment; the H2020 initiative to depollute the Mediterranean, with the objective to tackle 80% of pollution loading by 2020; as well as the UfM Water agenda, designed around the four pillars of water governance, water and climate change adaptation, water demand management and water financing.”

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183 Website for Greenpeace Mediterranean and web page about Greenpeace worldwide. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
184 Water & Environment section of the UfM website. Reference access on February 9, 2014.
Greenpeace already campaigned with a Mediterranean outlook at the beginning of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{185} Still, Greenpeace argues that “[t]here is no shortage of international and regional commitments, agreements and scientific advice declaring the need for a network of Marine Reserves. What is lacking is the political will to make this a reality”. Elsewhere, Greenpeace argues that “the Mediterranean is desperately in need of protection through the establishment of ocean sanctuaries” and that “[n]ineteen countries share the responsibility of looking after the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{186} Thus, Greenpeace states that it “continues to apply pressure on politicians - local, regional and international”.\textsuperscript{187}

A variety of campaigns have been launched in the framework of Greenpeace Med, often spearheaded by the Turkish office in Istanbul and addressed specifically at Turkish decision-makers.\textsuperscript{188} Thereby, Greenpeace at large takes a holistic approach particularly when it comes to matters of marine conservation: “The Mediterranean Sea functions as a whole ecosystem so the measures to protect it must reflect and support that”.\textsuperscript{189} In consequence, Greenpeace Med has initiated regionally oriented campaigns. A staff member explained that “we have pushed the idea of solar energy in the region and its connectedness in the whole region”, which has led to “legislation changes mainly in Turkey and Israel and ended a lot of projects from Gulf countries”.\textsuperscript{190}

This holistic approach to environmental, and especially marine, protection in the Mediterranean, dates back to 1993, when the Mediterranean was defined “as the

\textsuperscript{185} Questionnaire response 3n1 received from a staff member of Greenpeace Mediterranean carried out on January 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{186} Greenpeace web page of March 20, 2014, on the Mediterranean Sea.
\textsuperscript{187} Greenpeace web page of July 22, 2008, on ‘Solutions for the Mediterranean’.
\textsuperscript{188} Website of Greenpeace Mediterranean, Turkey. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
\textsuperscript{189} Greenpeace web page of July 22, 2008, on ‘Solutions for the Mediterranean’.
\textsuperscript{190} Questionnaire response 3n1 received from a staff member of Greenpeace Mediterranean carried out on January 7, 2013.
whole region except where there are already established Greenpeace offices".\textsuperscript{191}

This remains reflected by the organizational structure today, which awards responsibility for basically the entire non-EU Mediterranean region to the Greenpeace Med branch. Accordingly, a staff member argued that "[t]he impacts of climate change, lack of water, desertification, toxics pollution and arms race especially in the Middle East region are regional problems that we need to seek more cooperation".\textsuperscript{192} The sub-regional and national policy orientation of Greenpeace diverges from the Euro-Mediterranean regional vision. Yet, a group member qualified this saying that this mode of operation could change if the Euro-Mediterranean framework provided for legally binding decision-making, pointing out that i "doesn't mean that we don't support such an idea of regional cooperation especially on issues like, agriculture, oceans, fisheries and solar energy".\textsuperscript{193}

The Mediterranean Coastal Foundation (MEDCOAST) is another sub-regional network in the field of marine conservation which maintains a secretariat in Ankara. MEDCOAST began its scientific activity in 1993 and was formalized in 2007. It comprises 15 member organizations, most but not all of which are based in riparian countries of the Mediterranean. The network’s activities in environment research and training are oriented towards the riparian regions of the Mediterranean, but also towards the Black Sea region. Thereby, MEDCOAST implements projects which are sponsored externally, i.e. by various funding organizations. It also supports MEDSETCON, a sea turtle conservation network, and has institutionalized its

\textsuperscript{191} Questionnaire response 3n1 received from a staff member of Greenpeace Mediterranean carried out on January 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{192} Questionnaire response 3n1 received from a staff member of Greenpeace Mediterranean carried out on January 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{193} Questionnaire response 3n1 received from a staff member of Greenpeace Mediterranean carried out on January 7, 2013.
network by founding the Mediterranean Coastal Foundation.\textsuperscript{194} Furthermore, MEDCOAST has relocated to a small town called Dalyan, located in the seaside Muğla Province of South-Western Turkey.\textsuperscript{195}

Insight from research on Greenpeace Med indicates that it has adopted a comparably strong idea of sub-regional cooperation on environmental issues affecting the Mediterranean Sea, including regarding its vision of environmental protection and its holistic ecosystem approach. In this sense, it confirms this study's hypotheses regarding the regional orientation of non-state groups. Yet, even though there are few issues more suited for a regionally integrated policy response and despite a certain degree of awareness in this regard, the policy orientation of Greenpeace Med remains national or sub-regional. This observation needs to be considered in the light of the variety of Greenpeace offices which, in one way or another, address marine conservation or depollution. Yet, Greenpeace Med has, thus far, remained a sub-regional network instead of developing regional actorhood of a Euro-Mediterranean orientation.

\textsuperscript{194} Former MEDCOAST website. Reference access on December 13, 2013
\textsuperscript{195} MEDCOAST website. Reference access on December 13, 2013.
7 PRIVATE SECTOR: DESERTEC, ASCAME, EMA

The private sector has hardly been studied regarding its involvement in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation schemes. One exception to this is offered by Dorothée Schmid, who primarily studied the case of the Union of Mediterranean Confederations of Enterprises (UMCE). Schmid argues that “business communities have apparently grown to like the Mediterranean challenge and occasionally cultivate a critical eye on the political decision-makers” (Schmid, 2009, p. 415) and that “the private sector now figures among the obligatory protagonists of Euro-Mediterranean keynote speeches” (Schmid, 2009, p. 428). This chapter discusses empirical research regarding the specific characteristics and involvement of the organizations situated around the Desertec concept, as well as regarding the regional activities of ASCAME and EMA.

7.1 The Desertec Concept: Euro-Mediterranean Sectoral Politics

The case of Desertec consists of a number of formally independent organizations which share the objective of a regional scheme for producing renewable energy in North Africa. As solar and wind power are at its heart, Desertec has targeted the MENA region with its geographical and climate features. Uniquely, Desertec is a large-scale initiative from which “the MENA region could benefit from an export industry worth up to €63 billion per year”. These objectives make it political in terms of energy security, development and investment safety. Desertec has come to

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196 Section ‘Mission and Vision’ on the website of Dii. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
be situated at the core of the Mediterranean Solar Plan advanced by the UfM (Werenfels & Westphal, 2010, pp. 12, 20).

### 7.1.1 Organizations

The for-profit, *Dii*, was founded in 2009 as the Desertec Industry Initiative but has since shifted to using only the three-letter abbreviation.\(^{197}\) In culmination of a controversy between the Foundation and Dii managements regarding future strategy, the Foundation withdrew its Dii membership in June 2013.\(^{198}\) In this context, media reported that the Foundation demanded that Dii entirely stop using the term ‘Desertec’ in its publications, though an interviewee remarked that the intensity of the relationship between Dii and the Foundation had previously been exaggerated in media and public perception.\(^{199}\)

While Dii stakeholders were originally based primarily in Germany, as of 2014, the consortium is sustained by twenty shareholders and numerous partner organizations, mostly corporations, from across the Euro-Mediterranean and beyond. Thus, Dii has expanded its constituency in geographic terms, with German corporations losing in centrality. Dii also sustained various representatives in its local or regional networks. Membership fees have ranged between € 5,000 and €125,000 depending on the type of membership as of 2014. Beyond management structures and a core staff of more than 30 employees in München, Germany, *dii* branches now operate in Morocco and Tunisia. In support of its ambitions, Dii has initiated its own

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197 Website of Dii GmbH. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
198 Sueddeutsche Zeitung news article of July 9, 2013 titled ‘Desertec-Investoren schicken Leiterin in die Wüste’.
199 Anonymous interview 6n1 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on August 2, 2013.
investment financing program called “Renewable Energy Development and Investment Vehicle for MENA (REDIMENA)” with an initial funding of €30 million.\textsuperscript{200}

In contrast to the more recently founded Dii, the not-for-profit Desertec Foundation dates back to the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation (TREC) platform founded in 2003 by the German association of the Club of Rome and the Hamburg Climate Protection Foundation. The Foundation’s members are scientists, politicians, and economists from across the region.\textsuperscript{201} In addition to a core staff of more than 30 employees in Hamburg, Germany, 14 Desertec Foundation coordinators are present in a number of Euro-Med countries at regional or local level, for instance in the case of TREC UK.

Furthermore, in 2010, the Desertec University Network was co-initiated by the Desertec Foundation, drawing its 29 members primarily from academic institutions in Germany and the MENA region.\textsuperscript{202} Sustained by a full-fledged governance structure, its headquarters are provisionally hosted by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Tunis, while the network is supported by the Foreign Office of Germany as well as by the government-owned German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Moreover, the Desertec Academic Network (DAN) is an offspring for activities beyond the EU-MENA geographic focus. It originated at Justus Liebig University in Gießen, Germany, where a working group exists on Solar Energy Partnership with Africa (SEPA). Within the Desertec research sphere, for instance, the Germany-based Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy has cooperated with ALCOR, a Tunisian partner, on a GIZ-financed “Strategic Study of the Energy Mix for Electricity Production in Tunisia” [author’s translation] (Wuppertal

\textsuperscript{200} Dii news article of October 30, 2013 on REDIMENA.
\textsuperscript{201} Website of the DESERTEC Foundation. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
\textsuperscript{202} Website of the Desertec University Network (DUN) e.V. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
Institut & Alcor, 2012). Another GIZ-financed project entailed a value chain analysis regarding solar energy in Tunisia which was implemented in cooperation with Adelphi Consult based in Germany.\textsuperscript{203} Further studies regarded the energy mix across the MENA region implemented by Bernhard Brand and the creation of an investment decision tool for CSP in Morocco and Egypt by Thomas Fink. The Wuppertal Institute has also contributed to the envisaged establishment of a Desertec Institute for Studies on Socio-Economic Development and Employment in MENA (DISEM)\textsuperscript{204} which was endorsed by the UfM Secretariat as well.\textsuperscript{205}

7.1.2 Sectoral Networks

The activities and ambitions of the Desertec-related organizations are closely linked to the regional role of both the Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MedReg) and the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO).

MedReg is a network of national agencies, part of national Ministries or independent regulators in charge of energy regulation.\textsuperscript{206} While MedReg is constituted by members from Mediterranean riparian states only, its operation is linked to broader ambitions of improving energy connections between North Africa and Europe. MedReg was founded by regulators as a working group in 2006 and was institutionalized in a non-profit association under Italian law in 2007. The network began operating in Rome, largely sustained by the Italian Government, the European

\textsuperscript{203} Web page of Wuppertal Institute on the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Reference access on April 14, 2014.

\textsuperscript{204} Interview 7n5 with a researcher at the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy carried out on April 9, 2014.

\textsuperscript{205} UfM Secretariat web article of September 12, 2012, titled ‘UfM discusses the Mediterranean Solar Plan with Tunisian Ministers and High Officials’

\textsuperscript{206} MedReg website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
Commission, the Council of European Energy regulators (CEER), and the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP). Thereby, REMEP itself is an intergovernmentally driven platform active in energy monitoring since 2003, as organized by its Secretariat hosted by the governmental Institute for Industrial Promotion, with seconded staff from member states.

Med-TSO embodies an initiative coordinated by the European Commission and specifically by the Directorate-General for Energy.\textsuperscript{207} It was initiated in 2012, in Rome as well, but aims to advance the integration of Mediterranean and Euro-Mediterranean electricity markets by placing emphasis on the respective operators of electricity transmission systems, i.e. primarily electricity grid systems.\textsuperscript{208}

Furthermore, the Commission has fostered coordination of Dii and Medgrid, a joint venture of 18 shareholders, primarily French companies, that is concerned with developing the trans-Mediterranean power grid infrastructure. The two consortia state that they are planning to cooperate in pressuring for better regulatory and investment conditions in the MENA region. This objective has been endorsed by the UfM Secretariat and the European Commission, with a specific focus on creating “framework conditions” and on fostering the Mediterranean Solar Plan’s co-ownership by MENA governments.\textsuperscript{209} This endorsement is illustrated by the Commission presence at the Euro-Mediterranean Rendezvous on Energy which took place in Brussels in April 2013.\textsuperscript{210}

This event, bringing together the networks and organizations introduced thus far with other stakeholders and EU institutions, Medgrid announced its ambition to “lobby European Bodies; together with MEDREG, ENTSOE [European Network of

\textsuperscript{207} Anonymous interview 5e3 with a regional official carried out on April 10, 2013.  
\textsuperscript{208} Terna Corporation web page about Med-TSO. Reference access on November 20, 2013.  
\textsuperscript{210} Documentation of the Euro-Mediterranean Rendezvous on Energy, Brussels, April 11, 2013.
Transmission System Operators], Med-TSO, Dii, OME [Mediterranean Energy Observatory]. Thereby, for both Medgrid and Dii, advantageous energy regulation is among the most important issues on the road to a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community as it has been suggested by various stakeholders. MEDREG equally purported to “concentrate its efforts on the establishment of strong and independent regulatory authorities in all the countries of the Mediterranean” [author’s translation], highlighting the developments in Morocco which follow these objectives. At the ‘Rendezvous on Energy’, MEDREG mentioned the role of dialog with “other regional associations (e.g., UfM, MED-TSO); financial institutions (e.g. EBRD, EIB) [and] private initiatives (e.g. Medgrid, Desertec)” [author’s translation].

Dii is considered an important stakeholder by all these organizations. Indeed, Dii frames its ties to Medgrid, through “regular joint workshops” or through the “Joint Committee of MSP National Experts to integrate the industry perspective in the MSP” under the umbrella term of “fostering Euro-Mediterranean cooperation”. This Joint Committee, a UfM flagship initiative, is constituted by over “a hundred experts from twenty Euro-Mediterranean countries”.

In the light of the various institutions that maintain ties of some sort to the broader Desertec vision, a regionally constituted field of activity has emerged. Within this field, shifting orientations or loyalties of actors to a Euro-Mediterranean energy

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vision are expected both for non-state actors as well as for individual governmental or intergovernmental entities, diversified along various levels of hierarchy.

### 7.1.3 Euro-Med Orientation

From this study’s theory perspective, a large initiative with commercial objectives of a regional scope would be expected to strongly relate to existing regional cooperation formats. In contrast to most other organizations constituting this study, Dii has preferred the term ‘EU-MENA’ or ‘EUMENA’ to the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ when identifying the geographic scope of its operation. Dii identifies a geographic target area extending slightly beyond the membership of the UfM. At the same time, the term EU-MENA is intended to signal the central involvement of non-Mediterranean EU countries in the initiative.\(^{217}\) Thus, Dii intends to avoid potential misinterpretations caused by terminology.

The vision of solar energy from North African deserts faces a broad range of political concerns regarding political stability, the permanence of regional institutions, legal questions, and investment guarantees. In addition, it touches upon a variety of social concerns, many of them related to the North-South nature of any large-scale investment in the MENA region. This, in turn, entails a number of concerns regarding communication regarding both advocacy in Europe and local communication in project target countries. The strategies developed by Dii and the Desertec Foundation to react to such challenges navigate the balance between the objectives of Euro-Mediterranean institutions and detachment from their logics of operation.

\(^{217}\) Anonymous interview 6n1 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on August 2, 2013.
The case of the Desertec organizations is characterized due to its massive scope and the financial and political weight of its key supporters. The ambitions of both Dii and the Foundation are inherently linked to political and geostrategic decisions. Equally, as a sectoral economic effort, the stated objective of the Desertec concept relates to EU-level debates regarding energy diversification and the development of renewables. In particular, Dii relates strongly to the regional formats in place all while maintaining its autonomy from regional policymaking. From a theory perspective, this leads to the question of political advocacy conducted by Dii and the Foundation.

7.1.4 Advocacy

Both the Desertec Foundation and Dii are foremost advocacy organizations, despite the fact that the latter has aimed to support the financial and technical implementation of energy projects in North Africa as well. For its advocacy efforts, Dii has relied on a number of its key publications. In its major study titled “Getting started” study, for instance, broader topics were addressed including “the long-term, secure access to facilities – a factor that in the MENA states can often be complicated”. The same study devotes significant attention to the political and institutional situation in the Euro-Mediterranean as well, arguably since “[p]olitical commitment for the development of renewables will be crucial especially in the starting phase since the necessary market conditions are not yet in place” (Dii, 2013a, p. 216). Hence, Dii commends that

218 Web page of June 2013 about the ‘Desert Power: Getting Started’ publication.
“institutions should promote the adoption of credible long-term policy in order to provide a stable perspective for investments. In the short term, policy objectives should be combined with the implementation of first projects and the development of transmission infrastructure” (ibid).

Regarding the UfM, the study applauds the Mediterranean Solar Plan as “an excellent platform for political discussion regarding the development of renewable energy in the Mediterranean” (ibid). Specifically, it suggested that the Union “should continue its bottom-up approach by further encouraging the participation of experts from different member countries in common working platforms” (ibid) and that it “could act as a facilitator by bringing together governments, international financial institutions, and the private sector” in the development of reference projects (Dii, 2013a, p. 217). Institutionally, the study argues that “the MSP Master Plan should be translated into a binding framework […] creating a Mediterranean Renewable Energy Framework” and calls for swift agreement on principles in this regard (ibid). Furthermore, it suggests that “the UfM could establish an industry panel” (ibid). The study’s ambitious long-term recommendation to political institutions is for them to “adopt a comprehensive framework, which provides for an EUMENA integrated power system. This framework should combine political, legal and institutional functions” (Dii, 2013a, p. 219).

In addition to addressing ‘political institutions’, the same study also comments on sectoral networks such as MedReg the role of which “in ensuring the compatibility and in strengthening the regulators is remarkable” according to Dii (Dii, 2013a, p. 220). For the “mid- and long-term”, it argues that “MedReg should be strengthened accordingly to facilitate the implementation of a supranational body with regulatory competences” (ibid). Regarding MedTSO, the study recommends that it “should contribute to the adoption of common principles applicable to transmission
The study also addresses questions of a suitable legal framework, leading to the recommendation, among others, that the “EU, EU Member States and Southern Mediterranean countries should agree on the full adoption of the Mediterranean Renewable Energy Framework, including common network codes and minimum standards for power sector regulation” (Dii, 2013a, p. 230). Furthermore, broader policy recommendations are stated, including the ambitious objective of a “flagship exchange program for the EUMENA region […] along the lines of the US Fulbright scholarship or existing Eastern European programs” (Dii, 2013a, p. 243).

The Desertec Foundation has appraised the UfM-related Mediterranean Solar Plan in its aim of “a new balanced north-south relationship based on the promotion of sustainable energy projects” (Dii, 2013a, p. 243). Dii, in turn, has advocated the involvement of International Financial Institutions in UfM project funding regarding North African local energy supply, technology transfer, employment, economic stability, and water desalination. At the same time, in the light of its development dimension, the initiative has highlighted the principle of Southern co-ownership and the participation of stakeholders based in Southern Mediterranean countries.

Following the launch of the UfM in 2008, the Mediterranean Solar Plan was classified as a UfM priority project. Accordingly, the UfM Secretariat and Dii signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2012. The topic of solar energy has also been ‘uploaded’ to the EU and Euro-Mediterranean levels beyond the MSP. The significance of the Desertec vision to Euro-Mediterranean regional integration has been argued both with a focus on the economic benefits of a Euro-Mediterranean energy infrastructure, as well as with regards to the ensuing effects for social

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219 Desertec Foundation press release of October 30, 2009 titled ‘Joint venture Dii established and ready to take up work’.
development and democratization objectives in the Southern Mediterranean. Thereby, reference is consistently made to an arguable integration pressure by an increasing need for energy interdependence. These points have been part of public outreach as reflected in prominent media debates.

For instance, Dii commissioned a study titled the ‘Economic Impacts of Desert Power’ and subtitled ‘Socio-economic aspects of an EUMENA renewable energy transition’. This report argues that the export of “excess electricity is an economic opportunity for MENA countries” (Dii, 2013b, p. 4). It also derives policy recommendations: for instance, it suggests bidirectional student exchange and specifically addresses the European Commission, which “could play an important role in funding and implementation, since such programs promote [its] goals for greater regional integration in the Maghreb” (Dii, 2013b, p. 24). For a different example, the report proposes that a “socio-economic development plan should aim to coordinate, and encourage collaboration between, the responsible political actors” (ibid). Desertec has specifically called for an EU – North African development partnership and for stable institutions beneficial to the regulation of a future Euro-Med energy market.220

To substantiate the argument supporting its main cause, Dii has launched projects targeting Southern Mediterranean youth, in an effort to ‘empower’ MENA-based students to “contribute fully to the democratic process by demanding the necessary conditions for the expansion of renewable energies in Egypt and

220 Anonymous interview 6n1 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on August 2, 2013.
Tunisia”. With regard to broader regional cooperation triggered by Desertec implementation, the Foundation argues by reference to European integration:

“Working together to utilize unlimited renewable energy sources has other advantages in terms of security – trade relationships, interdependency and common ties ensure peace and cohesion, as the European Union has shown. Partnerships between neighboring countries in electricity grids and the trade in clean power can help foster similarly strong international communities both in the Mediterranean region and in other DESERTEC regions.”

Evoking memories of the European Coal and Steel Community, Dii also underpins its proposals by reference to the broader benefits of integration:

“integrated power system lays the groundwork for much broader cooperation between Europe and the MENA region. It also contributes to political stability and encourages mutual reliance as no country is dependent on one single supplier but rather on the power system as a whole”.

In its ‘Getting started’ study, Dii even quotes Robert Schuman himself to point out its “spirit of identifying the concrete achievements capable of creating the solidarity needed to build a sustainable power system for EUMENA” (Dii, 2013a, p. 245). There could hardly be a clearer reference to its integration rhetoric than when it argues that in energy, “there is hardly a choice in the long term than to understand the Mediterranean as a hub, not as a border” (ibid).

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223 Section ‘Mission and Vision’ on the website of Dii. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
7.1.5 Institutional Relations

In addition to advocacy by reports and policy documents, Dii has forged continuous high-level contacts at the level of individual governments as well as at regional level. An interviewee argued that Dii is familiar with regional politics, in terms of its diversified ties to governments and Commission Directorates, highlighting the particular importance of the UfM as a forum but also mentioning outreach to NGOs and other non-state organizations. Besides the permanent work of the UfM Secretariat and various meetings at the level of government officials, this concerned the MSP-centered Ministerial which took place in December 2013. Beyond its UfM ties, Dii broadly disseminates its positions and has also specifically addressed Members of the European Parliament and the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly. Desertec representatives are in particularly frequent contact with the Directorate-General for Energy of the European Commission. While interviews indicate disagreement as to whether electricity transfer across the Mediterranean should be bidirectional or merely South-North, positions have approximated each other. The CEO of Dii acknowledged, in coincidence with the Initiative’s internal changes of 2013, the excessively unidirectional design of its original concept, particularly in the light of the required high-capacity, long-distance electricity grids.

A Desertec ‘whitebook’ (Desertec Foundation, 2009) has been presented to decision-makers, including at regional level. Furthermore, a Dii conference series was launched in 2009 in Barcelona, with participants from the UfM Secretariat government administrations, industry, financial institutions, and NGOs. The press

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224 Anonymous interview 6n1 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on August 2, 2013.
225 Anonymous interview 5e3 with a regional official carried out on April 10, 2013.
226 Anonymous interview 5e3 with a regional official carried out on April 10, 2013.
227 EurActiv news article of May 31, 2013 titled ‘Desertec abandons Sahara solar power export dream’.
release of its 2013 edition states that “the UfM Secretary General praised Dii’s active involvement in the collective efforts to develop the Mediterranean Solar Plan, which will be submitted for political endorsement in the coming UfM Ministerial Meeting on Energy”.

Dii has been able to seize support from governments, the European Commission, as well as the UfM. For instance, the UfM Secretariat has advocated supportive energy regulation in North Africa. In March 2012, the Mediterranean Solar Plan Project Preparation Initiative was launched as a financial tool to implement technical assistance in Desertec target countries. In June 2010, the Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan energy ministers met Commissioner Oettinger in Algeria with the aim to “step up the process to integrate the electricity markets of the Maghreb, the first step towards full integration of these markets into the European market”, and with first relevant investments already made. Importantly, Desertec representatives have also joined German delegations and have been backed by German government officials directly in intergovernmental negotiations.

The proposals made by Dii and the Desertec Foundation have been rejected or delayed in individual cases. This is true in the case of the 2013 Energy Ministerial at UfM level, which had originally been expected to produce a major breakthrough. Thus, Desertec proposals have been opposed by individual governments or by regional officials who support a different vision of Euro-Mediterranean energy ties. In other cases, Desertec proposals are met with approval but considered self-sufficient

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228 Web article of November 1, 2013 titled ‘UfM at the 4th Dii Desert Energy Conference’.
229 UfM press release of March 20, 2012, titled ‘The first operational financial tool for the Mediterranean Solar Plan (the MSP)’.
231 Anonymous interview 4g1 carried out on February 27, 2013.
232 Anonymous interview 6n1 with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on August 2, 2013.
233 News article of December 11, 2013 titled ‘Embattled UfM ministerial meeting focuses on energy’.
in the light of Dii’s constitutive corporations.\textsuperscript{234} An interviewee, in turn, remarked how the credibility of Desertec indirectly supports his own unit’s agenda.\textsuperscript{235} Despite these divergent reactions to the Desertec agenda, Dii and the Foundation have left traces on the agenda of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and in individual cases have contributed to the institutionalization of its objectives.

In 2012, for instance, the European Investment Bank announced a “Mediterranean Solar Plan Project Preparation Initiative” for project funding in seven countries, financed by the Neighborhood Investment Facility.\textsuperscript{236} The key Joint Communications on a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ of 2011 as well as ‘Delivering on a new European Neighborhood Policy’ of 2012 prominently addressed the topic of renewable energy. The 2011 Communication noted “clear potential for building an EU-Mediterranean partnership in the production and management of renewables, in particular solar and wind energy” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011, p. 9). Furthermore, it highlighted that it “is desirable to open a credible perspective for the integration of the Southern Mediterranean in the EU internal energy market based on a differentiated and gradual approach” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011, p. 10). In follow-up, the Commission pledged “to consult Southern Mediterranean partners in 2012 to establish energy partnerships as a first step towards regional electricity and renewable energy market integration, with the long-term perspective of establishing an EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy

\textsuperscript{234} Anonymous interview 4g1 carried out on February 27, 2013.
\textsuperscript{235} Anonymous interview 5e3 with a regional official carried out on April 10, 2013.
\textsuperscript{236} EIB web page of June 19, 2012 on the Mediterranean Solar Plan – Project Preparation Initiative (MSP-PPI)
While both Dii and the Desertec Foundation have conducted advocacy work in a variety of ways, the for-profit Dii has been particularly capable of forging high-level contacts in the pursuit of its economic agenda. The structure and addressees of its advocacy sustain this study’s neo-functionalist hypotheses, as both organizations have created direct ties to regional-level decision-making venues, including at the EU and the UfM. Moreover, both organizations have employed ‘integration arguments’ as increased regional cooperation, policy harmonization and formal institutionalization would be beneficial for the implementation of their concepts. At the same time, such ‘integration references’ are employed to add legitimacy to the economic objectives in question. Research indicates that Dii’s advocacy has inspired or directly affected the Euro-Mediterranean political agenda at numerous occasions, and thus become promoted an integration agenda for the Euro-Mediterranean region.

7.2 Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry

This study’s theory framework raises the question of the role, in Euro-Mediterranean politics, of large-scale networks of a primarily Mediterranean riparian background. The Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCAME) is an international non-profit association by its statute, within the framework of Spanish law. It was founded already in 1982, long before the emergence of the EMP, by various national and local Chambers of Commerce “at the initiative of the

ASCAME Statute.
Chamber of Commerce of Barcelona, supported by the Chamber of Marseille, the Chamber of Beirut, the Chamber of Tanger, and the Chamber of Tunis, and I believe Istanbul” as explained by an interviewee.238

The ASCAME constituency of more than 200 members and over 20 countries is drawn almost exclusively from Mediterranean riparian states. Furthermore, ASCAME offers Associate Membership to “those Mediterranean institutions which have some connection with the aims of the Association”.239 Operations of ASCAME are coordinated by a Secretariat hosted by the Chamber of Commerce of Barcelona. The organization’s Presidency rotates and was recently held by a Turkish respectively a Lebanese association. ASCAME is funded “by membership dues, the contributions of its members, grants made by other agencies and institutions as well as receipts accruing from its activities and services rendered to third parties”.240 ASCAME highlights the ideals of economic exchange, international cooperation, cultural dialog, and even political integration irrespective of the geographic framework chosen, as poetically emphasized by a former ASCAME President:

“I have to say, the keyword of today’s world is ‘cooperation’. […] I have no doubt that the Mediterranean Sea will become a lake of peace and fraternity when politics and commerce walk together. […] While working as the President of the ASCAME, I always tried to establish durable friendships and acquaintances under the roof of ASCAME. We have become a family in the true sense of the word” [author’s translation].241

The following sections look into the translations of these ideals into the practice of ASCAME regarding its regional orientation and advocacy activities.

238 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
239 ASCAME Statute.
240 ASCAME Statute.
241 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
7.2.1 Regional Orientation

Primarily, ASCAME is a Mediterranean organization, its activities centering on the riparian states of the Sea. According to its statutes, ASCAME “works on the assumption that the Black Sea is a natural extension of the Mediterranean Sea”.\(^{242}\) In addition, ASCAME acknowledges the importance of non-riparian countries to Mediterranean cooperation and includes a number of ‘non-Mediterranean’ members, e.g. from Serbia or the Paris region. Due to this regional operational and advocacy focus exceeding the geographic scope of its membership, ASCAME subscribes to regional integration of a Mediterranean as well as Euro-Mediterranean scope:

“we champion integration. We consider advocating integration and the creation of an area of economic integration between Europe and the Mediterranean to be one of our priorities [and we] also believe in the integration of the [broader] Euro-Mediterranean region which unites a population of 800 million inhabitants, offering specific advantages and competitiveness within the new international division of labor and cooperation”.\(^{243}\)

In terms of advocacy, ASCAME has repeatedly addressed broader regional policies and institutions, arguing that “as there is no doubt about being a pan-regional organizational, we prioritize the cooperation with the EU and UfM”.\(^{244}\) Particularly from 2007 on, ASCAME even went beyond the Euro-Mediterranean range: “we did not limit our understanding of serving ASCAME to the shores of the Mediterranean and cast our net wide from Brussels to Washington”.\(^{245}\)

\(^{242}\) ASCAME Statute.
\(^{243}\) Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
\(^{244}\) Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
\(^{245}\) Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
ASCAME members agree on the geographic outlook of the Association. The former President of ASCAME emphasized that “the only thing disturbing Turkey reveals when the Euro-Mediterranean project is regarded as an alternative of EU membership for Turkey”. Despite this broad regional focus, ASCAME consciously avoids using the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ to avoid being misunderstood as a ‘Southern European’ association, arguing that it is “possible that in this moment, [the Euro-Med] does not ‘explain itself’ well [and] what has been clear is that many people identified the Euro-Mediterranean with the Mediterranean European countries.”

Thus, while ASCAME has adopted a terminology different from the official Euro-Mediterranean concept, it frequently relates to broad regional cooperation of a Euro-Mediterranean scope in its publications and member activities.

### 7.2.2 Institutional Relations

ASCAME has positioned itself as a regionally oriented interface with contacts beyond its core focus on the business sector, particularly during the ITO Presidency of the Association. It is described by an interviewee as having

“come together with politicians, state persons and the representatives of the NGOs both from different Mediterranean and European countries. We have visited 22 cities, showed up at 32 occasions, made 60 speeches and expanded from 169 to 213 members. […] [ASCAME] “has always been and will be present at international events such as FEMIP Conference, MED Business Days, Crans Montana Forum, Mediterranean Week of Economic Leaders, Euromed Erasmus and Leonardo Programs Conference, MEDITOUR and MEDITEX”.

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246 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
247 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
248 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
Specifically, the Mediterranean Week of Economic Leaders has taken place seven times, involving both a variety of regional non-state organizations as well as regional institutions including the UfM and the European Investment Bank. The major Mediterranean Week of 2013, held in Barcelona “aimed at consolidating and defending the euro-Mediterranean integration and collaboration as the driving forces behind social and economic development of the region”. This context allowed the signature of four Memorandums of Understanding with civil society groups, and a special workshop was held on ‘University-Enterprise Cooperation’, specifically between ASCAME and the UNIMED network. Furthermore, two other networks – MEDCITIES, a territorial entity network, and the Association of Organisations of Mediterranean Businesswomen, AFAEMME – held their respective general meetings in the context of the Mediterranean Week. ASCAME has formalized its ties with a number of regional institutions under its current Presidency, on which it reports that

“[President] Mr. Choucair has also pursued in his efforts in order to encourage the creation of a Mediterranean Arbitration Center. Furthermore, he has been able to increase the presence of ASCAME in international economic organizations thanks to interviews with economic and politic leaders of the euro-Mediterranean region. Among them, he has met the President of the French republic Mr. François Hollande, the General Secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, Mr. Fathallah Sijilmassi; the President of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Michel Sleiman; the Vice-president of the EIB, Mr. de Fontaine Vive and the President of the Catalan government, Mr. Artur Mas among other important personalities.”

A Memorandum of Understanding between ASCAME and the EIB was eventually signed in November 2013. ASCAME has also furthered its political leverage via its close ties to the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBRES), a leading European advocacy association. While

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250 News section of the ASCAME website. Reference access on December 10, 2013.
EUROCHAMBRES has developed its own Euro-Mediterranean dimension through its relations to specific chambers, e.g. the Egyptian-European Business Association, and through its involvement in various initiatives and projects, a joint symposium with ASCAME was held in Marseille in 2013, and a cooperation agreement had previously been signed.251

7.2.3 Advocacy

ASCA ME has supported various specific revisions of Mediterranean and Euro-Mediterranean organizations and policies. It relates to several UfM ‘priority projects’ as well as to multi-stakeholder initiatives. For instance, ASCAME cooperates with the Union of Mediterranean Confederations of Enterprises (Businessmed),252 EUROCHAMBRES and the Anima Investment Network in the high-profile Invest in Med program253 which is sustained by EU funding and implemented in partnership with IGOs like the World Bank.

Despite its primarily riparian constituency, ASCAME has issued policy declarations directed at Euro-Med regional stakeholders:

“We produce reports the majority of which are outcomes of economic or sectoral meetings and forums, because we take into account that the role of the private sector is key in order to advance in regional and economic integration; therefore our reports or declarations are directed mainly at governments, the EU, UfM as well as at business organizations, Chambers of Commerce and communication media”.254

Thereby, the Association has positioned itself to relate to the existing regional

251 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
252 Interview 7n7 with a BUSINESSMED representative carried out on May 23, 2014.
253 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
254 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
frameworks. For instance, it stated that participants of the 2013 ‘Mediterranean Week’ had “the strong will to support the Union for the Mediterranean and Barcelona, in its decisive role as the economic capital and bridge between the northern and southern sides of the Mediterranean”. Generally, ASCAME has focused its advocacy on EU-level institutions as well as the UfM: “we have continued to persuade primarily in Brussels, and then the Union for the Mediterranean”. ASCAME’s former President explained that the UfM has received particular scrutiny due to its yet undefined character, arguing that it “is very important for the stability and the securing of peace in the region. [...] The UfM and ASCAME can generate studies [and projects] for the development of countries in the Southern Mediterranean”. In addition, various EU-level institutions have been at the center of attention during the 2007-2012 ASCAME Presidency: “During our Presidency term, we took lobbying activities with the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and Eurochambres, explaining them who we were and trying to get a deeper insight into the workings of the EU”. For 2013, the interviewee remarked that “ASCAME will more focus on increasing its say and role at the EU’s institutions and contributing to changes of regional policies and institutions will be one of the most important agenda items of ASCAME in 2013”. To this aim, the scope and North-South character of ASCAME are considered helpful in terms of the association’s legitimacy:

“We represent more than 30 million businesses, for which reason we have significant representative power. [...] We have important chambers of commerce such as Paris, Barcelona, Marseille, Istanbul, Roma, Milano, and

255 News section of the ASCAME website. Reference access on December 10, 2013.
256 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
257 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
258 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
259 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
we have chambers – I don’t know – from Sfax, from Tunis, or small ones from the South”.

In turn, the increased involvement of the private sector in policymaking as well as in policy implementation has been at the core of ASCAME’s advocacy:

“We have proposed that economic and business actors participate in the design of these [regional] policies so that they can afterwards implement them; and in all these matters, we participate as observers in many commissions such as the Euro-Med Industrial Cooperation, Mediterranean Solar Plan […] and there we contribute our position about what it would need to do from the private standpoint.”

The argument underlying these objectives is chiefly that “[if] we will be able to provide the necessary finance and opportunities in future years, SMEs will be able to provide about 5 million jobs in this sector [for instance sustained by a] ‘strong trade structure and unification between regions to present a secure and stable investment environment’.”

Briefly, the objective of ASCAME in economic relations is

“to help investment and regional integration initiatives; to support modernization and converge towards EU policies, regulations and standards and to promote major transnational infrastructures. In the social area, the objective is to promote gender equality, culture and intercultural dialogue and youth.”

ASCAME has also published documents jointly with other organizations, proposing increased private sector involvement. The Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Business Declaration of 2010 urged “political leaders to further promote Euro-Mediterranean economic integration and to involve the private sector systematically into the process

260 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
261 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
262 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
263 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
of shaping the Union for the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{264} The Declaration stated that “[w]e also expect business organisations to be closely associated with future decisions to guarantee that our views are fully taken on board” and demanded that the UfM “must be driven by a new spirit of cooperation and conciliation to unlock the potential of business development”.\textsuperscript{265} Beyond proposals for policy reform, this declaration also addressed institutional questions. It called, \textit{inter alia}, for additional business-focused funding of the UfM Secretariat, increased private sector participation in the UfM, a clarification of UfM structures and processes, the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, and for an externally funded Mediterranean Business Development Initiative targeting small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

To promote its points, ASCAME has referred to the power of a ‘Mediterranean brand’ or label and has conducted a study aimed at the development of a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank\textsuperscript{266} and a feasibility study on a Mediterranean Arbitration Tribunal. ASCAME members have undertaken ‘policy field trips’ to Brussels and the association is developing a ‘Bureau of representation’ in the city.

The UfM focus on Small and Medium Enterprises and certain of its economic priority projects reflect the ASCAME agenda. Specifically, ASCAME demands are increasingly reflected in the involvement of the EIB in UfM project financing, through the ‘Invest in Med’ cooperation or the multi-stakeholder EUROMED Invest project launched in 2014. Furthermore, the UfM has begun to host the Euro-Mediterranean Trade and Investment Facilitation Mechanism (TIFM) project aiming at the provision

\textsuperscript{266} Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
of an online information portal. An ASCAME interviewee summed up the association’s work by arguing that it

“has successfully convinced political organizations of the importance to count on the private sector as an actor, and not merely a spectator, in the design and implementation of economic policies or programs; and in this respect, we have made a lot of progress although there is still a long way ahead”.

7.2.4 Integration Pressure

While ASCAME pursues clear-cut policy goals, the association also emphasizes a broader need for cross-Mediterranean cooperation based on existing commonalities. Specifically, ASCAME’s previous President argues that

“[w]e should never underestimate the huge potential which the Mediterranean region is in possession of. In the Mediterranean area, we are talking about a total population of 500 millions of people and a total GDP of 8 trillion dollars. The population of young people in this region is about 100 millions. These facts are considerable advantages when we take the long view”.

In the light of figures of this type, ASCAME has advocated truly integrative policies considering the complementary of the North and South of the Mediterranean as well as the existing trade dynamics. Its former President elaborated that the “Northern Mediterranean boasts advanced technology, rich capital, and a huge market while Southern Mediterranean holds abundant sources of energy and inexpensive qualified manpower.” The perceived benefits of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and integration are also considered in the context of economic blocs which compete at the global scale, in line with the arguments introduced in the theory chapter of this

268 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
269 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
270 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
thesis. One ASCAME interviewee pointed out that to this aim, “the dedication to an area of integration between the EU and the Mediterranean is a project which is necessary for both despite the multiple problems”.271 Thereby, the Association has consistently argued that the wealth divide across the Mediterranean Sea should be tackled, stating that it “has worked to resolve the economic and social inequality between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries in cooperation with the European countries”.272

Findings of the ASCAME case thus support this study’s hypothesis regarding the re-orientation of even sub-regional organizations towards broader regional concerns and policymaking venues. The case of ASCAME is remarkable regarding the extent to which substantial policy and institutional reforms of a regional scope are advocated by the organization. The association’s focus on the regional political centers has been reflected by concrete results in terms of new cooperation initiatives and programs as well as by ASCAME’s involvement in public-private partnerships.

7.3 Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development

The Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development (EMA) constitutes part of this study’s sample as a case of a recently emerging Euro-Mediterranean business group based in a non-riparian state. EMA is an Incorporated Association promoting economic cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean space, with a focus on German-Arab business and trade relations. Founded in 2009, it is constituted by individual members – mostly from the business sector – from Germany

271 Interview 2n1 carried out on October 3, 2012 and questionnaire received from a staff member of the General Secretariat of ASCAME.
272 Questionnaire response 3n2 received from a former ASCAME President in January 2013.
and the broader Euro-Mediterranean area. While close to corporations and a number of other economic actors, its juridical status is that of a charitable and non-profit association. Its head offices are located in Hamburg, with a staff of five people lead by the association’s Secretary-General. In management terms, EMA is sustained by a 10-member Board comprising diplomats and by an Advisory Council. Furthermore, EMA operates issue-specific sub-organizations and associations at state level in Germany. While it is formally an autonomous organization, it has ties to the German government – and indeed recently received a ‘Development Sherpa’ paid for by federal funds – as well as to various North African institutions and Chambers of Commerce. EMA can also be considered a case of a ‘development network’ with a pro-integration agenda embedded into official policy.

EMA started publishing an open-contributing magazine called ‘Mediterranes’ which links the organization to research groups as well as individual contributors from the political and economic sphere. Each issue of Mediterranes is shipped in 10,000 hard copies, but is openly available in digital format as well. While the magazine addresses specific sectoral trends, it has addressed political questions as well as in a 2009 issue entirely devoted to the Union for the Mediterranean. The Federation of German Industry (BDI) contributed “ten demands” ranging from “strong structures” of the UfM and its Secretariat to an orientation of ‘exporting’ WTO and OECD standards to cover the entire Euro-Med region.

EMA has launched initiatives regarding a variety of dimensions of regional concern. One particularly visible initiative operates through the German-Arab Women’s Network Forum founded in 2012 to promote civil society exchange across

\[273\] EMA website. Reference access on December 9, 2013.
\[274\] Magazine contribution of 2009 titled ‘Ten Demands of BDI to the Union for the Mediterranean’ (‘Zehn Forderungen des BDI an die Union für das Mittelmeer’).
the countries concerned. The Network Forum is equally administered from Hamburg, Germany, but receives support from a number of other non-state organizations, besides EMA. Moreover, EMA publishes an open-audience newsletter called ‘Ouissal’, which focuses on its own activities, and in which it highlights its broader links to a variety of social and economic actors in Germany, the Southern Mediterranean, as well as in other EU member states.

7.3.1 Regional Orientation

As repeatedly highlighted throughout this study, the involvement of non-Mediterranean EU members in in Euro-Med or Euro-Arab economic cooperation is rapidly changing. This includes Germany, in the light of its economic position within the EU and in consideration of its economy’s pronounced export orientation. EMA itself maintains offices in Hamburg, the biggest German port city. In a contribution to EMA’s ‘Mediterranes’ magazine, the Chairman of the Hamburg State Social-Democrats pointed out that “the countries of the Arab World and of North Africa constitute a so-called focus region of Hamburg Senate’s politics” (Alkazaz, 2009, p. 16), partly in reaction to the City-State’s potential in terms of education, but also in response to a perceived under-development of economic relations to the MENA region.

The very name of EMA - Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development – signals the association’s situation within the broader context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, i.e. beyond traditional organizations focusing on bilateral relations or on relations of one country to one region. In its mission statement and self-definition, EMA’s activities in economic and research matters as well as on the
intercultural dimension are intended “to design exchange across the Mediterranean and Near East Region, Europe and particularly Germany”. While German-Arab exchange is central to EMA, the Association states that it “also embodies sub-regional and inter-regional cooperation. In this sense, EMA attaches high importance to South-South cooperation as the basis for the development of North-South cooperation”.275

Thus, EMA’s geographical references resemble those of the government-led array of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Indeed, EMA defines its approach on the basis of EU policy, but delineates its ‘EMA region’ so as to include Germany, the Southern Mediterranean states, Turkey, the member states of the GCC, as well as further non-Mediterranean member states of the Arab League.276 The Association consistently highlights the potential of Euro-Arab and German-Arab cooperation in a variety of fields as an opportunity presented by the existing economic context: The association also maintains ties to a variety of government agencies from across the Euro-Med space. Moreover, it has shaped ties to enable corporations based in Germany and beyond to become involved in regionally relevant policymaking processes. To the involvement of SMEs in development policy, EMA provides advice through its events and projects, but also through the publication of development policy tenders on its website.

The Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development is an intriguing case. On the one hand, its operations are centered on Germany; on the other hand, it has a broad regional understanding. On the one hand, it is a grouping of a clear-cut economic focus; on the other hand, it consistently underlines its organizational ethics and broad vision including support for a number of political and

275 EMA website. Reference access on December 9, 2013.
276 EMA Region Map.
socio-cultural objectives. On the one hand, it offers its expertise as an implementing organization for corporations and other ‘clients’; on the other hand, it defines its objectives in a semi-political way. Yet, the case of EMA illustrates how a sub-regional, pragmatically oriented organization, which understands itself as a mediator, has adopted a number of references and elements of discourse that concern geographically broader regional cooperation and integration, and converges to the official Euro-Mediterranean agenda to a degree.
8 TERRITORIAL ENTITIES IN EURO-MED NETWORKS

A number of networks of sub-national territorial entities (TE) based on city, municipal and regional governments across the Euro-Mediterranean share a core agenda regarding regional governance. TE networks can constitute regional actors in the understanding of this study’s theory framework. This chapter introduces the Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities (COPPEM), the Euromed Cities Network (ECN) and the Mediterranean Commission of the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG / CGLU-COMMED). In particular, it examines their political coordination through ARLEM and other venues.

8.1 Networks of Local and Regional Authorities

TEs are ultimately governmental entities. Advocacy by their networks tends to be less focused on sectoral regional cooperation. Instead, networks are primarily concerned with institutional reform, specifically with the extension of intergovernmental Euro-Med governance to the level of sub-national authorities.

8.1.1 The Euromed Cities Network

The Euromed Cities Network (ECN, Réseau des Villes Euromed) held its first Plenary Session in 2000. The Plenary followed up on the conclusions of a Euro-Med Foreign Affairs Ministerial held in Germany in April 1999 which was the first to highlight the
involvement of local authorities in the EMP.\textsuperscript{277} The initiative at the time originated from the City of Bordeaux, France. The ECN was formalized only at its first Plenary Session in 2009. A total of over 110 cities from across the Euro-Mediterranean region are members to this network. This figure includes a variety of municipalities from non-Mediterranean Europe, e.g. Hamburg, Antwerp, or Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{278}

The ECN Technical and General Secretariat is hosted by the rotating Presidency of the network; for instance, in 2010-2012, it was accommodated by the Municipality of Nice, France, while Fez, Morocco, and Jdeidé, Lebanon were Vice-Presidents. ECN conceives of itself as a consultative network constituted by major cities, i.e. usually cities with high population figures. In its role, ECN identifies as a consultative network and has been active in management training, focusing on questions of governance and exchange across members. It has developed relations with other institutions, and has come to be linked to the Eurocities Euromed Committee through City of Bordeaux. Furthermore, cooperation exists with the United Cities and Local Governments.

ECN considers itself to be the “first Euro-Mediterranean working group”, aiming to promote exchanges and dialog at the level of TEs in line with “the general principles of the Barcelona Process”.\textsuperscript{279} Indeed, according to its statutes, the network “was born out of the volition of European cities and of cities of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean to actively engage in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” [author's translation].\textsuperscript{280} ECN has claimed this role within the UCLG – which is also listed as a ‘partner organization’ on its website - as well as towards

\textsuperscript{277} Website section of June 2010 titled ‘La création et l’évolution du Réseau des villes Euromed’.
\textsuperscript{278} French-language version of the Euromed Cities network website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
\textsuperscript{279} Website section of June 2010 titled ‘La création et l’évolution du Réseau des villes Euromed’.
\textsuperscript{280} ECN Statutes ['internal regulations'] as published on November 12, 2009.
regional addressees. It undertakes “lobbying to strengthen relations between the Euromed Cities Network and EU bodies”, focusing on questions of governance.281 The network has suggested a process “towards a Union of Cities in the Mediterranean” which was presented, for instance, at the occasion of its 2012 Plenary Session attended also by a representative of the UfM Secretariat.282

8.1.2 The Mediterranean Commission

COMMED, first suggested in 2001 and adopted by the UCLG Councils in 2005, is a network of various types of sub-national TEs from across the Euro-Mediterranean space. Since 2006, it has operated a small Secretariat in Marseille, France, hosted since 2012 by the Territoires Solidaires network and primarily sustained by the City of Marseille and the French Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region. In addition, the network maintains antennae in North Africa, governed by a representative Council of its members. The City of Marseille has also been involved in other networks of a Mediterranean orientation, and has forged its own partnerships, notably with Barcelona by means of a specific charter signed in 1998. This charter also involved Genova and Lyon283 and provided the basis for lobbying the European Commission for increased funding for Mediterranean TEs.284

COMMED has a broad geographical scope in terms of its membership as its membership is composed of a sub-set of the members of the UCLG, though exceptions can be granted.285 Indeed, an interviewee pointed out that the

281 COMMED CGLU brief on the ECN. Reference access on December 15, 2013.
282 Press release on the first ECN plenary session held on February 9-10, 2012 in Nice, France.
283 City of Marseille web page on city network involvement. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
284 Interview 5n4 with a local authority official carried out on April 18, 2013.
involvement of atypical members from non-Mediterranean Europe or from the Balkans is desired and envisaged.\textsuperscript{286}

A Political Council was set up within COMMED in 2013, in which ARLEM holds observer status and which is chaired by representatives from Morocco, Lebanon, Turkey, and the West Bank. In a 2013 Charter emerging from its work, the importance of democratic local governance was highlighted.\textsuperscript{287} At the same time, its mission includes to “give a political voice to Mediterranean local and regional authorities”, to define political strategies and to “intensify the political dialogue with international institutions, as well as regional integration in the three continents concerned”.\textsuperscript{288} Thus, COMMED envisages providing “visibility and legibility to the numerous initiatives of local authorities in the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{289} More generally, COMMED defines as its objective to

“Engage in dialogue with donors of State and multilateral funds (French Development Agency, Bretton Woods Institutions, United Nations agencies, investment bank funds), and to promote closer relations with the institutions of the European Union (EU Parliament, Commission, Committee of the Regions) [and to] [d]efend the role and participation of local authorities in the Barcelona Process-Union for the Mediterranean, the new Neighborhood Policy and overall within the Mediterranean partnership.”\textsuperscript{290}

This kind of dialog is facilitated, for instance, in the context of the Fora of Local and Regional Authorities initiated by COMMED. The 2013 edition was concluded with remarks by high-ranking representatives of key institutions for Euro-Mediterranean politics, among them the Vice-President of ARLEM, the President of the Anna Lindh...
Foundation, the Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, and the UfM Secretary-General. Furthermore, reports on questions of youth and on governance have been produced by COMMED and its constitutive TEs. These reports are shared across members and disseminated among national and European authorities. The City of Marseille, which is at the heart of COMMED, additionally channels its positions vis-à-vis regional addressees by relying on national-level intermediaries in the National Assembly and Senate of France.

8.1.3 COPPEM

In Italian, COPPEM originally stands for Comitato Permanente per il Partenariato Euromediterraneo delle Autorità Locali e delle Regioni. This Committee was established in 2000 as a non-profit international association, was formally adopted in 2002 and has notably expanded its scope in 2012. Originally, it had been promoted by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) as well as by the Arab Towns Organization (ATO). COPPEM has grown to 117 full members as well as 117 so-called alternate members. Members are appointed by national-level TE networks across the Euro-Mediterranean region across which they are relatively equally distributed. They comprise both various types of local authorities and national associations thereof.

The Committee operates a Euromediterranean Office of around twenty Secretariat employees in Palermo, Italy. There, it is supported by the Sicily Region

291 Program of the Forum of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean held in Marseille on April 3-4, 2013.
292 Interview 5n4 with a local authority official carried out on April 18, 2013.
293 English, French and Italian language versions of the COPPEM website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
“through a special law”. The Secretariat includes an External Relations department staffed by four employees. COPPEM also maintains representations in Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Israel, Palestine, and Poland. Moreover, its structure includes five specific commissions involving more than 20 members, one of them focusing on political and institutional questions. COPPEM is sustained by a comprehensive governance structure including a Presidency Council, an Assembly. Cooperation through COPPEM has, for instance, initiated a federation of parks and reserves of the Mediterranean. It has also coordinated the Euro-Arab Cities Forums which led to a joint Declaration on matters relevant to cities in both the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean.

COPPEM’s stated core objectives cooperation of local authorities regarding local development. Beyond its statutes, COPPEM has stated five priority areas, which also include “political and institutional cooperation”. The COPPEM Secretariat has also produced reports, including an 87-page review of the legislative structure in decentralized government in 37 Euro-Mediterranean countries, which constitutes a basis for its own operations (COPPEM, 2003).

COPPEM considers itself as supportive of the goals of the Barcelona Declaration and of the development of the UfM. Its name suggests the objective of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership across the local level. COPPEM specifically advocates TE’s “active and concrete participation in achieving the objectives established within the Barcelona Declaration of ’95”. In geographical terms, its membership explicitly comprises entities from those “Countries which signed Barcelona Declaration and from States joined Union for the

294 Section ‘About us’ of the COPPEM website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
296 Section ‘About us’ of the COPPEM website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{297} An interviewee commented regarding COPPEM’s geographic outlook that “strengthening cooperation and widening the area of cooperation is a key activity to do in order to succeed to find solutions, sustainable solutions for our future, the Euro-Mediterranean future”, and that COPPEM members share this vision.\textsuperscript{298}

COPPEM initiatives address political issues of Euro-Med regional politics, including questions of governance and institutions. In this context, COPPEM has also signed Memoranda with non-governmental and governmental regional and sub-regional organizations from across the Euro-Mediterranean. This includes local or national associations like the Italian ‘National Association of Families Emigrants’ but also a partnership regarding CO2 emissions agreed with the Commission Directorate-General Energy in 2012.\textsuperscript{299} In various declarations, COPPEM has directly related to regional policies and institutions. The COPPEM Secretariat already produced a policy brief at the advent of the UfM, including an evaluative summary.\textsuperscript{300} At the 2010 General Assembly of the Committee, its Secretary-General opined that a UfM crisis cannot be accepted, as “it's like we abandoned the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration. We need to study the forms for a decisive contribution”.\textsuperscript{301}

\textsuperscript{297} Section ‘About us’ of the COPPEM website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
\textsuperscript{298} Interview 1n1 with a staff member of the COPPEM Secretariat carried out on October 24, 2012.
\textsuperscript{299} COPPEM article of November 22, 2012.
\textsuperscript{300} Policy brief by the Political and Institutional Commission of COPPEM.
\textsuperscript{301} COPPEM article of November 30, 2010 on the COPPEM Assembly.
8.1.4 The Origins of ARLEM

In the context of their orientation towards Euro-Mediterranean policy and institutional revision, TE networks have promoted decentralization as well as “regional integration processes”\(^{302}\). Concrete reforms of Euro-Mediterranean regional frameworks were proposed in a joint Declaration of Mediterranean Mayors of 2003. In a 2008 Declaration of Local and Regional Authorities for the Mediterranean, TE networks demanded that a “formal representation system of local and regional authorities in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership must be set up urgently, in order to involve them in the design and implementation of the main policies” [author’s translation].\(^{303}\) Another Declaration of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean followed in May 2010.

These demands for involvement culminated in the formalization of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM). COMMED has been at the center of the push for the institutionalization of the participation of the sub-national level in Euro-Mediterranean politics. For this purpose, support was sought from decision-makers in the region, including from the regional organizations in question.\(^{304}\) In 2009, a ‘background note’ was released by UCLG. In it, the Union claims that a process started in 1995 in the framework of the ‘Meeting of Mediterranean Cities’ and with the Barcelona Declaration itself

“seems to have produced concrete results with the resolution for the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (EMRLA) as the structure for political representation of local and regional authorities within the EMP and the Union for the Mediterranean” (Mediterranean Commission of United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 1).

\(^{302}\) COMMED web page on objectives and actions. Reference access on November 20, 2013.

\(^{303}\) Declaration of Local and Regional Authorities for the Mediterranean of June 2008.

UCLG identified a basis for actual participation of the TE level in the first ‘Forum of Local and Regional Authorities’ of 2000. Yet, it acknowledges that operational participation “gradually evolved”. The Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Mayors of 2003, in conjunction with the experience of first Euro-Med TE-level project funding schemes, is considered to have led to a strengthened recognition, by Foreign Affairs Ministers, of Euro-Med cooperation at the local level. According declarations were contributed to the Committee of the Regions in 2004 and from the Western Mediterranean sub-regional TE grouping ‘Arco Latino’ in 2005. UCLG considers the ensuing decisions to have “led to the MED PACT Programme and later to the CIUDAD Programme” (Mediterranean Commission of United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 2) which involve local authorities in operational cooperation of Euro-Mediterranean scope.

Declarations demanding increased political participation of TEs included, furthermore, the Declaration of cities and regions on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 2005, in which the demand for “a permanent Euro-Mediterranean forum of local and regional authorities directly supported and recognised by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” was first expressed (Mediterranean Commission of United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 3). UCLG itself identifies its Forum of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean of 2008, in which 140 elected officials were present, as a “turning point in this respect” (ibid). In the following, this initiative received support from the level of Ministers and, in more concrete terms, from the follow-up process at the level of Senior Officials. COPPEM highlights that ARLEM’s “former Co-Presidents from the South shore were the both COPPEM
members and among ARLEM bureau members also one of the COPPEM Vice-President seats”.

While the advocacy activities of Euro-Mediterranean TE networks have partly been channeled through ARLEM since 2010, its activities outside the Assembly continued as well. For instance, in 2013, a political declaration of the Forum of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean specifically addressed “heads of State and Government, international fund donors, members of parliament and all the different actors of civil society” and demanded “a stronger and deeper Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from European institutions for 2014-2020.” It also repeated demands to “enhance the participation of local and regional governments” and asked for “the States to seize the opportunities to support decentralization and deconcentration that are included in the proposals of the European commission.” Specifically, this led to calls for reinforced cooperation policies, e.g. with a reference to the Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue program. In institutional terms, it asked riparian states to “set up a global programming that should include local and regional authorities right from the start in the definition of priorities and foresee appropriate resources” for a macro-regional strategy and ARLEM was encouraged “to continue the dialogue with the UfM, in order to assure its territorial dimension” including at sectoral conferences.

305 Section ‘About us’ of the COPPEM website. Reference access on November 20, 2013.
306 Political declaration of the Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean as gathered at the Forum of April 2013 in Marseille.
307 Political declaration of the Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean as gathered at the Forum of April 2013 in Marseille.
308 Political declaration of the Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean as gathered at the Forum of April 2013 in Marseille.
8.2 Associated through ARLEM

The Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM; alternatively referred to as Euro-Mediterranean Assembly of Local and Regional Authorities) was inaugurated in 2010 as a quasi-international network.\textsuperscript{309} ARLEM is constituted by 84 local and regional representatives from more than 30 mostly riparian countries. Its members are designated by the Assembly’s constitutive bodies, which prominently includes the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR) on which it was modeled and by which it is hosted.\textsuperscript{310} ARLEM members from various other countries tend to be sub-national representatives with prior activity in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Ten of the European members of ARLEM are representatives of TE networks, among them Arco Latino, UCLG, COPPEM, and MedCities. Next to the foundation of ARLEM on the design of the CoR, its format was also inspired by the dialog format established in preparation of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU. The former President of CoR, Luc van den Brande, is described as having been particularly supportive in the initiation of ARLEM.\textsuperscript{311}

The North-South parity within the Association’s eight-member Bureau, as well as its co-chairing principle reflects the organizational structure of the UfM. Indeed, ARLEM maintains close ties to the UfM, having signed a Declaration of Intent for cooperation with its Secretariat.\textsuperscript{312} The UfM Secretary-General reciprocated this development by pointing out that to reach concrete results, “we cannot do what we

\textsuperscript{309} Web article of January 25, 2010 on the European platform of local and regional authorities for development.
\textsuperscript{310} Website of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM). Reference access on November 20, 2013.
\textsuperscript{311} Anonymous interview 5i1 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
\textsuperscript{312} Anonymous interview 5i1 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
are doing in UfM without thinking about ARLEM”. The Assembly holds observer status at the UfM, in its Senior Officials Meetings as well as at the UfM Parliamentary Assembly (PA – UfM, formerly EMPA). One of the meetings of ARLEM’s Bureau has taken place in Barcelona, the seat of the UfM Secretariat in 2013. Indeed, ARLEM has set up two commissions which are intended specifically to increase the association’s involvement in the implementation of the UfM’s sectoral priorities and has identified the uploading of its recommendations a stated objective, particularly focusing on the UfM Secretariat, the European Commission, and the EEAS.

Hence, largely, ARLEM operates within the existing UfM framework. Other, primarily European institutions have forged ties with ARLEM following its constitution. These ties are illustrated by the high-level attendance of the ARLEM Plenary in 2013 by representatives of the EU institutions, including Special Representative Bernardino León, by the UfM Secretary-General, by the President of the European Economic and Social Committee, and by high-ranking representatives of the Anna Lindh Foundation, European Investment Bank, and various national governments. The European Economic and Social Committee received observer status at the Association in 2013.

ARLEM has appropriated the aim of a stronger Euro-Mediterranean regional-level representation of the sub-national level. While subscribing to a regional integration agenda, ARLEM highlights the value of decentralized cooperation in the sense advocated by TE networks and carries their agenda further. For instance, in January 2012, ARLEM’s Plenary called on a “Euro-Mediterranean cohesion policy”

313 Documentation of the 4th ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
315 ARLEM draft work programme for 2013, dated February 1.
316 Anonymous interview 911 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
317 Documentation of the 4th ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
and on “the extension of the Covenant of Mayors to Southern Mediterranean cities and regions”\textsuperscript{318}. The Covenant of Mayors is a European Commission initiative aimed at highlighting and coordinating the implementation of sustainable energy initiatives. The Covenant has indeed appropriated the objective for itself, as will be discussed further on.

In addition, ARLEM has begun to operate as a platform for debate and advocacy on a variety of policy matters of Euro-Mediterranean regional relevance. Its 2013 Plenary, for instance, addressed the role of the local level in providing responses to the regional issue of youth unemployment through an emphasis on vocational training a field in which projects involving territorial governance were initiated\textsuperscript{319}. Furthermore, ARLEM has brought together the UfM MED4JOBS initiative and the European Entrepreneurial Regions\textsuperscript{320}.

For a different example, ARLEM has highlighted the territorial dimension regarding water policy and its suggested urban strategy, arguing that “implementation is always local”\textsuperscript{321}. The Assembly has also promoted a role of the EU institutions and the UfM in the field of tourism development (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, 2013b) Specifically, ARLEM and the CoR pledged to shape the Commission position regarding coastal tourism\textsuperscript{322}, on which a public consultation had been held in 2012 followed up by a joint workshop of the Commission and the CoR in April 2013\textsuperscript{323}.

\textsuperscript{318} Euroalert news report of January 31, 2012 titled ‘Local and regional authorities could help to achieve an innovative Euro-Mediterranean cohesion policy’.
\textsuperscript{319} Documentation of the 4\textsuperscript{th} ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
\textsuperscript{320} Anonymous interview 5\textsuperscript{i1} with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
\textsuperscript{321} Documentation of the 4\textsuperscript{th} ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
\textsuperscript{322} Documentation of the 4\textsuperscript{th} ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
\textsuperscript{323} European Commission web page on coastal and maritime tourism. Reference access on February 26, 2014.
ARLEM member organizations have made specific project proposals as well.\textsuperscript{324} For instance, they proposed a project on the “reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacities of local and regional authorities in the management of public policies on the field of urban development”\textsuperscript{325} In this case, ARLEM discussed the project ahead of time with a variety of TE networks, including COPPEM and UCLG\textsuperscript{326} as well as at the occasion of the first ARLEM Bureau meeting held at the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{327}

The Assembly’s annual reports highlight its institutional relations, specifically regarding its role within the UfM governance structure. For instance, its annual report of 2012 finds that “the presence of ARLEM at meetings of senior officials as an observer has proved to be useful for ensuring a high institutional profile for the Assembly vis-à-vis both the UfM member states and the EU institutions present” (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, 2013a, p. 4). The 2012 report also mentions the development of “lines of action” with EMUNI, based on a Declaration of Intent (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, 2013a, p. 5). These kinds of institutional ties are understood as the basis for ARLEM’s “political commitment” which comprises the commitment to “the territorialisation of the UfM’s sectoral policies” (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, 2013a, p. 6). The Assembly pledges to “ensure that regional and local players are involved” in UfM projects (ibid: 12). Specifically, ARLEM “has called for the adoption of a Mediterranean urban strategy, a spatial planning system for the Mediterranean, and the establishment of a Mediterranean urban agency, a task which could be taken on

\textsuperscript{324} Anonymous interview 5i1 with a regional official carried out on April 11, 2013.
\textsuperscript{325} Synopsis of February 2014 of the 5th ARLEM plenary session.
\textsuperscript{326} Report of November 2013 on the ARLEM Meeting with Associations.
\textsuperscript{327} UfM Secretariat press release of May 23, 2013 on the 11th Bureau meeting of the ‘Assembly of Euro-Mediterranean regions and cities’.
by the Secretariat of the UfM for the time being” (ibid). Moreover, the Assembly states that it “has always called for an innovative Euro-Mediterranean cohesion policy” (ibid: 14), also in the light of advancing “regional integration [which] would increase the GDP of the southern countries and foster growth for the whole Euro-Mediterranean region” (ibid: 15).

This chapter has, thus far, indicated how TE networks have oriented towards the Euro-Mediterranean regional level, which has culminated in the formalization of their participation via ARLEM. In line with this study’s neo-functionalist hypotheses, local and regional authorities and their respective alliances have adopted a degree of regional actorhood with a particular emphasis on institutional affairs.

8.3 Program and Project Cooperation

Numerous Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects, usually funded by regional institutions, have been established at the level of Territorial Entities. TE networks have accordingly disseminated calls for proposals among their members, as in the case of an EU program aiming at cooperation of local authorities and non-state actors. MED-PACT was an initial ENPI project of a budget of €5 million, funded for 2006-2010. Its aim was to promote “dialogue and cooperation between cities and their civil societies”, specifically in the MENA region. In the beginning of 2009, Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue (CIUDAD) was launched as a follow-up to MED-PACT. CIUDAD was endowed with €14 million and was initially funded thru 2011, though it was eventually concluded only in late 2013. In contrast to

\[328 \text{UCLG document of December 4, 2009 on financing Opportunities for local authorities.}\]

\[329 \text{EU Neighbourhood Info Centre sheet on MED-PACT. Reference access on February 6, 2014.}\]
MED-PACT, the idea of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and exchange of best practices was highlighted in CIUDAD. Therefore, nine projects were funded including over 30 Mediterranean and 25 European cities. While one of the MED-PACT programs already involved the non-riparian Bruxelles Capitale as a project leader\注330, CIUDAD extended the program scope to include local authorities as well as project partners like universities from EU countries, its Eastern and Southern neighborhood (CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism, 2013).

CIUDAD was outfitted with a Supporting Mechanism, i.e. a kind of secretariat for technical and administrative assistance in project implementation. The project team of this Mechanism, composed of five individuals, operated from Brussels, Kiev, and Beirut. Due to its organizational structure and visibility, the Supporting Mechanism had a significant coordinating function for the individual program-financed projects. In November 2013, it co-organized the final event of the program in Istanbul which brought "together representatives of many of the 170 institutions involved in the CIUDAD programme"\注331.

The Supporting Mechanism has facilitated the long-term involvement of TEs in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, through horizontal networks but also through overarching groupings. Meanwhile, the Covenant of Mayors has been joined by Southern Mediterranean cities. Notably, Salé in Morocco “is an example now also for a new contract that has been signed recently, the Cleaner Energy Saving Mediterranean Cities” (CES-MED)\注332, an ENPI-funded network for technical

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\注330 MED-PACT website. Reference access on February 6, 2014.
\注331 EU Neighbourhood Info Centre press release of November 14, 2013 on the CIUDAD final conference.
\注332 Anonymous interview 3i1 carried out on January 24, 2013.
assistance active since January 2013 which is also aimed at an approximation of Southern Med cities to the Covenant of Mayors.\textsuperscript{333}

The team of the Supporting Mechanism and individual TEs involved in CIUDAD projects have also represented their work vis-à-vis ARLEM. For instance, the Supporting Mechanism maintained a booth at an ARLEM Plenary.\textsuperscript{334} An interviewee stated that “it’s an ongoing contact and discussion with them; so we are trying to combine forces, and some [cities involved with CIUDAD] are also members of ARLEM”.\textsuperscript{335}

Participation in CIUDAD projects has been open to non-Mediterranean states as well as the Eastern neighborhood, as materialized in a cooperation of Brussels with Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon. With regard to a cooperation that includes Friedrichshafen, Germany, an interviewee explained that “their twin city was Polotsk [in Belarus], so for this reason they decided to put in place this project, the SURE [Sustainable urban energy in the ENPI region – towards the Covenant of Mayors] project, and then they came across Salé. […] [I]t’s a bit of a weird combination of Morocco, Belarus and Germany, but it worked; so it was a good example of interregional cooperation”.\textsuperscript{336}

While the actorhood of CIUDAD and its Supporting Mechanism is limited due to its character of EU policy facilitator, an interviewee stated that based on the experience gathered in the context of the program, “there are a lot of very interesting points that I think the European Commission, the European Union, the international donors in general have to take into consideration”, for instance in the context of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{333} CES-MED website. Reference access on December 15, 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{334} Documentation of the 4\textsuperscript{th} ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{335} Anonymous interview 3i1 carried out on January 24, 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{336} Anonymous interview 3i1 carried out on January 24, 2013.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Results Oriented Monitoring. In this sense, the suggestions of the Supporting Mechanism are considered

“from purely administrative to more higher-level, I would say; so program level, project level, sub-project level; and trying to influence a little bit what the Commission will elaborate in the future; so we are starting locally to try to influence, I would say, the politics, the policies of the European Commission”.  

Similarly, in the case of CIUDAD’s predecessor program, MED-PACT, a publication had summed up “lessons learned and recommendations” from program and project implementation in a nuanced and partly openly critical way.

Various projects under CIUDAD and similar programs have been extended to a Euro-Mediterranean scope. For instance, in the case of the NEW MEDINA project in the field of sustainable urban planning, the operational scope of the European New Towns & Pilot Cities Platform (ENTP) was enlarged so as to comprise a Euro-Mediterranean dimension. An interviewee stated that individual participant local authorities in Europe “have the impression that, maybe, you know, we should start cooperating […] with European local authorities; it’s easier; and they don’t see that, you know, the borders are also what we make them”. In contrast, other participants from EU countries acknowledge the parallels of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the institutionalization of ties between European cities, “something they experienced in a very different way, like, 40, 50 years ago”.

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337 Anonymous interview 3i1 carried out on January 24, 2013.
338 Anonymous interview 3i1 carried out on January 24, 2013.
339 Brochure of November 2009 titled 'Local Authorities Partnership in the Mediterranean Programme (MED-PACT). Lessons learned and recommendations.'
340 Interview 1p1 with a CIUDAD project member carried out on October 24, 2012.
341 Interview 1p1 with a CIUDAD project member carried out on October 24, 2012.
The interviewee argued that in the light of Euro-Mediterranean interconnectedness, people involved in cooperation projects are working for regional cooperation:

“there is a need of cooperation, a need of exchange, dialog, not only at governmental level; and that's really what is interesting about this project, that it's about non-state actors, local authorities, and not only, you know, intergovernmental cooperation”.342

Thereby, even project cooperation is understood to comprise a political component “because there are recommendations from the experts” and since the CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is in a position to forward ideas and demands to the EU institutions.343

8.4 Local and Regional Authorities in Euro-Mediterranean Politics

The activities of TEs and their networks have come to constitute an integral dimension of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Their advocacy has resulted in the institutionalization of ARLEM while in parallel, a multi-layered field of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation at program and project level developed. The TE networks discussed in this chapter increasingly take on a consultative role vis-à-vis the Euro-Mediterranean regional-level institutions. Local and regional authorities and their alliances have targeted various political channels in this quest. Their advocacy tends to refer to integration pressures, of a cultural or a functional character, and tends to highlight the need for institutional reform of an integrative character. For instance, the

342 Interview 1p1 with a CIUDAD project member carried out on October 24, 2012.
343 Interview 1p1 with a CIUDAD project member carried out on October 24, 2012.
increasing shared environmental pressure across the Mediterranean is emphasized as a basis for intensified cooperation.

From a theory perspective, local and regional authorities have converged around the adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean cooperation agenda. In their specifically regionally oriented cooperation contexts, TEs illustrate how individual sub-state entities shift their orientation and, to some degree, their loyalties towards a regional focus at one among the various levels within a broader government hierarchy. Furthermore, this case study illustrates the diversification of geographical orientations within a national context. The following chapter will compare and discuss the findings of the case and organization studies discussed thus far. It will examine patterns, key differences and paradoxes of the non-state organizations discussed thus far, with a focus on the theory implications of these findings.
9 Conclusion: Regional Convergence and Advocacy

In order to assess the potential of, and restrictions to, the application of neo-functionalism to Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors, this chapter will compare empirical research findings regarding individual non-state organizations and their approaches to the Euro-Mediterranean region respectively to regional political activity. Furthermore, it discusses cross-case results regarding the specificities and challenges common to Euro-Mediterranean non-state activity, e.g. the multi-faceted positions non-state organizations adopt towards EU-driven regionalism. Findings are discussed in the light of this study’s research questions which inquired why and how non-state organizations position themselves towards the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean region, and to what extent they become political actors, possibly promoting integration at the regional level. The final sections of this chapter engage with the value of taking into account New Regionalism approaches and the perspective of embedding the Euro-Mediterranean case in the existing scholarship on Comparative Regionalism, and conclude by suggesting future research avenues and challenges.

9.1 Comparing Non-State Groups

This study has intended to include cases of a variety of characteristics so as to take a wide-angle picture of Euro-Mediterranean non-state actors. The variation of cases along theory-relevant dimensions allows for their structured comparison. Table 9.1 indicates for each case the combination of field of activity, regional orientation, scale of operation as classified by membership and staff size, as well as degree of financial
or statutory embeddedness with UfM and ENP structures. Across case studies, large membership, staff size, and economic orientation support an organization’s regional reorientation. A prior embeddedness in, and familiarity with, regional institutions facilitates advocacy access. At the same time, individual organizations have actively pursued a strategy to become embedded in regional projects, as in the cases of Dii and ASCAME, have attempted to position themselves as a key interlocutor for a field, as in the case of EPUF, or have successfully advocated institutional integration into the Euro-Mediterranean contexts, as in the case of ARLEM. These findings support the neo-functionalist expectation of groups’ convergence towards the Euro-Mediterranean regional context, dependent on prior governance of a field and familiarity of groups with the regional policymaking and institutional structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Embeddedness</th>
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<td>EURO-MED</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>EMHRN</td>
<td>EURO-MED</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>ASCAME</td>
<td>Med+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>O</td>
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<td>O / ++</td>
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<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Med</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>ALF NATIONAL NETWORKS / ECEM / FFM</td>
<td>EURO-MED</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1: Matrix of Case Characteristics

This study has contributed an alternative angle regarding the question of what makes regional cooperation ‘take off’, i.e. *by whom and when* it is taken into consideration. Indeed, various non-state organizations have a Euro-Med orientation and political
agenda, regionally constituted membership, and direct their policy demands to regional-level decision-makers. Frequently, when advocating for intensified Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, or when addressing questions of institutions or governance, actors’ positions are underpinned by reference to official institutional objectives, previous integration dynamics or cooperation pressures. The following sections will discuss cross-case results regarding groups’ regional orientations, political activity, and their navigation of the hybrid institutional framework of Euro-Mediterranean politics.

9.2 Regional Orientation

As expected by neo-functionalism, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has unleashed or produced non-governmental dynamics of a geographic orientation towards its regional centers. Empirical research for the present study shows that regionally constituted non-state organizations tend to subsequently regionalize their operations and policy focus. The perceived importance of cross-Mediterranean cooperation and integration is shared across stakeholders of different backgrounds.

Accordingly, empirical research signals an ideational component among stakeholders directly involved in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Interviewees have highlighted the importance of regional stability, peace, intercultural dialog and interpersonal interaction as in the case of 14km, besides political and economic benefits as in the cases of ASCAME or Dii. Despite this regional convergence, organizations attribute importance to Euro-Mediterranean terminology and concepts to varying degrees, ranging from their clear association with it, as in the cases of individual ALF members or EPUF, via a critical commitment as in the case of other
ALF members, to strategic avoidance in the cases of ASCAME and Desertec or indifference in the case of Greenpeace.

Interviewees from among non-state organizations refer to the Euro-Mediterranean, sometimes interchangeably, as a ‘region’, an ‘area’, a ‘concept’, a ‘space’, a ‘project’, a ‘framework’, a ‘vision’, a ‘process’, an ‘idea’, a ‘union’, a ‘cause’, a ‘zone’, and less frequently also as ‘politics’, ‘affairs’, and ‘policies’. Importantly, the majority of stakeholders from non-state as well as from governments and regional institutions point out the benefits of regional cooperation which also includes non-Mediterranean EU members. This observation is in line with survey findings of the increasing participation of ‘Northern’ members in originally riparian non-state organizations. Potential motivations for this geographical extension include cultural ideals, the attempt to raise the group’s visibility and legitimacy, additional political support from national circles, access to program funding, or the exchange of best practices in certain policy fields. For instance, the prestige of non-Mediterranean institutions of higher education was highlighted in the case of EPUF. More generally, the need to mitigate ‘negative externalities’ caused by instability in the Southern Mediterranean was frequently linked to a responsibility for engagement by non-Mediterranean Europe. These points are reciprocated by most stakeholders based in non-Mediterranean countries who have highlighted an increasing interest in Euro-Mediterranean or Euro-Arab links, for instance triggered by economic interests, immigration, the debate around the US-proclaimed ‘war on terror’, or the Danish ‘cartoon crises’.

When the existing Euro-Mediterranean institutional framework is contested by the organizations studied, this is largely limited to specific policies and institutions or to other actors’ agendas, and hardly occurs regarding the very idea or the official
geographic scope of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. At the same time, individual groups maintain a focus on Mediterranean riparian states, as in the case ASCAME. In addition, an understanding of Euro-Mediterranean as implying Euro-Arab persists from early EC approaches and defines individual non-state organizations as in the case of EMA. Accordingly, stakeholders’ attitudes diverge regarding the desirability of including individual states or groups of states in the Euro-Mediterranean notion, notably when it comes to Turkey, Mauritania, and the non-EU Mediterranean states of the Western Balkan. The inclusion of Israel in Euro-Mediterranean affairs is particularly contested and is a key reason for the persistence of an alternative Euro-Arab framing of cooperation.

Despite the omnipresent uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the Euro-Mediterranean space, the majority of non-state stakeholders subscribe to a positive outlook. One interviewee summed up his impressions regarding the future of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation by stating that “we can reach our objectives, but it will take time”.\(^{344}\) In certain cases, positive outlooks are conceived of as conditional on achieving the objectives advocated by the stakeholder, as in the case of the business agenda of ASCAME, or to readjustment of the EU’s overarching approach to the Mediterranean region, as in the case of EPUF. One interviewee summed his position up by arguing that due to the importance of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, “we just have to remain critical and see how we can all try to improve it”.\(^{345}\)

\(^{344}\) Interview 1n1 with a staff member of the COPPEM Secretariat carried out on October 24, 2012.
\(^{345}\) Interview 3n4 with the Danish ALF Network Coordinator carried out on January 29, 2013.
9.3 Political Activity

In addition to the regional orientation of non-state groups, neo-functionalism expects that individual Euro-Mediterranean non-state groups go beyond their original mission to advocate specific regional policies in regional decision-making. Case studies have shown that organizations tend to engage in ‘venue shopping’ across the overlapping regional centers of Euro-Mediterranean affairs. Several among the studied organizations specifically direct their political activity at Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings, conferences or workshops.

Regional political activity by non-state actors is conditioned by several factors. First, non-state stakeholders perceive the ‘gains from regional activity’ to be high in terms of regional policy redefinition or allocation of additional financial resources. Second, the multisectoral character of Euro-Mediterranean regionalism signals a ‘relevant sectoral coverage’ as suggested in neo-functionalism as a precondition for non-state organizations’ access. Third, non-state organizations’ staff tends to be familiar with the relevant structures and policy processes at various levels of governance, allowing them to ‘ascertain benefits of supranational activity’. To this aim, groups commonly facilitate political advocacy by an argumentative mobilization of integration dynamics, e.g. regarding a necessity of intensified cooperation. Sure enough, deep Euro-Mediterranean integration along functional necessities is a prospect only for certain sub-sectors, and the intensity and type of groups’ political advocacy at Euro-Mediterranean level depends on their organizational nature and target sector. While this limits the applicability of neo-functionalism to the Euro-Mediterranean and similar regions, individual policy adaptations illustrated by the case studies can be interpreted as low-intensity spill-over or spill-around.
In addition to what has been shown by the case studies, the political role of non-state organizations at Euro-Mediterranean level and the feedback created by their regional convergence is generally also welcomed by government and regional officials. Most regional officials and diplomat who were interviewed for this study stated to be aware of non-state actors’ activities and of policy papers produced by them, though one interviewee explicitly opposed increasing funding for NGOs.\textsuperscript{346}

One national diplomat highlighted the willingness to “respond to participation invitations, if meetings, forums, working group meetings are being arranged by [the] private sector, NGOs on the related fields nationally, regionally or internationally” and to “take note of the ideas, discussions of the meetings for further consideration”.\textsuperscript{347} Another diplomat opined that critical opinions are accepted by her government: at the Anna Lindh Forum, “they will have a lot of non-governmental organizations here that criticize the government on this issue or on other issue; so it’s civil society, it’s open, and democracy in Israel, but this is a good example that they gather and do things together”.\textsuperscript{348}

Another diplomat also argued that because of the nature of intergovernmentalism and the socialization of diplomats, non-state actors are important “because they can do and say things that we states cannot do or say. […] [My diplomat colleagues] they all speak English or French, and they’ve had a good education. […] but, I mean, the rest of the population are different, and it’s where the non-state actors can play a very important role”.\textsuperscript{349} Similar points are frequently made with reference to regime change in Arab countries: “I think the status quo today exists

\textsuperscript{346} Anonymous interview 5e1 with a regional official carried out on April 12, 2013.
\textsuperscript{347} Questionnaire response 2g1 received from a national diplomat on November 12, 2012. Reference reflects the Ambassador’s personal assessments.
\textsuperscript{348} Questionnaire response 2g1 received from a national diplomat on November 12, 2012. Reference reflects the Ambassador’s personal assessments.
\textsuperscript{349} Interview 3g1 with a French diplomat carried out in Paris on January 21, 2013.
no longer where governments can afford to ignore what civil society, what the
citizens are saying".\textsuperscript{350} Broken down to the UfM Secretariat, this implies to the same
interviewee that even those divisions which “focus more on, you know, on
infrastructural projects, even they are taking, and need to take into consideration, the
contribution of civil society”\textsuperscript{351}

Notably though, this study has shown that links of Euro-Mediterranean
institutions to non-state actors go beyond the civil society field which is so often at
the core of research on non-state groups. In several fields, certain Euro-
Mediterranean programs and even institutions are linked to previous activities or
advocacy by non-state actors, and can be considered building blocks of Euro-
Mediterranean institutional integration. As discussed regarding ARLEM, new regional
institutions in turn provide new opportunities for their respective constituencies to
express demands and to upload proposals to the regional level. In addition, even if
programs are funded by the EU or the UfM, they can act as a transmission belt for
feedback from smaller non-state organizations, as in the case of CIUDAD. Thus,
various ways of non-state involvement in Euro-Mediterranean politics have emerged
and are likely to increase further.

\textbf{9.4 Ambiguous roles and the EU agenda}

The previous sections have indicated the extent to which the findings of empirical
research confirm neo-functionalist expectations regarding the regional role of non-
state groups. However, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation tends to entail a number of

\textsuperscript{350} Anonymous interview 3r1 with a regional diplomat carried out on November 13, 2012.
\textsuperscript{351} Anonymous interview 3r1 with a regional diplomat carried out on November 13, 2012.
specific challenges and ambiguities to actors involved, related to the heterogeneity of the region and to the volatility of regional politics. Furthermore, they are a consequence of the multiple roles of EU institutions in Euro-Mediterranean politics, and of the integration agenda embedded in elements of European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean.

Non-state groups operating across the Mediterranean also tend to face the challenge of bringing together diverse constitutive members from across the Euro-Mediterranean region (cf. Malhotra, 1997). While groups like the EMHRN have taken a proactive approach to this question, most groups conceive of Europe as the primary hub for their activities, even if they closely involve Southern European members and maintain representations in MENA states. Furthermore, non-state organizations’ venue shopping comprises a multitude of political levels concerned with Euro-Med politics. In particular, the involvement of EU institutions in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is ambiguous and occurs in in multiple roles: as arenas for policymaking by member states and other actors; as immediate policymakers, especially regarding the ENP; and as key stakeholders in the Barcelona Process and in UfM governance. Accordingly, the identification of EU institutions as policy addressees by non-state organizations varies significantly by policy field and frequently raises challenges in finding the preferable interlocutor on a given issue. Notably, this implies that non-state actors which engage in Euro-Mediterranean politics need to navigate the duality of regionalism and foreign policy. For instance, while the project-oriented approach of the UfM reduces the leverage of the institution, it also provides new access points for non-state organizations and takes individual projects closer to potential stakeholders from among business and civil society.
In turn, case studies point to the multiple roles of non-state organizations as outcomes of regional cooperation processes including EU-funded projects, as autonomous advocates of regional integration, or as embedded interlocutors of the various regional centers of Euro-Mediterranean politics. Across organizations, the diffusion of EU norms about regionalism norms as suggested in chapter 2 can be traced back to three potential mechanisms. As regards the normative effect, research for this study hints at the fact that the export, by European institutions, of a European concept of a regionalist norm has inspired, for various reasons, the commitment of non-state organizations to the Euro-Mediterranean concept. As regards the coopting effect, Euro-Med non-state organizations, particularly civil society organizations, are addressed by EU Mediterranean policy and are frequently eligible to receive EU funding. Irrespective of their autonomy, this effect implies incentives for groups to align with the EU-defined regional agenda and with the understanding of regionalist policy that is specific to the EU. Finally, regarding the social effect, the staff and leadership of non-state organizations, irrespective of their nationality, is frequently highly familiar with EU politics and specifically with the logic of operation of ENP or UfM project funding. Empirical findings, specifically the numerous references to European integration in non-state organizations’ documents and in interviews, point at the possibility that this ‘Europeanization’ factor contributes to the diffusion of a model of regional integration which is pronouncedly ‘EU’ in character. This effect is particularly visible given that the communication of non-state organizations, including in interviews, repeatedly alludes to the neo-functionalist narrative of European integration history.
9.5 Cross-case findings and Integration Theory

The discussion of cross-case results in the preceding sections has, again, illustrated the potential of neo-functionalism when applied to the hybrid case of the Euro-Mediterranean, which is a region characterized by institutional volatility, the polycentricity of regional centers, the heterogeneity of its constitutive states and regions, and even by continued armed conflict across its range. Indeed, neo-functionalism has been repeatedly revised to reflect more bumpy roads to cooperation. If additional insight from Comparative Regionalism and New Regionalism approaches is taken into consideration, there are theoretical and empirical arguments against a dismissal of neo-functionalism as a tool for studying non- or ‘semi’-European cases (cf. Söderbaum & Sbragia, 2010). More fundamentally, Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond argue that if neo-functionalism “has been misunderstood and if what is normally taken to be its essence is, in fact, a bad misconception then the case for a re-inspection, if not full scale intellectual recovery, is strong” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1005). In particular, “the concept of ‘spillover’ has been unhelpfully frozen and caricatured in standard accounts of Neofunctionalism” (Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond, 2010, p. 1006), though it is unlikely to be of major relevance to cases resembling the Euro-Mediterranean.

In the Euro-Mediterranean case, a non-state political sphere has emerged with varying interests, agendas and resources depending on the sector, type and geographic scope of an organization. Several among the surveyed groups, and particularly several among the organizations which have constituted case studies, dispose of the capacity to induce revisions or adjustments of existing Euro-Med frameworks during decisional cycles respectively to demand new organizations or
fields of regional activity, partly even across sectors. While true spill-over or spill-around is rare in the Euro-Mediterranean case, this kind of political activity nevertheless favors regional integration at a small scale. For one example, the activities of trade and business organizations including ASCAME have supported the UfM focus on local investment and on Small and Medium Enterprises. In this context, ASCAME has linked its calls for job creation, particularly regarding young people in the Southern Mediterranean, to migration pressure in its rhetoric and argumentation. Thus, it is possible to consider this example a light case of spill-over from (anti-)immigration policy to Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation and policy. In the light of the relative weakness of Euro-Mediterranean regional institutions in terms of mandate, these findings also highlights the extent of positive integration in the region, in terms of the development of transnational economic ties and policies, as compared to negative integration in terms of the creation of a free trade zone or generally the lowering of internal boundaries (cf. Scharpf, 1998).

While many of the non-state organizations researched in this study operate primarily from Europe, their regional membership and their role in Euro-Mediterranean politics nevertheless indicates that their activities surmount the obstacle of low levels of domestic pluralism in the Southern Mediterranean. At the same time, Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation has features of ‘regionalism by proxy’ due to the defining role of both European and Mediterranean riparian actors as well as in the light of the various external organizations that maintain a presence in Euro-Mediterranean politics. As governmental and non-governmental activity at the Euro-Mediterranean level is nevertheless largely complementary in geographic scope, Euro-Mediterranean governance might indeed resemble a ‘regionalist regime’ constituted by a variety of types of actors (cf. Xenakis, 1999). Similarly, the
governmental-intergovernmental-non-governmental relations of the Euro-Mediterranean could be understood in the context of a ‘common life world’ in Habermasian terms in which dense interaction patterns exist in a multitude of venues and in which the logics of consequentialism, appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998) concur with the logic of arguing (Risse, 2000).

9.6 Perspectives

Euro-Mediterranean regionalism has unleashed new non-state dynamics at the regional level. Findings of the present study indicate a transformative effect on individual actors, which – for various reasons and in various ways – have adopted or appropriated the Euro-Mediterranean or Mediterranean reference as a resource for their own activities and advocacy. Individuals from among both non-state and government organizations commit to a Euro-Mediterranean vision in public rhetoric, interviews, and policy orientation. This convergence of actors around the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation idea is particularly remarkable in the light of the volatility of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation formats.

Neo-functionalism offers a resource to link the dimensions of regionalism, non-state activity, and European foreign policy in a case that is neither contradictory nor similar to the European integration experience. Its expectations regarding non-state organizations’ regional activities are generally reflected in the Euro-Mediterranean case. While the EU-driven character of Euro-Mediterranean regionalism is likely to have facilitated this kind of convergence and supports the applicability of integration theory, the diversity in non-state organizations relating to Euro-Mediterranean regional politics illustrates the unforeseeable dynamics regionalism can unleash. At
the same time, this study has also indicated the limitations of the application of neo-functionalism to ambiguous and hybrid regions that do not neatly fall into theory narratives based in *either* European integration theory *or* New Regionalism.

While the present study is positioned within ‘classical’ integration theory and focused on non-state actors, it also yields insight relevant to Comparative Regionalism, which has thus far hardly engaged with the Euro-Mediterranean case. Around the globe, we are witnessing the “organized arrangement of core peripheral relationships within the context of economic super-blocs” (Geyer, 2006, p. 29). Therefore, the comparison of the Euro-Mediterranean case to other North-South schemes is expected to be more fruitful than its ubiquitous comparison to the ‘sui generis’ European Union, notwithstanding the key particularities of the Euro-Med as introduced above. For instance, Joffé argues that “the EU's Mediterranean policy, which reflected European imperatives in resolving its hinterland problems by securing its southern periphery, was similar to the United States' decision to engage in [NAFTA], at least as far as Mexico was concerned” (Joffé, 2007, pp. 221–222). Calleya agrees regarding “parallels between the systemic changes taking place between [Central America and NAFTA] and those impelled by the relations of the Mediterranean countries with the European Union” (Calleya, 2008, p. 38). Another comparative study could comprise ASEAN+3 which includes Japan, China and South Korea. For better or worse, Euro-Mediterranean regionalism can be interpreted to aim at the constitution of a *counter-region* (Mattli, 1999, pp. 15–16) to East Asia and NAFTA within a ‘race to regionalize’ (Thomas & Tétrault, 1999, p. 15). For the Mediterranean, competing approaches include the US-Middle-East Partnership "designed, in part at least, to challenge Europe” (Joffé, 2007, p. 264). Based on this study’s application of integration theory to the non-state dimension of regional
integration across North-South divides, the fruitful application of a similar research approach could be imagined for similarly structured regional cooperation schemes. To identify and typify regional cases that could subsequently be compared, the dimensions listed in Table 9.2 suggests a starting point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and geographic range of members</th>
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<tr>
<td>Regionalization and integration preconditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-South Heterogeneity</td>
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<td>Sub-regional regionalization</td>
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<td>Policy fields and sectors covered</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depth of integration (institutionalization and transfer of authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of decision-making parity and co-ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness, approach to multilateralism and to domestic liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness in multi-level governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional policies by key actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.2: Dimensions for the Comparison of North-South Regionalism

Though sometimes portrayed as a ‘technocratic’ theory, neo-functionalism also acknowledges the importance of regional identification and commitment by political actors to a regional reference. While stakeholders researched for this study converge around the desirability of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, this desirability is heavily contested across the political spectrum in both Europe and Southern Mediterranean countries. Researching the patterns and logics of this commitment respectively contestation in the light of this study’s findings would be a promising avenue for further research, potentially guided by an analysis of the political discourse, the symbols attributed to the Euro-Mediterranean - in which olives recur with a similar frequency to drowning refugees - or the metaphors applied to its region-building. Research of this kind is expected to highlight the divisions within Europe as well as those between Europe and North Africa, West Asia, or North America, as regards conflicting visions for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, including their polarization in terms like ‘Eurabia’. For instance, constructivism as previously applied to regional
integration schemes or security communities (cf. Duina, 2007) could lead to insight into actors’ competing visions and interpretations regarding Euro-Mediterranean regionalism as well.

The recent revolts and regime changes in Southern Mediterranean states that used to be called the ‘Arab Spring’ have unleashed a variety of challenges as well as opportunities within the field of Euro-Mediterranean politics. Their effects on Euro-Mediterranean non-state activity and politics are frequently discussed by non-state organizations themselves as well as by officials and diplomats. While regime changes are frequently considered reasons for instability of regional cooperation, stakeholders have also emphasized that many ‘new’ governments contribute a renewed impetus to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Furthermore, the recent importance of civil society organizations in individual countries of the Southern Mediterranean has been highlighted, including with regard to a perceived necessity among stakeholders to bypass instable governments. While thus far, organizations and institutions have reacted to these dynamics in various ways, the question of how to address political instability and volatility at Euro-Mediterranean level certainly remains in need of a satisfactory answer. Perhaps, the dynamics unleashed by Euro-Mediterranean regionalism at the non-state level will lead to novel ideas and ambitions that can contribute to answering this question in the future.
ANNEX A: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENT WORK AND SOLE USE

This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference, etc.

It contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions.

Research, notably interview research, was conducted in line with ethical standards.

_____________________
Johannes Müller

ANNEX B: STATEMENT OF OBJECTION

The Statement of Objection is attached to this thesis in a separate document.
ANNEX C1: INDEX OF SURVEY DIRECTORIES

Directories i-a to i-f and i-x to i-z: non-state and public-private or multi-stakeholder organizations and networks

Directory i-i: inter-state, inter-agency, and inter-parliamentary Contexts

Directory i-p: programs and projects

ANNEX C2: INDEX OF INTERVIEWS

Pilot interviews conducted in preparation of this study are not included in this listing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Footnote reference (identification, code, date)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quotation</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Phone</td>
<td>Background</td>
<td>English</td>
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<td>Anonymous interview 1g1 with a national diplomat carried out on October 24, 2012, following up on a questionnaire reply of September 19, 2012.</td>
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<td>Interview 3e2 with an EEAS official carried out on December 20, 2012.</td>
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<td>Interview 3g1 with a French diplomat carried out in Paris on January 21, 2013.</td>
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<td>Roundtable interview 5n1 with three representatives of non-state organizations carried out in Brussels on April 9, 2013.</td>
<td>Face-to-Face Roundtable Verbatim English</td>
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<td>Anonymous interview 5n3 with representatives of a non-state organization in the ALF network carried out on April 7, 2013.</td>
<td>Face-to-Face Background French</td>
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<td>Questionnaire response 6g1 received from diplomatic sources on October 18, 2013.</td>
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<td>6n2</td>
<td>Roundtable interview with the ECEM President and a staff member carried out in Madrid on October 14, 2013.</td>
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<td>Interview with an ECEM Board Member carried out on October 16, 2013.</td>
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<td>7n1</td>
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<td>Face-to-Face in follow-up to interview 3n3</td>
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<td>7n4</td>
<td>Interview with a German ALF network coordinator carried out on February 17, 2014.</td>
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<td>7n5</td>
<td>Interview with a researcher at the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy carried out on April 9, 2014.</td>
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<td>Anonymous interview with a staff member of a non-state organization carried out on May 20, 2014.</td>
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<td>7n7</td>
<td>Interview with a BUSINESSMED representative carried out on May 23, 2014.</td>
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<td>7u1</td>
<td>Interview with a UfM official carried out on January 8, 2014.</td>
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<td>Anonymous interview with an academic carried out on November 13, 2012.</td>
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**ANNEX C3: INDEX OF EVENTS**

This table lists only those among the events attended by the researcher which were subsequently documented. Partly, the status of academic observer was granted.

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<thead>
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<th>Footnote reference (title, location, date)</th>
<th>Resources (local documentation, notes taken, website, news coverage)</th>
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| Documentation of the Anna Lindh Mediterranean Forum, Marseille, April 4-7, 2013. | Local documentation (9al)  
Website: http://www.annalindhforum.org  
Coverage: http://enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=32730&id_type=1&lang_id=450 |
| Documentation of the 4th ARLEM Plenary Session, Brussels, February 18, 2013. | Local documentation (9ar ) and notes (9r1)  
Coverage: http://enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=32032&id_type=1&lang_id=450  
| Documentation of the Euro-Mediterranean Rendezvous on Energy, Brussels, April 11, 2013. | Local documentation (9m)  
Website: http://medgridconferencebruxelles.evenium.com  
Coverage: http://enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=32285&id_type=1&lang_id=450 |
| Documentation of the EPUF General Assembly and ISLAH/EPUF Workshop, Barcelona, November 4, 2013. | Local documentation (9ep) and notes (9n1) |
| Documentation of the VII Mediterranean Week of Economic Leaders, Barcelona, November 20-22, 2013. | Local documentation (9as)  
Website: http://www.medaeconomicweek.org/ |
ANNEX D1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS

Constitution: I have a rough idea of your organization’s background but would like to begin the interview by asking about your opinion about its origins: who are the key individuals driving your work? [what are their backgrounds?]

Regional identification: It is interesting that your organization employs the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ [bears it in its name]. I would be interested in understanding what ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ means to you and your organization.
- Is there any specific idea or vision of the Euro-Mediterranean that you support? [What do you think about the Euro-Mediterranean idea promoted by the European Union?] 
- Are there different opinions about this within your organization about this? Would you say that everybody is supporting roughly the same idea?

Regional orientation: How important is the Euro-Mediterranean idea to you and your organization? In which ways is it beneficial for you as compared to, for instance, a European or a purely Mediterranean orientation of your organization?
- [If the answer is that it is not important:] How come you use it nevertheless? Why wouldn’t you, instead, focus on only the North African countries, for example?

Scope and type of advocacy / access points and strategies: I have noted that your organization has produced policy-relevant papers / reports / ... [depending on the organizations] oriented towards the politics of the Euro-Mediterranean region. How frequently do you do this and how important is it to you(r organization)?
- So let’s assume you were going to draft a position paper addressing a Euro-Mediterranean political issue. Who would be your primary addressee, respectively where and to whom would you disseminate it?
- [Depending on answer] which political arena is most important to you(r organization)? [National-level politics, EU politics, or even the Euro-Mediterranean organizations such as the UfM Secretariat?]
- [Depending on answer:] How close are your contacts with these people / organizations?
- What other means, besides policy papers / reports /... is important to you when you address policymakers?
- And are there cases in which you would say your work / demands [depends] have been able to contribute to a change of Euro-Mediterranean regional policies or even organizations / institutions?

Euro-Med integration: May I conclude by asking you how you personally / your organization perceives the future of the Euro-Mediterranean space? [For example, what do you think of increasing cooperation or even integration of the Euro-Mediterranean space?] Do you think that, independent of your organization’s work, the Euro-Mediterranean space will indeed grow together during the coming years and decades?
- [In which ways, if any, does the work of your organization contributes to this?]
ANNEX D2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR REGIONAL AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Involvement: To what extent do you consider yourself / your unit to be involved in Euro-Mediterranean politics?

Relation to non-state actors and parliament relations: Have you ever been in contact with non-state actors that work on topics of Euro-Mediterranean policy or governance? By non-state actors, I mean, for example, NGOs, corporations, business associations, or think tanks.
- [If yes] in which ways does [did] your interaction with these actors unfold? [If no immediate reply:] For example, did you meet with representatives, or were you contacted with policy demands?
- [If substantial interaction:] Have the positions put forward by the [respective actor(s)] affected your own position in negotiations, e.g. about policy reform? May you have an example to share?
- Would you say, generally speaking, that it is a good idea to include other groups, such as the ones we talked about, in intergovernmental negotiations?

Perspectives: If I may ask one concluding question, which would be your preferred format for Euro-Mediterranean politics in the future?

ANNEX D3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS

It is interesting that your organization applies the term 'Euro-Mediterranean'. What does 'Euro-Mediterranean' mean to you and your organization?

Is there any specific idea or vision of the Euro-Mediterranean that you support?

Specifically, how do you think about the Euro-Mediterranean idea promoted by the European Union?

In which ways is it beneficial for you to be a 'Euro-Mediterranean organization' compared to, for instance an identity focused on North Africa / Middle East?

Do you frequently produce policy papers / reports on Euro-Mediterranean politics? If so, to which organizations or individuals are they usually addressed?

Which other means are important to you when it comes to your organization’s political outreach?

Which political arena is most important to you? (For instance, governments of individual states / EU / Euro-Med organizations / Union for the Mediterranean?)

In which ways do you think that your organization contributes to the future of the Euro-Mediterranean region?
Are there cases in which your political work has markedly contributed to changes of regional (Mediterranean) policies or even Euro-Mediterranean organizations?

Independent of your organization’s work, do you believe the Euro-Mediterranean space will increasingly grow together during the coming years and decades?

**ANNEX E: TRANSCRIPTION CODES**

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<td>Emphasized by the interviewee</td>
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<tr>
<td>[?]</td>
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<td>Repeated sections</td>
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<td>xyz…</td>
<td>Unfinished word or sentence</td>
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ANNEX F: LIST OF SURVEYED ORGANIZATIONS AND Contexts

Programs and projects, which were reviewed as well, are excluded from this list.

A1) MEDELEC (‘Euro-Mediterranean Electricity Cooperation’)
A2) Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCAME)
A3) Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and Development e.V. (EMA)
A4) Union of Mediterranean Confederations of Enterprises (BusinessMed) / Union méditerranéenne des confédérations des employeurs (UMCE)
A5) Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie [Mediterranean Energy Observatory]
A6) ANIMA Investment Network
A7) Euromed Capital Forum
A9) Euro-Mediterranean Irrigators Community (EIC)
A10) Euro-Mediterranean Center Of Mediation and Arbitration (CEMA)
A11) Euro-Med Young Artists Network (EMYAN)
A12) Mediterranean Federation of Insurance Brokers Associations (FMBA)
A13) MED Confederation
A14) Mediterranean Bank Network
A15) Maison Méditerranéenne des Métiers de la Mode [Mediterranean House of Fashion Industry]
A16) First Mediterranean / 1st Mediterranean
A17) Réseau euro-méditerranéen de l’innovation (MedInnov) [Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Network]
A18) Finances & Conseil Méditerranée [Finances & Consultancy Mediterranean]
A19) Association of Organisations of Mediterranean Businesswomen (AFAEMME)
A20) Association Euro-Méditerranéenne pour le Travail et les Échanges [Euro-Mediterranean Association for Work and Exchange]
A21) Euro-Mediterranean Restaurant Federation (EMRF)
A22) Union of Mediterranean Architects (UMAR)
A23) RES4MED
A25) Mediterranean Oil Industry Group (MOIG)
A26) ICS – Building a Mediterranean Cooperative System (MedCoop)
A27) Euro-Mediterranean Trade Distribution and Services Initiative (Euro-Med TDS)
A28) MEDISAMAK
A29) Medgrid
A30) Euromed-IHEDN
A31) Agence pour la coopération internationale et le développement local en Méditérranée (Acim) [Agency for international cooperation and local development in the Mediterranean]
A32) EUROMED Invest
A33) Euro-Arab Centre for Education (EACE)
A34) Dii
A35) Desertec Foundation
A36) OpenMed
C1) European Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) Euromed Trade Union Forum
C2) Association of Solidarity Europe and Mediterranean Cooperation (AESCOOMED)
C3) Foro Sindical Euromed (Euro-Med Union Forum)
C4) Mediterranean [Trade] Union Coordination / Network of Mediterranean trade unions
D1) Mediterranean Politics Online
D2) European University Institute’s Mediterranean Programme
D3) Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)
D4) Euro-Mediterranean University (Euromed-UM)
D5) EuroMed Permanent University Forum (EPUF) / UfM Rectors’ Conference
D6) Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) [Institute International Affairs]
D7) European Institute for Research on Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA)
D8) Euro-Mediterranean University Institute (EMUI)
D9) European-Mediterranean Seismological Centre (emsc / csem)
D10) Euro-Mediterranean Centre for Educational Research (EMCER)
D11) Association Euro Méditerranéenne des Formations sur les Risques (Euro-Mediterranean Risk Society, EMR)
D12) Institut de Prospective Economique du monde Méditerranéen (IPEMED) [Institute for the Economic Future of the Mediterranean world]
D13) Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Insular Coastal Dynamics
D14) Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo)
D15) Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques (FEMISE) [Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economics Institutes]
D16) (Network for) Master in Euro-Mediterranean Affairs (MEMA / MAEM)
D17) Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Egypt
D18) M.A. Degree in Global Politics and Euro-Mediterranean Relations (GLOPEM)
D19) Euro Mediterranean Academy of Tourism
D20) Governance Center Middle East / North Africa
D21) Desertec University Network (DUN)
D22) Desertec Academic Network
D23) German Council on Foreign Relations EU – Middle East Forum (DGAP EU-MEF)
D24) European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)
D25) Réseau universitaire et scientifique euro-méditerranéen sur les femmes et le Genre (RUSEMEG) [Euro-Mediterranean university and science network on women and gender]
D26) Centre of Research and Studies for the Eastern Mediterranean [Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale, CREMO]
D27) Mediterranean Archeological Network (MedArchNet)
D28) Osservatorio Mediterraneo di Ricerca Operativa (O.Me.R.O.) [Mediterranean Observatory for Business Research]
D29) Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS)
D30) Institut de la Méditerranée [Institute of the Mediterranean]
D31) Mediterranean Universities Union (unimed)
D32) Campus Mare Nostrum, University of Murcia (UM) and the University of Cartagena (UPCT)
D33) Mediterranean Institute, University of Malta
D34) International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)
D35) Euro-Mediterranean Economists Association (EMAE)
D36) Istituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo
D37) Community of Mediterranean Universities (CMU)
D38) Institut Méditerranéen de l’Eau (IME) [Mediterranean Water Institute]
D39) Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC) [Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Changes]
D41) Euromed Management
D42) Istituto Euromediterraneo [Euro-Mediterranean Institute]
D43) EUNEDCONNECT3
D44) Mittelmeer Institut Berlin (MIB) [Mediterranean Institute Berlin]
D45) Mediterranean Science Commission (CIESM)
D46) Confluences Méditerranée
D47) Institut de Recherche et d’Etudes Méditerranée Moyen-Orient (iReMMO) [Research and Study Institute Mediterranean Middle East]
D48) Université Euro-Méditerranéenne (UEM) [Euro-Mediterranean University]
D49) Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée [Mediterranean Study and Research Grouping]
D50) relmed
D51) Centre des Etudes Méditerranéennes et Internationales [Center for Mediterranean and International Studies]
E1) Mediterranean Commission of the United Cities and Local Governments (COMMED-CGLU)
E2) Euromed Cities Network (ECN) [Réseau des Villes Euromed]
E3) Euromed Committee of Eurocities
E4) MedCities
E5) Standing Committee for the Euro Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities (COPPEM)
E6) Intermediterranean Commission (of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe)
E7) euromedcity
E8) Arco Latino / Arc Latin
E9) ISOLAMED
E10) Association of Cities and Regions for Recycling and sustainable Resource management MED (ACR+MED)
E11) Covenant of Mayors
E12) Euro-Arab Cities Forum
E13) Union Maritime pour la Méditerranée [Maritime Union for the Mediterranean]
F1) Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN)
F2) EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform
F3) Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders (EMHRF)
F4) Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture & Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE)
F5) Fondazione Mediterraneo [Mediterranean Foundation]
F6) Stiftung Wissensraum Europa – Mittelmeer (WEM) [Foundation Space of Knowledge Europe-Mediterranean]
F7) Union des Jeunes Euro-Maghrebins [Union of Young Euro-Maghrebians]
F8) Encuentro Civil Euromed (ECEM) [Euromed Civic Encounter]
F9) Euro-Mediterranean Council for Burns and Fire Disasters (MBC)
F10) Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Heritage Agency
F12) EuroArab Forum
F13) 14km
F14) Forum of Mediterranean Deltas for the Sustainable Development (deltamed)
F15) International Federation for Sustainable Development and Fight Against Poverty in the Mediterranean-Black Sea (FISPMED)
F16) Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs
F17) Fondation René Seydoux pour le monde méditerranéen [René Seydoux Foundation for the Mediterranean World]
F18) Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft (DAG) [German-Arab Association]
F19) Network of Managers of Marine Protected Areas in the Med (MEDPAN)
F20) Mediterranean Coastal Foundation (MEDCOAST)
F21) Forum Femmes Méditerranée de Marseille [Mediterranean Women Forum of Marseille]
F22) Fondation des Femmes de l’Euro-Méditerranée [Foundation of the Women of the Euro-Mediterranean]
F23) MEDITERRANEAN SOS Network (MedSOS)
F24) Mediterranean Model Forest Network (MMFN)
F25) Medmaravis
F26) International Association for Mediterranean Forests
F27) Group d’amitié UE – Maghreb [EU-Maghreb Friendship Group]
F28) ecoMed21
F29) EuroMed Forum
F30) Forêt Méditerranéenne [Mediterranean Forest]
F31) Mediterranean Citizens’ Assembly
F32) Centre of Education and intercultural training Rencontre
F33) EUROMEDINCULTURE(s)
F34) German Marshall Fund of the United States
F35) Paralleli - Istituto Euromediterraneo del Nord Ovest [Parallels]
F36) FONDEMA Foundation
F37) Euro-Mediterranean Youth Parliament
F38) Maison de l’Union Méditerranéenne (M.U.M.) [House of the Mediterranean Union]
F39) Mediterranean Women’s Fund
F40) eurient
F41) Heinrich Böll Stiftung [Heinrich Böll Foundation]
F42) Southern Mediterranean Civil Society Forum
F43) Middle East and International Affairs Research Group (MEIA Research)
X2) ANSAMed
X3) Global Water Partnership Mediterranean (GWP-MED)
X4) Euro-Mediterranean Youth Platform (euromedplatform)
X5) COPEAM
X6) jmed
X7) S&D Group in the European Parliament / Arab Social Democrats Forum
X9) Econostrum
X10) Mediaterranée
X11) Circle of Mediterranean Journalists for Environment and Sustainable Development (COMJESD)
X12) Babelmed
X13) Nissa TV [Women TV]
X14) mediteu
X15) euromediterraneo news
Y1) International Union for Conservation of Nature Center for Mediterranean Cooperation (IUCN-Med)
Y2) WWF (Mediterranean Programme)
Y3) Greenpeace Mediterranean
Y4) Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBRES)
Z2) EuroMed Civil Forum
Z3) UfM-hosted multi-stakeholder conferences
Z5) Power of One
Z6) German-Arab Women’s Network Forum
Z7) Euro Mediterranean Public Management Dialogue (MED)
Z9) Euro-Mediterranean Energy Efficiency Forum
Z10) Mediterranean Social Forum (fsmed)
Z11) Mediterranean Weeks
Z12) MENA Economic Forum
Z13) Forum de Paris / Casablanca Round
I1) Union for the Mediterranean / EMP
I2) Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) / Parliamentary Assembly – Union for the Mediterranean (PA – UfM)
I3) Summit of Presidents of the UfM Parliaments
I4) Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean
I5) Circle of Mediterranean Parliamentarians for Sustainable Development (COMPSUD)
I6) European Neighborhood Policy – Mediterranean Dimension
I7) European Investment Bank – Facility for Euro-Med Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) ['Mediterranean Partnership Fund']
I8) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
I9) Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF)
I10) 5+5 Dialogue (Western Mediterranean Forum)
I11) Mediterranean Forum (FOROMED)
I12) Euro-Mediterranean Forum
I13) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mediterranean Dialog
I14) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mediterranean Partnership
I15) European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement
I16) Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies
I17) Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA / EMFTA / EU-MED FTA)
I18) Mediterranean Wetlands Initiative (MedWet)
I19) Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE)
I20) Red Cross Med
I21) Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy Conservations (MEDENER)
I22) Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC)
I23) Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MedReg)
I24) Euro-Mediterranean Network of Regulators (EMERG)
I26) Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE)
I27) Mediterranean Regional Office of the European Forest Institute (EFIMED)
I28) Euromed Summits of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions
I29) Euro-Mediterranean Network of Social Economy / TRESMED projects
I30) EuroMed III program / Rabat Process (International Center for Migration Policy Development, ICMPD)
I31) Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations (MENBO)
I32) Euromed Police (project)
I33) MENA Partnership for Democracy and Development
I34) European Endowment for Democracy
I36) European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO)
I27) EuroMed Transport
I28) Euro-Mediterranean Assembly of Local and Regional Authorities (ARLEM)
I29) Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI)
I30) Council of Europe South Programme / North-South Centre
I31) Arab Maghreb Union
I32) G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)
I33) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
I34) United Nations Environment Programme - Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP / MAP) + Regional Activity Centers (RACs): Plan Bleu; for Specially Protected Areas (SPA); for Cleaner Production (CPRAC); Info; Priority Actions Programme (PAP/RAC)
**LIST OF CITED DOCUMENTS**

This table lists the resource locators for those documents which were referenced in footnotes. All other documents which contributed to empirical research for this study were included in this study’s bibliography.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Footnote reference (indicating type, title, date)</th>
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<th>Every document has been archived locally as well.</th>
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<td>Web page ‘About Young Arab Voices’. Reference access on December 11, 2013</td>
<td><a href="http://www.youngarabvoices.org/about-young-arab-voices">http://www.youngarabvoices.org/about-young-arab-voices</a></td>
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<td>Synopsis from April 7, 2013 of an event in Marseille (‘Crises actuelles et enjeux démocratiques en Méditerranée à l’épreuve du genre’).</td>
<td><a href="http://destimed.fr/Marseille-Colloque-au-Pharo-sur">http://destimed.fr/Marseille-Colloque-au-Pharo-sur</a></td>
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<td>RUSEMEG event brochure of April 2013 for ‘Crises actuelles et enjeux démocratiques en Méditerranée à l’épreuve du genre’</td>
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<td>Dii presentation at the Euro-Mediterranean Rendezvous on Energy titled 'Case study: cooperation in the electricity sector', April 11, 2013.</td>
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