

**FRAGILE PROXIES: THE POLITICS OF CONTROL AND
DEFECTION IN STATE SPONSORSHIP OF REBEL
ORGANIZATIONS**

By

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Declaration

I hereby declare that no parts of this thesis have been accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Milos Popovic
October 14, 2014

Abstract

Foreign governments frequently intervene in armed conflicts by providing support to rebel organizations against their adversaries. State sponsorship of rebel organizations is less costly than a direct military intervention, but rebels often defy orders, desert fighting or turn guns against their sponsors. Under what conditions do rebels turn against their sponsors? Drawing on principal-agent and organizational theories, I argue that the non-centralized structure of rebel organizations increases the length of delegation chain from sponsors to rebels, leading to defection. Non-centralized organizations have weak central leadership that is unable to control, monitor or punish its rank and file. Due to this disadvantage, non-centralized rebel organizations are less accountable to their sponsors, cannot credibly commit to rapidly change their policies in response to shifts in the sponsor's demands and suffer from frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons. My argument is tested through the statistical analysis of a novel dataset on Sponsorship of Rebels (SOR), and the case study of Pakistan's sponsorship of Kashmiri militants, 1989-2004. I find support for my argument that non-centralized organizations are likely to defect against their sponsors. Likewise the model demonstrates that shared ethnic ties, weak rebels and the existence of transnational support are associated with defection. Finally, the existence of multiple sponsors does not affect the probability of defection.

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INTRODUCTION

Slave, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my condescension. Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I can make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. *You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!*

(Mary Shelley, “Frankenstein”, Ch. 20)

On December 13, 2001 several gunmen infiltrated the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and opened fire on guards killing six policemen. The police shot dead five militants who belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Kashmiri militant outfit sponsored by the Pakistani government since the late 1990s. However, it turned out that then Pakistan’s leader General Pervez Musharraf was unaware of this operation and outraged by the attack as he was reluctant to escalate conflict with India.¹ The Parliament attack eventually stalled the Indo-Pakistani peace negotiations and placed the two countries on the brink of war. India launched a massive military mobilization known as Operation Parakram. Jaish’s action also delegitimized the Kashmiri struggle by providing India with the argument that there is no difference between Pakistan-led jihad and Al-Qaeda. Pakistan was cornered by the US and India to crack down on Jaish and other Kashmiri militants. In January 2002, the Musharraf government detained the leaders of major militant outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad, froze their accounts and officially banned them. The leaders were soon released and allowed to rename their organizations provided they lower their profile – stop incursions into Indian controlled Kashmir and do not align with the Taleban. Some organizations like Lashkar decided to comply

¹ Who Will Strike First? *The Economist*, 22 December 2001.

with Musharraf's demands, while others refused to do so and eventually turned against their very creators – the Pakistani state.

On the second anniversary of the Indian Parliament attack, Pakistan's ruler Pervez Musharraf nearly escaped death when a bomb planted under a bridge in Rawalpindi exploded just a minute before his convoy had crossed it. More than a week later he escaped a second assassination attempt not far from the bridge where the first attack occurred. This time two suicide bombers intercepted Musharraf's motorcade. The plotters belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami.

Evidently, the abovementioned events show that Pakistan had nurtured the entity beyond its control that ultimately turned against its master. Interestingly, those who wanted the Pakistani President dead have traditionally been labeled "good jihadists" and received abundant material support to battle India.² What conditions contributed to such a disastrous result? The plot to kill President Musharraf was the most costly policy and Jaish had other strategies at its disposal such as to lower their profile as Lashkar did. Given the simultaneous fighting against India, the costs of acquiring another enemy by angering Pakistan were tremendously high and promised no obvious gains for Jaish. Why did Jaish turn against Pakistan? Common knowledge holds that "when allies have a common enemy, the alliance security dilemma is softened by the unlikelihood of abandonment"³. Some statistical analyses suggest that asymmetrical alliances are likely to be durable decreasing the likelihood of reneging.⁴ What factors then encouraged Jaish to renege on their commitments by pursuing such a defiant and self-defeating behavior?

² Stephen Tankel. 2011. *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 122-123.

³ Glen H. Snyder. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 317.

⁴ James D. Morrow. 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): pp. 903-944; Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Burcu Savun. 2007. Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements? *Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1118-1132.

This question refers to a more general problem underpinning the illicit ties between states and non-state armed actors. The main aim of this project is to explain when rebels damage or break these ties, i.e. under what conditions rebels defect against their sponsors. I understand defection as actions by rebel combatants aimed at maximizing their benefits at the expense of their sponsor's goals. Defection can be collective – when rebel leadership acts against the sponsor's interests, or factional – whenever a faction of members behaves detrimental to the sponsor's welfare. Previous definitions have used defection in civil war to describe the egregious behavior of lower echelons toward their central leadership. Jeremy Weinstein, for example, understands defection as “actions individual combatants take that maximize their personal gains at the expense of the group's broader objectives”.⁵ While Jacob Shapiro does not explicitly use defection, the focus of his study is also on the propensity of militant factions to carry out violence against the central dictate.⁶ On the other hand, Stathis Kalyvas employs “ethnic defection” to denote “a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their co-ethnics”⁷. While these concepts are not constructed to denote the relationship between sponsors and rebels, I draw on their logic to construct my concept.

Given that some rebel actions can be self-destructive, why do then some rebel organizations ever turn against their sponsors? When do other organizations pursue policies, short of armed confrontation, that defy the orders of their sponsors? And when do these organizations desert their sponsors? Why do some organizations only defy orders, while other desert or even turn against their benefactors? Is defection avoidable and when? If so, why have

⁵ Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131.

⁶ Jacob N. Shapiro. 2013. *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁷ Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (8): 1043-68, at pp. 1045.

other rebel organizations, assuming the same opportunities, refrained from such a behavior? Under what conditions do some rebel organizations remain obedient to their external masters? The above example is perhaps the most extreme case of how rebels can go rogue. A brief look at Table 1 indicates that there are other forms of defection. Some infamous militant organizations such as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) or PLO followed Jaish's violent path; others like the Taliban pursued defiant policies while some as the Greek Communist Party (KKE) decided to abandon their master; other militants as the RENAMO had largely remained loyal to its sponsor.

Table 1. State Sponsorship of Rebel Organizations: Some Examples of Defection and Loyalty

Sponsor	Rebels	Period	Target	Defection	Narrative
<i>India</i>	Tamil Tigers (LTTE)	1983-1991	Sri Lanka	Collective	In 1991, LTTE clashed with the Indian forces in Sri Lanka; killed former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
<i>Pakistan</i>	The Taliban	1995/96	Afghanistan	Collective	Attacked Herat against Pakistan's orders; refused to cooperate with Dostum; refused to immediately release the captured Russian pilots
<i>Yugoslavia</i>	The Greek Communist Party (KKE)	1946-1948	Greece	Collective	In 1948, the KKE decided to side with Stalin in a dispute between USSR and Yugoslavia
<i>Pakistan</i>	Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Kashmiri separatist group	1999-2003	India	Factional	In 2002 and 2003, the group was involved in a failed assassination attempt against Pakistan's President Musharraf.
<i>South Africa</i>	Renamo	1980-1994	Mozambique	No	The group was successfully controlled until the peace agreement was reached leading to its demobilization

Conflict scholars mostly assume that external interventions in armed conflicts are a zero-sum game – they can either succeed when interveners accomplish certain goals or fail when these goals are not met. Similarly, conventional wisdom holds that interventions are usually third-party military and/or economic incursions into internal affairs of foreign countries aimed at shifting the balance between the government and rebel organization(s).⁸ Recent proliferation of studies on state sponsorship of rebel groups goes beyond this simplified picture. Scholars begin to recognize that external interveners have their own political agenda and that external support to rebel groups is a form of power bargaining.⁹ Most governments intervene in armed conflicts with an interest in controlling the rebellion and exerting pressure on the target government.¹⁰ By providing resources to militants, external governments delegate the use of force to non-state armed actors when the direct military intervention is too costly. There is a significant body of scholarship devoted to understanding the causes and consequences of external intervention in civil conflicts.¹¹ Existing research finds that external involvement, particularly external support

⁸ Patrick Regan. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 10.

⁹ Navin Bapat. 2006. State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 213-229; Navin Bapat. 2007a. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (4): 265-280; Navin Bapat. 2007b. The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and Bargaining Power. Manuscript, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; Daniel Byman. 2007. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Idean Salehyan. 2009. *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca (N.Y.) and London: Cornell University Press.

¹⁰ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps. 2010. Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism. *International Studies Perspectives* 11(1): 1-18; Idean Salehyan. 2010a. The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 493-515; Idean Salehyan. 2010b. *Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan*. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, PA: Carlisle.

¹¹ For example: Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4): 615-642; Erin K. Jenne. 2007. *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press; Patrick Regan. 2002. Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 55–73; Stephen M. Saideman. 2001. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*. Columbia University Press.

to rebel groups, tends to prolong civil conflicts,¹² generate more violence against civilians,¹³ and hamper conflict resolution.¹⁴ State sponsorship may become a serious source of international instability as sponsors sometimes lose control over their militant agents.¹⁵ Externally backed rebels may use support to commit atrocities or turn against their sponsors.¹⁶

Despite such detrimental consequences of state sponsorship, scholars have not examined how the relationship between sponsors and rebel organizations evolves. To accurately understand how external interventions develop we need to analyze conditions under which sponsored rebel organizations break their commitments to external governments. We also have to consider cases in which rebels oppose policies of their masters, and cases in which rebel defection can be expected yet it does not occur. In particular, are there factors that cause some rebel organizations to pursue confrontational policies toward their masters, and others to remain obedient and avoid defection, given similar opportunities?

While the issues of external intervention and the relationship between governments and rebels are interesting in themselves and relevant for conflict studies, they both are essentially important because of their impact on conflict resolution – on whether or not the termination of state-sponsored illicit arrangements can contribute to peace.

Why Understanding Sponsorship of Rebels and Defection is Important?

Studying state sponsorship of rebels and particularly conditions under which these illicit ties go astray is important for several reasons. First, foreign sponsors who have a stake in the outcome of a conflict can become serious obstacles to peace. “Sometimes such a regional power

¹² Regan (2002)

¹³ Weinstein, *op. cit.*, Idean Salehyan, David Siroky and Reed M. Wood. 2014. External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities. *International Organization* (forthcoming).

¹⁴ David E. Cunningham. 2011. *Barriers to Peace in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵ Byman and Kreps, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David Cunningham. 2011. Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. *International Organization*. 65(4): 709–744.

... may see its interests best served by the prolonging of a stalemate until the situation forces a settlement it can accept, rather than commit itself wholeheartedly to the course of conflict resolution”.¹⁷ In particular, some scholars show that external support to non-state combatants is likely to lead to a bloodier civil war.¹⁸ External support can encourage opposition groups not to easily give up violence. The sponsored rebels are argued to be more ruthless toward the local population than other opposition groups.¹⁹ Therefore, it is necessary to identify factors that weaken or break these illicit ties.

Second, we need to understand conditions under which rebels defect against their sponsors in order to shorten armed conflicts. Sponsored rebels organizations may become “spoilers”²⁰, and infinitely block peace process. Although external support may not be fundamental for rebel victory, some authors argue that the insurgency is unlikely to end unless the sponsorship is terminated.²¹ Extraterritorial sanctuaries can increase the length and severity of civil wars,²² but other sources of dependence on external governments can infinitely block peace process. Consider the political friction between externally supported Hamas that governs the Gaza strip and the Fatah that rules the West Bank. Owing to the Iran-Syria patronage, Hamas nurtures a rejectionist attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian process and a confrontational policy toward Israel. Prior to the 2008 ceasefire agreement, Hamas was involved in shelling Israeli towns and its militant wing is argued to be equipped, trained and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In early 2012, Hamas has accepted a reconciliation accord with Fatah that

¹⁷ K.M. de Silva, K and S.W.R. Samarasinghe, (eds). 1993. *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts*. London: Pointer Publishers, pp. 14.

¹⁸ For example: Bethany Lacina. 2006. Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): 276-289.

¹⁹ Weinstein, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Stephen Stedman. 1997. Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security* 2(2): 5-53.

²¹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. 1970. *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, pp. 24.

²² Salehyan (2009)

provides for creation of a joint caretaker Palestinian government. However, it seems unlikely that the organization would renounce its militant ideology in the long-term given its financial dependence on Iran. In order to “pacify” Hamas, policymakers should consider the ways of weakening its ties to the Islamic Republic rather than containing its activities.

Third, the sponsorship of rebels can cause conflict spillovers to neighboring countries.²³ Sponsors may become the target of their own creations. For instance, Saudi Arabia has been one of the main supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) against the non-Sunni governments in Iraq and Syria.²⁴ With this support, the ISIS occupied vast swaths of the Iraqi territory. As its soldiers approached the Saudi border, “jihadi social media begins to speak of the House of Saud as its next target”²⁵. Some rebels may draw their sponsors into armed conflict. Prior to the US war on terror, Al Qaeda attacks against US embassies in the Middle East were conducted from Afghanistan and Sudan. Afghanistan was bombed on several occasions during the 1990s and invaded in 2001 by the US as a punishment for supporting Al-Qaeda. In addition, rebel activities against their former patrons can evolve into a full-blown war. In 1970, for instance, the drift between Jordan and the PLO resulted in a short-term intrastate conflict. In Pakistan, a variety of jihadi outfits turned against the establishment as the government limited their incursions into Jammu and Kashmir in the early 2000s. At that time, Pakistan faced an open insurgency of its former agents who allied themselves with transnational militant movements, such as Al-Qaeda. If the Pakistani state had fallen into anarchy, the consequences for neighbors and the region as a whole would have been devastating given the propensity of conflicts to spill

²³ *Ibid*

²⁴ Steve Clemons. ‘Thank God for the Saudis’: ISIS, Iraq, and the Lessons of Blowback, *The Atlantic*, June 23, 2014, source: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-saudi-arabia-iraq-syria-bandar/373181/>.

²⁵ Patrick Cockburn. Iraq Crisis: How Saudi Arabia Helped Isis Take Over The North of The Country, July 13, 2014, source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-helped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html>.

over borders. Taking all the reasons into consideration, understanding factors that contribute to the termination of delegations can provide a window to better conflict management strategies, both in the short and long run.

Theory of Defection: Delegation Chain and Rebel Organization

In this dissertation I argue that sponsors delegate violence to rebels along with material support in return for their cooperation over goals, strategies and tactics. In doing so, sponsors create delegation chains – from their secret services to the rebel movement – that may vary in length. This authority is delegated to the rebel leadership who becomes an agent to its sponsor. Consecutively, the rebel leadership becomes the principal to its chief commanders in charge of field commanders and local units. Within the rebel organization, the command and control chain may extend to further principal-agent relationships. The chief commanders in the rebel organization become principals to their field commanders, while the field commanders turn into principals of their local regiments. Depending on the rebel configuration, the local regiments may end up being an agent to their field commanders and to the chief commanders.

The length of delegation chain depends on the rebel organizational structure. The sponsor's management of rebels may run smoothly when the authority and resources are delegated to a rebel organization with a clear central leadership and robust hierarchy. Centralized organizations have commanders who are directly responsible to the leadership. By definition, these organizations espouse “clear departmental boundaries, clear lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and formal decision making procedures”²⁶. Key decisions are taken by a few individuals at the top, while the lower levels have almost no say in organizational policies

²⁶ Walter W. Powell. 1990. Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12: 295–336, at pp. 303.

and are in charge of implementation of these decisions. The lower levels report back to the central leadership and can be held responsible for any action.

My argument starts from Abdulkader Sinno's proposition that centralized rebels are easier to control by their foreign backers because rebel leaders can discipline the rank-and-file.²⁷ Contrary to non-centralized organizations, Sinno argues, centralized rebels lack solid ties to their local communities and, thus, heavily depend on external supporters for resources.²⁸ I develop Sinno's proposition by transforming the problem of sponsor's control into that of rebel behavior toward sponsors, i.e. defection. In doing so, I spell out particular causal mechanisms, connecting organizational structure to defection. While Sinno draws on a number of narratives to support his argument, this is the first comprehensive study of sponsor-rebel relations.

The central leadership is likely to be accountable to its sponsor because it receives private rewards attached to the regular support. Acting as a proximate principal, the rebel leadership is a supreme node which issues orders and receives information from the lower levels, and assures that every unit in the chain is responsible only to its proximate principal. Top leadership exclusively decides which commander and unit get what, when and how much of these resources. They exercise effective control over the organization. Those commanders who do not conform to the dictate of the central leadership may be deprived of these resources. Such sanctions are likely to be effective since the rank and file has weak local ties. Likewise the rank and file is unable to attract alternative external support because it has little power in the organization. As a result, the rank and file of centralized organizations is likely to be obedient because it has no way to compensate for the loss of resources from the center. This obedience allows the leadership to accept any change in sponsor's policies. Therefore, the command and

²⁷ Abdulkader H. Sinno. 2008. *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 78-80.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 14.

control structure of centralized organizations ensures that their agents will not alter any order without a clear indication from a sponsor.

However, this mechanism may be unfeasible in non-centralized organizations. The leadership of non-centralized organizations cannot use the sponsor's resources to control the rank-and-file as commanders have stronger local ties, and, therefore, an access to alternative resources, which weakens their allegiance to the center.²⁹ This is a decentralized organization, where each commander has the final say over the allocation of resources among the troops. Unlike their centralized counterparts, decentralized organizations are, by and large, less accountable to their sponsors because their commanders are more autonomous. As Jacob Shapiro argues, when militant leaders and followers have diverging preferences over tactics, internal monitoring and sanctioning is fragile and there is a mismatch between goals and tactics, the rank-and-file is likely to engage in unsanctioned violence, defect to the government or even turn against its leadership.³⁰ With strong parochial interests, commanders are bound to the protection of their respective communities, which usually runs against more general interests of their parent organization and sponsor. This makes decentralized organization less amenable to the control of central leadership, and, consequently, more prone to defection against their sponsors.

Factionalized organizations are the most unstable form of non-centralization where certain parts within the organization operate independently from or openly challenge the leadership but do not collectively exit the organization nor formally establish a new organization. These factions are autonomous in that they not only change central orders but also veto their implementation if they find it to be against their interests. The rank-and-file is able to do so, because it often enjoys significant financial autonomy owing to its ties to the local level, other

²⁹ Alexander Cooley. 2005. *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

³⁰ Shapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-61.

militants or political actors and even external governments. These organizations often suffer from protracted infightings where many actors compete for the leadership.³¹ Sometimes factions simply carve out a parallel organization within the parent organization,³² which they can use to carry out operations detrimental to the sponsor. Most factionalized organizations have a fluctuating command and control as their commanders and factions claim membership in other rebel organizations. This creates a serious problem for the leadership to monitor and control the flow of recruits, let alone issue the directions that are given by a sponsor.

Defection of non-centralized organizations is driven by three causal mechanisms. In all these mechanisms, external shocks serve as antecedent condition that leads a non-centralized organization to defect. Given their aforementioned characteristics, centralized organizations are likely to be less vulnerable to external shocks. The first mechanism comes directly from the delegation chain and is triggered by the change in sponsor's policy of support. Often sponsors are pressured by third parties to cease their support to rebels. These international pressures may include sanctions or a threat of force. A sponsor may cave in and advocate restraint in executing offensive operations against the target government, support cease-fire, peace talks and proposals. All these forms of reconciliatory policies are likely to gradually lead to divisions and tensions between the sponsor and rebels because national concerns of sponsors are not shared by narrow-focused rebel movements. In fact, such a shift in the sponsor's policy may threaten rebel territorial gains or its very survival. In the second mechanism, the sponsor attempts to force its agent to comply with a new course. The rebels may resist, by raising voice or their arms against the sponsor. But if the rebels give in, this may create discontent among the commanders and

³¹ Adria Lawrence. 2010. Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule. *International Security* 35(2): 88–122, at pp. 90–91.

³² Wendy Pearlman. 2008. Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process. *International Security* 33(3): 79–109.

factions, who may turn both against their leadership and sponsor. The third mechanism is triggered by counterinsurgency (COIN) and inter-rebel clashes. The decimation of the rank-and-file at the hands of the target government and rivals encourages resentment, disorder and fear among the commanders and foot soldiers. Intimidations, targeted killings, kidnappings and skirmishes weaken the ties between the rebel leadership and rank-and-file prompting commanders and factions of non-centralized organizations to reconsider their loyalty to the cause. As the conflict prolongs, and attrition grows, the affected rank-and-file becomes more attracted to civilian life. Under such conditions, the target government can stir these hopes by buying off greedy commanders, offering amnesty or promising political offices.

Research Design

As conventional wisdom suggests, the appropriateness of method is dependent on the type of research question that we pose.³³ In this study, I am interested both in the outcome and process of rebel behavior toward their sponsors. To analyze the outcome and process, I use a “mixed method” approach because the combination of case study and statistical methods helps avoid the limitations of the two methods when used separately.³⁴ The main advantage of such a research design is that allows one to identify general trends and avoid bias and better organize spurious results stemming from a separate employment of small- and large-N analysis.³⁵

In particular, the statistical part allows me to narrow down a set of hypotheses that can be further tested through a more in-depth study. It likewise helps me mitigate the case selection problem associated with the use of small-N studies providing an interval of candidates that can

³³ Garry King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁴ Andrew Bennett. 2002. Where the Model Frequently Meets the Road: Combining Statistical, Formal, and Case Study Methods, paper prepared for presentation at the 2002 APSA Conference in Boston, 29 August–1 September.

³⁵ Evan S. Lieberman. 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review* 99: 435-452, at pp. 450.

be randomly or non-randomly selected for the following phase.³⁶ I first use the multilevel logistic modeling, which assumes that predictors vary at two levels (individual and group level). Since I am interested in the relationship between rebels and states, the argument in this dissertation touches upon both the sub-state (individual) and state (group) level. By employing the multilevel modeling I fit the method with the nature of the data.

In addition, I use the Cox proportional hazard model, which estimates the survival time of a factor, until it reaches a realization of event, in my case, a rebel organization defecting against its sponsor. There are two methodological benefits from using this method. First, this modeling assesses whether rebel defection occurs or not after the last observed year, which mitigates the selection bias from the omission of sponsorships that never experienced rebel defection. Second, the survival model allows me to assess the effects of explanatory variables that change in value over the observation period.

On the other hand, I use process tracing to carry out an in-depth analysis of the relevant causal processes and mechanisms regarding the underpinning state-specific case. Given that the aim of this study is theory-testing, I focus on a single case study. The single-case study is regarded as a valuable toolkit for theory-testing even though the “least value is generally attached to them”³⁷. The conventional wisdom holds that single case studies are less robust, generalizable, and accurate than multiple-case studies.³⁸ Single case studies are arguably more vulnerable to researcher’s arbitrary interpretation than multiple-case studies, and more likely to produce the findings that are idiosyncratic to a single case.

³⁶ James Mahoney. 2007. Qualitative *Methods* and Comparative Politics. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(2): 122-144, at pp. 128–131.

³⁷ H. Eckstein. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science. Political Science: Scope and Theory*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 94-137, at pp. 80.

³⁸ K. R. Yin. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Melissa E. Graebner. 2007. Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50(1): 25–32.

While a single case-study alone may not be appropriate for generalization, I use the quantitative method for external validity. The primary goal of single-case study in this dissertation is to demonstrate how my argument plays out in a specific context. A single-case study is suited to this end because it offers a challenging environment in which numerous factors are present and interfere with the ongoing processes. In such a context there is little room for researcher's "subjectivism" in the interpretation of evidence as every theory faces the scrutiny of rich data.

For the single-case study I chose Pakistan's sponsorship of seven major rebel organizations that have operated in Kashmir in the period (1988-2004). The reader might wonder why the analysis focuses only on this theater given the sea of armed conflicts around the world. The most important reason is that this case provides a maximum variation on the dependent and independent variables. Six out seven movements have engaged in defection with two movements defying orders, three deserting and one turning guns against Pakistan. There is also a rich variety of organizational forms with the conflict featuring two centralized, three decentralized and one factionalized organization.

The second reason for this study is a moderate capacity of sponsor and target governments to deal with the insurgents, each in its own right. Pakistan is the major, and in most cases the only sponsor, and that provides a control factor for the nature and behavior of the sponsor toward its militants. Its general motive and approach – destabilizing the Indian held Kashmir without a direct intervention – has not changed much since the outset of the conflict. Pakistan is also a moderately capable state allowing its government and intelligent services to effectively select, monitor and punish the rebels. The counterbalance is a very capable Indian state that has exerted a significant pressure on the militants throughout the conflict.

The data for the single-case study was obtained from several sources and entailed a short-term research in the field to develop a comprehensive analysis of each insurgent organization. I relied on the following techniques in collecting the data: a) interviews; b) archival evidence; c) secondary sources. I interviewed 15 subjects, excluding a number of off-side discussions, comprising Indian generals who served in Kashmir during the insurgency, intelligence chiefs, Indian and Kashmiri journalists, policy analysts. These are all highly knowledgeable interviewees who viewed the conflict from diverse perspectives, which helped me build a more nuanced picture. The Kashmiri and Delhi journalists have been particularly helpful in mapping out local dynamics and actors, while the elites have provided insightful information about the general trends and events. The information about the first decade of insurgency mainly comes from the interviews.

Regrettably, I was not able to travel to Kashmir and Pakistan for security reasons given that my topic was depicted as highly sensitive. For this reason, I have found the most information about the Pakistani view from the news archives and magazines. Also the majority of key Kashmiri militant leaders is either dead or in exile, and only a handful of them resides in the state.

Through my determination to collect the necessary data, I realized the scarcity of information on Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir. For this reason, I was compelled to also rely on news archives, weekly magazines and articles and books by the authors from both India and Pakistan who are close to the security and political establishments of the respective countries. By triangulating between the interviews and these sources I have tried to maximize the efficiency of analysis and squeeze out as much information about the actors and processes as possible.

Dissertation Roadmap

In this introduction I have argued to move conflict studies toward understanding and explaining the behavior of rebels regarding their state sponsors. In addition, I provided theoretical and policy relevance of carrying out such a project. I suggest that the length of delegation chain, and particularly the structure of rebel command and control determine whether the rebels defect against or stay loyal to their sponsor. For the purposes of this research I employ a mixed method approach: the external validity of my argument and alternative theories is tested through a novel dataset on rebel behavior toward state sponsors, while the internal validity is checked in a within-case study of Pakistan's support to seven Kashmiri militant outfits.

The next chapter, Chapter 1, addresses the definitional issues and provides a conceptual framework. In this chapter, I discuss a number of topics. First, I define what it means to be a rebel in the context of armed conflict, what rebellion is and how to understand state sponsorship. Second, I present my understanding of state sponsorship as a principal-agent relationship in which a foreign government delegates some authority to a rebel organization to carry out violence in return for cooperation over goals, strategies and tactics. Third, I define rebel defection in terms of agency problems, and particularly, moral hazard, opportunism and "Maddison's dilemma" whereby rebels are using the granted resources to carry out agendas that are opposite or detrimental to the interests of their sponsors. Finally, fusing the principal agent literature with conflict studies I suggest three alternative explanations of rebel defection: shared ethnicity/ideology, alternative resources and rebel capabilities.

Chapter 2 develops an organizational theory of rebel defection and obedience. This theory assumes that while sponsors are relatively coherent actors, rebels are coalitions of leaders and followers. The problem of managing a rebel movement is the problem of dealing with all

these actors within a rebel organization. When the rebels espouse a centralized and hierarchical organization they are more accountable to their sponsors. But when they are decentralized or fragmented, the power of rebel elites drives the whole movement in directions that are often contrary to the interests of their sponsors. The change in sponsor's policy toward the armed struggle can trigger two defective outcomes in their non-centralized clients: defiance and switching sides. The external shocks from the COIN or insurgent fratricide may lead to massive desertions of non-centralized outfits or their constituent parts.

The external validity of my argument and alternative explanations is tested in Chapter 3. In this chapter I first measure the dependent, independent and control variables. Then I apply multilevel logistic regression and the Cox proportional hazard to the dataset, and interpret the coefficients. Next, I run some postestimation analyses to examine how different factors produce rebel defection. Finally, I exclude some cases to check for the robustness of the results.

In Chapter 4, I try to uncover particular mechanisms and processes that lead to defection or loyalty of seven rebel outfits sponsored by Pakistan in the 1990s. The analysis is organized into two parts. In the first, I examine four indigenous movements and their relationship with Islamabad: JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Ikhwanul Muslimeen. In the second, three Pakistani militant movements that have fought in Kashmir are analyzed: Harkatul Ansar, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

In Chapter 5 I first discuss the causal mechanisms of the most significant factors drawing on the findings from previous chapters and from additional illustrative cases. Next, I test whether my argument and alternative theories could travel across time and types of warfare. I divide the sample from the dataset on the period before and after Cold War, as well as on asymmetric and symmetric wars. Finally, I suggest some extensions to my theory.

The conclusion offers the summary of main findings, theoretical implications for conflict studies and policy implications for third parties interested in tackling the issue of state sponsorship in armed conflicts.

CHAPTER 1

Principals, Agents and The Limits of Sponsor's Control

This chapter first describes sponsorship of rebel groups and clarifies conceptual issues related to both state sponsorship and forms of rebel defection. The topic raises important definitional issues that need to be discussed before proceeding to my theory. For instance: what do we mean by rebels, rebellion and the state sponsorship of rebels? What is the difference between sponsorship and intervention? How do we know that a sponsor has control over a rebel outfit? Similarly, what signifies rebel non-compliance and how do we measure one? By answering these questions, my aim is to provide a guide for the measurement of these concepts. In doing so, I am aware that every definition can be contested. I attempt to answer possible challenges to my definitions through the discussion of each term.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss terms as “rebels”, “state” and types of support given to rebel groups which help me delineate the term “sponsorship of rebels” from external intervention. Next, I use the language of agency theory to conceptualize and operationalize my dependent variable, “rebel defection”. Defection is defined with reference to the principal-agent terminology. I also provide indicators of defection; my aim is to use these measures for the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3.

Defining Rebels, States and State Sponsorship of Rebels

States often empower rebel movements to fight their adversaries instead of pursuing open aggression. Despite the power asymmetry, Pakistan was able to challenge Indian authority in Jammu and Kashmir owing to its sponsorship of various militant groups, operating across the

disputed territory. Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea had waged extensive cross-border wars through the sponsorship of insurgent groups.³⁹ Iran and Israel do not have a single recorded militarized interstate dispute although Tehran-sponsored militants such as Hezbollah and Hamas attack the Israeli forces and civilians on behalf of their sponsor. Armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda involve complex interactions between state and non-state actors in which governments provide troops, arms, money, and supplies to their warring rebel agents.⁴⁰ Recent studies highlight this pervasiveness of external ties in international conflicts, showing that more than one hundred and fifty insurgencies around the world have been supported by a foreign government.⁴¹ The sponsorship of rebels is, therefore, a fairly widespread phenomenon and many insurgents heavily rely on external governments for their fighting.

A recent proliferation of studies on externally backed insurgencies raises some important issues such as: why governments delegate conflict to rebels,⁴² how this state strategy affects the onset or the duration of civil and international wars,⁴³ why rebels accept foreign assistance,⁴⁴ and

³⁹ See e.g. Gerard Prunier. 2004. Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986–1999). *African Affairs* 103(412): 359–383.

⁴⁰ For instance: Thomas Turner. 2007. *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality*. New York: Zed Books, pp. 116–130; John F. Clark (ed.). 2002. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 129–141, pp. 155–159.

⁴¹ Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, *op. cit.*

⁴² Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps. 2010. Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism. *International Studies Perspectives*, 11(1): 1-18; Idean Salehyan. 2010a. The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 493–515; Idean Salehyan. 2010b. *Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan*. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA.

⁴³ Navin Bapat. 2006. State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 213–29; Navin Bapat. 2007a. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 265–280; Navin Bapat. 2007b. The Strategy of the Weak: State Support for Terrorism and Bargaining Power. Manuscript, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill; Daniel Byman. 2007. *Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Idean Salehyan. 2009. *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca (NY) and London: Cornell University Press.

⁴⁴ Salehyan *et al.*, *op. cit.*

under what conditions can states use coercion to compel other states to cease their support to rebels.⁴⁵

Until recently, however, sponsorship of rebels lacked conceptual coherence and it was mainly used for descriptive classification of insurgent groups. Lately, some authors have proposed more precise definitions of external support. But these definitions differ in terms of recipients. While some authors like Idean Salehyan subsume different opposition groups under the label “rebels”, other authors like Daniel Byman and Navin Bapat analyze exclusively state sponsorship of “militant” or “terrorist” groups. In political science, these terms often have different meanings and are associated with a variety of phenomena such as revolution, ethnic conflict or insurgency. In colloquial language, “rebels” denote an organized opposition to authority, while terms “terrorists” and “militants” stand for the groups using the most radical means of confrontation. This project opts for term “rebels” because it is more inclusive, encompassing militant and terrorist groups alike.

“Rebels” are defined as a named non-governmental political-military collective of individuals using armed force against a target government to achieve certain political goals.⁴⁶ Importantly, they are understood as an organization rather than a group. The difference is crucial: a group is comprised of two or more individuals who engage each other in social interaction without any commitments, whereas an organization is a mutually oriented activity of individuals who are restrained by membership and the relations of authority.⁴⁷ Defining rebels as an

⁴⁵ Kenneth A. Schultz. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Civil Wars. *International Organization* 64: 281–312.

⁴⁶ This definition corresponds with the one in Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) dataset on non-state actors. See: UCDP Actor Dataset 2.1-2010, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/63/63658_UCDP_Actor_Dataset_Codebook_2011.pdf.

⁴⁷ Paul Kenny. 2010. Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma. *International Studies Review* 12(4): 533-55.

organization may shed more light on power-relations between the leadership, commanders and factions. It also displays rebel entities as actors with multiple interests.

Rebels are engaged in “rebellion” or “insurgency”, which is viewed here as a protracted political-military struggle against a government aimed at weakening and/or replacing its authority over a certain territory through the use of illegal political organizations and armed forces. Rebellion or insurgency includes a range of tactics – guerilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization – directed toward the establishment of alternative government on a piece of territory. Such means and goals distinguish rebels from paramilitary groups, such as the Popular Army in Iraq, Arkan’s Tigers in Croatia and Bosnia, the Sudanese Janjaweed or the Assamese Rifles in India. These irregular formations are a “flip-side” of rebel movements.⁴⁸ Paramilitaries are the supplements of the state’s regular forces and may control a rear base but they ultimately lack a distinct political organization and their objective is always driven by violence. Finally, criminal groups, extremist political parties and militant religious sects are excluded because they do not try to control territory and population as rebels do.

The “state” in state sponsorship of rebel groups refers to a sovereign government over a certain territory recognized by at least two permanent members of the UN Security Council. Government is the regime that controls the capital city. The non-state forms of support, such as diasporas, companies and refugees, are excluded from this definition because none of them seeks to exert control over rebellion. These actors are often coerced into assisting rebels. Similarly, my definition of sponsor excludes all entities whose statehood is internationally disputed. I choose such an approach because unrecognized entities are quite similar to state-like rebel organizations. For example, some separatist organizations such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

⁴⁸ Marie-Joelle Zahar. 2001. *Proteges, Clients, Cannon Fodder: Civil-Militia Relations in Internal Conflicts*. In Simon Chesterman (ed.), *Civilians in War*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, pp. 43–65.

(LTTE) had developed sophisticated governance including health, security, educational and even bank system that closely resemble modern state administration.⁴⁹ Yet, these movements are not internationally recognized sovereign units, along with all privileges and obligations that stem from such a status. If my definition of sponsor would encompass non-recognized entities like the Palestinian National Authority or Abkhazia, then there would be no legitimate reason to exclude other rebel organizations that have a degree of political control over a chunk of territory. Including non-recognized states would not only overstretch my definition of sponsor but would also make the universe of cases extremely heterogeneous and the underlying causes and patterns spurious.

External governments provide different types of support to embattled opposition groups, but in this project support refers to the provision of troops, sanctuary, weapons, finance, material/logistics, training and access to military/intelligence services.⁵⁰ Based on the level of involvement of sponsor in the ongoing conflict between its *protégé* and the target government, the assistance is divided into military (troops) and non-military (the rest). Military support corresponds to the term military interventions as the sponsor's own armed forces become embroiled in an ongoing conflict. Consider the 1979 joint invasion of Tanzania and Ugandan exiles against Idi Amin's regime as a prototype of military support.

The provision of troops is a nod in which sponsorship and direct intervention overlap. Despite their analytical and empirical links, note, however, that sponsorship is not a conceptual substitute for intervention, or *vice versa*. First, direct intervention assumes that the intervening

⁴⁹ Zachariah Cherian Mampilly. 2011. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press.

⁵⁰ This variable is coded according to the UPCD External Support in Armed Conflict dataset compiled by Högladh, Pettersson and Themnér (2011) which covers the above types of external assistance for the 1975-2009. Since my project also covers the post-World War 2 period, the remaining observations will be coded using EACD v2.3 dataset compiled by Kristian S. Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and David Cunningham as well as supplementary sources.

state openly sides with a party, and takes responsibility for conflict, including casualties and damage to its international reputation. In contrast, sponsorship can be unknown, secretive or overt, and a sponsor undertakes it to avoid physical loss and international condemnation.⁵¹ Second, direct intervention entails an external party who is peripheral to insurgency and with little control over a rebel movement.⁵² On the other hand, the concept of sponsorship presumes that foreign governments play a vital role in shaping and exercising control over rebels' agenda (e.g. goals, strategies and activities).⁵³ For instance, former Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi established, financed and directed The Islamic Legion aimed to create a pan-Arab entity against Chad.

Unlike intervention, sponsorship is a complex relationship between sponsors and rebels. In this relationship, a sponsor provides resources to a rebel movement in exchange for compliance and loyalty, often at the expense of rebels' organizational autonomy.⁵⁴ In contrast with a somewhat static view of intervention, the sponsorship also assumes a varying level of external control – the sponsor's grip over rebellion may increase, decrease, weaken, then resume or completely end – as testified in Syria's sponsorship of the Fatah (1964-1970) and various Palestinian rebel groups, or in the case of Vietnam's control over the Khmer Rouge. Finally, scholars sometimes consider intervention as a benevolent act aimed toward ending a conflict and

⁵¹ Chris Loveman. 2002. Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 2(3): 29–48 at pp. 33.

⁵² Dylan Balch-Lindsay, and Andrew Enterline. 2000. Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4): 615–642; Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis 2000. External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2433; Michael Findley and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars. *The Journal of Politics* 68(4): 828–837; Patrick Regan. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Patrick Regan. 2002. Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 55–73.

⁵³ Salehyan, *Delegation of Conflict*, pp. 501; Sinno, *op. cit.*, pp. 79.

⁵⁴ Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov. 1984. The Strategy of War by Proxy. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 19(4): 263-273, at pp. 270.

establishing peace.⁵⁵ Sponsorships are not necessarily driven by such principals. The cessation of violence may not necessarily be the goal of sponsors. For instance, external governments may support a rebel organization in order to economically weaken the target government as in the case of the South African sponsorship of Renamo.

The provision of material assistance is an important segment of state support to rebel outfits, but by itself it does not constitute a sponsorship. Governments need to *actively* commit themselves to the provision of material assistance. Consider the notorious example of Al-Qaeda on the eve of 9/11: this organization raised money in Germany, enjoyed financial aid from many rich Saudis, ran a private sanctuary in Malaysia and even had operatives in the US.⁵⁶ Although the inaction of these governments may have been important, none of these governments deliberately chose to support the organization's activities. Since there was no relationship to start with, as these governments were not active sponsors of Al-Qaeda, it would be unreasonable to expect the organization to comply with the policies of their alleged masters. Summing up the abovementioned constitutive parts, I define *state sponsorship as an active provision of material and non-material resources by an external government to a designated rebel organization – which is fighting against an internationally recognized government – aimed at establishing and maintaining an agenda control over the group*. At the heart of sponsorship is a sponsor-rebel dyad per conflict. This is my unit of analysis.

Naturally, there are many conflicts featuring multiple sponsors. One of these is the ongoing Syrian civil war where the Free Syrian Army enjoys a sanctuary in Turkey and receives money, arms and possibly training from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates etc. Sometimes a sponsor backs multiple groups, e.g. Pakistan's sponsorship of Kashmiri rebels and

⁵⁵ For example: Reagan (2000) and Reagan (2002). For exceptions see for instance: Robert Nalbandov. 2009. *Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

⁵⁶ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, pp. 219.

Sudan's proxy war in Chad (2004-2009). Regardless of the scenario I assume that sponsors and rebel movements can rationally distinguish between their allies according to certain criteria such as ideological or ethnic ties, quality of service provision, capabilities, or something else. This implies that both sponsors and rebels may act in a specific way toward each of their allies. Ideally, every sponsor-rebel dyad should constitute a distinct unit of analysis. I am aware that this assumption can be contested in multiparty civil wars where rebel behavior toward a sponsor is intertwined with strategies of other armed groups. While the dyadic approach is imperfect, it is nevertheless more precise than polyadic and monadic approaches. This is because dyadic claims about behavior of a party always relate this behavior to the other party. Polyadic and monadic claims suggest that rebel groups act in a certain way, but it is unclear whether their behavior is aimed at a particular sponsor. Since I am interested in rebel behavior toward their state sponsors, the dyadic approach seems as a more reasonable option. In the following section I describe sponsor-rebel dyad using the principal-agent terminology.

Principals and Agents, Sponsors and Rebels: Delegation of the Use of Force in Civil Wars

No matter how noble the goal of assisting aggrieved groups may sound, the ultimate aim of any sponsor is to fulfill its own political agenda. During the Cold War, the superpowers carried out proxy wars in Africa, Asia and Latin America to topple down ideologically unfriendly regimes. Rivals contesting territory may delegate violence to militants when they are much weaker than their opponents.⁵⁷ In doing so, they may throw full support behind the secessionists for territorial gains. For example, Somalia sponsored the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) who fought for an independent state in eastern Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s. Alternatively, sponsors may be interested in making

⁵⁷ Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca. 2012. Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–2001, *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4): 720–734.

their rival “bleed from thousand cuts” without necessarily seeking to acquire a disputed territory. Such a strategy is often attributed to Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East. Either way, a sponsor preserves the plausible deniability in case their agents commit atrocities or other embarrassing acts.

More importantly, external governments frequently delegate violence to rebels to avoid human and material losses of open military confrontation. For instance, instead of fighting a disastrous conventional war with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan in the 1980s the US government funneled covert support to seven mujahedeen outfits. At a relatively low cost for the US, the mujahedeen forced the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, and averted the breakout of a nuclear war. Similarly, delegation may be an efficient mechanism when rebels have the expertise, knowledge of local terrain, language and links to the indigenous population.⁵⁸ This is especially advantageous in inhospitable areas (e.g. jungles, deserts, mountains and swamps) where limited navigation and communication may severely hamper the deployment of troops and heavy mechanization.

Similarly, states are more likely to support their kin waging an armed struggle in neighboring states as this may be seen as a popular move. Recent research finds that rebels with transnational ethnic ties are more likely to receive military support from foreign governments than those without such ties.⁵⁹ At other times, external governments choose their clients on the basis of symbolic commitments – such as shared identity and ideology – that tend to trump the rationalist logic. As Byman and Kreps suggest, ideology can be such a powerful motivator for some states like Iran that they opt for a less capable but normatively congruent agent.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Salehyan (2010a).

⁵⁹ Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, *op. cit.*, at pp. 727.

⁶⁰ Byman, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-94.

Either way, sponsorship is a collective action⁶¹ in which the external government provides resources in return for minimal cooperation of the rebel group. This relationship is best captured by agency (or principal-agent) theories. These theories are a set of general governance models found in both the writings of Max Webber and the “new institutionalism” in economics. Principal-agent theories have proven a powerful tool in analyzing various delegation affiliations in legal studies and political science with an emphasis on legislative bodies, governments, bureaucracies, and political parties.⁶² International relations scholars examine delegation of decision-making from member states to multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organization and various EU agencies.⁶³ In a nutshell, agency theory assumes that there is a (formal or informal) contract according to which a “principal” transfers authority to an “agent” to perform some service for the principal including the transfer of some decision-making authority to the agent.⁶⁴ In conflict studies, principal-agent theories have been used to understand the relationship between rebel leaders and followers,⁶⁵ and the ties between state sponsors and rebel organizations.⁶⁶ Following these recent studies, I adopt the framework to understand state sponsorship of rebel movements.

⁶¹ Russell Hardin. 1982. *Collective Action*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

⁶² For example: Roderick Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; K. Strøm. 2000. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 261–289.

⁶³ Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2): 241-276; Mark Pollack. 1997. Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community. *International Organization* 51 (1): 99-134; R. L. Brown. 2009. *Nonproliferation Through Delegation*. PhD dissertation, University of California: San Diego, La Jolla; Giandomenici Majone. 2001. Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance. *European Union Politics* 2(1): 103–122.

⁶⁴ Michael Jensen, and William Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, *Journal of Financial Economics* 3: 305-360, at pp. 308.

⁶⁵ Scott Gates. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. *Journal of Conflict Revolution* 46(1): 111–130; Shapiro, *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ Byman and Kreps, *op. cit.*; Salehyan, Delegation of War; Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, *op. cit.*; Ora Szekeley. 2014. A Friend in Need: The Impact of the Syrian Civil War on Syria’s Clients (A Principal–Agent Approach). *Foreign Policy Analysis*, forthcoming.

In the context of sponsorship, the agent is usually a rebel movement to which a foreign government delegates some authority to carry out violence against a target government. The principal idea is that a rebel organization serves as a representative of its sponsor. The sponsor provides rebels with enough support to fight against the target government, but not enough to accomplish their main goal.⁶⁷ In return for their support, sponsors expect rebels to cooperate with them over goals, organization, strategies and tactics. Cooperation implies that at least there is non-collision between the strategies and behavior of rebel organization and its sponsor. Ideally, sponsors seek exclusive (restricted to other actors) and complete (regarding the sponsor's goals at large) compliance of its agent. In practice, however, sponsors seek to maintain complete control over the organization even when they share the supervision with other foreign governments. They are likewise concerned with the active cooperation of the rebel leadership and a passive cooperation of the membership as a whole. They favor complete but inclusive relationship to incomplete arrangement, and a minimum of cooperation to non-cooperation. At a minimum, sponsors expect their agents not to use the granted resources to threaten the survival of the sponsor's political regime.

When a rebel outfit agrees with a sponsor about its role in a conflict, has the same information as its sponsor on how to carry out operations and commits all its resources to fighting a target government, the delegation works flawlessly. Because their preferences and beliefs are aligned, the rebels trust their sponsor and will comply with its orders.⁶⁸ Under such conditions, the benefits of delegation offset the costs of direct intervention in that the sponsor

⁶⁷ Salehyan (2010a); Steve Coll. 2004. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: The Penguin Press, at pp. 91.

⁶⁸ Robert Spekman. 1988. Strategic Supplier Selection: Understanding Long-Term Buyer Relationships. *Business Horizons* 31(1): 75–81, at pp. 79.

does not need to invest considerable resources and time in selection, monitoring and sanctioning of its agents.

The Weakening of Sponsor's Control and Rebel Defection

The principal-agent framework shows that agents may deceive their principals, behave opportunistically or use external support against their principals. First, agents can take hidden actions whose revelation could damage the interests and reputation of their sponsors (*moral hazard*). They can, for instance, shirk in covert missions, commit monstrosities against civilians, make secret deals with enemies of their principals or anger powerful states by claiming responsibility for acts they did not necessarily commit against them. Second, even when principals have the knowledge of what and how their agents act, the rebels can still behave opportunistically. For example, the rebels can refuse cease-fire and peace agreements against the will of their masters. Finally, one of the chief dangers in all governance structures is what Kiewiet and McCubbins call "Madison's dilemma". "The essence of the problem is that resources or authority granted to an agent for the purpose of advancing the interests of the principal can be turned against the principal".⁶⁹ In this scenario, rebels exploit the favorable strategic circumstances to harass or kill sponsor's citizens, commit attacks against government officials and objects or start an all-out insurgent campaign.

I assume that these three broad forms of agency problems are a mirror image of rebel cooperation. They correspond to what I call rebel defection. By defection I understand voluntary actions that rebel leadership, commanders or its factions pursue to maximize their benefits at the expense of the contract that they made with a sponsor.⁷⁰ In other words, defection is a flip coin of

⁶⁹ Kiewiet and McCubbins, *op. cit.*, pp. 26.

⁷⁰ This definition is similar to Jeremy Weinstein's definition of control within rebel organization. Yet it differs from it in one important aspect: I understand defection as exogenous, while Weinstein sees it as endogenous to the

cooperation and “means a weak commitment and no support in conflicts with the adversary”⁷¹. It can be collective – when rebel leadership acts against sponsor’s interests and, factional – whenever a group of members behaves against the sponsor’s welfare.⁷²

I unpack the notion of defection into two forms: mild and severe defection. In its mild form, defection appears as defiance of sponsor’s orders related to military matters. The first indicator of defiance is the verbal criticism of sponsor’s policy toward the armed conflict. It can be expressed either by the organization’s officials or through collective means such as protests. For instance, when South Africa signed the 1984 peace accords with Mozambique, and Renamo immediately accused its sponsor of “betrayal” and of “being in the league with the Marxists of Maputo”⁷³. A prototype of collective form of dissatisfaction is, for instance, the 1970 rally organized by PLO leftist factions, PLFP and DFLP during which the crowd – led by a donkey with the picture of Nasser on its face – swarmed the streets of Amman with banners condemning Egyptian President Nasser – one of their main supporters – as the “traitor” and “agent of imperialism”⁷⁴.

The second indicator of defiance is shirking – when a rebel organization refuses to carry out certain operations or twists the initial orders. In February 2008, the Sudanese government reportedly ordered the leader of RFC Timan Erdemi and other Chadian rebel leaders to launch a

principal. See: Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131. On the other hand, Stathis Kalyvas uses “ethnic defection” to denote “a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their coethnics”. This definition is narrower from my concept because it includes only ethnic affiliations between the principal and agent and because it does not cover instances of defiance. See: Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(8): 1043-68, at pp. 1045.

⁷¹ Glen H. Snyder. 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics* 36: 461-495.

⁷² Note that defection counts if a faction is a part of the group or if less than a month passed before a group announced split with its parent.

⁷³ Robert Davies. 1985. South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period: A Critical Analysis of Effects and Implications. Report nr. 73. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, University of Uppsala. 5-62, at pp. 33.

⁷⁴ Alan Hart. 1989. *Arafat, a Political Biography*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 315.

renewed offensive against Chad's President Idriss Deby after they failed to take Ndjamena. Erdemi refused Ghosh's demand because Khartoum denied him a leadership role in a united Chadian opposition. Reportedly, Sudan was "not happy" about Erdemi's decision.⁷⁵

The third indicator of defiance is when rebel organizations refuse to take part in negotiations over or refuse to sign cease-fire, peace or other undertakings that are explicitly backed by their sponsor. The most notorious example is the refusal of Krajina and Bosnian Serbs to accept peace proposals by the Contact group even though their sponsor, Yugoslav President Milosevic, openly did so.

Severe defection poses a serious concern for sponsors because it is the termination of contract by the organization or its faction(s). This type of defection has two forms. The first type is desertion, whereby a rebel movement or its faction threatens to leave its sponsor or deliberately discards sponsor's assistance. For instance, in the conclusion of the civil war in Chad (1978-1987) Qaddafi had to pull back his forces from the country after its agent, the Chadian rebel Transitional Council (GUNT), demanded the Libyan forces to leave Chad. Similarly, Congolese Resistance Movement (RCD) deserted one of its backers, Uganda, when Kampala clashed with another sponsor, Rwanda, over the control and management of Congo's resources. Desertion is also coded when an organization or its faction arrives at a negotiated settlement with the target government or drops out of the fighting without making an alliance with the target government. For example, the Hizbul Mujahideen commanders struck a cease-fire with India in 2000 against the wishes of Pakistan. On the other hand, the Jammu and Kashmir

⁷⁵ Wikileaks Cables. Chad: RFC's Erdemi Plans Land Grab While Other Rebels Move to Topple Deby. March 17, 2008 <http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM397/?q=erdimi%20sudan>.
Wikileaks Cables.Minawi: Erdemi Rejects Khartoum's Push for Renewed Offensive. March 3, 2008. <http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM311/?q=erdimi%20sudan>.

Liberation Front (JKLF) commanders renounced violence against India and effectively dropped out of fighting in 1994.

The second type of severe defection is switching sides, a situation where a rebel group turns guns against the sponsor. The rebel group may become allied, formally or informally, with the target state security forces. Take, for instance, the decision of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to abandon Saddam Hussein's patronage and align itself with Tehran in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Switching sides may have serious repercussions for sponsors particularly if significant resources have already been invested into a rebel organization. Ultimately, the rebel organization may enforce its will on the master that had created it without joining the target government. Switching sides is a perverse effect of state sponsorship whereby a militant agent uses the endowed resources to act against its sponsor's sovereignty. This is surely the greatest concern of all principals. The indicators for this form of defection are:

- verbal calls for an overthrow of the sponsor's regime or constitutional order, as well as any spoken act denying the sponsor's ability to govern its population or territory;
- sporadic one-sided violent attacks by the members of a sponsored rebel group against the population (e.g. bombing) or against the officials of the sponsor country (e.g. assassination attempts) and
- armed clashes between rebel militias and the sponsor's security forces.

Some rebels may use resources and privileges granted by their sponsor to threaten its authority over territory and population. In the course of the 1990s, Pakistan, for instance, nurtured a bulk of Kashmiri militants such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkatul Mujahedin, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, as a means of weakening the Indian government. With the supervision of the

Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), these outfits were allowed to recruit militants to fight in Kashmir and received free training and weapons. As time passed and the Kashmiri organizations grew, not all of them remained respectful of Pakistan's sovereignty. Some organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba still follow Islamabad's agenda by occasionally carrying out violence against Indian forces. The majority of other outfits such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkatul Ansar, have turned into Frankenstein's monsters by conducting suicide bombings against Pakistani officials or stirring sectarian violence.

Potential Explanations for Rebel Defection

Although the literature on civil wars has expanded rapidly, we lack theories of strategic interactions between non-state and external interveners in the context of armed conflicts. The existing studies of rebel behavior contribute to our understanding of conditions under which non-state armed actors use violence against civilians.⁷⁶ Students of conflict studies have also developed theories about the behavior of combatants toward rebel leadership and the likelihood of organizational splits.⁷⁷ Finally, there is a burgeoning literature on alliances between rebel groups that draws on propositions from dominant IR theories.⁷⁸

However, this literature provides no explanations for rebel defection. The scholarship on strategic alliances between rebels offers plausible arguments, but these explanations are based on symmetric relations, while state sponsorship typically involves the unequal distribution of

⁷⁶ Scott Gates. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 111-130; Stathis Kalyvas. 2006. *Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Claire M. Metelits 2008. The Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Fuzzy Sets. *Political Research Quarterly* 62(4): 673-684; Reed M. Wood. 2010. Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 601-614.

⁷⁷ For instance: Kenny, *op. cit.*; Michael H. Woldemariam. 2011. Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies. Princeton University: Unpublished PhD Dissertation.

⁷⁸ Christia, *op. cit.*; Christina Furtado. 2007. Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, The Case of South Asia. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Illinois-Champaign; Navin Bapat and Kanisha Bond. 2012. Alliances between Militant Groups. *British Journal of Political Science* 3: 1-32.

resources and capabilities in favor of external governments. Whereas the parity of inter-rebel alliances produces equal opportunities for all parties to renege on mutual agreements, the power asymmetry of sponsorship makes, by default, external governments less committed to the mutual cause. Because sponsorships are shrouded in secrecy, sponsors can always deny that they support a rebel group. Moreover, external governments can afford to alter or break their commitments by manipulating the extent of support, whereas rebels need all necessary resources to endure fighting. Finally, sponsors can also use a range of punishments, such as detention or financial blockade, to bring disobedient agents into line with their own preferences. In inter-rebel alliances the relative power parity among parties generally prevents such a behavior. Therefore, rival theories should allow for the power disparity between parties.

I formulate potential explanations on the basis of principal-agent framework. Agency theory is chosen for several reasons. The first reason is that power asymmetry is incorporated into principal-agent models through the notion of delegation of authority. The delegation of authority involves the ability of principals, i.e. sponsors, to oversee and discipline their agents, i.e. rebels. Sponsors can use selection mechanisms, strict sanctions or hire third-parties to monitor rebels and report back to them.⁷⁹ Second, principal-agent theories relate to the problem of defection. As mentioned before, agency models recognize that agents often behave against the goals and interests of their principals. This behavior includes shirking, hiding information, opportunism and the use of resources against the principal.⁸⁰ Finally, agency models suggest several explanations of agent's disobedience. Broadly speaking, three such explanations can be identified in the principal-agent literature: preference convergence, the availability of alternative resources and capabilities.

⁷⁹ Roderick D. Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 27-34.

⁸⁰ Susan Shapiro. 2005. Agency Theory. *Annual Review of Sociology* (31): 263-284, at pp. 279.

First, defection may be more likely when rebels' preferences differ from those of the principal. As long as these preferences are aligned with those of the sponsor, the rebels are likely to be compliant.⁸¹ Agency problems arise when the distance between the sponsors' and rebels' preferences widens. The greater the gap between the two, the more likely a rebel organization will be motivated by its narrow interests, often at the expense of the sponsor's agenda.

The most common proxy for shared preferences in civil war studies is ethnicity. The basic premise of all ethnic-based explanations is that in times of crisis, particularly amidst armed conflicts, individuals and groups tend to be loyal to organizations claiming to embody and protect their ethnic identities.⁸² Shared ethnicity is thought to mitigate problems of collective action,⁸³ and to be sticky and evident, and more restricting than other ideological forces.⁸⁴ Shared ethnicity can arguably lead to organizational cohesion through a variety of mechanisms, from common preferences to a more efficient in-group monitoring.⁸⁵ Common norms may bring rebel behavior closer in line with the preferences of its sponsor as ethnic groups cherish primordial social and authority ties. Owing to these ties, sponsors can claim legitimacy – a belief that the ruler has the right to issue orders and rebels have an obligation to comply with them. By setting up clear criteria of authority, shared ethnicity solidifies principal-agent relationships.⁸⁶ Consequently, common ethnic origin facilitates sponsor's monitoring and control over a rebel

⁸¹ Nielson and Tierney, *op. cit.*

⁸² David Horowitz. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, at pp. 349; Chaim D. Kaufmann. 1996a. Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can be Done and the Other Can't. *Security Studies*, 6(1): 62-100; Stephen Biddle. 2006. Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon. *Foreign Affairs* 85(2) 2-14.

⁸³ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 4: 715–35.

⁸⁴ Chaim D. Kaufmann. 1996b. Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. *International Security* 20: 136–75.

⁸⁵ Fearon and Laitin, *op. cit.*; Salehyan (2010a), pp. 506.

⁸⁶ Robert H. Bates. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa, in *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olunsorola. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; James D. Fearon. 1999. Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together. Mimeo, Stanford University.

group and decreases the chance of rebel defection. Similarly, shared ethnicity may facilitate the flow of information, improve coordination between the parties and strengthen rebel command structures.⁸⁷ Shared ethnicity may contribute to intra-rebel cohesion because in-group policing and expectations of repeated interactions with co-ethnics raises the costs of defection.

A similar argument is made in favor of shared ideology. Daniel Byman and Sarah Kreps argue that strong ideological links may reduce the need for monitoring mechanisms and make a rebel group a more deadly proxy force.⁸⁸ However, they also caution that the ideological bonds are not a sufficient condition for loyalty. They cite the example of Iran's sponsorship of Hezbollah where ideological proximity is reinforced by Tehran's material incentives. Theories of shared preferences, therefore, offer the following empirical propositions:

H1a: Rebels are less prone to defection when their leaders or the majority of membership share ethnicity with their external sponsor.

H1b: Shared ideology decreases the chance of defection.

Overall, the ethnicity-based argument seems convincing and there is certainly some logic in maintaining the control through pre-established norms, practices and social structures. Although shared identity can under some circumstances serve as an effective disciplining mechanism, recent findings indicate that amid civil wars ethnic kinsmen often defect against each other by allying with rival groups or governments.⁸⁹ Sponsors are subject to different international pressures, such as embargo, international isolation or threat of foreign intervention, than their clients. International pressure and war weariness often compel some sponsors to

⁸⁷ This line of argumentation draws on Mancur Olson's in that the homogeneity of the organization in question is seen as the main condition for the effective use of selective incentives and for overcoming the problem of collective action. See: Mancur Olson. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Boston: Harvard University Press.

⁸⁸ Byman and Kreps, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

⁸⁹ See: Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. *op. cit.*; Paul Staniland. 2010. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries. MS MIT.

choose compromise with the target government at the expense of a hardline policy.⁹⁰ This progressively leads to divisions between the sponsor and its narrow-focused agent, and ultimately to rebel defection. For instance, two major Serb organizations in Croatia and Bosnia had fiercely rejected calls from their kinsmen in Belgrade to accept externally brokered peace agreements.⁹¹ Some Kashmiri outfits such as Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen and Muslim Jambaz Force abandoned their kinsmen from Pakistan and joined the Indian security forces, while others such as the Pakistani-stuffed organizations Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkatul Jehadi Islami even attempted to kill the then Pakistani President Musharraf. These examples indicate that ethnic ties may fuel rebel defection. Because wars put tremendous pressure on combatants even ethnically aligned actors can fall prey to opportunism, indiscipline and treachery. This claim is corroborated by the statistical tests in Chapter 3.

The second explanation for defection is access to alternative sources of support. The logic here is the following: alternative sources break a sponsor's monopoly over strategic resources making the rebels less willing to follow its orders. If alternative support is available, the sponsor will have less leverage. When alternatives are non-existent, the sponsor will have greater leverage and the rebels will be more compliant. There are two streams of this argument: the multiple sponsors and the transnational ties argument.

Rebels sometimes have two or more sponsors. These sponsorships are either agreements with distinct principals ("multiple principals") or a single contract with multiple principals ("collective principal").⁹² Throughout its history of armed struggle the PLO had separate deals with different countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. At various points in

⁹⁰ Nina Caspersen. 2008. Between Puppets and Independent Actors: Kin-state Involvement in the Conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia and Nagorno Karabakh. *Ethnopolitics*. 7(4): 357–372, at pp. 358.

⁹¹ Nina Caspersen. 2007. Belgrade, Pale, Knin: Kin-State Control over Rebellious Puppets? *Europe-Asia Studies*, 59(4): 621–641.

⁹² Nielson and Tierney, *op. cit.*

the 1990s, Hamas and Hezbollah have received financial and military support from Syria and Iran whose governments closely coordinated their policies.

Principal-agent theories expect agents with multiple principals to have a greater leeway in pursuing their behavior than those with a single principal. Defection arises due to collective-action problems among the principals, which makes monitoring more difficult.⁹³ The increase in number of principals multiplies the heterogeneity of preferences increasing the tensions between them.⁹⁴ This structure is inherently unstable as principals tend to impose their own preferences on each other. As multiple principals lack institutional remedies to the consequential power struggle, the threat of principal fragmentation is omnipresent.⁹⁵ If the agent is aware of this tension, then it may be able to pit multiple sponsors against one another to increase its freedom of action.⁹⁶ To sanction such a behavior principals must synchronize their policies, which is ultimately very costly, and they often end up issuing contradictory directives to their agents. With alternative sources of funding and contradictory orders, rebels are, therefore, less susceptible to sanctioning and threats from any specific principal increasing the probability of defection.

Alternative sources may likewise lead to defection when rebels receive support from other, non-state actors. This includes the support outside national borders, based on ethnic or ideological sympathy, from militant movements, regional organizations or diasporas. With transnational support, rebels may not be in dire need of external sponsors. If a sponsor threatens to punish the rebels they can always rely on their transnational allies assuming that this support

⁹³ Edward Banfield. 1975. Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization. *Journal of Law and Economics* 18: 587–605, at pp. 595; Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott. 1996. Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 12(1): 119– 66.

⁹⁴ Salehyan 2010, at pp. 509.

⁹⁵ Julia Adams. 1996. Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies. *American Sociological Review* 61(Feb):12–28, at pp. 16.

⁹⁶ Szekely, *op. cit.*

goes beyond vocal backing. This may make the rebels more defiant of sponsor's policies especially when they need to execute orders that go against their goals or ideology. In this mechanism, the rebels are expected to defy orders as they could still draw on alternative support even if the sponsor abandons them. Another mechanism linking transnational ties and defiance is when the transnational support comes from ethnic majority of the sponsor country. This mechanism stands in opposition to the ethnic ties argument. For instance, the Serb rebels in Croatia and Bosnia received support from both the Milosevic government and Serbian opposition. In this mechanism, rebels pursue more radical policies believing that they can successfully mobilize elites and electorate from the sponsor country around their goals. If such goals run against sponsor's national interests, the rebels may be asked to modify or abandon them. Instead of seeking a compromise, the rebels may choose defiance, believing that the support from the elites or electorate will increase the pressure on the regime to back down. When the regime rejects such blackmail, an open confrontation between the sponsor and its agent is unavoidable. This does not imply desertion or switching sides, as transnational support should make the rebels more resilient and, as suggested, radical in their demands.

H2a: Rebels with multiple state sponsors are more prone to defection.

H2b: The presence of transnational support increases the chance of defiance, but decreases the likelihood of desertion/switching sides.

The alternative support explanation offers a powerful and elegant account of rebel behavior. On the other hand, multiple sponsors may increase control over rebels. Contrary to the expectation of the multiple-principal hypothesis, principals may gain leverage by investing into a strong leadership. The more resources sponsors invest into the rebel leadership, the more

disciplined will be the rank and file.⁹⁷ For instance, the abundant support from the socialist block to the insurgents in South Africa and El Salvador had buttressed their respective leaderships, making them more obedient and disciplined.

The third explanation suggests that lacking or otherwise inadequate sanctioning capabilities determine rebel defection. The use of subsequent sanctions is considered to be a key instrument in the control of principals over bureaucracies because it can presumably discourage disobedience.⁹⁸ As long as rebels act rationally, they will be reluctant to defect against sponsors who can credibly threaten to punish them. The key word for punishment in this context is the coercive capacity of sponsor. Those governments with coherent regimes and effective policing infrastructure can use intelligence to locate rebel camps on their territory, deploy police and army to rural areas, and identify, round up and punish the ringleaders for misbehavior. In such instances rebels should be expected to be obedient to their external sponsors. But when sponsors run weak states, they lack coercive capacity and willingness to confront rebel defection, so defiance should be more likely. Likewise weak sponsors are likely to be associated with rebel desertion/switching sides. Because such sponsors lack capacity to operate across borders, they might be unable to provide the necessary logistical, operational or material support to their agents who are exposed to counterinsurgency.

By the same token, the ability to punish rebels should be reduced when they possess strong military capabilities. In this mechanism, as rebels grow stronger, sanctioning becomes more costly and sponsors are less able to credibly threaten them. Because sponsors cannot credibly threaten to curtail their activities, highly-equipped groups will be more autonomous in

⁹⁷ Nicholai H. Lidow. 2011. Violent Order: Rebel Organization and Liberia's Civil War. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Stanford University, pp. 124-125.

⁹⁸ Barry Weingast. 1984. The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective. *Public Choice* 44: 147-92; Barry Weingast and M. Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policy Making by the Federal Trade Commission. *Journal of Political Economy* 91:765-800.

pursuing their policies. Enhanced capabilities make rebels better able to defy sponsor's demands,⁹⁹ and independently negotiate with the target government. Moreover, stronger rebels can risk severing or terminating ties with their sponsors because the "rising power will have less need for allied support"¹⁰⁰. Finally, rebels can use their capabilities against the sponsor if it opts for more conciliatory policies toward the target government.¹⁰¹ The opposite mechanism is at work in desertion/switching sides. Weak rebels should be more likely to abandon their sponsors because they lack capabilities to endure a protracted fighting. The target government can inflict serious casualties on the rebels, leading key members to abandon fighting. In addition, if a movement is under attack by a much stronger rival outfit, it may choose to switch sides to ensure survival.¹⁰² Although such movements may adopt hit-and-run tactics, inactivity may stimulate some factions or commanders to eventually leave the group.

Hence the capabilities explanation suggests the following hypotheses.

H3a: Weaker sponsors are likely to suffer defection.

H3b: Stronger rebels are prone to defiance, while weaker rebels are prone to desertion/switching sides.

The capabilities argument offers a commonsensical explanation for defection. But it also begs further questions, such as how we know that sanctioning does not come after rebels have defected against their sponsors. Sanctioning is usually an *ex post* mechanism used by principals, who faced with a disobedient agent, aim to avert future slack. If sanctioning comes only after defection, then the explanatory power of capabilities is suspicious. Other factors may be driving the outcome, while capabilities may have little analytical purchase. Similarly, the capabilities

⁹⁹ Byman and Kreps, *op. cit.*, pp. 8.

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Walt. 1997. Why Alliances Endure or Collapse. *Survival* 39(1): 156–179 at pp. 159.

¹⁰¹ Stephen J. Stedman. 1997. Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security* 22(2): 5-53.

¹⁰² Staniland (2010).

argument hits upon the problem of endogeneity: how do we know that capabilities affect defection and not the other way around? This problem becomes acute as capabilities are too broad and static to explain variation. Particularly in the context of civil wars it is difficult to measure the change in capabilities in a chronological and sequential fashion. Consequently, the lack of fine-grained information makes one skeptical that capabilities are causally prior to defection. Finally, even if one had precise measures why would the level of capabilities determine defection? The capabilities argument places rebels in a rather passive, responsive role, to be automatically deterred or encouraged by power, which is rarely the case in practice. Rebels dare disobey even a superpower. UNITA's leader Savimbi did not mind breaking the cease-fire with the Angolan government in 1992 even though its erstwhile sponsor, the US government, was clearly against this move.¹⁰³ Even those groups with low capabilities are often undeterred by their sponsors as violence of Palestinian Marxist groups toward Jordan implies.

The summary of key arguments is presented in Table 2. The aforementioned vignettes do not suggest that the three explanations play no role in explaining defection. Rather it suggests that political context alone cannot explain varying outcomes as shared preferences, alternative resources and capabilities alone do not make rebels more or less exposed to defection. All these factors matter to some extent, but only as a broad structural constraint and not as a driving force of varying outcomes. If, for instance, sanctioning plays certain role in rebel behavior, then there must be a conditioning variable that determines differing organizational behavior based on shared political context. This variable needs to be endogenous to the rebel structure reflecting the distribution of power between the leaders and cadres.

¹⁰³ The New York Times. Widespread Attacks by Unita Rebels in Angola Are Reported. October 31, 1992. www.lexisnexis.com.

Table 2. Alternative Explanations for Rebel Defection

Theory	Prediction
Shared Preferences	Shared ethnicity → non-defection (both defiance and desertion/switching sides) Shared ideology → non-defection (both defiance and desertion/switching sides)
Alternative Support	Multiple sponsors → defection (both defiance and desertion/switching sides) Transnational ties → defiance
Capabilities	Weak sponsors → defection (both defiance and desertion/switching sides) Strong rebels → defiance Weak rebels → desertion/switching sides

Summary

In this chapter I have introduced the concepts of rebel organization, sponsor, sponsorship and defection. A rebel organization is distinguished from paramilitary forces and criminal gangs. Only internationally recognized states are considered to be sponsors. The governments who actively offer material support to rebel movements form sponsorship. Sponsorship is a dyadic relationship in which a rebel outfit receives resources in exchange for sponsor's control over its organization, policies, goals and tactics. Unfortunately for sponsors, agents are not always loyal to their cause. Some rebel agents might work against their sponsor's interests, which I call defection. Defection ranges from defiance of orders to desertion and armed confrontation with the sponsor. It is committed by the rebel movement as a whole (group defection) or by a faction (factional defection). The principal-agent literature offers three explanations of defection. These are shared ethnicity/ideology, alternative sources of support (multiple sponsors and transnational ties) and coercive capabilities.

Above I have pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of these explanations. My argument is that these approaches possess some explanatory power in terms of group defection, but they are unable to account for both group and factional defection. They all ignore intra-rebel organizational dynamics, particularly how the change in the relationship between rebel leadership and its rank and file affects its loyalty to the sponsor. Following this course, I present my theory of rebel defection in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Theory of Rebel Defection

“Trust is good, but control is better”. (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin)

In the previous chapter I discussed three types of rebel defection and the possible explanations based on principal-agent framework. In this chapter, I develop a theory to explain why and when rebels defect against their sponsors. The goal is to understand the delegation chain from sponsors to rebels, the impact of its length on the ability of sponsors to control rebels and how external shocks shape the constraints on rebels to obey their sponsors. This requires theorizing the organizational structure of rebel movements and their response to sponsor’s and government’s policies.

My theory applies to non-state armed organizations that receive military support from one or more state sponsors in armed conflict. First, I consider militant outfits that have the same parity or are stronger than the target government as well as those that are fighting an asymmetric war.¹⁰⁴ Even though I test the causal mechanisms in the case of an asymmetric conflict (i.e. Kashmir) in Chapter 4, the parameters of my theory should also be valid in conventional conflicts. I assess the validity of my argument beyond asymmetric conflicts in Chapter 3 and 5.

My argument envisions a context in which a rebel organization faces a capable government or rival militant outfits. The rank and file of such an organization is placed under a considerable pressure to stay loyal to its superiors, particularly when located in remote areas. In

¹⁰⁴ For the distinction between asymmetric and conventional civil wars see: Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells. 2010. International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 104: 415–429; Stathis Kalyvas. 2005. Warfare in Civil Wars, in: Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds.), *Rethinking the Nature of War*. Abingdon: Frank Cass, pp. 88-108; Laia Balcells. 2010. Behind the Frontlines: Identity, Competition, and Violence in Civil Wars. Ph.D. Dissertation: Yale University.

this case, keeping an organization together is a daunting task and factionalism may spread like a wildfire throughout a movement. To solidify internal discipline, increase prowess and lethality of missions, these outfits are dependent on their foreign sponsors. The sponsors may offer more sophisticated weapons, money, an access to safe territory, and logistical or intelligence support in return for cooperation (or subordination) in organizational and operational matters. All this material support may buttress the central leadership through which, as Sinno argues, sponsors prefer to channel their support. On a flip side, rebels may lose their autonomy. The loss of autonomy may force the rebels to accept most sponsor's conditions.

In essence, the sponsored rebels have two options: to remain loyal to their sponsors or defect against them. For those movements fighting in multiparty civil wars – faced with the government and numerous rivals – staying loyal may be more costly than defecting despite the benefits of foreign support. This is because rebel organizational behavior is conditioned by actions of other organizations. The target government is usually the most powerful actor. In response to COIN and rivalries, rebels are frequently forced to shift their organizational structure from centralized to decentralized, and *vice versa*. Such shifts may empower or weaken the rank and file of these organizations affecting the number of important players within a movement. The increase in number of commanders and factions affects the relationship between the leadership and the rank and file, in that there are more preferences – some even radical – that must be accommodated. The failure to accommodate some interests at the expense of others may lead to internal coup or, worse, to in-group fighting and split-up. At the same time, this increase in organizational complexity puts a considerable strain on sponsor's ability to monitor and sanction a movement. Sponsors cannot prevent powerful commanders and factions from finding alternative allies, building stronger ties to their local communities or making deals with the target

government. Under such circumstances, the delegation chain is highly unstable and rebels are prone to defection.

The explanatory power of my theory is restricted to armed conflicts and violent movements. It does not aim to explain the relationship between foreign governments and armed movements in peacetime. Nor does the theory make claims about the relationship between foreign sponsors and non-violent movements. Both phenomena are situated in different contexts and driven by other dynamics than proposed in this study. In addition, this theory may not be fit to understand the relationship between governments and paramilitaries, as well as inter-rebel alliances. Paramilitaries are better integrated into the military hierarchy of their sponsors lacking the autonomy of rebel outfits. On the other hand, inter-rebel alliances entail more or less symmetrical relationships in which each party can credibly threaten to defect from the agreement. In sponsorships, the power asymmetry leaves a much smaller space to rebels to renege on their obligations. In contrast, my argument extends to terrorist movements given that they are involved in asymmetric warfare. Finally, my theory does not discriminate against different goals of rebel movements; it applies to secessionist, ethnically, ideologically and religiously motivated rebellions, anti-government insurgencies and anti-colonial uprisings.

Leaders, Followers and Sponsors: Theory of Rebel Defection

Rebels are coalitions of individuals and groups linked by common goals, membership and authority structure.¹⁰⁵ Individuals and groups join them when there is some material or ideological benefit to be gained, and leave when these advantages are absent. Organizational activities are maintained and defined by a coalition of members and factions who invest their

¹⁰⁵ Richard M. Cyert, James G. March. 1992. *Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 32; Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik. 2003. *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource-Dependence Perspective*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 24; Kenny, *op. cit.*, pp. 535.

capabilities and take part in combat.¹⁰⁶ By virtue of this contribution organizations operate for the interests of the coalition members.

Akin to other organizations, such as political parties and the military there are upper and lower echelons. Roughly speaking, rebel organizations are composed of leaders, commanders and operatives. Leaders usually belong to upper, while commanders and operatives belong to lower echelons. This distinction denotes a typical organic composition rather than the actual distribution of power. Each of these echelons has its own goals that are not necessarily in congruence with those of the organization.¹⁰⁷ Each echelon has its own group of supporters which helps them in achieving their goals.

Organizations are arenas of struggle for power. Power, understood as the control of decision-making, is critical to the effective governance of organization.¹⁰⁸ The main goal of leaders is to preserve their power and prevent the ascendance of challengers. At a maximum, leaders prefer organizations in which they need not share decision-making authority with the lower echelons. Also they favor those organizations where they can tightly control the flow of resources (money, guns, lucrative materials etc.). The lower echelons, i.e. commanders and operatives, on the other hand, are interested in maximizing their autonomy from the leadership. Ultimately, commanders and operatives favor those organizational formats in which they can modify or veto the decisions by the leadership; they prefer largely independent sources of financing. Therefore, rebel organizations are coalitions built on an inherent contradiction between control and autonomy.

¹⁰⁶ James March and Herbert Simon. 1958. *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.

¹⁰⁷ Kenneth J. Arrow. 1964. Control in Large Organizations. *Management Science* 10(3): 397–408, at pp. 398.

¹⁰⁸ Herbert Simon. 1961. *Administrative behavior*. New York: Macmillan; David Ulrich and Jay B. Barney. 1984. Perspectives in Organizations: Resource Dependence, Efficiency, and Population. *Academy of Management Review*, 9: 471-481.

With this contradiction at play, rebel organizations serve as a platform for bargaining between the leaders and rank and file. Sometimes, leaders tilt the balance in the favor of *status quo*. At other times, the rank and file succeeds in securing greater autonomy or taking over the leadership. In such a setting, preserving the balance of power is a precarious business. What may satisfy the leadership would increase the dissatisfaction of the rank and file leading to the point where the organization may not be saved.¹⁰⁹ Some factions may opt out from the coalition or align with those deprived of political status in an attempt to seize the leadership. As a result of this turmoil, the rebel organization can change the scope of its activities, fragment or cease to exist. Therefore, coalition members and groups are continuously involved in process of bargaining and out of this exchange and interdependence arises some sort of temporary power-balance among the members of rebel organization.

Can sponsors affect the nature of rebel structure? Some authors believe that they can. For instance, Patrick Johnston argues that state sponsors are key to preserving the power-balance by providing material resources to leaders to fend off other factions and create incentives for cooperation.¹¹⁰ Along these lines, Sinno suggests that the demand for unitary command and control is often attached with foreign support, and that sponsors favor more centralized and formalized structures because they can hold accountable rebel leaders for the performance of the whole outfit.¹¹¹ Recent reports from the Syrian civil war support this argument. Reportedly, in November 2012 the fragmented Syrian National Council (SNC) transformed into the National Coalition for Revolutionary Forces and the Syrian Opposition after Turkey and Qatar threatened

¹⁰⁹*Ibid*, pp. 27.

¹¹⁰ Patrick Johnston. 2008. The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone. *Security Studies*, 17: 107–137.

¹¹¹ Sinno, *op. cit.*, pp. 34 and pp. 79.

to cut their arms supplies to the rebels.¹¹² Similarly, after Saudi Arabia and Qatar put pressure on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to centralize its military decision-making, the rebels established a unified military council in late 2012.¹¹³ The provision of resources may sharply increase the dependence of rebel leadership on sponsors. Sponsors can use these resources to impose their agenda onto the organization through the rotation of leaders, cooptation of disgruntled members or factions or by pitting factions off against each other. Such examples have been encountered among various Palestinian organizations that were based in Syria in 1970s and 1980s, most of whom lost their decision-making to the Syrian regime.

On the other hand, Paul Staniland offers a more nuanced answer to the above question. Staniland argues that sponsors may advance the unification of less cohesive outfits or undermine them by playing different factions off each other.¹¹⁴ But sponsors cannot fix or ruin every organizational structure because other forces, such as local rivalries, petty interests and COIN, are also at play. By manipulating the level of their support, sponsors may force fragile organizations to unite under a unitary leadership.¹¹⁵ However, sponsors cannot prevent future splits, and, more importantly, they cannot use their support to cause a shift in organizational structure. Analyzing the fragmentation of militancy in South and Southeast Asia, Staniland shows that sponsors can instigate splits. But whether sponsored militants preserve their cohesion is likely to depend on robustness of their social roots and hierarchy. This finding suggests that centralization may not be endogenous to sponsor's support. Some empirical examples from this dissertation also point to a similar conclusion. For instance, the case study of Kashmir in Chapter

¹¹² Turkey, Qatar Cut Arms Supply Until Divided Syrian Factions Unite, *Today's Zaman*, October 1, 2012, source: <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Report%3A+Turkey+and+Qatar+cut+arms+supply+until+divided+factions+unite.-a0304028233> (accessed on 08/05/2014).

¹¹³ Afshon Ostovar and Will McCants. The Rebel Alliance: Why Syria's Armed Opposition Has Failed to Unify. *CNA Analysis and Solutions*, March 2013.

¹¹⁴ Paul Staniland. 2014. *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 50-51.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*

3 suggests that Pakistan could not change the organizational structure of Hizbul Mujahideen by sidelining it in favor of jihadi groups. Similarly, despite a cut of support and instigated splits, Pakistan did not cause the end of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF); it was rather the unsynchronized onslaught by the Indian military and Hizbul Mujahideen.

Sponsors often face difficulties controlling their agents because rebel organizations cannot filter every possible demand; they must appease some interests to the detriment of others. Unwillingly, rebel leaders favoring their sponsor may offend the rank and file. In order to stay in existence rebel organizations may be compelled to maintain cordial relations with some actors and to downgrade relations with others. The obvious question then becomes when organizations can and do respond to sponsor's demands and under what conditions they do not comply with its orders.

The Problem of Many Hands: Delegation Chain from Sponsors to Rebels


The delegation chain starts from a sponsor government who delegates authority to its secret services to select and supervise a rebel outfit. The secret services primarily cooperate with the rebel leadership who becomes their agent. But rebel organizations vary in terms of their structure, i.e. how decision-making authority is distributed between the rebel leadership and lower echelons. In centralized organizations, this authority is concentrated in central leadership who exercises direct control over its chief commanders. In decentralized and factionalized organizations, various commanders and factions hold more decision-making authority than their leaders. Abdulkader Sinno suggests that centralized rebels will be better controlled by their foreign backers because rebel leaders can discipline the rank and file.¹¹⁶ Contrary to non-centralized organizations, Sinno argues, centralized rebels lack solid ties to their local

¹¹⁶ Sinno, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

communities. For this reason, centralized rebels are heavily dependent on external supporters for resources. Therefore, centralized organizations are likely to be more loyal to their sponsors. I advance Sinno's proposition by transforming the problem of sponsor's control into that of rebel behavior toward sponsors, i.e. defection. Although we both draw on rebel organizational structure, I contribute to Sinno's proposition by developing it into a particular causal mechanism that connects organizational structure to defection.

According to this causal mechanism presented in Figure 1, defection is driven by the length of delegation chain from sponsors to rebels, which, in turn, is affected by the organizational structure. Centralized organizations are likely to shorten the delegation chain because sponsors deal with a narrow group of leaders who have the monopoly of power. In contrast, decentralized and factionalized organizations are likely to lengthen delegation chains because sponsors act as principals to both the leadership and lower echelons. As the length of delegation chain increases, the likelihood of defection also increases. This is because the preferences of those at the bottom of the chain are much different from those of the sponsor.¹¹⁷ Therefore, as the organizational structure becomes less centralized the length of delegation chain increases; in longer chains the potential for rebel preference misalignment is greater increasing the probability of defection.

Figure 1. The Causal Mechanism of Organizational Theory



¹¹⁷ Paul Seabright, Conflicts of Objectives and Task Allocation in Aid Agencies, in: Bertin Martens *et al.* 2002. *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34–69, at pp. 46.

The issue with long delegation chains is that they increase the distance between a sponsor and the rebels. The longer the distance between the sponsor and rebels, the higher the costs of supplying resources and monitoring rebel activity. In particular, in chains with many autonomous agents within a rebel movement, the sponsor lacks a control over rebels' coercive apparatus. This curtails sponsor's ability to deter rebel misbehavior by credibly threatening to punish its leadership. Such a scenario also diminishes the manipulative potential of private rewards to rebel leadership since the rank and file is often able to develop its own sources of financing. If the sponsor is unable to efficiently transport resources and control its clients, the room for rebel hidden action widens. As a consequence, a long delegation chain leads to rebel defection.

During the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, Pakistan's ISI faced a similar problem controlling Jamiaat-e-Islami's chief field commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud. While Jamiaat's political leadership – which was based in Pakistan – had an excellent relationship with its sponsor, ISI had seldom to use other mujahideen outfits to discipline Massoud whose army was based across the border.¹¹⁸ “Massoud ran local police and civil affairs committees in the Panjshir valley and levied taxes on emerald and lapis miners, (...) and his militias depended directly on popular support”¹¹⁹. His army received crops and livestock from the population. In early 1980s, the Soviet army initiated a series of military operations (the so-called “Panjshir offensive”) in the Panjshir valley. The offensive was not a major success as the rebels managed to hold their grounds while the Soviets suffered casualties and defections. Nevertheless, Massoud received no reinforcements or supplies from Pakistan and had to sign a truce with the Soviet command without a prior consultation with his leader Rabbani and ISI.

¹¹⁸ Barnett Rubin. 2002. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 220.

¹¹⁹ Coll, *op. cit.*, pp. 118.

Reportedly, Rabbani “felt betrayed”, while ISI decided to cut the support to disobedient Massoud.¹²⁰

This example suggests that apart from organizational features, physical distance may also lengthen the delegation chain. Massoud was located in Afghanistan where he enjoyed greater autonomy than if he had operated within Pakistan’s borders. In essence, Pakistan could not dispatch a disciplinary patrol to Afghanistan without risking a confrontation with the Soviet army. In turn, Massoud’s location reinforced his perception of ability to avoid Pakistan’s sanctions for misbehavior. If Pakistan could not punish Massoud, then he could conduct activities that even ran against his sponsor’s interests. Massoud would risk losing supplies, money and weapons, but given his earnings from taxation and illicit trade this loss would be minimal. At the same time, the separation from his leadership and sponsor meant that Massoud would not be able to receive well-timed assistance from Pakistan in case of a major Soviet offensive. Under such circumstances, distance also strengthens the perception of vulnerability to adversaries, inciting resentment, fear and discouragement among the targeted ranks. Organizations located outside sponsor’s reach should, therefore, be more vulnerable to counterinsurgency.

The perception of vulnerability is absent when a rebel outfit is located within its sponsor’s borders. The access to the sponsor’s territory allows rebels to avoid attrition and grow in size. It also allows sponsors to monitor and punish their agents. However, the proximity to sponsor’s capital may lead some militants to establish connections with local political groups. Common ethnic or ideological bonds may facilitate the formation of these connections. In the absence of such bonds, the networking may be driven by business interests.¹²¹ These ties may

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 121.

¹²¹ William Reno. 2007. Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups. *Civil Wars* 9(4): 324-342.

help militants raise more funds for their cause. But meddling into domestic politics of sponsor state may eventually pit them against the sponsor. Once their sponsor and local connections are at odds, the militants may be drawn into this conflict. The triggering mechanism for confrontation should be a change in sponsor's policy toward the armed struggle, i.e. advocating restraint in militants' operations, calling for cease-fire or peace deal. This U-turn in sponsor's approach may anger its militant agent. If the sponsor becomes weak, the militants may defy orders or even turn guns against him or her. Located within sponsor's borders may, therefore, reinforce the perception of opportunity. While geography places constraints on rebel behavior, it is also static. As such, physical distance offers partial explanation for defection. Without a variation in the organizational structure, geographic location cannot predict when rebels defect against their sponsors. Explaining defection requires considering how the change in organizational structure creates incentives for rebels to pursue certain behavior.

To explain this relationship, I first consider when organizational structure should encourage loyalty to sponsors. Such an organizational structure should stimulate rebels to execute all the sponsor's orders irrespective of the level of its material support. Sponsor's interests are recognized and broad directions how to meet them are given. The implementation of these directions smoothly runs through a top-down channel, from senior leaders to chief commanders, from chief commanders to district officers, all the way to foot soldiers. The performance of lower echelons is carefully monitored by their seniors and there is a feedback to the central leadership. In turn, the sponsor monitors the organization and its leadership; if there is any doubt about the loyalty of leadership, it is easily replaced.

Apparently, this ideal implies a straightforward and short delegation chain from a sponsor government to rebel leadership to rank and file, and back. Straightforward implies that the flow

of information and resources runs top-down, and the short size of delegation chain implies that a rebel movement can be regarded as a unitary actor. As I have already assumed that sponsors act as unitary actors, the main condition for a straightforward and short delegation chain is a hierarchical control within the rebel organization. In this sense, there must be a chief executive or a team of individuals with an authority to select capable commanders and operatives, run an effective incentive system, monitor actions of the rank and file, sanction the transgression of orders, receive a feedback from the lower levels and so forth.

Under these circumstances, the delegation chain is configured in such a way that at each stage a single sponsor delegates violence to only one agent (rebel leadership), and one agent is accountable to one sponsor. Because the accountability rests with the rebel leadership, sponsors can more effectively employ monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. As the sponsor can easily make the leadership reveal hidden information and credibly punish it in case of transgression, the costs of defection become higher than its benefits. Thus, the distribution of decision-making authority within a rebel organization in favor of the rebel leadership should deter rebel defection.

In practice, however, the length of delegation chain from sponsors to rebels can be quite long as the command and control in rebel organizations becomes more complex. In particular, I identify three types of organizational structure that affect the length of delegation chain.


Three Types of Rebel Organizational Structure

The distribution of decision-making between the leadership and rank and file of rebel organization is what I call the level of *centralization*. Centralization denotes the extent of power and authority at the upper levels of organizational hierarchy.¹²² Authority and power are understood as the ability of central leadership to issue orders and receive feedback from the rank

¹²² Simon, *op. cit.*

and file. Centralized organizations have commanders that are directly responsible to the leadership and do not experience any challenge to its central command. Key decisions are taken by a few individuals at the top, while the lower levels have almost no say in organizational policies and are in charge of implementation of these decisions at the directions of the top level. The lower levels report back to the central leadership and can be held responsible for any action. As depicted in Figure 2, the decision-making authority is vertically distributed and – akin to a military organization – central control prevails over autonomy. An example of this form was the The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the militant organization known for its clearly defined leadership, complex bureaucratic structure, functional differentiation and the subordination of the military corps to the political leadership. Other examples, presented in Table 3, include Fatah, Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba and UNITA.

Figure 2. Centralized Organization as a Pyramid



Centralized organizations have a firm control of resources provided by sponsors. Together with private rewards, these resources are channeled to and through rebel leaders. The central leadership is likely to be accountable to its sponsor because it receives private rewards attached to the regular support. Private rewards also motivate rebel leaders to keep or change

their organizational policies in line with sponsor's demands. Acting as a proximate principal, the rebel leadership assures that every unit in the chain is responsible only to its superior. Resources are delivered to obedient rank and file and denied to those who may oppose the central dictate. Such sanctions are likely to be effective since the rank-and-file has weak local ties. Likewise, the rank and file is unable to attract alternative support because it has little power in the organization. This way, rebel leaders make sure that the rank and file is dependent on them and, therefore, unlikely to voice serious concerns about the change of course. This obedience allows the leadership to smoothly implement any change in sponsor's policies. Therefore, the command and control structure of centralized organizations ensures that their agents will not alter any order without a clear indication from a sponsor.

In non-centralized organizations, on the other hand, most decisions are made and implemented with the high participation of lower levels, i.e. commanders. Often the leadership itself is divided between two or more individuals or a group, which gives more space to commanders to push for their preferable policies. Under such circumstances, the commanders can assume the authority to transform or disregard leadership directives. Apparently, non-centralized organizations are horizontally structured and favor autonomy over central control.

One such type of non-centralized organization is a decentralized outfit, which has autonomous commanders, but it does not compete with the central leadership over the control of movement. The decentralization of decision-making entails more control over the creation of local and organizational strategies by the lower levels of power (See Figure 3).¹²³ As a result, the leadership of non-centralized organizations lacks control over local policies and external resources are squandered among lower echelons without a sponsor's ability to reign in the

¹²³ This organization is a set of actors "tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other". John Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt. 2001. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, RAND Corporation, at pp. 7.


organization. Even though there is a central leadership, the rank and file is more independent from the central command as it has stronger ties to the local levels. With strong parochial interests, commanders are bound to the protection of their respective communities, which usually runs against more general interests of their parent organization and sponsor. Sponsors and the rebel leaders are likely to face serious problems controlling battle-hardened commanders who seek to maximize their personal power “either by coercing their employer or by coercing the enemy more than the employer government had intended”¹²⁴. Consequently, the agenda-setting is often diluted and followers may be opposed to organizational goals.

This is because commanders usually have localized interests such as the protection of their respective communities. Such interests usually clash with more general interests of their parent organization and sponsor. In the face of counterinsurgency, when the local units incur casualties, the discrepancy of these interests widens as the commanders are sandwiched between the loyalty to the distant leadership and the social ties to their soldiers and the population. If the commanders decide to compromise with the target government, there is little that the central leadership could do to prevent them. As Shapiro argues, when militant leaders and followers have diverging preferences over tactics, internal monitoring and sanctioning is fragile and there is a mismatch between goals and tactics, the rank-and-file is likely to engage in unsanctioned violence, defect to the government or even turn against its leadership.¹²⁵ This makes decentralized organization less amenable to the control of central leadership, and, consequently, more prone to defection against their sponsors.

¹²⁴ Kenneth W. Grundy. 1968. On Machiavelli and the Mercenaries. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6(3): 295-310, at pp. 297.

¹²⁵ Shapiro, *op. cit.*, 56-61.

Figure 3. Decentralized Organization as a Solar System



The examples of this type are Hamas, the Afghan mujahideen (except for Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami), Frolinat and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (see Table 3). Despite the different context, all these movements share a similar organizational design: their commanders are tied to a central leadership but they are not centrally controlled. Instead, each has more operational autonomy to make its own decision and alter the central directions as they see fit.


Factionalized organizations entail the same traits as their decentralized counterparts except for the fact that they have experienced one or more protracted group infightings.¹²⁶ This is the most unstable form of non-centralization where certain factions within the organization operate independently from or openly challenge the leadership but do not collectively exit the organization nor formally establish a new organization.¹²⁷ As depicted in Figure 4, factionalized organizations look like a constellation of stars where the leadership is segmented – with many

¹²⁶ Fractionalized organizations are a stage in the development of command and control and should be distinguished from fragmentation, which is a collective decision of members to leave the organization and jointly coordinate their actions toward establishing a new entity. In contrast, fractionalization is endogenous to the organization because a faction still draws on organization's recruits, resources and institutional infrastructure despite its disobedience to the existing leadership.

¹²⁷ For a similar distinction between rebel factionalization and fragmentation see: Woldemariam, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-38.

actors vying for authority – and networked – having loose connections between various commanders and factions.¹²⁸

Figure 4. Factionalized Organization as a Constellation



These commanders and factions are autonomous in that they not only change leader's orders but also veto its implementation if they find it to be against their interests. These organizations often suffer from protracted infighting where many actors compete for the leadership.¹²⁹ Sometimes factions simply carve out a parallel organization within the parent organization,¹³⁰ which they can use to carry out operations detrimental to the sponsor. Some factions often wield significant financial autonomy owing to their ties to the local level, other militants or political actors and even external governments. Due to these ties most factionalized groups have fluctuating command and control as their commanders and factions claim membership in other rebel

¹²⁸ Organizations that are neither centralized nor decentralized Gerlach calls "segmentary, polycentric and integrated network" or shortly SPIN. L. Gerlach. *The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and its Opponents*, in J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds.). 2001. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, pp. 289-310, RAND Corporation.

¹²⁹ Lawrence, *op. cit.*, at pp. 90-91.

¹³⁰ Pearlman, *op. cit.*

organizations. This creates serious problem for the leadership to monitor and control the flow of recruits let alone issue the directions that are given by a sponsor.

Table 3. Some Examples of Rebel Organizational Structure

Type	Rebels
<i>Centralized</i>	LTTE
	Fatah
	Hezbollah
	Lashkar-e-Taiba
	UNITA
<i>Decentralized</i>	Hamas
	Jamaat-e-Islami (Afghanistan)
	Frolinat
	JKLF
	FMLN
<i>Fractionalized</i>	FAP
	RCD
	SLM/A
	ADF
	MDD

Under such circumstances, factionalized organizations are prone to splits particularly when the command and control is exposed to COIN or inter-rebel fighting.¹³¹

In practice, fractionalized organizations have a nominal leader, but their hierarchy is fragile with no central control and frequent infightings. This type includes, among others, FAP, RCD, SLM/A, ADF and MDD. They all had autonomous commanders and factions with ties to other organizations and governments who did not have much in common with their peers except for the common cause and propensity for violence.

¹³¹ Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown and Angela Dalton. 2012. Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 94–117.

The (dis)Advantages of Organizational Structure

The centralization of decision-making indicates how power is distributed among actors and, consequently, what kind of organizational outcomes can be expected. My argument is that higher centralization of command and control strengthens defection constraints on rebels even in competitive and dangerous environments. It may be reasonably argued that there is a connection between the centralization and organizational outcomes because the distribution of power tends to “simultaneously constrain and prescribe the behavior of organization members”¹³². The behavior of followers is constrained by the distribution of resources within an organization. The control of external resources flowing into the rebel organization is a key source of power and is even more important when a resource is rare.¹³³ Those who decide on the allocation of resources can induce others to carry out undesired orders. Cutting off resources to cadres is a sufficiently strong sanction to deter defection. No rational group of individuals would trade stable income and supplies for the wrath of their benefactors. Thus, the level of centralization may be related to rebel defection.

Control

If the aforementioned logic holds, one would expect highly centralized rebel organizations to be less prone to defection than their non-centralized counterparts. This expectation is built on different sizes of their “zones of acceptance”. Zone of acceptance is a critical point beyond which an individual or a group of people is not ready to carry out orders.¹³⁴ The wider the zone, the less likely is rebel defection.

¹³² Richard H. Hall. 1982. *Organizations: Structure and Process*, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

¹³³ There are many potential forms of control such as possession, access to resource or use of resource. Pfeffer and Salancik, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

¹³⁴ Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 10; Chester I. Barnard. 1938. *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 169.

In centralized organizations this zone is wider than in non-centralized because the access to resources is controlled by the central leadership. In such instances, strong central leadership acts as a “proximate principal” – it is a primary channel through which a sponsor filters its resources and instructions, and it is empowered “to hire, fire, or otherwise alter the agent’s employment contract”¹³⁵. Acting as a proximate principal, the rebel leadership is a supreme node which issues orders and receives information from the lower levels, and assures that every unit in the chain is responsible only to its proximate principal. Top leadership exclusively decides which commander and unit get what, when and how much of these resources. They have effective control over the organization. Those commanders who do not conform to the dictate of the central leadership may be deprived of these resources. Such sanctions are likely to be effective since the rank and file has weak local ties.¹³⁶ Likewise the rank and file is unable to attract alternative external support because it has little power in the organization. As a result, the rank and file of centralized organizations is very likely to have a wide zone of acceptance because there is no way to compensate for the loss of resources from the center. Therefore, the command and control structure of centralized organizations ensures that their agents do not alter any sponsor’s order.

In contrast, non-centralized organizations allow for the dispersion of resources to the lower levels making them more autonomous. The leadership of non-centralized organization lacks this manipulative capacity as commanders have stronger local ties, and, therefore, an access to alternative resources, which decreases their allegiance to the center.¹³⁷ Each commander or faction has the final say over the allocation of these resources among the troops, which they all can use as a trump card against the leadership. By and large, such commanders are

¹³⁵ Martens *et al. op. cit.*, pp. 47; Nielson and Tierney, *op. cit.*

¹³⁶ Sinno, *op. cit.*, pp. 14.

¹³⁷ Cooley, *op. cit.*

likely to disobey orders even in the face of punishment.¹³⁸ In addition, as Jacob Shapiro argues, when militant leaders and followers have diverging preferences over tactics, internal monitoring and sanctioning is fragile and there is a mismatch between goals and tactics, the rank and file is likely to engage in unsanctioned violence, defect to the government or even turn against its leadership.¹³⁹ Finally, non-centralized groups can also attract multiple sponsors, often with opposing agendas, further empowering the factions over leadership. Thus, by narrowing or widening the access to resources, the level of centralization makes behavior of leadership and its cadres toward the sponsor more or less defective.

Accountability

Firm control is one of advantages of centralized organizations. Their second advantage is accountability. Centralized rebel organizations are easier to control than their non-centralized counterparts because the leadership is capable of regulating the behavior of the second-tier members and is directly accountable for organizational activities.¹⁴⁰ The central leadership is accountable to the sponsor because the sponsor offers it private rewards (e.g. money), which are used for personal enrichment and the preservation of *status quo* within the organization. Top leadership is interested in payments and the promise of future rewards, whereas the lower echelons are motivated through both material (e.g. physical survival) and social incentives (e.g. approval).¹⁴¹ Sponsor's clout over the leadership is reinforced when it provides exclusive support

¹³⁸ J.K. Zawodny, *Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations*, in Lawrence Z. Freedman and Alexander Yonah. 1983. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Wilmington, Delaware, pp. 64.

¹³⁹ Shapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–61.

¹⁴⁰ Sino, *op. cit.*, pp. 79.

¹⁴¹ Lidow, *op. cit.*, pp. 25.

to the centralized organization.¹⁴² Consequently, the central leadership is eager to bring the rank and file into line with sponsor's preferences.

In contrast, non-centralized organizations are more complex hampering leader's ability to establish effective communication with the rank and file, monitor their behavior and punish disobedient units. More individuals and groups involved in decision-making open up more space for conflict and difference in implementation. As some authors note, rebel commanders and constituent factions of such organizations frequently act independently of their leadership.¹⁴³ A commander or faction may *de facto* oppose its superiors by establishing autonomous mini-hierarchical compartments together with its lower echelons. Under such conditions, the rank and file "can sometimes take orders from the rogue cell without being aware that the cell is acting independently of its superiors"¹⁴⁴. Lacking a central command to limit ambitious individuals and their followers, non-centralized organizations easily turn into battlegrounds for power, resources, prestige and so forth. Even a sponsor may become embroiled in intra-rebel power-struggles with an uncertain outcome.

Thus, centralized organizations are more accountable to sponsors than their non-centralized counterparts, and they are a much safer choice for sponsors. Since few people at the center make key decisions, there is less conflict and dissent among lower echelons. The monopoly over decision-making and force inhibits frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons, which one can find in non-centralized organizations.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² *Ibid*, pp. 14.

¹⁴³ Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91; Pearlman, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ Sun-Ki Chai. 1993. An Organizational Economics Theory of Antigovernment Violence. *Comparative Politics* 26(1): 99–110, at pp. 102.

¹⁴⁵ Sinno suggests that specialized branches within centralized rebel organization may undermine its coherence. Sinno, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–81.

Credible Commitments

The third advantage of centralized organizations is prompt execution. With fewer individuals in charge of decision-making, centralized organizations tend to speak and act as one. No wonder that central leadership can credibly commit to rapidly change its strategies in response to changes in sponsor's demands without jeopardizing its organizational structure and interests. The disempowered, divided and dependent rank and file is unlikely to voice serious concerns about the change of course, let alone endanger the central leadership.

Such a constellation makes the communication and decision-making process much more efficient than in non-centralized structures in which many local power holders must participate in the process. A non-centralized organization cannot afford unity, much less blindly follow a rapid change of strategy, because a multiplicity of goals tends to dilute and subjugate a dominant objective.¹⁴⁶ As various rebel elites and commanders push for their goals, sponsor's agenda-setting shrinks leaving a fertile soil for defection.

Counterinsurgency, Inter-Rebel Fighting and Sponsor's Defection: External Shocks and Rebel Organization

The abovementioned advantages of centralization – control, accountability and credible commitments – allow sponsors to exercise their control without much difficulty. This was, for example, the case with the Somali National Movement (SNM), a centralized organization that became a proxy of the Ethiopian ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam in the 1980s. In order to prevent the SNM leadership from challenging his authority, Mengistu organized the rebels' headquarters in Ethiopia's capital and maintained his control through the selective sidelining of some

¹⁴⁶ Lindsay Heger, Danielle Jung and Wendy Wong. 2012. Organizing for Success: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24: 743–768, at pp. 747–748.

members and payments to those who would best serve Mengistu's interests.¹⁴⁷ Such a patron tends to hold exclusive control over the centralized organization and accordingly have a significant clout over its leader or leaders. If the patron withdraws guns, money or a safe haven, the group immediately declines as it is unable to compensate for the loss of support.

However, rebel organizations do not operate in a vacuum. They are often exposed to external shocks stemming from the anarchic nature of civil wars and insurgencies. External shocks often prompt both sponsors and rebels to change their policies at the expense of interests and goals of the other. Thus, to explain how organizational structure leads to defection I consider sponsor's and target government's policies as incentives for rebels.

The first shock is the change of sponsor's policy toward armed struggle, including the reconciliatory policies and the use of force against its rebel client. As members of the international system, sponsors are exposed to external pressures regarding their interventionist policies in armed conflicts. Through condemnation, economic sanctions or threat or use of force, third parties often pressure sponsors to terminate their involvement in a conflict. Such international pressure combined with war weariness may lead to serious civil discontent within the sponsor country endangering its political regime. As a result, the pressured sponsor may need to change its policy of support to the rebels, usually by making concessions to other states that are directly opposed to the interests and goals of their clients. For instance, a sponsor may advocate restraint in executing offensive operations against the target government, or support cease-fire, peace talks and proposals, all of which may threaten rebel territorial gains or its very survival. All these forms of reconciliatory policies are likely to gradually lead to divisions and tensions between the sponsor and the rebels because national concerns of sponsors are not shared by the narrow-focused rebel movements. The sponsor may force its client to comply with a new

¹⁴⁷ William Reno. 2011. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 154–155.

course, by arresting rebel leaders, freezing or confiscating rebel resources and closing rebel facilities. The rebels may resist, by raising voice or their arms against the patron, or the rebel leadership may attempt to reign in the discontent. Even a centralized organization may become internally divided over the loyalty to the sponsor. This may lead to factionalism, and where some commanders and factions may turn guns both against their leadership and sponsor.

The second shock stems from counterinsurgency (COIN) and inter-rebel rivalries. In general, rebels should be more vulnerable to COIN and rivalries when they are outside sponsor's reach. The attrition from COIN and rivalries is likely to push the exposed rebels away from the sponsors. Capable target governments can use the police, military and intelligence to locate and attack rebel strongholds or their local branches.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, rival rebel movements can engage in targeted killings of sponsored rebels.¹⁴⁹ The decimation of the rank and file at the hands of the target government and rivals encourages resentment, disorder and fear among the commanders and foot soldiers. Intimidations, targeted killings, kidnappings and skirmishes weaken the ties between the rebel leadership and rank and file prompting commanders and factions to reconsider their loyalty to the cause. As the conflict prolongs, and attrition grows, the affected rank and file becomes more attracted to civilian life. Under such conditions, the target government can stir these hopes by buying off greedy commanders, offering amnesty or promising political offices.

How do these shocks trigger defection? Their impact is filtered through the delegation chain, and, particularly, through the rebel organizational structure. External shocks put rebel command and control into flux. In other words, defection is a reaction of rebel command and control to the change in sponsor's policy, and to the conflict with other actors. This reaction is based on perceptions about the preferences of the sponsor, target and rivals. Their preferences

¹⁴⁸ Weinstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.

¹⁴⁹ Staniland, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place*.

are deduced from verbal or physical acts. Both the rebel leaders and rank and file have their perceptions of other actors. These perceptions are not necessarily congruent. The rebel leadership and rank and file base their perceptions on their power within an organization, and their expectation of sponsor's coercive reach. These perceptions are primarily driven by the variation in the organizational structure. The coercive reach is constant and does not predict when and why rebels defect against their sponsors. It serves as a setting in which the organizational structure changes over time. Organizational structure is the key variable of my theory, and we should see defection when there is a decline in centralization.

In Table 4 I combine the organizational structure and location to present the dominant perceptions of the rebel leadership and rank and file. There are four perceptions: perception of restriction, perception of autonomy, perception of opportunity and perception of vulnerability. The rebel leadership and rank and file base their actions toward the sponsor on these perceptions. There are four possible actions: stay loyal, defy orders, desert and switch sides.

Table 4. Rebel Behavior toward Sponsors

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

		Centralized	Decentralized	Factionalized
WITHIN SPONSOR'S REACH	Yes	Perception of Restriction The organization is tightly controlled, <u>leaders</u> : stay loyal <u>rank and file</u> : stay loyal	Perception of Opportunity Rebel factions meddle into domestic politics, <u>leaders</u> : stay loyal <u>rank and file</u> : switch sides	
	No		Perception of Vulnerability Uncertainty about sponsor's commitment <u>leaders</u> : desert <u>rank and file</u> : desert	Perception of Autonomy Local ties trump sponsors' interests <u>leaders</u> : defy <u>rank and file</u> : defy

The abovementioned example of Ethiopia's sponsorship of the SNM should reinforce the perception of restriction. The SNM was a centralized organization and under the coercive reach of its sponsor. It was insulated from counterinsurgency, preventing desertions. Simultaneously, the SNM leadership depended on its sponsor and was tightly monitored by the Mengistu regime. Such a status restricted the ability of the leadership or rank and file to defy orders, let alone switch sides, even in the face of Ethiopia's radical shift in its policy toward the armed struggle. The perception of restriction should reinforce the loyalty of the organization as a whole regardless of its location. Why would a centralized organization refrain from defection if it is beyond its sponsor's reach? First, because the leadership depends on external support, and the rank and file depends on its leaders. Sponsors can deliver private rewards to leaders to keep the organization in line with their interests. Neither rebel leaders nor lower echelons have strong local ties. Thus, they both are expected to blindly follow sponsor's directions even if it leads to their demise. Second, given their bureaucratized and formalized structure centralized organizations should be more resilient to COIN. The conventional wisdom holds that organizations based on charismatic leadership are more vulnerable to counterinsurgency, and particularly decapitation, leading to their stagnation or downfall.¹⁵⁰ While charismatic leadership may be an important feature, it tends to be routinized and formalized in centralized organizations. The presence, messages and performance of leaders are usually transformed into highly bureaucratized and formalized relationships. But why do the bureaucratization and formalization make centralized organization more loyal agents than other organizational types? Because these features entail clear rules on decision-making and succession, allowing centralized organizations

¹⁵⁰ Michael Freeman. *The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Targeting, Terrorism and Political Violence*, forthcoming; Patrick B. Johnston 2012. Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns. *International Security* 36(4): 47-79; Bryan C. Price. 2012. Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism. *International Security* 36(4) 9-46.

to find a replacement in case of elimination of a leader or key commanders.¹⁵¹ The existence of administration and rules makes the intra-organizational monitoring and sanctioning highly effective, deterring potential defectors from reaching out to the target government even when they are dissatisfied with the central dictate. In sum, centralized organizations should prefer loyalty over defection irrespective of their location.

In contrast, decentralized and factionalized organizations are more inclined towards defection. The perception of opportunity is dominant among both types when they have access to sponsor's territory. On the other hand, when located outside their sponsor's reach, decentralized organizations are likely to develop the perception of vulnerability, and factionalized organizations – perception of autonomy. The perception of autonomy is reinforced due to local ties. The delegation chain from sponsors to the rebels is strained by the fact that the rebel organization also draws on popular support and resources, obtained through taxation or extortion of their respective communities. These communities are also a source of non-material incentives, such as respect and honor. The rank and file is particularly motivated by both material and social incentives, that is, it has vested interests at the local level. Commanders and factions are mainly interested in preserving these benefits, and they have low tolerance for those central decision that limit or endanger the access to the privileges. Likewise commanders and factions can reasonably ignore the sponsor's orders without incurring too high costs for their actions because they are out of sponsor's reach. As a result, commanders and factions have a narrower strategic picture than the rebel leaders, let alone their sponsor. Commanders and factions are likely to develop the perception of autonomy because they are stronger than their leaders and are outside the sponsor's reach. As a result, the rank and file is most likely to defy the sponsor's shift toward

¹⁵¹ Jenna Jordan. 2014. Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes. *International Security* 38(4): 7-38, at pp. 12-15.

reconciliatory policies, such as cease-fire agreements, peace-treaties or other operational decisions affecting their local interests because they risk losing social status, privileges acquired through taxation or predation or the loyalty of their constituencies. While rebel leadership may not be in favor of the policies advocated by some factions, satisfying every sponsor's request may be more damaging to its public standing. Rebel leaders are embedded in their respective communities and they compete with other factions over their support and loyalty. Failing to address the public demand may bolster more radical factions, and lead to decline of the leadership. Since leaders already lack the monopoly of power within the organization, local politics should encourage them to enter the outbidding even at if it means the collision with the sponsor. Given that they are outside his or her reach such a move would not entail costly sanctions. The two conditions reinforce the perception of autonomy. With this perception at play, defiance is likely to be triggered in response to the sponsor's reconciliatory policies toward the armed struggle.

The most severe forms of rebel defection are desertion and switching sides. Desertion involves accepting cease-fire or peace talks with the target government without a sponsor's explicit approval, abandonment of fighting or joining the target government. Switching sides is turning guns against the sponsor without necessarily joining the target government. Similar to defiance, a non-centralized organizational structure is the main condition for severe defection. Decentralized organizations beyond sponsor's reach will be more prone to desert given their perception of vulnerability. On the other hand, factionalized organizations within sponsor's reach will be likely to turn their guns against the sponsor due to the perception of opportunity.

Naturally, exogenous pressures such as COIN and insurgent fratricide provide a fertile soil for desertion. As argued above, these external shocks destabilize the delegation chain and the

command and control within a rebel movement. Because attrition interrupts supply lines and generates manpower losses, lower echelons are prone to abandon the fighting or make compromise with the target government. These are the most important factors outside the delegation chain that shape the rebel decision to desert combat and their sponsors.

Whether and to what extent these factors overwhelm the organization leading to desertion depends on a proximate cause: the length of delegation chain, and more precisely, the configuration of rebel command and control.¹⁵² When commanders and factions are mainly associated with their respective communities and lack solid organizational links to one another and to the central leadership, the ability of rebel leaders to influence the behavior of their military cadre is seriously constrained. Detached from its rank and file, the rebel leadership has scarce information about the needs and interests of its troops, and much less information about the inflow, type and number of recruits that are joining the local branches. As a result, recruits are randomly assimilated into local outfits, with little or no effort invested in horizontal (among the lower echelons) and vertical (between upper and lower echelons) organizational consolidation. Even if the leadership has broad knowledge about the situation on the ground, the territorial separation hampers the flow of supplies to remote units.

If the rebel leadership suffers from the information asymmetry and poor logistics, so does the sponsor who sits at the top of the delegation chain and has virtually no clue about the problems of his second-tier agents. Situated outside the reach of sponsor's policing patrols, usually across the international border, the rank and file may avoid wraith of its state patron. But it likewise cannot count on external support to survive decapitation or attrition even if the sponsor has information and willingness to assist the hammered outfit. Moving equipment and supplies across the international border, even a porous one, is not just costly in material terms,

¹⁵² For a similar argument see: Weinstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 131.

but it may also harm sponsor's reputation lest its officers are caught by the border guards. As most sponsors provide support to conceal their involvement in the conflict, it is unreasonable to expect that they would run a risk of exposure, particularly if the target government can credibly retaliate. Deprived of support from their sponsors amid a counterinsurgency or pressure from rivals, decentralized organizations are likely to develop the perception of vulnerability. This perception should discourage decentralized organization from fighting. As a result, we should expect either the organization as a whole or its rank and file to seek an agreement with the target government or desert fighting when operating outside sponsor's purview.

Whereas desertion stems from the weakness of sponsors to protect the lowermost agents in delegation chain, switching sides is related to the tendency of both decentralized and factionalized organizations to exploit ties to various domestic actors within the sponsor country. Striving to distinguish themselves from rebel leadership, different commanders will appeal to powerful individuals, political parties, religious groups or even factions within the sponsor government for additional political, economic and social support. These connections reinforce the perception of opportunity among the rank and file, the opportunity to gain a leverage over their nominal leaders and to influence the decision-making process within the sponsor country. In doing so, however, these factions are meddling into the internal affairs of the sponsor state. This creates alternative sources of material support and exerts political pressure on the sponsor to acquire greater tolerance of and support for rebel activities.¹⁵³ But when these allies are in opposition to the sponsor government, the group may easily become confronted with the sponsor.

¹⁵³ Rex Brynen warns that such internal alliances can backfire against the rebels by drawing them into domestic political squabbles. Rex Brynen. 1990. *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon*. Boulder: Westview Press, chapter 1.

The greatest danger for sponsors is when fractionalized groups give birth to “semi-splinter groups”¹⁵⁴. As noted above, the leadership of non-centralized organizations is weak to reign in elites and commanders because they enjoy a broad organizational space to define and pursue their interests. The greatest problems pose those individuals and groups who openly shun central commands. Leaders may try to win them back by endorsing their strategies. But this is a risky business as such a rapprochement may be against sponsor’s goals – remember the assumption about some adopting goals leads to the detriment of other. Alternatively, leadership can ignore or expel the troublesome elements. However, ignoring the disobedience means cutting the branch on which the leadership sits and conveys a message that opposing the central dictate is allowed. Expelling the troublemakers is costly as they might pull the others with them leaving the group in shambles.¹⁵⁵ If ignoring is risky and expelling is costly, the leadership can seek a third way – allowing the creation of a semi-splinter group. This will allow the group to carry its actions under a different name and secure separate funding while recognizing the central leadership.

However, once semi-splinter groups are allowed to attract alternative sources of support they tend to take on a life of their own. This also includes alignments with external allies with extreme agendas. Incidentally, this has been one of the greatest concerns in contemporary Pakistan where some fractionalized militant Kashmiri outfits such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad were simultaneously supported by the ISI and Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda attached extremist ideology to its material support which these groups used to stir sectarian violence within Pakistan. Many semi-splinter groups linked to Harkatul and Jaish have used suicide

¹⁵⁴ Pearlman *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17.

¹⁵⁵ Those who break away from the parent group are dangerous foes because they continue to vie for the loyalty of the followers of their former group. Lewis Coser. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Illinois: The Free Press, pp. 71.

bombings and assassinations to get rid of their rivals and the leadership of their parent groups.¹⁵⁶ In this situation, the leadership of a fractionalized organization might cut off its support and deny affiliation with a semi-splintered group. By that time, however, the semi-splinter will have already grown into a serious actor with powerful friends. Although drawing on the same followers and facilities as the parent organization, the semi-splinter entity has attained the motivation of a small, ideologically united faction, which can call upon the resources of its much stronger and extremist sponsors. If the sponsor decides to punish such behavior, fractionalized rebels who are nothing more than indoctrinated flocks may shun state authority, viewing the activities of local security forces as aimed to destroy their armed struggle and will violently respond. For weak and unresolved governments – who suffer from chronic instability – this challenge may ultimately drag their countries into civil war. Think of the Jordan's showdown with the fractionalized Palestinian leftist groups in September 1970, infamously known as Black September.

Blaming the Principal? Fragmentation of Sponsors

In Chapter 1, I defined rebel defection as a rational action. Following past work on actors in civil wars, I assume that both sponsors and rebels are utility-maximizing actors led by their self-interest.¹⁵⁷ They both make decisions based on the expected costs and benefits of available options. In this dyad, which is regarded as the main unit of analysis, sponsors are conceptualized as unitary actors. This implies that external governments act as a coherent entity toward their rebel clients usually through the army and intelligence services. I accept that there may be disagreements and conflicts within the government, between the military/intelligence and the

¹⁵⁶ Jessica Stern. 2000. Pakistan's Jihad Culture. *Foreign Affairs*, November/December; Stephen Philip Cohen. 2003. The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan. *The Washington Quarterly*, 7-25, at pp. 10.

¹⁵⁷ Leites and Wolf, *op. cit.*; Kalyvas, *op. cit.*; Weinstein, *op. cit.*

government and within the security services on how to manage the rebels. However, my assumption is that embattled agendas and bureaucratic spheres of interests do not seriously affect how external governments treat their rebel clients.

This assumption is not unproblematic. One line of argument for unitary-actor skepticism is that in practice a sponsor constitutes only a fragment of government. For example, parts of the Lebanese government actively backed the PLO in 1971, while others actively opposed it.¹⁵⁸ If only a handful of ministers support rebels, can we still call it a state sponsorship? The second criticism is that security services often act on their own without consulting the government. A notorious example is Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – often referred to as a “state within the state” – which has managed the Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s, and the Taliban and various Kashmiri militant outfits since 1990s. ISI became well-known for its contradiction of government's policies toward Kashmir, one of the clearest examples being the involvement of its officers in the 2008 Mumbai attacks by the officially banned militant groups LeT and JeM. Pakistan's main intelligence agency often operates outside the government's purview. Its alleged links to drug trade and other illegal financial transactions are supposedly invested in militant operations in Kashmir and northeastern India.¹⁵⁹ While ISI does not seem to be a rogue, anti-state agency,¹⁶⁰ it is certainly an autonomous actor capable of hiding, distracting or forging information from the sponsored insurgents to the Pakistani government.

Both arguments pose a thoughtful challenge to the unitary-actor assumption. While there is no easy or instant solution, I suggest two ways to address this issue. The first is to account for

¹⁵⁸ I thank Ora Szekely for this comment.

¹⁵⁹ Rian Clarke. 2010. Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, no. 35, pp. 41.

¹⁶⁰ Policy experts are divided over the issue of government control over ISI. Some authors like Bruce Riedel, a former CIA operative in Pakistan, and Shuja Nawaz claim that the civilian authority has minimal control over the agency. Other authors, such as William Milam and Marvin G. Weinbaum, disagree and suggest that certain officers rather than the whole ISI sometimes go rogue. For the discussion see: E. Kaplan, and J. Bajoria. 2008. The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations. *Council on Foreign Relations*. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/#5>.

sponsor's administrative and coercive capacity. As suggested by one of the alternative explanations in Chapter 1, weak states are expected to be fragmented sponsors. This proxy does not fully capture the nuances in the bureaucratic politics, but it partly accounts for the ability of governments to control their security apparatus. The second way to relax this assumption is to analyze the specific causal mechanisms behind a sponsorship. This step is undertaken in Chapter 4 where the relationship between Pakistan and Kashmiri militants is analyzed.

The conditions I propose, rebel organization and external shocks, are simply one segment of the wider context in which sponsors and their clients cooperate. The alternative explanations that I have suggested in the previous chapter may also affect the delegation chain, and my intention is not to downplay their explanatory capacity. Rather my aim is to analyze sponsorships in the context of capable sponsor and target governments; the rebels who are weak to establish their own rural base, and depend on sponsor for support; and where some rebels have ethnic and/or ideological ties to the sponsor while others do not. I embarked on this goal in Chapter 4 where the behavior of several Kashmiri militant groups toward Pakistan is analyzed. Before that I outline causal mechanisms leading to the two forms of defection.

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing Rebel Defection Across Armed Conflicts, 1968-2012

In the previous two chapters, I discussed the principal-agent approaches to rebel obedience and defection, and presented an organizational framework for analyzing the effect of command and control within rebel entities on their relationship with sponsors. The theoretical section has produced a core hypothesis: as the level of rebel centralization decreases, the likelihood of defection increases. This hypothesis, along with the alternative explanations surveyed in Chapter 1 are tested using a novel, cross-national dataset on sponsorship of rebels (SOR) and the onset of rebel defection from 1968 to 2012.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the properties of the dataset including the universe of cases, unit of analysis and some methodological issues. The indicators for the dependent variable are also provided. In the second part, I present the measurements for independent and control variables. Third, I justify the use of the multilevel logistic model (also known as the hierarchical method). The following section shows the results, which support my argument. As this is a novel dataset, I subsequently run a number of diagnostics to check for the adequacy of the models. After these tests, I analyze the sample using the Cox proportional hazard model in order to assess the risk of rebel defection in time. Then I analyze the robustness of the statistical findings by omitting some time periods and cases. In the final section, I summarize the main findings of the statistical analyses.

Data

The universe of cases for the quantitative analysis was selected from the Uppsala Conflict Department Program's (UCDP) cross-national database of external support in armed conflict. In this dataset, which is commonly used among political scientists, conflict is defined as

a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.¹⁶¹

External support or sponsorship of rebels is understood as “warring or non-warring support to a primary party that is given to assist it in an ongoing armed conflict”¹⁶². Warring support implies that a sponsor is sending troops to support the rebels, while non-warring support consists of “sanctuary, financial assistance, arms, logistics and military support, short of troops”¹⁶³. Note that UCDP does not include verbal support. The main unit of analysis in this dataset is conflict/year and there is a total of 169 conflicts for the time period 1975-2009 with 118 conflict featuring the external support.

This dataset was disaggregated into sponsor-rebel dyads per year. Furthermore, the UCDP dataset covers only conflicts after 1975 even though there are a number of major civil wars that have their beginnings in the sixties, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the first Sudanese civil war, and the civil wars in Cambodia and Chad. Dropping these cases creates a gap in our understanding of external intervention dynamics which have occurred prior to 1975. Where a conflict begins in 1968 and continues into 1975 I added new observations for sponsor-rebel dyad per year. The new observations were added respecting the UCDP rule of 25 battle-related deaths for the inclusion of conflict. I identified the name of sponsor using the Expanded

¹⁶¹ Stina Högladh, Therése Pettersson, and Lotta Themnér. 2011. External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009- Presenting New Data. Paper prepared for the 2011 ISA annual convention in Montreal, Quebec, Canada 16-19 March.

¹⁶² *Ibid*

¹⁶³ *Ibid*

Armed Conflict Data v2.3 (EACD) dataset. The type of support was located using the online searching engines, articles and books. Next, I have added certain rebel organizations that have been missing in the UCDP dataset after 1975. These are TELO and EROS from the Sri Lankan civil war that received military support from India, and five militant organizations supported by Sudan, UFDD-F, RFC (UFR), FPRN, FUC and MPRD, during the Sudan-Chad proxy war (2003-2009). The Kashmiri insurgents were disaggregated into particular rebel organizations when they met the battle-related deaths threshold. I included Al Barq, Al Jihad Force, Al Umar Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, JKLF and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Likewise, I removed all the sponsor-rebel dyads that have lasted for one year because it is a short period for the survival method to observe change in the outcome. Finally, I considered only cases where the sponsorship was explicit or acknowledged because it was analytically unjustified to expect rebel loyalty where the relationship may not even exist.

The modified dataset, which I named State Sponsorship of Rebels (SOR), has 188 sponsor-rebel dyads nested within 108 conflicts.¹⁶⁴ Since the focus is on sponsorship, considered are only those conflicts that experienced external intervention. The unit of analysis is a sponsor-rebel dyad per year, with observations for the years 1968-2012. The data is dyadic because the focus of my and alternative frameworks is on rebel behavior toward a particular sponsor. Following UCDP coding rules, a movement enters the data only if reaches twenty five battle-related deaths by fighting against the government, and if a sponsor provided the support for at least two consecutive years. Those sponsorships that lasted for one year are excluded because parties in every alliance need some time to develop their behavior toward one another. A sponsor-rebel dyad is observed until the conflict is terminated, the movement perishes or the sponsorship is ended.

¹⁶⁴ See Appendix A for the complete list of sponsorships.

In total, there are 188 sponsorships. For the universe of cases I draw on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset on External Support in Armed Conflict, 1975-2010.¹⁶⁵ Note that I do not incorporate into SOR those sponsorships that are coded as “alleged” in the UCDP dataset. Overall, the UCDP dataset seems to reasonably fit with this research for three reasons. First, the UCDP data is compatible with my definition of sponsorship. It defines a sponsor as a government or other entity that provides a material support to a non-state armed actor to fulfill its own political agenda. Second, the dataset provides fine-grained information about the sponsorships. In particular, the UCDP data distinguishes between particular sponsors and ten types of support (troops, access to territory, access to military/intelligence infrastructure, weapons, logistics, training, funding, intelligence, other forms of support, and unknown type of support) on a year basis. Finally, the dataset coincides with my scope conditions – analyzing the relationship between sponsors and armed groups in the context of armed conflicts. The UCDP includes only those cases where two parties, one of them being the government of a state, engage in combat resulting in minimally 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. This distinction is important because it excludes sponsorship of protests, political and communal violence, all of which are outside the purview of this study.

For additional cases I draw on the Expanded Armed Conflict Data v2.3 (EACD).¹⁶⁶ This dataset does not code cases on a year basis and provides a different coding scheme for types of support. For this reason, I had to personally code these parameters in accordance with the UCDP codebook for each conflict that was included in the SOR. Following the EACD dataset, my research design refers to particular rebel organizations. In the UCDP dataset some rebel

¹⁶⁵ Stina Högladh, Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér. 2011. External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009-presenting new data. Unpublished manuscript presented at the International Studies Association Convention in Montreal 2011.

¹⁶⁶ David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.

alliances, such as Patriotic Front (PF) in Rhodesia or Northern Alliance in Afghanistan are coded along with specific organizations. Likewise, one finds the whole ethnic group, e.g. Kashmiris, designated as a rebel organization. This coding ignores a potential variation in capabilities, resources and external support across organizations. To avoid possible pitfalls associated with lumping together various organizations as “rebels”, the SOR dataset includes only particular rebel organizations. There are a total of 108 rebel organizations that received external support since 1968 in the SOR.

My main dependent variable is rebel defection. Defection is a binary dependent variable denoting whether there is rebel defection or not. I coded this variable using LexisNexis, ProQuest, WikiLeaks, Google online book abstracts, and various books, articles and reports on civil wars and insurgencies. It was very hard to identify rebel defections using these open sources because the information is scarce and because the relations between foreign governments and rebel movements are shrouded in secrecy. Presented here is but a fraction of numerous cases of defection that are buried somewhere in intelligence files across the globe. The reader is, therefore, advised to approach this dataset as an imperfect undertaking, which sheds some light on the relationship between state sponsors and rebel organizations.

In coding defection I followed three criteria. First, I only considered the aforementioned acts in the context of an ongoing sponsorship. If a rebel movement defected against its sponsor after the sponsorship had ended or the conflict had been terminated, then it was not coded as defection against a sponsor. For example, Lawrence Kabila turned against Rwanda and Uganda after he overthrew Mobutu. Similarly, Khmer Rouge began purging its cadres from the

Vietnamese advisors after it captured the capital in 1975.¹⁶⁷ Both cases depict a relationship between two governments rather than a sponsor-rebel relationship.

Second, defection was considered only if it was aimed against a sponsor and its explicit interests. Before coding an act as defection, I first searched for a dissatisfied tones from the sponsor government regarding the behavior of its agent. When the sponsor government is silent about the behavior of its agent such incidence was not coded as defection unless it included an open denunciation of the sponsor, an armed attack against its military, citizens or property or outright desertion of movement or faction. Even though it may be argued that a sponsor may not care about the desertion of a movement, let alone a faction, I found the coding appropriate because it presents a material cost for a sponsor who often invests considerable resources into its agent.

Following these rules, I identified 100 occurrences of defection.¹⁶⁸ Defection is coded when the leadership of rebel movement or any of its factions engages in two types of behavior. The first type, which I code mild or organizational defection, is the disobedience of sponsor's orders without the termination of contract. In particular, mild defection is coded when rebels refuse to:

- conduct military operations
- accept cease fire or peace talks even though a sponsor explicitly supported it, or
- sign a peace agreement that is explicitly backed by the sponsor.

I identified 54 occurrences that conform to the definition of mild defection. The second type of defection, labeled severe defection, is the termination of contract by the leadership or factions

¹⁶⁷ Michael Haas. 1991. *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard*. Westport: ABC CLIO.

¹⁶⁸ For detailed narrative of defections see Appendix B.

through desertion or by turning guns against the sponsor. Specifically, severe defection is measured as:

- accepting cease-fire or peace talks with the target government without a sponsor's explicit approval,
- abandoning fighting,
- joining the target government, or
- targeting civilians and/or the armed forces of sponsor government.

Following these characteristics, I found 46 incidents of severe defection. As defined, defection can be both group-led and factional. Out of 100 reported incidents, seventeen denote factional defection, while the rest are committed by the movement as a whole. Of these seventeen incidents, three incidents fall under mild, and fourteen belong to severe defection.

Independent Variables

For my key variable, the structure of rebel organization, I mainly used open sources because the existing data offers partial information. In Chapter 2, I define rebel structure as a distribution of decision-making between the leadership and rank-and-file. Consequently, I searched for examples indicating whether there is a central leadership, to what extent the leadership is able to issue orders to the rank-and-file, whether the rank-and-file has only operational or other competencies, does the rank-and-file compete for the leadership. To inspect the validity of the first two indicators, I draw on the EACD dataset as a reference category. In this dataset there are two dummy variables to depict rebel structure: whether an organization has a central control, and to what extent. If there were any misunderstandings in the findings, I also

consulted START project,¹⁶⁹ which codes for the level of centralization of some militant outfits. For the third indicator I mainly relied on the open sources, while for the fourth I consulted the MAROB dataset.¹⁷⁰ Although it covers only armed actors in the Middle East, I find MAROB's classification useful. This dataset classifies rebel organization according to the strength of its central leadership. In sum, there are movements with factionalized/competing leaders, decentralized and strong ruling council/strong single leader.

Drawing on these sources and indicators, I coded centralized organizations as entailing strong person or council at the helm who issues orders and receives feedback from the rank-and-file, which has competencies related to operational issues and experiences no competition over the leadership in a given year. This level of centralization takes the value of 3. Decentralized organizations, which take the value of 2, have a person/council as a leader who issues political statements or orders that are modified by field commanders who operate in distinct geographic areas. Factionalized organizations have competing leadership and commanders or factions that can decide on a broad range of issues from organizational to alliance politics to operational issues and frequently do not follow any orders issued by the central leadership. This level of centralization is coded 1.

This variable is time-sensitive, meaning that for each year of existence the level of rebel centralization can change from centralized to decentralized, or from factionalized to centralized. Such an approach differs from the majority of other datasets where rebel structure is considered to be constant across years, and sometimes even across decades. The advantage of my coding is that it offers fine-grained information about the evolution of rebel structure allowing for a more

¹⁶⁹ National Consortium for the Study OF Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2013. Terrorist Organization Profiles. edited by University of Maryland. http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.

¹⁷⁰ Victor Asal, Amy Pate and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2008. Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook Version 9/2008 online: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp>.

precise analysis of its impact on defection.¹⁷¹ The frequency of distribution is in favor of centralized organizations. There a total of 698 or 56.98 percent of observations with centralized organization in the data. The decentralized organizations account for 359 observations (29.31 per cent), while fractionalized organizations are encountered in 168 observations or 13.71 percent.

To test the first alternative hypotheses – the relationship between shared preferences and defection – I develop two binary variables. The first is *shared ethnicity*, which is coded 1 if the rebel leadership and the majority of sponsor government share ethnicity, and 0 otherwise. To determine if the two have ethnic bonds, I relied on online sources and the EGIP variable from the EPR-ETH dataset.¹⁷² Overall, there are 35 sponsorships based on common ethnicity, and 153 that are not. The second variable is *shared ideology*. To code ideological links I first used the information about rebel movements in the START project.¹⁷³ Then I compared the ideology of a rebel organization with the ideology of ruling party of a sponsor government. To assess sponsor's dominant ideology I used the Database of Political Institutions 2012.¹⁷⁴ If the political program of a rebel organization corresponds to the ruling ideology of a sponsor government I coded 1 for shared ideology, and 0 otherwise. The main weakness of this operationalization is that a rebel group may proclaim certain political program to attract external support only to change it afterwards. There are a total of 76 ideologically-based sponsorships, and 112 that are non-ideological.

For the second alternative hypotheses that establish the link between alternative sources of support and defection I draw on several sources. Whether a group has two or more state

¹⁷¹ There are still some organizations that do not change much over time. For instance, both Hezbollah and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been centralized for over a decade, and MDD was fractionalized for over five years.

¹⁷² Lars-Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer. 2009. Ethnic Power Relations Dataset. <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/11796>.

¹⁷³ START(2013)

¹⁷⁴ Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1): 165-176.

sponsors is coded as a binary variable and labeled *multiple sponsors*. The information on this variable is received from the UCDP and EACD datasets. Multiple sponsors are present in 761 observations (62.12 percent), whereas single sponsor provided support to a rebel movement in 464 observations (37.88 percent). Apart from state support, rebel groups can receive military or non-military assistance from transnational non-state actors as militant outfits, religious, ideological (Islamist and Marxist), racial and ethnic/diaspora movements. The existence of such support may encourage rebel defection. *Transnational* support is coded as a binary variable and is constructed by merging two variables from the EACD dataset: 1) variable *transconstsupp*, signifying the presence of non-military support from transnational non-state actors; and 2) *rebextpart*, denoting the presence of military assistance from transnational non-state actors. Transnational support is encountered among 738 observations (60.24 percent), while the lack of transnational support appears in 487 observations (39.76 percent) in the data.

Finally, the third alternative hypotheses suggest that capabilities cause defection. For the *capacity of sponsor* government I use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita from Gleditsch's dataset Expanded Trade and GDP Data.¹⁷⁵ Although imperfect, GDP per capita is a standard measure used to denote state strength. The weakest sponsor in my data has a GDP per capita of US\$ 239, the average of US\$ 2,717 and the strongest sponsor – US\$ 27,342. *Rebel capabilities* are coded as thousands of troops and logged. I borrow the figures from the EACD dataset and update for missing values and years. In the SOR, the weakest sponsored movement has 100 troops, whereas the average and the strongest have 6,870 and 115,000 troops, respectively.

¹⁷⁵ Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 712-24.

Control Variables

Since there is little previous research to suggest the choice of control variables, I used those relating to the characteristics of the target government, conflict context and external support. Militarily capable target governments should present a serious challenge for rebel movements because they are able to arrest senior rebel members, inflict casualties to the rank-and-file and behead its leadership leading to the defeat of insurgency. Under such conditions, rebels may desert their sponsors. On the other hand, a weaker counter-insurgent may allow rebels to be more defiant of sponsor's demands given that the rebels face no serious challenger. To code for the counterinsurgent power of the target government, I rely on the COW data on military personal, signifies thousands of active soldiers per year.¹⁷⁶ The weakest target government in my data has 3,000 soldiers, the average – 192,000 and the strongest has over a million personal under its command.

Features of the sponsorship may also affect rebel behavior. Idean Salehyan argues that sponsors can install advisors and trainees in a rebel group to monitor the behavior of the leadership, ideologically indoctrinate the rank and file and provide military training.¹⁷⁷ *Training* may increase the cohesiveness and discipline of a rebel movement, making it more resilient to COIN.¹⁷⁸ If this holds, rebels should prefer *status quo* over defection when they receive training from their sponsor. This variable is coded, following UCDP, as the provision of military training by a group of foreign advisors/trainees in the conflict-ridden country or abroad. *Training* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when a sponsor prepares rebel troops for fighting, and 0 otherwise. Embedded advisors are present in 62 rebel movements, and absent in 46 in the data.

¹⁷⁶ National Military Capabilities v. 3.02, David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 19-48.

¹⁷⁷ Salehyan, *op. cit.*

¹⁷⁸ Weinstein, *op. cit.*

This coding is also from the UCDP dataset. Next, previous research found that access to external sanctuary increases the likelihood of conflict between a sponsor and rebel movement.¹⁷⁹ At the same time, sanctuary should decrease the risk of desertion. Following UCDP, *sanctuary* denotes the establishment of rebel bases on the territory under sponsor's control and with its permission. Sanctuary is coded 1 if a sponsor provides access to its territory to a group, and 0 otherwise. In total, 70 rebel movements enjoyed external sanctuary, while 38 did not. Finally, I control for the duration of sponsorship by observing the length in years from the beginning until the end of external support to a movement. The shortest sponsorship lasted for 2 years, while the average and the longest spanned over 5.5 and 23 years respectively.

Characteristics of the conflict environment may also influence the onset of rebel defection, and I control for three important factors. First, I control for the identity of conflict, i.e. whether it is fought over a territory or government. I find the measure for *incompatibility* in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset. It is coded 1 for territorial, and 0 for non-territorial conflicts. There are a total of 48 territorial and 60 non-territorial conflicts in the data. Second, high conflict *intensity* places constraints on the ability of rebel groups to honor their contract with a sponsor. Discouraged by state violence, followers prefer desertion to harassment, arrest or elimination at the hands of security services.¹⁸⁰ This variable is from UCDP Dyadic data set and records the level of intensity in the dyad per calendar year. It is coded 1 for low-level conflicts (26–999 battle deaths), and 2 for civil war (1,000 or more battle-related deaths). Civil wars account for 760 observations (62.04 percent), while minor conflict is present in 465 observations (47.96 percent) in the data. Finally, I control for multiparty civil wars. The presence of other rebel

¹⁷⁹ Brynen, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁰ G. T. Marx. 1979. External efforts to damage or facilitate social movements, in M. Zald & J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics*, 94–125. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop; Paul Berman. 1974. *Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People's Liberation Armed Forces*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

movements may encourage rivalry between them leading to inter-rebel clashes. Paul Staniland argues that inter-rebel clashes lead to switching sides as weaker rebel groups choose survival over annihilation.¹⁸¹ Simultaneously, the presence of multiple rebels may encourage rebel alliances decreasing the need for external sponsors or at least decreasing rebel dependence on them. *Multiparty* is a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of other rebel movements in the conflict and is borrowed from the UCDP data. The majority of conflicts in the data are multiparty (78), while the rest are not (30). The descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Defection	0.08	0.27	0	1
Structure	2.40	0.71	1	3
Ethnic ties	0.16	0.37	0	1
Ideology	0.47	0.50	0	1
Multi sponsors	0.62	0.48	0	1
Transnational	0.60	0.48	0	1
Rebel strength	13.07	14.32	0.1	115
Sponsor GDP (p.c.)	1.92	1.32	239	27342
Target power	192.18	322.38	3	1325
Training	0.35	0.47	0	1
Sanctuary	0.46	0.50	0	1
Duration	5.56	4.21	1	23
Incompatibility	0.41	0.49	0	1
Intensity	1.62	0.48	1	2
Multiparty	0.68	0.46	0	1

Before turning to that test, however, Table 6 presents the values for variance inflation factor (VIF) to assess whether multicollinearity is a problem. VIF denotes the extent of inflation of the standard error, whereas tolerance indicates the degree of collinearity. A VIF of 1 indicates there is no multicollinearity among factors, while a VIF of 1.5 suggests that the variance of a

¹⁸¹ Staniland (2010)

variable is 50 percent higher than it would be if that factor was no correlated with other factors. In general, multicollinearity is the matter of degree and the unwritten rule is that VIF equal to or larger than 10 and tolerance values equal lower than 0.4 indicate extreme multicollinearity. According to the results in Table 6, multicollinearity is not a problem. The highest inflation is among the control variables, particularly incompatibility, but it is much lower among the main predictors.

Table 6. Variance Inflation Factor and Tolerance Test of Collinearity

	VIF	Tolerance
Structure	1.18	0.84
Ethnic ties	1.47	0.68
Ideology	1.16	0.86
Multi sponsors	1.24	0.80
Transnational	1.16	0.85
Rebel strength	1.46	0.68
Sponsor GDP	1.27	0.78
Target power	1.63	0.61
Training	1.19	0.83
Sanctuary	1.28	0.78
Duration	1.17	0.85
Incompatibility	1.92	0.52
Intensity	1.25	0.80
Multiparty	1.30	0.77
Mean VIF	1.33	

Method

I first apply the multilevel logistic modeling to the problem. Multilevel modeling assumes sampling at two levels (individual and group level), with independent variables at both levels.¹⁸² Because I study how behavior of non-state armed actors is intertwined with the interventionist policies of states, my theories touch upon both the sub-state (individual) and state (group) level. For this reason, I employ a method that treats the data as multilevel in order to

¹⁸² Joop J. Hox and J. Kyle Roberts. 2011. *Handbook of Advanced Multilevel Analysis*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 7.

avoid drawing inferences about groups from individuals, and *vice versa*.¹⁸³ Multilevel modeling allows me to structure the data in a hierarchical fashion (the rebel-sponsor dyads nested within country-years), and to more precisely compute the effect of independent variables using the mixed-effects procedure. A mixed-effects model simultaneously calculates random effects, coefficients denoting random outcomes of covariates in a model, and fixed effects, parameters that do not vary over the group level.

As a supplement, I use the Cox proportional hazard model to assess the significance of various covariates in the incidence of rebel defection. The multilevel logistic model estimates the proportion of sponsorships that suffer defection in a time period. In contrast, the Cox proportional hazard calculates the probability of an event occurring—in my case, a rebel organization defecting against its sponsor—at a particular time, given that it has not yet happened.¹⁸⁴ The Cox proportional hazard is important to my research question and data because it accounts for right-censoring, i.e. whether rebel defection occurs or not after the last observed year.¹⁸⁵ For example, suppose that sponsor A has been providing support to X and Y for five years. X and Y are parties to the same conflict. Within five years of this sponsorship, suppose X once defects against A, and Y stays obedient to A. While they both share A's resources and operate in the same place and period, the two cases are different: X defects ("fails"), while Y stays loyal ("survives"). X is regarded as uncensored because we have information about its "failure" to remain obedient to A. But Y is considered right-censored because there is no information whether it defects against A after the observed period. The standard regression

¹⁸³ Douglas A. Luke. 2004. *Multilevel Modeling*. London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 5–6; Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 218–237.

¹⁸⁴ P.D. Allison. 1984. *Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

¹⁸⁵ Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 16–19.

models do not discriminate between uncensored and right-censored observations. This may create inflated or deflated estimates. The Cox model addresses this issue and helps me avoid selection bias resulting from the omission of sponsorships that never experienced rebel defection.

Results of the Multilevel Logistic Model

Table 7 reports the results of the regression with rebel defection as a dependent variable. I begin my analysis by examining macro factors in base model, Model 1, to determine whether the characteristics of the environment help explain rebel defection. The coefficient for target power is negative and significant across the models. It confirms the expectation that rebels should be more defiant towards their sponsors when they face a weak counter-insurgent force. However, in subsequent models I check whether this holds when mild and severe defections are considered separately. As expected, training decreases the probability of defection, while the presence of other rebel movements increases it. Territorial conflict is also found to be associated with defection although this finding is less robust in the successive models. Other control variables are insignificant.

In Model 2, I included the common preferences factors, shared ethnicity and ideology, while controlling for the context. Ideology demonstrates an insignificant effect on defection. Ethnic ties, on the other hand, show a surprisingly positive association with defection. The theory expected rebel movements with ethnic ties to their sponsors to be more reliable agents. Previous work did find that ethnic defection is common to civil wars, but in a different context.¹⁸⁶ What could explain this finding? A potential explanation may be associated with the

¹⁸⁶ E.g. Kalyvas (2008); Staniland (2010).

Table 7. Onset of Rebel Defection, 1968–2012

Variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Structure					-0.73** (0.14)	-0.79** (0.15)
Ethnic ties		0.74** (0.32)				0.92** (0.33)
Ideology		-0.00 (0.22)				-0.00 (0.23)
Multi sponsors			-0.12 (0.24)			0.02 (0.25)
Transnational			0.47* (0.24)			0.36 (0.26)
Rebel strength(log)				-0.15* (0.08)		-0.06 (0.09)
Sponsor GDP(log)				-0.04 (0.09)		-0.12 (0.10)
Target power(log)	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.27** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.25** (0.10)
Training	-0.58** (0.25)	-0.65** (0.25)	-0.64** (0.25)	-0.59** (0.25)	-0.43* (0.25)	-0.57** (0.26)
Sanctuary	0.12 (0.22)	0.03 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)	0.06 (0.23)	0.21 (0.22)	0.00 (0.24)
Duration(log)	0.11 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)	0.10 (0.13)	0.19 (0.14)	0.17 (0.13)	0.23 (0.15)
Incompatibility	0.59** (0.29)	0.25 (0.32)	0.49* (0.29)	0.52* (0.30)	0.61** (0.29)	0.17 (0.33)
Intensity	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.20)
Multiparty	1.32** (0.32)	1.14** (0.33)	1.27** (0.32)	1.19** (0.33)	1.13** (0.32)	0.84** (0.34)
Constant	-2.44** (0.56)	-2.36** (0.57)	-2.51** (0.58)	-1.76* (1.02)	-0.94 (0.61)	0.29 (1.08)
Wald chi2	32.28	37.94	35.97	35.98	58.49	67.53
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
LL	-326.85	319.41	-324.96	-325.09	-313.42	-306.68
Observations	1225	1225	1225	1225	1225	1225
Dyads	188	188	188	188	188	188

Note: Multilevel logistic regression of rebel defection. Presented are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. LL is log likelihood. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

existence of popular support for insurgents within the sponsor state. When the population shares ethnic ties with the rebels, it is more sympathetic toward their armed struggle. The population is more willing to give vocal and material support to its ethnic brethren and expect an unwavering

government backing to the rebels.¹⁸⁷ Even though governments frequently do not work in public interest, even the most authoritarian regime may use the support to rally the population around the nationalist agenda and divert its attention from other political or economic issues. The rebels may assume that such a popular support implies unconditional support from the sponsor for their actions. Riding the wave of nationalist fervor, they may become bolder in their behavior toward the sponsor believing that the support would never stop. Under such conditions shared ethnic ties may fuel rebel defiance.

With regard to alternative support, I test the effect of multiple sponsors and transnational support, along with controls, in Model 3. Multiple sponsors receive no support from this test, even though the coefficient is negative as I anticipated. One possible reading of this finding is that rebels are unable or unwilling to defect against ideologically coherent sponsors who can successfully synchronize monitoring and sanctioning of their agents. Whether this tentative interpretation holds I leave for future research. In contrast, transnational support confirms the expectation: it is significant and positively associated with the onset of defection. Even though transnational ties are not robust to the inclusion of all factors, the result in Model 3 indicate that non-state support is a far greater danger for sponsors than the presence of other state sponsors. Such a result seems ironic given that armed movements with transnational ties are found to be more likely to receive state support than movements with only local ties.¹⁸⁸

Model 4 tests the effect on capabilities in a sponsorship on defection. Sponsor's wealth is negative but insignificant. This result may be due to the inadequacy of the measurement of sponsor's strength. It is noticeable that training retains its direction and significance indicating its favorable effect on rebel coherence and discipline irrespective of sponsor's capacity. The

¹⁸⁷ Brynen, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁸ Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, *op. cit.*

coefficient for rebel capabilities shows that weaker rebels are more prone to defection. This is in line with the mechanism of desertion. However, it needs to be tested if the sign changes when it comes to defiance.

In Model 5, I include only rebel structure while keeping the controls. With regard to organizational theory, the term for the rebel structure is consistent with my hypothesis: as the rebel centralization decreases, defection becomes more likely. The log likelihood of -313.42 demonstrates a significant improvement from base model's -326.85, and it is also much better than in all preceding models.

As presented in full model, Model 6, the coefficient for rebel structure is robust to the inclusion of other factors. The term for ethnic ties also preserves its significance and direction from Model 2. However, none of the previously identified factors pertaining to the alternative explanations is significant anymore. Despite having the same direction, neither rebel strength nor transnational ties show a significant effect on defection after the inclusion of other predictors.

A number of explanations offers particular mechanisms for the types of defection. In Table 8 I use mild and severe defection as dependent variables and run the full model. Model 7 reveals that rebel structure is a significant predictor of defiance. The results show a positive association between transnational ties and defiance. As expected, weak target government leaves more freedom to rebel organizations to disobey their sponsors. Multiparty civil wars, too, encourage defection. The coefficient for ethnic ties is positive but it becomes only significant in Model 7 where severe defection is considered as outcome. This finding runs against the expectations that shared ethnicity increases loyalty, and requires future research to tease out particular mechanisms linking ethnic ties to defection. The findings suggest that rebel structure is associated with severe defection, as my theory posits. Among the control variables, the

coefficient for sponsor's capacity takes the anticipated negative and significant sign. This confirms the hypothesis that rebels terminate their contract with a sponsor when it is not a capable actor. The estimates for transnational ties, target government power and multiparty wars mostly retain their direction but they all cease to be significant in Model 7.


Table 8. Onset of Mild and Severe Defection

Variables	M7 Mild	M8 Severe
Structure	-0.40** (0.21)	-1.04** (0.20)
Ethnic ties	0.74 (0.48)	1.16** (0.46)
Ideology	0.12 (0.31)	-0.15 (0.35)
Multi sponsors	0.23 (0.36)	-0.17 (0.36)
Transnational	1.39** (0.43)	-0.55 (1.36)
Rebel strength(log)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
Sponsor GDP(log)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.26* (0.15)
Target power(log)	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.22 (0.14)
Training	-0.54 (0.34)	-0.60 (0.42)
Sanctuary	0.26 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.34)
Duration(log)	0.18 (0.19)	0.25 (0.21)
Incompatibility	0.00 (0.48)	0.28 (0.45)
Intensity	0.04 (0.28)	-0.27 (0.28)
Multiparty	1.10** (0.50)	0.51 (0.46)
Constant	3.37** (1.47)	2.10 (1.60)
Wald chi2	36.32	50.21
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00
LL	-197.10	-167.03
Observations	1225	1225
Dyads	188	188

Note: Multilevel logistic regression of rebel defection. Presented are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. LL is log likelihood. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Since it is difficult to directly interpret the effect of factors based on the estimates from logistic models, I compute predicted probabilities at various levels of my variable of interest while holding other factors constant. In particular, Figure 5 graphs the predicted probability of defection at different values of the rebel structure while holding all binary variables at their median and continuous predictors at their mean values (based on Table 7, Model 6).


Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Defection by Levels of Rebel Structure



In terms of the core hypotheses, this implies that there are no common ethnic or ideological ties between a sponsor and rebel movement, the movement receives support from other state sponsors and from transnational constituencies, the size of the rebel force is set to 6,870 soldiers and the sponsor profile has a GDP per capita of US\$ 2,697. In addition, the rebels do not have embedded advisors or access to their sponsor's territory, the sponsorship is in its fourth year, and the rebels are fighting in a multiparty civil war to topple down a government that controls 86,000 troops. Presented here is the probability of defection in each dyad year. Figure 5

shows that the probability of defection increases as the level of centralization decreases. The change from centralized to decentralized organizational form increases the likelihood of defection nearly twice. The probability of defection is more than doubled as the organization moves from decentralized to factionalized. This test supports my hypothesis that weakly centralized rebel organizations are more likely to defect against their state sponsors than their more centralized counterparts.

Figure 6. The Effect of Rebel Structure on the Probability of Defection by Ethnic Ties and Sponsorship Duration




The above analysis assumes a rather artificial setup, in which many factors are held at their constant values. In the subsequent figures I allow three significant variables from Model 6 to vary along with the rebel structure and duration of sponsorship. All other variables are set at their mean or median values. In Figure 6, I present the marginal effects of rebel structure on defection by ethnic ties across time. Ethnic ties have a substantial effect on the probability of

defection through time. A decentralized or factionalized organization with ethnic ties is two times more likely to engage in defection, than a decentralized/factionalized organization without ethnic ties to its sponsor. The effect on centralized organizations is more dramatic: coethnics with centralized organizations are three times more likely to defect against their sponsors than those without ethnic ties.


Figure 7 presents the combined effects of structure and number of belligerents in a conflict per years of sponsorship on the probability of defection. The effects are as paramount as in the previous figure. On average, rebels that fight in a multiparty conflict are 2.5 times more likely to defect against a sponsor than those facing no rival movements irrespective of the level of centralization. The strongest influence is encountered among centralized organizations who are nearly three times more likely to defect in multiparty than in two-party conflicts.

Figure 7. The Effect of Rebel Structure on the Probability of Defection by the Number of Belligerents and Sponsorship Duration



In Figure 8, I display the joint effect of rebel structure and the target government power on the probability of defection. The target's counterinsurgent potency is presented in percentiles of distribution and shown in thousands of soldiers. The effect of the target government power is the most significant for centralized structures. Centralized organizations are almost two times more likely to be obedient when they face a formidable opponent (18,000 troops) than when they are fighting a weak incumbent (1,000 soldiers). In contrast, decentralized and fractured organizations are not profoundly affected by the variation in target's power indicating that the resulting defection may be more due to their non-centralized composition than the pressure from counterinsurgency.

Figure 8. The Effect of Rebel Structure on the Probability of Defection by Target Government Power



Results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Models

To complement the multilevel logistic method, I re-estimated Model 6 from Table 7, using the Cox proportional hazard regression. Multilevel logistic models are useful for computing the effects of covariates at different levels of analysis, increasing one's confidence in findings, but they tell little about the time period leading to an event. Apart from the effects of various variables it is equally relevant to distinguish time periods in which the rebel defection is most likely to occur. The Cox regression model is fit to this end.

Before carrying out the analyses, I modified the data to fit the requirements of the method. The unit of analysis, sponsor-rebel dyad per year, was aggregated to the dyad level. This means that 188 dyads were turned into 188 observations, i.e. one observation for each dyad. All the binary variables, including the dependent variables (defection, mild and severe defection), were set to their maximum values, while the continuous variables were set to their mean values. Duration of sponsorship, which is used to denote time leading to the occurrence/non-occurrence of defection was set to its maximum value.

Similar to logistic regression, the standard coefficients from the Cox regression are nonlinear, so their interpretation is not straightforward. To ease interpretation, I estimate hazard ratios. Hazard ratio is a number that increases the odds of defection for a one unit increase in an independent variable while holding other independent variables at their constant values. For instance, a hazard ratio of 2 on the shared ethnic ties variable would mean a 100 percent increase in the risk of defection for every year of sponsorship (in other words, the odds of defection are as two times as high). In contrast, a hazard ratio of 0.45 on the provided training variable would imply a 55 percent decrease in the risk of defection. In interpreting the results, I report the hazard ratios and their robust standard errors clustered around a sponsor-rebel dyad.

In general, the findings agree with those of the logistic models. Table 9 reports the estimates of the Cox models including, in turn, each of the three outcomes of interest: defection, mild defection, and severe defection. Moving to the interpretation of the results, I find that the estimates for the rebel organizational structure remain significant across the tests.

Table 9. Cox Proportional Hazard Regression for Defection and its Forms


Variables	M9 Defection	M10 Mild	M11 Severe
Structure	0.42** (0.08)	0.40** (0.15)	0.42** (0.10)
Ethnic ties	2.41** (0.74)	2.24* (0.92)	3.34** (1.41)
Ideology	0.95 (0.20)	0.85 (0.24)	0.92 (0.30)
Multi sponsors	0.64 (0.20)	0.79 (0.40)	0.57 (0.23)
Transnational	1.21 (0.35)	3.28** (1.74)	0.65 (0.19)
Rebel strength(log)	0.85 (0.09)	0.79 (0.16)	0.86 (0.11)
Sponsor GDP(log)	0.72** (0.06)	0.80** (0.08)	0.63** (0.10)
Target power(log)	0.66** (0.06)	0.71** (0.11)	0.65** (0.10)
Training	0.63** (0.14)	0.69 (0.19)	0.49* (0.18)
Sanctuary	0.69* (0.14)	0.97 (0.27)	0.47** (0.15)
Incompatibility	1.32 (0.43)	1.11 (0.59)	1.81 (0.85)
Intensity	0.82 (0.22)	1.22 (0.56)	0.70 (0.28)
Multiparty	1.32 (0.42)	2.89* (1.76)	0.87 (0.34)
Wald chi2	110.53	60.27	62.66
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
LL	-310.88	-178.82	-157.82
Observations	188	188	188
Failures	81	50	41

Note: Reported are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. LL is log pseudo-likelihood. ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$.

Ceteris paribus, for each increase in the level of centralization the risk of defection decreases by 58 percent. When I disaggregate defection into mild and severe, the results are similar. As the rebel command and control becomes more centralized the probability of disobedience drops by 60 percent, and the probability of switching sides by 58 percent. As expected by my core hypothesis, the weaker command and control within rebel organizations increases the ability of the rank and file to act independently from its sponsor, allowing them to renege on the contract.

Figure 9 shows the survivor function for rebel organizational structure. The descending line indicates that the probability of survival – defection not occurring – decreases for each year of sponsorship. Figure 9 displays that over time the probability of defection increases when the rebels have decentralized or fractionalized organizational structure.

Figure 9. Survival Rate for Rebel Structure



The gap between the centralized and fractionalized form widens as time passes by, indicating that the probability of survival – no defection occurring – is lower when rebels have a more autonomous rank and file than when they have a strong central leadership.

Among the common preferences variables, the shared ethnic ties between a sponsor and rebel organization preserves a positive and significant effect on the hazard ratio of defection across the models. Shared ideology seems to decrease the risk of defection but this finding is not corroborated when I consider either of the forms of defection. Rebel organizations that share ethnic bonds with their sponsors are almost 2.5 times more likely to defect against them than those that have no common ethnic origin. The results for shared ethnicity are robust across the models indicating that ethnic ties increase the risk of defiance by 224 percent, and, more dramatically, the risk of desertion/switching sides by 334 percent. In contrast, the hazard ratio of the ideology variable is less than one indicating a negative effect on the defection, but it falls short of statistical significance. Both variables offer no support for the claim that common preferences make rebels more loyal to their external benefactors. Similarly to the logistic models, I find that access to material support from multiple state sponsors does not trigger defection. The presence of transnational support is again found to be associated with mild defection increasing the risk of movement's disobedience more than three times. The major difference from the logistic model is the significance of sponsor's capacity in all three models. In line with the capabilities hypothesis, weaker rebels are more likely to suffer defection; in addition, rebels are likely to disobey less capable sponsors, but also to desert them.

Regarding the control variables, target's power and training preserve their significance and direction from the previous models. For every increase in the target's power the risk of defection decreases by 34 percent. The presence of other rebel movements increases the risk of

defiance, but it is not significant regarding severe defection. Unlike the logistic model, sanctuary becomes significant, but only in Model 10 and Model 11. Rebels who have access to external sanctuary are 53 percent less likely to desert their sponsors or turn guns against them.

Robustness Checks

While the above analyses provide strong quantitative support for my argument, there is an important concern about the endogeneity of the fragmentation of rebel organization and individual defection. Because of the relatively small number of defections relative to the number of observations and due to a significant heterogeneity in the number of rebel organizations and their sponsors across time and space, I dedicate particular attention to the robustness of the results. In particular, there are two issues.

First, some may argue that the organizational and factional defection are two different types of defection. More specifically, factional defection may be nothing more than fragmentation, a process by which a group of disgruntled members breaks off to establish its own group. If such a group does not receive support from its erstwhile sponsor, the argument goes, then there is no reason to code any aspect of its behavior as related to the sponsor. In constructing SOR I paid attention to this potential pitfall. An instance of factional defection is coded only if a faction breaks off and immediately (within a month) commits defection. It is reasonable to assume that within a month, (sometimes even longer) the splinter group still claims the resources (including foreign support), infrastructure (offices, training grounds etc.) and recruits of its erstwhile parent. While proclaiming a split with its parent organization the faction may in fact be still regarded as a (disgruntled) member of the group. To partially address this issue my data allows the type of rebel organization to vary across time, moving from centralized to decentralized to fragmented and vice versa. Likewise, in Table 10 I estimate Model 12 using

one year lagged defection as a dependent variable. While many variables lost their significance, the results for rebel structure remains significant.

Table 10. Robustness Checks

Variables	M12: Lagged Defection	M13: Lagged Severe	M14: Without factional	M15: 1975- 2009
Structure	-0.62** (0.16)	-0.70** (0.20)	-0.61** (0.23)	-0.83** (0.18)
Ethnic ties	0.77* (0.37)	0.73 (0.49)	1.33** (0.55)	0.74 (0.46)
Ideology	-0.05 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.35)	0.02 (0.42)	0.00 (0.28)
Multi sponsors	-0.30 (0.27)	-0.16 (0.38)	0.33 (0.44)	-0.15 (0.31)
Transnational	0.21 (0.27)	-0.61* (0.36)	-0.71* (0.42)	-0.18 (0.30)
Rebel strength(log)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.15)	0.06 (0.12)
Sponsor GDP(log)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.11)
Target power(log)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.17)	-0.36** (0.13)
Training	-0.33 (0.27)	-0.63 (0.43)	-0.81* (0.48)	-0.28 (0.29)
Sanctuary	-0.07 (0.25)	0.08 (0.36)	-0.36 (0.41)	-0.40 (0.29)
Duration(log)	0.18 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.27)	0.04 (0.25)	0.54** (0.19)
Incompatibility	0.03 (0.36)	0.61 (0.48)	0.11 (0.28)	-0.39 (0.40)
Intensity	-0.03 (0.28)	0.14 (0.37)	-0.39 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.24)
Multiparty	1.02** (0.37)	0.83* (0.50)	0.67 (0.57)	0.60 (0.38)
Constant	-0.45 (1.22)	0.49 (1.73)	0.90 (1.79)	1.22 (1.25)
Wald chi2	39.19	37.00	26.90	48.35
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
LL	-273.41	-158.03	-129.65	-229.85
Observations	1037	1037	1119	1067
Dyads	188	188	175	169

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Presented are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. LL is log likelihood. ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The second issue is that I am walking a thin line between one of my variations on the independent variable – factionalism, and the outcome on my dependent variable – factional

defection. The reader may wonder how these two phenomena are different. To account for this issue, I have performed two tests. First, I re-ran the full model with lagged severe defection as a dependent variable in Model 13. Then First, I recoded the rebel organizational structure to exclude any outfit that may have suffered internal fragmentation in the year of defection against a sponsor.¹⁸⁹ Both models offer a support to my argument that non-centralized organizations cause defection.

In addition, in Model 15 I test whether the inclusion of cases outside the UCDP dataset may have affected the significance and direction of estimates. I exclude from this analysis those cases that are not listed in the UCDP dataset, that is, those conflicts that take place 1975 and terminate before 2010. For this model I used lagged defection as a dependent variable. In addition to this exclusion, I dropped all those cases that occurred between 1975 and 2010 but are not listed in the UCDP dataset.¹⁹⁰ The results of the Cox proportional hazard are reported in Figure 16. Overall, the size, direction, and significance of the coefficients on organizational structure variable did not considerably deviate from the models in Table 8.

Beyond the models in Table 10, I account for temporal dependence. I re-estimated Model 6 (full model) using restricted cubic splines of duration of sponsorship.¹⁹¹ I generated five knots at 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 percentiles of duration's marginal distribution.¹⁹² Alternatively, I also include polynomials of duration (squared and cubed term for duration) in the analysis to account for time dependence of my data.¹⁹³ In both tests rebel structure remains statistically significant.

¹⁸⁹ Eleven out of one hundred and seven rebel movements or twenty out of one hundred and eighty seven sponsor-rebel dyads were removed from the analysis.

¹⁹⁰ Thirteen sponsor-rebel dyads were dropped from the analysis.

¹⁹¹ Neal Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 1260–88.

¹⁹² F.E. Harrell. 2001. *Regression Modeling Strategies: With Applications to Linear Models, Logistic Regression, and Survival Analysis*. New York: Springer.

¹⁹³ David B. Carter, and Curt S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependency in Binary Data. *Political Analysis* 18(3): 271–92.

These findings significantly increase our confidence in the argument suggesting that endogeneity may not pose a serious issue.

Summary

This chapter moves the study of civil wars toward the relationship between state sponsors and rebel groups. It inquires into conditions under which rebel groups and their factions defect against sponsors. Studying these illicit ties is important because conflict scholars have found that external intervention makes civil wars longer and bloodier.¹⁹⁴ Weakening or breaking these ties is of outmost importance for third-party countries.

The findings indicate that as the rebel organizational structure becomes less centralized and formalized, the risk of defection increases. This factor is significant throughout the statistical tests suggesting that sponsors should avoid supporting fractionalized organizations. In addition, the results show that ethnic ties can be a source of conflict rather than discipline between a sponsor and a rebel group. Interestingly, rebels tend to defect sponsors irrespective of their capacity. Finally, alternative support plays no role in explaining defection except for the transnational sources of support which are likely to fuel rebel disobedience. Further tests indicate that ethnic ties play an important role – along with organizational structure – in predicting defection. In the subsequent chapter I use the case of Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir to draw out particular mechanisms.

¹⁹⁴ Bethany Lacina. 2006. Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): 276-289; Stephen Stedman. 1997. Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security* 2(2): 5-53; Leites and Wolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 24.

CHAPTER 4

A Story of Pakistan and Militants in Kashmir, 1988-2004

“[...] no true victory is possible with alien arms”.
(Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, pp. 83–84)

In this chapter I focus on explaining defection or obedience of eight rebel movements that had an important role in the Kashmir conflict. Five of them are indigenous Kashmiri organizations, both in terms of their recruits and location (in Indian Jammu and Kashmir – IJK), whereas three of them are foreign, Pakistani, with respect to their ethnic composition and location (in Pakistan controlled Kashmir – PCK). The first part, section A, deals with indigenous militant groups including two major outfits – Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) – and three smaller groups such as Ikhwanul Muslimeen (IUM), Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) and Muslim Mujahideen (MM). The main focus is on the former, their organizational dynamics, exogenous pressures and behavior toward Pakistan. The latter are examined briefly and serve as illustrative examples. The second part, section B, analyzes those organizations whose members are of Pakistani or Afghan origin, operating from their Pakistani sanctuaries. The focus is on three major outfits: Harkatul Ansar (HUA), Jaish-e- Mohammad (JEM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET).

The distinction between the two groups is based on their affiliation with Pakistan and their geographic location. The indigenous groups shared only ideology with their Pakistani sponsor (JKLF did not share even that), while the foreign militants had common ethnicity and ideology. The indigenous groups were located in the IJK and, therefore, suffered the brunt of the killings and destruction by the Indian army and paramilitary. The foreign outfits operated from

their sanctuaries in Pakistan making them less exposed to the counterinsurgency. As the exposure to counterinsurgency puts the organizational structure under a heavy pressure, the indigenous outfits may be classified as the most-likely case for my theory, while the foreign organizations may be termed least-likely. In contrast, the indigenous groups are the most-likely case for the shared preferences, that is, one should expect their defection due to absent or partly present common bonds.

Table 11. Rebel Organization, External Shocks and Predictions in Kashmir

ORGANIZATION	CONDITIONS	PREDICTION
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 1988-94	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High exposure to COIN and rivalries • Decentralized, fractionalized org. 	Defection (Desertion)
Hizbul Mujahideen, 1991-1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High exposure to COIN and rivalries • Centralized 	<i>Status Quo</i>
Hizbul Mujahideen, 1998-2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High exposure to COIN and rivalries • Decentralized 	Defection (Desertion)
Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force, Muslim Mujahideen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High exposure to COIN and rivalries • Decentralized 	Defection (Desertion)
Harkatul Ansar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low Exposure to COIN and rivalries • Fractionalized 	Defection (defiance)
Jaish-e-Mohammad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pakistan's crackdown • Fractionalized 	Defection (Assault)
Lashkar-e-Taiba	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralized 	<i>Status Quo</i>

At the same time, this is the least-likely case for the capabilities and alternative support (if one excludes HM) given that rebel outfits lacking military prowess and other sources of support are not expected to defect against their sponsors. The picture is reversed with the foreign groups. They are the most-likely case for the capabilities and alternative support because all of

the foreign outfits had higher capabilities and access to alternative sources. On the other hand, the foreign groups are the least-likely case for the shared preferences given that they all shared ethnicity and ideology with Pakistan. If my theory holds, one should expect the outcomes as presented in Table 11.

Background of Armed Conflict in Kashmir

As one interviewee in Delhi told me, the history in Kashmir does not start with the armed conflict in the nineties. Indeed, while the history of Kashmir spans over centuries, witnessing numerous invasions and rulers, the political divisions between India and Pakistan over the region originate in the colonial period. Jammu and Kashmir was one among hundreds of princely states that were directly or indirectly administered by the British. The prince of Kashmir was Hari Singh, a Hindu maharaja, who ruled over a predominantly Muslim population. In opposition to maharaja's despotism, the Kashmiri nationalists established the National Conference (NC) led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in late 1930s. At the same time, the Muslim Conference and, to a less degree, Jamaat-e-Islami, have used Islam as the driving force of political mobilization in the valley. These political organizations would be the most important actors in Jammu and Kashmir in the next couple of decades.

In the summer of 1947, the British colonial government proposed the partition of their Indian Empire into two successor states – India and Pakistan. More than five hundred princely states were asked to join one of the successor states. In August 1947, the British set up two boundary commissions under Sir Cyril Radcliffe who outlined a partition map. Of all the princes, only the Maharaja of Kashmir could not make a decision. “Frightened by Jinnah’s Islam in Pakistan and Nehru’s democracy in India, he opted for procrastination.”¹⁹⁵ By that time, the

¹⁹⁵ M.J. Akbar. 2002. *Kashmir-Behind the Vale*. Roli Books: New Delhi, pp. 97.

valley's most popular political leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, had become close to the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Allegedly, Abdullah expressed his desire to join India.¹⁹⁶ The status of Jammu and Kashmir came to the front with the announcement of Radcliffe's plan in mid-August. Pakistan was shocked to find that Radcliffe awarded India a land route to Jammu and Kashmir that allowed its holder the physical control over the region.¹⁹⁷

Since no appeal to Radcliffe's decision was allowed, Pakistan chose to seize Jammu and Kashmir by force. The Pakistani military organized a group of armed tribesmen who penetrated the valley in October 1947. This would be the first Pakistani covert action in Jammu and Kashmir. As the invading militia swiftly advanced through Jammu and Kashmir, many locals joined their ranks. Faced with the invasion and uprising, the maharaja's army could not put up a firm resistance, let alone expel the irregular army. With the enemy at the gates of Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, the maharaja invited his longstanding political opponent Sheikh Abdullah to join his government, and signed documents acceding to India. The Indian army was immediately flown in to secure the Srinagar airport and defeat the militia. After a number of setbacks of the militia, Pakistan directly entered the war against India in the spring of 1948. Following months of stalemate, India and Pakistan signed a cease-fire in 1949. According to the cease-fire, Jammu and Kashmir was partitioned between the two countries. Pakistan gained the areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with Gilgit and Baltistan while the Jammu region, the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh were awarded to India.¹⁹⁸ The maharaja abdicated and Sheikh Abdullah became the head of Jammu and Kashmir's administration until he was deposed

¹⁹⁶ Navnita Chadha Behera. 2006. *Demystifying Kashmir*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 27-28.

¹⁹⁷ Alastair Lamb. 1991. *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1947-1990*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 101-117.

¹⁹⁸ Sumantra Bose. 2003. *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 36-37.

and arrested in 1953. From 1953 until 1975, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by officials appointed by the Delhi government.

In 1962, China defeated India in a brief border war. Pakistan saw this event as an opportunity to take the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir by force. In 1965, Pakistan initiated Operation Gibraltar, the second covert war for Kashmir, unleashing a couple of thousands of irregulars into the Indian Kashmir. This operation failed because no political organization in the valley joined the invasion force. The subsequent Tashkent Declaration allocated some additional Kashmiri land to Pakistan, but the operation failed to meet Pakistan's goal. Pakistan launched another militant organization, symbolically named Al-Fatah ("conquest" in Arabic), hoping that it would garner local support against the Indian administration. However, the organization was discovered,¹⁹⁹ leading to the arrest of Al-Fatah's key members and another failure of Pakistan's covert warfare.

Following Pakistan's defeat in the Third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, potential plans for a new covert war in Jammu and Kashmir were delayed. In the aftermath of the war, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement in 1972. The treaty established a *de facto* border between the Indian and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir defined as Line of Control (LOC). But this agreement did not prevent future hostilities in Kashmir. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, leading the US to turn Pakistan into the main supplier of its military aid to the Afghan armed opposition. Exploiting its new regional role, the Pakistani military leader Zia-ul-Haq decided to save some portion of the Afghan aid for a new covert war in Kashmir.²⁰⁰ At the same time, the Pakistani intelligence services made contacts with potential partners across the

¹⁹⁹ For a detailed study of Pakistan's involvement in the creation and functioning of Al-Fatah see: Praveen Swami. 2004. *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004*. London and New York: Routledge, ch. 4.

²⁰⁰ Arif Jamal. 2009. *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*. New York: Melville House, pp. 109-110.

LOC, who agreed to start a jihad in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁰¹ The opportunity appeared in the late 1980s.

In 1987, elections were organized in Jammu and Kashmir for a state assembly and government. Apart from the National Conference led by Abdullah's son, there was an umbrella of anti-establishment political parties labeled Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF built its image in opposition to "Abdullahs' family rule, government corruption and lack of economic development"²⁰². The coalition seemed to attract sympathy and support across the valley.²⁰³ However, the elections were marked by serious irregularities, and MUF secured only four out of seventy six seats.²⁰⁴ The allegations exacerbated the decade-old frustration with the Delhi government and the National Conference. Many MUF leaders came to the conclusion that the "the bullet will deliver where the ballot had failed"²⁰⁵. Some of the MUF candidates in the elections, such as Yasin Malik or Syed Salahuddin, followed suit and became leaders of militant outfits. Pakistan embraced the disappointed youth and provided them with weapons and training.

The Kashmir Rebellion: Its Context and Militant Groups

The rebellion in Kashmir offers a story of manifold militant outfits, Pakistan's complex interests and India's changing counterinsurgent policies. In 1989-1991, at the outset of the rebellion, a plethora of organizations made a bid for the leadership of the struggle. In words of one interviewee, every village and town gave birth to an outfit, sometimes the size of a cricket team. Back then, it was fashionable to be anti-Indian and to carry an AK-47. The situation was in flux and it was easy to procure weapons across the Line of Control (LOC), from Pakistan. The

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp. 114-115.

²⁰² Bose, *op. cit.*, pp. 47.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, pp. 48.

²⁰⁴ Victoria Schofield. 2003. *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*. London and New York:: I.B. Taurus, pp. 137-138.

²⁰⁵ Behera, *op. cit.*, pp. 47.

government of Pakistan (GOP) and its Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) had provided arms, sanctuary, intelligence and training to “any outfit that was able to, by force of arms or otherwise, bring the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan”²⁰⁶.

At the same time, Pakistan never directly intervened to claim Kashmir even though the Indian government was on its knees in this period.²⁰⁷ Instead, Pakistan supervised the rise and fall of various organizations, often pitting them against each other fearing that a dominant Kashmiri organization could take on a life of its own and make a compromise with the government of India (GOI). While the GOI was initially caught off guard with its police and border guard being mere bystanders in a show run by militants and their Pakistani sponsors, from 1991/1992 onward the Indian army stepped in causing damage to JKLF, Hizbul and other outfits.

The massive, determined response from the Indian army raised the costs of the militancy, leading to an increase in and intensification of internecine rivalries between multiple outfits. This exogenous shock had a profound effect on militants’ organization exacerbating particularly those organizations with a loose relationship between the leadership and local commanders. Massive factionalism, splits and defections that subsequently ensued could not be prevented or remedied by Pakistan, whose intelligence agency itself frequently turned into an arbiter in turf wars over territory, assets and offices. The GOI used this confusion among the militants not only to decimate their organizations but often to turn those disappointed by fighting and Pakistan’s attitude against their former comrades. In the long run, however, these renegades proved to be ineffective and uncontrollable.²⁰⁸ A parallel, less costly GOI strategy included the pacification of the rebellion by organizing Kashmir state elections in 1996 and 2002. Through the elections the GOI played on rebels’ hardships and offered amnesty and a potential place in Kashmir’s politics

²⁰⁶ Manoj Joshi. 1999. *Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 50.

²⁰⁷ David Devadas. 2007. *In Search of a Future: The Story of Kashmir*. Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 176.

²⁰⁸ Author’s interview, ret’d. Indian Army General, name withheld

to everyone who gave up fighting. These strategies helped seed the plant of defection in the JKLF, and other smaller outfits. Therefore, despite their similarities and differences all Kashmiri rebel outfits were faced with a well-organized, capable and decisive GOI.

Under such conditions the variation in defection emerged as a result of variation in the level of centralization in the structure of militant groups faced with the counterinsurgent state and rivals. The summary of predictions and outcomes in Table 12 indicates that my theory performs well and that alternative approaches have mixed results at best. Let us turn to particular Kashmiri organizations.

The JKLF, the frontrunner of the rebellion, surfaced as a decentralized group (many interviewees referring to it as a “loose” or “more an idea than organization”) in which commanders located in the Indian Jammu and Kashmir (IJK) were able to make autonomous decisions, modify or even veto directions of its political leadership in the Pakistan controlled Kashmir (PCK). This structure would mark the JKLF’s early years, 1988-1990, known for its refusal to get rid of pro-independence ideology and for its open challenge to Pakistan’s control of Kashmir. As the GOP gradually distanced itself from the JKLF in 1991 (but it did not cease the support), the outfit entered a factionalized phase: senior commanders from the valley unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Chairman Amanullah Khan in 1993 and 1994 leading to leadership crises and, ultimately, splits. Simultaneously, the JKLF cadres had fallen prey to the hegemonic designs of Pakistan’s new darling, Hizbul Mujahideen, and to the Indian army. The factionalized structure exacerbated by these exogenous shocks ultimately led JKLF senior commanders to give up armed struggle and enter politics in 1994 despite the (reduced) support from Pakistan.

Table 12. Predictions and Reality in Kashmir*

	Shared Preferences (Alternative Theory I)	Capabilities (Alternative Theory II)	Alternative Support (Alternative Theory III)	Organizational Theory (My theory)	Outcome
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 1988-94	Defection	Status Quo	Status Quo	Defection	Defection
Hizbul Mujahideen, 1991-1998	Defection	Defection	Status Quo	Status Quo	Status Quo
Hizbul Mujahideen, 1998-2002	Defection	Defection	Status Quo	Defection	Defection
Hizbul Mujahideen, 2002-2004	Defection	Defection	Status Quo	Status Quo	Status Quo
Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force, Muslim Mujahideen	Defection	Status Quo	Status Quo	Defection	Defection
Harkatul Mujahideen/Harkatul Ansar	Status Quo	Status Quo	Defection	Defection	Defection
Jaish-e-Mohammad	Status Quo	Defection	Defection	Defection	Defection
Lashkar-e-Taiba	Status Quo	Defection	Defection	Status Quo	Status Quo

* Bold Cells are Correct Predictions

On the other hand, the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) entered the Kashmir arena in 1991 as a centralized organization owing to the patronage of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party, whose members filled its highest ranks, and the ISI. Despite the several splits HM managed to preserve a centralized profile until 1997/1998. I found no instances of HM defection in 1991-1997 despite the increasing pressures of the Indian army and its paramilitary forces. However, in 1997 two fundamental changes occurred that would transform HM into a decentralized organization. The first change was the JI's disengagement from HM, caused by tremendous victimization of the party at the hands of the Indian paramilitary. Because JI was a political front for HM activities, its step had weakened the militants' political base in the valley.

The second change was the brewing dissatisfaction of some powerful commanders with their status in the HM. Unlike some previous quarrels which resulted in splits, these dissatisfactions would erupt and ensue within the organization until the ISI separated the warring factions in 2002. In the meantime, some HM commanders defied the dictate of the central leadership and Pakistan proclaiming the cease-fire with GOI and engaged themselves in further peace talks. One of them, Abdul Majid Dar, even established his own political party ready to renounce fighting before he was killed in 2002. After 2002, the HM regained its centralized status at the cost of its former strength; its leader Syed Salahuddin is nowadays under a house arrest in Pakistan from where he occasionally issues political statements.

The story of three smaller outfits, Ikhwanul Muslimeen (IUM), Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) and Muslim Mujahideen (MM), indicates how an organizational breakdown leads to desertion. These outfits were prone to desertion because their local commanders were quite autonomous from the central leadership. Although they all had a nominal central command, their lower echelons could autonomously decide on the course of action. These movements lacked the political entrepreneurs, like in HM, who would monitor and discipline commanders at the behest of leaders. Each of these organizations accepted more recruits than their nascent command structure could tolerate, leading to the creation of semi-independent branches that were attached to their localities and alienated from the central leadership. Due to the lack of centralized structure, the rank and file of these organizations was tempted to desert fighting in the face of mounting counterinsurgency or internecine rivalries. This is because foot soldiers owed their loyalty to particular commanders; if commanders were bullied, arrested or killed, the soldiers would lose the remaining bond to their parties. Without that bond, continued fighting was impossible and desertions consequently ensued.

On the other hand, the Pakistani militants who are analyzed in the second part, proved to be more resilient to desertion, than to defiance and assault. Their leadership and commanders were based in the PCK decreasing their exposure to the devastating counterinsurgency. Likewise, most interviewees agree that the Pakistani organizations were more disciplined and battle-hardened owing to their involvement in the Afghan civil war. Inspired by jihadism, desertion was out of question for these holy warriors. However, they also inherited loose leadership-commander links and a propensity for factionalism from their Afghan brothers in arms. This was the case with Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad whose factional infightings eventually pitted them against Pakistan when the GOP shifted its policy of support after the US put some pressure in the wake of 9/11. Despite having a similar ethnic composition, alternative support and capabilities, Lashkar-e-Taiba remained loyal to Pakistan largely owing to its neatly centralized structure.

A. PAKISTAN AND INDIGENOUS MILITANTS IN KASHMIR (1987-2000)

Defiance and Desertion of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)

The JKLF was an indigenous, secular and nationalist organization seeking independence of Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. It had been at the core of a movement for Kashmiri independence since 1977 when it was founded by Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhat in Birmingham. The JKLF's struggle for sovereign Kashmir turned the movement into an enemy of Pakistan and India as both governments had been trying to crush it ever since its inception. Peculiarly, the JKLF became the first Kashmiri outfit sponsored by Islamabad in 1986. This was a marriage of convenience between the Pakistani ISI and JKLF because alternative allies were not available. An ideologically more preferable ally Jamat-e-Islami (hereafter, JI), an Islamist

party from the valley, was reluctant to become involved in armed resistance.²⁰⁹ Also, the ISI soon realized that the Islamists were less popular in the province and that the JKLF had to be the driving force of rebellion.²¹⁰ Likewise, the JKLF leaders desperately needed foreign support to move its separatist program from a decade-long deadlock.

In late 1986, the ISI and the JKLF agreed to accelerate their preparation for a rebellion in the IJK.²¹¹ According to the deal, the JKLF's task was to recruit and smuggle young Kashmiris across the LOC into the PCK where ISI would provide training and direct them back across the LOC.²¹² At first, the JKLF's central leadership opposed the division of labor, but the ISI supposedly managed to replace the main opponent, chairman Hashim Qureshi, with a more cooperative Amanullah Khan (not to be mistaken with the founder) who then brought the rank and file in line with Pakistan's demands.²¹³ During a meeting with an ISI senior officer, the JKLF leadership also demanded free hand in deciding upon the strategy for armed struggle in IJK. However, the ISI controlled the movement by providing each leader of the JKLF a separate camp in PCK.

Organizationally, ever since its revival the JKLF was a decentralized, popular and predominantly urban movement without ties to the main J&K political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami or the National Conference.²¹⁴ It had the leadership based in the PCK and commanders in IJK. In the PCK, the JKLF was led by Chairman Amanullah Khan, Vice Chairman Dr. Farooq Haider and Raja Muzaffar. The PCK JKLF's leaders operated their safe heavens from the

²⁰⁹ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 123.

²¹⁰ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 17.

²¹¹ David Devadas claims that Pakistan agreed to back JKLF's struggle for independent J&K, but I have not found the support for this argument elsewhere. Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 158.

²¹² Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126; Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 18.

²¹³ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 19.

²¹⁴ Author's interview, journalist (name withheld), Delhi November 2, 2012.

Rawalpindi area under the supervision of ISI security officers.²¹⁵ The PCK JKLF mainly served as a training checkpoint for recruits from the valley failing to develop a solid organizational base that would keep the operatives under its auspices. Unable to control its buoying membership, Amanullah Khan heavily depended on the ISI for the provision of facilities, arms and supplies.²¹⁶ Owing to this support, Khan was able to either sideline or expel ambitious members on the account of working with the Indian Research and Analyses Wing (RAW) intelligence service.

On the other side of the LOC, the JKLF was led by the so-called HAJY group derived from the names of its four senior commanders: Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Ahmad Mir and Yasin Malik. By 1992, all of these leaders were either jailed or killed by the Indian security forces. This branch of the JKLF was more exposed to repression by exogenous actors than the one in the PCK. Coupled with the non-centralized character of the JKLF, these two factors would have the major impact on the group's behavior toward Pakistan.

As a forerunner, the JKLF triggered the insurgency on July 31, 1988 with three successful bomb attacks. The JKLF's Khan immediately took credit for the attacks referring to them as a "declaration of war" against the Indian authority. The attacks led to massive arrests of Muslim youth in the valley. In turn, more young people were crossing the LOC for training and sanctuary.²¹⁷ Under the patronage of ISI they were trained in handling weapons only to be armed and sent back across the LOC. Initially, thousands of Kashmiri youngsters were accommodated in JKLF camps in the PCK, the only condition for support being the readiness to fight the Indian police. Until the end of 1988, swarms of these newly trained militants had poured into the IJK

²¹⁵ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 46.

²¹⁶ Despite this reliance on ISI, Khan was also in favor of J&K independence. See: Ved Marwah. 2009. *India in Turmoil: Jammu & Kashmir, the Northeast and Left Extremism*. New Delhi: Rupa Co., pp. 64.

²¹⁷ Zahid Hussain. 2007. *Frontline Pakistan: the Struggle with Militant Islam*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 24–25.

and carried 142 attacks on the Indian security forces.²¹⁸ The symbolic attack by a gang of JKLF activists would soon set the valley aflame.

Amid this initial success, the stage was set for a major change in Pakistan's relationship with the JKLF. In August 1988, the plane carrying Pakistani President Gen. Zia ul-Haq and eight more Pakistan's generals exploded in the air not far from Bahawalpur, Pakistan. General Zia was the main supporter of the Afghan insurgency and the mastermind of the Kashmir uprising. Despite being deeply religious, Zia pragmatically offered support to the JKLF and tolerated its call for an independent J&K. With his death, the new Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the ISI had lost patience with the JKLF. As of 1989, ISI was increasing pressure on the JKLF to adopt a pro-Pakistan posture and renounce independence but its leadership was unmoved by these demands. The last straw came in early 1990s when JKLF refused to allow the ISI to attend the group's organizational meetings.²¹⁹ After this defiance, the ISI would sideline the JKLF in favor of Islamic militants.

Why JKLF defied ISI's demands? Because for the first three years of insurgency (1989-1992) JKLF has been the strongest militant group in Indian J&K. Spurred by Indian crackdown, the mobilization of youth made the JKLF "the vanguard of uprising"²²⁰. The JKLF was by far the most popular armed group in Kashmir. At that time, the JKLF was able to take over a million people to the streets of major valley towns. It was likewise the core channel through which other militant outfits entered the valley. In the words of Manoj Joshi, all other militant groups had to pass through its mill.²²¹ At this stage, being the strongest and the most popular outfit JKLF was riding high. When in late 1990 GOI offered dialogue under the auspices of the Indian

²¹⁸ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 27.

²¹⁹ Amanullah Khan complained that GOP "left [the JKLF] on the streets of Pakistan". Quoted in: Zulfiqar Ali, For the Record, *The Herald (Pakistan)*, July 2005, pp. 56.

²²⁰ Bose, *op. cit.*, pp. 117.

²²¹ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 26.

constitution to any group in J&K, the JKLF flatly refused the proposal. The official justification was that “1990 has given rebirth to Kashmir issue which was lying in cold storage for decades”²²². Thus, given its mounting capabilities, Pakistan’s and popular support the JKLF was not considering desertion.

However, JKLF’s obedience would falter as soon as exogenous pressures started taking heavy tolls on its leadership and members. First, the ISI unleashed its ideological proxies against the JKLF. By early 1991, the ISI started to sideline the JKLF by diverting much support to Islamist and pro-Pakistan groups, such as Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant subsidiary of the JI party.²²³ This was part of a larger strategy launched by the Bhutto government and ISI in early 1990 after the US government warned the GOP of sanctions if it did not limit its support to terrorism. According to this strategy, the ISI would centralize its control over the chaotic insurgency (by 1990 there were already dozens of outfits) by taking over all the training camps and closing down the private ones.²²⁴

In this strategy, the JKLF was to be marginalized in favor of HM. The ISI tacitly approved the decimation of the JKLF ranks at the hands of HM.²²⁵ Particularly in 1991-1993 top JKLF cadres had fallen prey to HM’s systematic campaign of disarming, kidnap, arrest, torture and murder. Only in 1993 did JKLF lose some of its most prominent figures to HM such as political leaders Dr Guru, Maulvi Ghulam Mohammed Mir, Imam of the Hanifa Jama Masjid and Riaz Ahmad Lone, a zonal commander.²²⁶ Amanullah Khan claims that HM killed more of

²²² Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 44.

²²³ The support was not completely removed, but drastically decreased in favor of Hizbul and other outfits. Author’s interview with a former senior Indian intelligence officer, 18 October 2012, Delhi.

²²⁴ Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

²²⁵ K. Santhanam, Sreedhar, Sudhir Saxena and Manish. 2003. *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, pp. 171.

²²⁶ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 425.

its rank and file than the Indian army²²⁷. Second, the Indian security forces dealt some heavy blows to the JKLF's commanding echelons. By 1992, they killed all the senior leaders of the HAJY groups except Javed Mir and Yasin Malik who were detained in 1991. In 1993, the JKLF Area Commander Jan Mohammad, Regimental commander Farooq Ahmad Butt and three more senior commanders were killed in the Budgam district.²²⁸

Caught between a rock and hard place, the JKLF's military organization started to dissipate. Prior to 1992, the JKLF was a "loose organization"²²⁹, in which some sections, such as the Student Liberation Front (SLF), operated autonomously from the central leadership. The JKLF's dissipation accelerated in 1992 when the ISI began to encourage defections of the SLF and similar sections. The ISI provided money, arms and training to individual commanders to break from the JKLF and set up their own outfits.²³⁰ By 1992, JKLF would give birth to dozens of splinter groups. At the same time, there were major turbulences within the JKLF leadership. In June 1990, Amanullah Khan suddenly declared a Provisional Government of Kashmir, "a move that not only stunned Pakistan but created confusion in the JKLF as well"²³¹. Khan's intention was to prevent a group of Kashmiri exiled parties to do the same, as well as to boost his and the organization's international image. But none of the party seniors, including Vice Chairman Dr Farooq Haider, were *a priori* consulted, which triggered a tough response from the JKLF's Central Committee. Khan was summoned to explain his decision. When Khan refused to attend the meeting, the Central Committee overwhelmingly expelled him from the organization. In turn, Khan expelled his opponents including the Vice Chairman Haider whom he castigated as an ISI

²²⁷ According to Amanullah Khan, "Hizbul Mujahideen eliminated more JKLF officials than Indian military agents had." Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 156.

²²⁸ Sati Sahni. 1999. *Kashmir Underground*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, pp. 48.

²²⁹ Author's interview, journalist (name withheld), November 2012, New Delhi.

²³⁰ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–50.

²³¹ Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 43; Author's interview with a former senior Indian intelligence officer, October 18, 2012, New Delhi.

agent. The conflict dragged on for almost two years until the Haider group rejoined Khan in 1992.

But the damage had been done and, together with the ISI-instrumented defections, the JKLF leadership would further fractionalize in 1993 and 1994. In August 1993, one of the remaining JKLF valley commanders, Javed Mir, raised his voice against Khan's misappropriation of funds and his failure to preserve close relations with the ISI.²³² Mir proclaimed Yasin Malik, who was back then jailed in Delhi, Chairman of the JKLF. But this coup did not succeed. It only widened the gulf between the PCK leadership and IJK commanders. The turmoil spiraled off into an open power-struggle between Malik and Khan. While Malik was supported by the bulk of the cadre, Shabbir Siddiqui was JKLF's only commander in the valley to pledge his allegiance to Amanullah Khan.²³³ The Malik-Khan conflict took a new turn when the former decided to expel Shabbir Siddiqui from the JKLF. Initially, even Javed Mir supported Siddiqui. However, he later switched sides and returned to Malik's fold. Khan, who considered himself as the JKLF's true leader, was, in any case, not willing to see any person or organization unseating him.

Weakened by foes and internal feuds,²³⁴ lacking full support from Pakistan, the JKLF's valley commanders were becoming convinced that the gun was not the only option. In 1993, an umbrella of separatist parties called All-Hurriyat Party Conference (AHPC) was created under the leadership of Jamaat-e-Islami's chief Shabir Ahmed Shah Gilani with an aim to subordinate the militancy to politics. When Yasin Malik was released from prison in May 1994, he decided

²³² It appears that Mir had even a backing from a couple of Pakistani-based JKLF seniors. Santhanam *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 170.

²³³ Amanullah Khan had weak stature among the valley JKLF because he is from Gilgit in PCK and he does not speak Kashmiri.

²³⁴ "It seemed apparent in Srinagar that by 1994, whatever was left of the armed section of the JKLF was actually working in tandem with the authorities". Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 425.

to join the AHPC and renounce the armed struggle. Malik offered political negotiations to GOI “partly to preserve what remained of the JKLF’s cadre”²³⁵. But his non-violent approach caused a definite split with Amanullah Khan. “Unfortunately our organisation is practically divided into two groups. Our basic difference was Yasin Malik’s offer of a unilateral ceasefire, without informing us,”²³⁶ complained Amanullah Khan. At the end of 1995, Amanullah Khan ousted Yasin Malik from the presidency of the JKLF, whereas Yasin Malik expelled Amanullah Khan from the organization. Shabir Ahmed Siddiqi, who was released from prison in the second half of 1995, temporarily took over the leadership of Amanullah’s faction. Tensions prevailed after Pakistan recognized Yasin Malik as the legitimate leader of the JKLF rather than Amanullah Khan, although Amanullah remains based in Pakistan.

Even though Pakistan still maintains contact with Malik and other JKLF valley commanders, 1994 was a watershed for the relationship between ISI and its client. After 1994, JKLF was no more a militant movement and it definitely did not receive military support from Pakistan. Malik’s desertion was JKLF’s as well. Thereafter, the JKLF would remain confined to issuing political statements and organizing rallies short of a participation in state elections.

Even though ideology and capabilities had some structural impact on the JKLF’s strategies they were by no means the main causes of the JKLF’s defective behavior. The reason in fact rests with the internal politics of the organization and the exogenous pressures. First, the JKLF’s defiance of ISI’s policies came as a result of the internal divisions between Khan and Javed Mir in 1991. Second, desertion of the Malik faction was caused by internal feuds that were further fueled by the relentless targeting of JKLF cadres by the ISI-sponsored groups, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and by the Indian security forces.

²³⁵ Bose, *op. cit.*, pp. 130. Most interviewees agree that Malik’s primary motive was to spare JKLF from further victimization.

²³⁶ Cited in Schoefield, *op. cit.*, pp. 175.

The Rise and Fall of Hizbul Mujahideen, 1991-2004

Pakistan could not tolerate the JKLF's cry for independent J&K for too long because doing so would mean jeopardizing its hold on PCK, i.e. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. As shown above, the JKLF had openly challenged Pakistan's authority over PCK to the detriment of ISI support. The marginalization of the organization thus became an imperative for its Pakistani handlers. From the late 1990, ISI had decreased support to the group in favor of a pro-Pakistan indigenous outfit – Hizbul Mujahideen (“The Party of Holy Warriors”; hereafter HM). As its name suggests, HM is an Islamist, militant group, which, contrary to secular JKLF builds its struggle on the ideology of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of Pakistan. The group was formed, supported and directed by a Pakistani Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and ISI. While ISI channeled arms and money, provided training and intelligence reconnaissance, and issued operational orders, the JI supervised HM's field commanders through political administrators and served as an overground mouthpiece.²³⁷

The JI took over HM in 1990 by installing loyal members in key positions and creating a centralized leadership from co-opted intellectuals. At first, HM operated as an autonomous militant formation based on a twenty-member council and a five-member decision-making body, which held the executive power over the rank and file. The real power was vested in a triumvirate comprising the offices of a patron, a supreme commander and an emir.²³⁸ Mohammad Yusuf Shah (later renamed himself Syed Salahuddin after a great Muslim medieval leader), who was MUF's (Muslim United Front – a coalition of Kashmiri Islamist parties) candidate in the 1987 elections, served as patron, Master Ahsan Dar, who was as a JI instructor

²³⁷ “Jamaat also provided the Hizbul Mujahideen with links to Afghan groups such as the Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan, through which the Hizb boys could receive good training.” Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 48.

²³⁸ “The patron was to nominate the amir of the organization, (...), while the amir was to nominate the chief commander under the counsel of the patron. As a result, the power to appoint the patron meant nearly total control over the organization.” Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 144.

in one of its party schools, became the supreme commander of HM and Hilal Ahmed Mir acted as HM's emir. With the backing of the JI and ISI, Salahuddin ousted Ahsan Dar and marginalized Ahmed Mir crowning himself the "supreme commander" of HM.²³⁹

The dethronement of Ahsan Dar initiated the first rupture in HM. Dar gathered his forces and, with the support of the ISI, formed his own outfit, Muslim Mujahedin (MM). ISI's aim was to check HM's growing power and MM was ordered to target both the HM and Indian police.²⁴⁰ However, things would go badly for MM. Starting from the scratch, Dar had no time to develop MM's organization, even less space to integrate the arriving commanders into his nascent outfit. Likewise he suffered serious exogenous pressures. In 1992, Dar was temporary kidnapped by his erstwhile comrades.²⁴¹ After Dar's release, his outfit became the target of HM's reprisals. Finally, Dar was arrested by the Indian police in 1993. With Ahsan Dar imprisoned and its cadres being pounded by the HM and Indians, MM was "directionless"²⁴². After Dar had been released from the prison in 1994, he was killed by the HM. With no credible heir to MM's helm and the lack of control over district commanders, the MM gave birth to two factions. One led by Bilal Ahmad Sidiqi would continue fighting to the end, while the other headed by Ghulam Nabi Azad accepted Indian sovereignty over J&K and completely disengaged from the conflict. "A majority of his group shifted loyalties and joined the counter-insurgency force."²⁴³

This first split did not shake HM's foundations because by 1993 the JI had consolidated its control over the HM through the nomination of its own members into the organizational

²³⁹ After being accused of corruption and the misappropriation of HM funds, Ahsan Dar was dethroned and later even kidnapped by Salahuddin's followers in 1992. For some time he floated a group named Muslim Mujahideen with ISI's help. But this outfit proved to be short-lived and ineffective. New Nexus of Militant Bodies in J&K, *Tribune*, 22 January 1993; Santhanam *et al*, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–127.

²⁴⁰ Author's interview, journalist (name withheld), November 2012, New Delhi.

²⁴¹ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 87.

²⁴² Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 157.

²⁴³ Muzamil Jaleel, Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul, *The Indian Express*, 22 May 2003, available online: <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030522d.html> (05/14/2012).

hierarchy. The administrative and district departments of the HM were stuffed by JI leaders who also monitored the commanders in the field.²⁴⁴ Thus, the HM came to being as a centralized organization managed by both JI and ISI. After its consolidation, HM rose as the most dominant among the Pakistani-sponsored rebel outfits. “By 1993, the Hizbul was the only Kashmir-wide outfit, with a vast network of over 6,000 militants and a large upper-level base of Jamat- e-Islami leaders across the Valley”.²⁴⁵ The organization spread into the towns of the IJK, including Sopore, Doda, Pulwama, and the Srinagar district where underground cells were set up.²⁴⁶ In rural areas, the HM cadres established rear bases from which they launched attacks against the Indian troops.²⁴⁷ Thus, contrary to JKLF’s lack of solid political base, the HM leadership skillfully exploited JI’s network to rapidly spread its tentacles across the valley in search for recruits and shelter. The political cooperation with JI helped HM develop “a well- knit organisational and cadre-based structure at its disposal”²⁴⁸. As a result, the organization became feared by its foes and respected by other militant outfits. Despite HM’s exposure to COIN, the organization did not experience any major desertions. As my theory expects, externally-supported centralized organizations such as HM are less vulnerable to COIN given their bureaucratized and formalized nature.

However, by 1997 HM had lost a considerable number of district commanders and foot soldiers to the Indian army and paramilitary forces. The years of 1994-1996 have particularly witnessed the increase in effectiveness of the Indian counterinsurgency operations and the

²⁴⁴ Jamal, *op. cit.*

²⁴⁵ Jaleel, *op., cit.*

²⁴⁶ Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 258.

²⁴⁷ In 1991 the HM carried out one of the deadliest attacks on Indian army during the Kashmir insurgency. Its operatives set up an ambush for an army motorcade of 350 vehicles on Srinagar Jammu Highway at the heart of the Indian-controlled J&K. Reportedly, twenty-five armored cars were destroyed, more than two hundred Indian soldiers died and around five hundred were injured. The dead included three Majors, Major George, Major Sadhu and Major Gill. Amir Mir. 2004. *The True Face of Jehadis*. Lahore: Mashal Books, pp. 444.

²⁴⁸ Jaleel, *op. cit.*

brutality of the “renegades” against the HM.²⁴⁹ “While many HM militants were killed by the security forces, (...) the cash-starved HM leaders were unable to woo many youths.”²⁵⁰ Together with the killing of Ashraf Dar and other senior and district commanders, such as Firdaus Kirmani, Manzoor Ahmed Khan and Naseeb-ud-Din Ghazi, all these blows would shake the HM’s organizational basis weakening its control over the rank and file. On the surface, HM’s organization seemed virulent despite the exogenous pressures. Syed Salahuddin stood as HM’s undisputed leader with other commanders pledging him loyalty. Previous turbulences, as that with the ouster and split of Ahsan Dar and the split of General Abdullah had minor implications for the organization and functioning of the movement.

However, from the end of 1997 HM would experience some fissures in its organization and the weakening of links with its patron, JI. These internal problems would ultimately lead to its first open defiance of ISI policies in mid-2000. As a first sign of weakening internal control, HM’s chief commander in the valley, Abdul Majid Dar challenged Salahuddin’s leadership in October 1997. The conflict reflected Dar’s dissatisfaction with his status in HM. Namely, when Dar merged his Tehreek-i-Jihad-i-Islami into HM in early 1990s, he was promised a senior position.²⁵¹ As he was repeatedly denied the promotion, the Dar-Salahuddin conflict brewed into a major rift since the HM’s founding. Two constituent parts of the HM – Al Badr and the Pir Panjal Regiment – had sided with Dar and the conflict soon spilled into the streets of

²⁴⁹ In a 2001 interview, then chief commander of HM, Abdul Majid Dar, claimed that his outfit lost thousands of members since the outbreak of the rebellion. Josy Joseph. We will support any serious attempt to solve Kashmir issue. *The Rediff Interview*/Abdul Majid Dar, Chief Commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen, April 7, 2001, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/apr/07inter.htm>. Muzamil Jaleel suggests that besides 2000 Jamaat activists, half of 11000 insurgents that were killed by the GOI in the first decade of insurgency belonged to Hizbul. Jaleel, *op. cit.*

²⁵⁰ Arun Sharma, Hizbul's ceasefire call was just waiting to happen, *Express Indian*, July 27, 2000, available online: <http://www.expressindia.com/news/ie/daily/20000728/ina28084.html>.

²⁵¹ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 165. One interviewee suggests that Dar may have been likewise dissatisfied with Salahuddin’s luxurious life and widespread corruption in the movement while he and his comrades were bleeding on the battlefield. Interview, former Indian senior intelligence official (name withheld), October 18, 2012, New Delhi.

Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, where the two sides had their bases under the ISI supervision. Eventually, Salahuddin and Dar managed to temporarily tone down their differences.

But then, in a move to prevent future turbulences, Salahuddin turned against Dar's allies expelling Al Badr and Masood Sarfraz's Pir Panjal from HM. Sarfraz would not take lightly Salahuddin's action. Not only Sarfraz led a formidable, battle-hardened unit, but he also "played a central role in the jihadi movement, and (he) had run some of the most important missions of the fight"²⁵². In April 1998 Sarfraz and Salahuddin brought their rivalry to the streets of PCK.²⁵³ At first, Sarfraz had the backing of ISI, but when some financial allegations resurfaced against him, the ISI shifted its support to Salahuddin.²⁵⁴ JI also backed Salahuddin even using coercion to discipline Sarfraz. In October 2000, JI's Allama Rashid Turabi accompanied with a couple of hundreds armed men tried to disarm Sarfraz and his force. But this action failed and Sarfraz's faction turned guns on JI. To ISI's despair, the initial turf war spilled into towns and villages of PCK. "The two rival militias remained locked in battle for several weeks. The battle came to an end when the army moved in to disengage the two militias, and after the fighting had taken the lives of about a dozen civilians. The final resolution to the conflict was negotiated by the Kashmir Cell of the ISI, which divided the assets of the two groups."²⁵⁵ Sarfraz would subsequently separate from the HM in opposition to the ceasefire with GOI in October 2000.²⁵⁶

Another change occurred in the HM relationship with regard to its political wing, JI. Like HM, JI also took a heavy toll in the mid-1990s, its senior members and lower echelons being decimated by the security forces and Ikhwan. JI's political control over HM, as well as its

²⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 167.

²⁵³ Sati Sahni. Slaves have no Eid... *Rediff*, August, 2000, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/02hizb.htm>.

²⁵⁴ Mir speculates that ISI might have supported Sarfraz to Salahuddin for disassociating the outfit from JI, "an act that (also) infuriated Pakistan's ISI. Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 107.

²⁵⁵ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 167.

²⁵⁶ Zaffar Abbas. The Militant Brigade. *The Herald*. February 2004, pp. 59.

financial and moral support has convinced the Indian army that by striking the political front would likewise harm the militants.²⁵⁷ By the late 1990s “participation in the armed struggle has cost the JI heavily, losing hundreds, if not thousands, of its leaders, cadres, and sympathizers in battles with and illegal killings by the Indian forces”²⁵⁸. Consequently, JI and HM tried to publicly disassociate from each other to avoid JI’s annihilation.²⁵⁹ By late 1997, JI issued a series of statements disowning HM.²⁶⁰ In November 1997 Salahuddin also publicly announced that his outfit was breaking all ties with JI. The growing dissatisfaction of commanders with the leadership and the weakening of HM’s ties with JI would transform the centralized organization into decentralized. Given that HM commanders were outside Pakistan’s reach, it would reinforce to perception of vulnerability, and lead to desertion of exposed commanders.

The internal fissure has not been closed when it led to the first major defection of Hizbul against Pakistan in mid-2000. In early 2000 the ISI came up with the following plan: the senior leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen would secretly contact the Indian intelligence and inform them that they are ready to negotiate a cease-fire. The ISI and Pakistan’s military establishment expected that such a move would “help Pakistani negotiating efforts and increase international support for their cause”²⁶¹. It was suggested that the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as a political mouthpiece of the insurgency, would give a call for ceasefire, Hizbul Mujahedin would favorably respond to it, and subsequently there would be talks between the

²⁵⁷ Interview, journalist (name withheld), November 20, 2012, New Delhi.

²⁵⁸ Yoginder Sikand. 2002. *The Emergence and Development of the Jama'ati Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s–1990)*. *Modern Asia Studies*, 36(3): 705–751, at pp. 751.

²⁵⁹ Interview, former Indian senior intelligence officer (name withheld), October 18, 2012, New Delhi. Interview, Praveen Swami, October 23, 2012, New Delhi; Interview, journalist (name withheld), New Delhi. Amir Mir and Sati Sahni agree that this split was not cosmetic and that by 1997 HM and JI leaders “had already developed difference of perception and the means to achieve their objective”. Mir, *op. cit.*, 106; Sati Sahni. ‘Slaves have no Eid’.

²⁶⁰ Sumantra Bose. JKLF and JKHM: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Jammu and Kashmir Hizb-ul Mujahideen, in: Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman (eds.). 2007. *Terror, Insurgency, and the State*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 229–256, at pp. 245.

²⁶¹ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 210.

Indian officials and the HM with the active participation of the APHC. The negotiators would then present three conditions for reaching the deal on cease-fire, one of them being the inclusion of Pakistan in future peace talks.²⁶² Since GOI would never accept such a condition, the talks were supposed to break down adding the appearance of Pakistan's benevolence. The JI and HM seniors voiced their concerns and HM Chief Commander Abdul Majid Dar at first appeared to be the greatest opponent of this plan.

However, after departing from PCK to Srinagar *via* Dubai, it appears that Dar changed his mind.²⁶³ Upon landing in Srinagar in April 2000, Dar was surprised to find that Masood Tantrey and Khurshid Ahmad Zargar, two of the most powerful HM commanders in the valley, desired a ceasefire.²⁶⁴ It appears that the accumulated losses of HM cadres in J&K had moved the senior commanders toward the perception of vulnerability. According to Indian security services, HM lost around five thousands fighters from 1990 until 2000.²⁶⁵ In 1993 alone, HM had more than six hundred casualties, including forty district commanders, in its encounters with the Indian army.²⁶⁶ In line with my theoretical expectations, Dar and his fellow commanders decided to support a cease-fire even at the expense of damaging ties with Pakistan. Dar decided to inform JI leaders in the valley before announcing a cease-fire offer to the GOI. Reportedly, some of JI senior cadres such as Abdul Ghani Bhat and Abdul Ghani Lone supported cease-fire, but its head S.A.S. Gilani advised Dar to wait until the elections in JI took place. As Gilani was delaying the elections, Dar grew impatient. Dar "was impatient, and did not want to lose the

²⁶² Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 329.

²⁶³ There are some speculations that the Indian RAW used Dar's second wife, who lived in Dubai, to woo Dar into negotiations. Nevertheless, Dar later dismissed these speculations.

²⁶⁴ Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*, pp. 189.

²⁶⁵ Jaleel, *op. cit.*

²⁶⁶ Sati Sahni. "We Have No Enmity Towards the People of India". *The Rediff Special*, July, 2000, source: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/01hizb.htm>.

opportunity, fearing that his political masters across the border could change their minds.”²⁶⁷ Meanwhile the GOP and ISI had indeed changed their minds and Salahuddin asked Dar to postpone the announcement.²⁶⁸ But Dar disobeyed the order. On July 24, he suddenly announced the unilateral ceasefire without consulting Salahuddin or the ISI, and appointed Fazal Haq Qureshi, a long-time separatist activist and a moderate, the main negotiator. In the first meeting between Qureshi and the chief negotiator of the Indian government, Kamal Pandey, it was agreed that the Army would not fire on militants or break the ceasefire. The HM commanders would set up a committee with the Army to flesh out the modalities of the ceasefire on the operational level. It appears that HM negotiators either did not lay out any preconditions during this first meeting, or that their demand was muted by the subsequent media coverage.²⁶⁹

The announcement and substance of talks angered the Pakistani military establishment. First, the announcement took ISI off guard. Dar ignored Gilani’s instructions and failed to *a priori* inform the ISI about the timing of his offer. “If a ceasefire was successfully implemented before political dialogue began, Pakistan would lose its last source of leverage. That, in turn, would mean that Pakistan would find itself left out of a role in the Hizb’s negotiations with the GOI, and such a scenario was unacceptable to GOP.”²⁷⁰ Second, the GOP and ISI were “furious at the way Majid had presented the ceasefire, for he had modified the conditions they had dictated”²⁷¹. Following the first day of formal talks, an ISI officer rang Qureshi accusing the

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ Salah-ud-Din wanted Dar to postpone Hizb ceasefire offer, *Rediff*, August 3, 2000, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/03jk4.htm>.

²⁶⁹ When he announced the ceasefire on 24 July, Dar reportedly said: “Let them talk to anybody; the aim of the exercise should be to resolve the issue amicably, through a dialogue without preconditions”. My interviewees agree that HM did not attach any preconditions to the talks. On the other hand, HM’s negotiator Qureshi argues that he clearly pointed out to his Indian counterpart that “we cannot ignore Pakistan, it is equally a party, without that there will be no discussions.” Thakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 104.

²⁷⁰ Praveen Swami, Dialogue with the Hizb Light in the Tunnel But is it Dawn or Sunset?, South Asia Terrorist Portal, available online: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume6/Fault6-Swami-F.htm#_ftn1.

²⁷¹ Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 331.

entire HM chain of command for failure to insist on Pakistan's involvement in the negotiations. ISI was concerned that Dar is eager to proceed with the talks without Pakistan. That ISI's concern seemed to be founded in the light of Qureshi's subsequent account:

what we (Dar and me) had really wanted was secret talks with the government to come to a mutual agreement on a long-lasting peace formula. Once peace was restored in the Valley, Pakistan's influence could have been limited. This was because no leader in Kashmir can openly declare that he wants a solution independent of Pakistan – especially as they knew the fate of those who dared to go against the country's wishes.²⁷²

Following Pakistan's 1999 Kargil debacle in the fourth Indo-Pakistani war, its military government was in no position to openly reject the ceasefire. Instead Pakistan relied on its jihadi outfits to derail the ongoing negotiations. Both JeM and LeT were ordered to wrack havoc in the valley and put down the cease-fire at all costs.²⁷³ The first blow to Dar's initiative came on July 31 when LeT launched an attack on the Rashtriya Rifles garrison in northern IJK, with an aim at derailing HM's ceasefire offer.²⁷⁴ Subsequently, LeT undertook a series of massacres in South Kashmir culminating on August 1 when more than one hundred civilians, mostly members of religious minorities, were killed across the IJK.

Likewise, the ISI arm-twisted Syed Salahuddin into submission. At the outset, the HM chief reluctantly endorsed Dar's ceasefire simply because he was left with no choice.²⁷⁵ As the ISI demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the ceasefire by removing Salahuddin from the United Jihad Council helm – an umbrella organization of jihadists based in Pakistan – Salahuddin decided to bow before the orders of his masters. He swiftly turned against Dar denouncing his

²⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 105.

²⁷³ This claim is corroborated by a series of interviews, October-December 2012, New Delhi.

²⁷⁴ Lashkar-e-Toiba Says Attack in Response to Peace Talks. *Rediff*, July 31, 2000, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jul/31jk1.htm>.

²⁷⁵ Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 101; Abbas, *op. cit.*, pp. 56.

move as treachery.²⁷⁶ Even worse, Salahuddin threatened to disassociate himself and HM from ceasefire by August 8 unless the GOI included Pakistan in the talks.

Salahuddin's denouncement and withdrawal of support for the ceasefire offer infuriated Dar, triggering tensions between the leader and his chief commander. The emerging animosity between Salahuddin and Dar threatened to escalate into a major schism since their last quarrel in 1997/1998. Particularly when Dar received backing from North IJK Division commander Majid Jehangir and Ghulam Rasool Dar and Pir Panjal Regiment commander Shamsheer Khan. Salahuddin's anathema was supported by the North J&K Division chief Abdul Rashid Hajam and Deputy South J&K Division commander Abdul Ghani. Most importantly, Salahuddin was backed by ISI whose officers were seemingly "taken by surprise"²⁷⁷ following Dar's unilateral announcement of cease-fire.

Before Dar was expelled along with his supporters, he had committed another defiant act. Pressured by the ISI, Salahuddin announced on August 1 that HM would withdraw the ceasefire offer unless the GOI did not agree to include Pakistan in future talks. The deadline was set for 8 August. When the GOI refused his demand, Salahuddin carried out his promise. Yet, on the same day Abdul Majid Dar contradicted his supremo expressing the hope that talks would resume. In defiance to the ISI and his chief, Dar said he did not understand why the conditions were attached to the talks after they had been initiated. "We took this decision after months of deliberation. (...) It showed a ray of hope and we want talks to *proceed* (emphasis added) further"²⁷⁸. Proceeding with talks effectively meant that Dar does not insist on the key ISI

²⁷⁶ Authors like Arif Jamal and Pradeep Thakur suggest that Salahuddin tacitly supported Dar's secret negotiations with GOI, but he was not consulted about the timing of its announcement. See: Jamal, *op. cit.*; Thakur, *op. cit.* Yet, some of my interviewees argue that Salahuddin was not aware of negotiations.

²⁷⁷ Interviews, October-November 2012, New Delhi.

²⁷⁸ Hizb Commander Wants Talks to Continue, *Rediff*, August 8, 2000, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/08kash1.htm>.

condition – the inclusion of GOP. Thus, despite ISI and Salahuddin undermining the talks, Dar was in favor of them even at the cost of GOP's exclusion.

Pressured from the ISI and the jihadists, Salahuddin decided to disassociate himself and HM from the ceasefire offer on 8 August. Salahuddin's withdrawal of support for the cease-fire had exposed a power-struggle between the HM leader and his chief commander. The two began issuing statements that contradicted each other. On August 22, Dar announced that he believes "that a new cease-fire will take place in the next two months" and that "the talks between Hizbul Mujahideen and the Indian authorities will start again".²⁷⁹ On the other hand, Salahuddin kept rejecting any talks unless Pakistan was included in them – the condition he knew GOI would never accept. Thus, by August it became clear that HM has not bridged previous divisions and that they grew into intense factionalism following the unilateral declaration of ceasefire.

The split became inevitable as Salahuddin came to see Dar as a major threat to his authority. In November 2000, acting under instructions from the ISI, Salahuddin summoned the supreme council to recall Dar and his supporters from the valley. It appears that Salahuddin did not only worry about the past transgressions, but he also became alarmed by Dar's efforts to revive a dialogue with the GOI.²⁸⁰ As Dar and a couple of his loyalists avoided the session of the supreme council, Salahuddin replaced them with new commanders. For eleven months there had been a lull within HM. But this abruptly changed in mid-November 2001 when Dar's close associate, commander Khurshid Ahmed Zargar, publicly criticized Salahuddin's hardline policy. Zargar publicly endorsed a dialogue with GOI arguing that "the gun alone is no solution to the problem"²⁸¹. In late November, Salahuddin issued another call to Dar and others to immediately

²⁷⁹ Kashmir's Hibul Hopes for Truce Renewal Soon, *Free Press Kashmir*, August 22, 2000, available online: <http://freepresskashmir.com/kashmirs-hizbul-hopes-for-truce-renewal-soon/>.

²⁸⁰ Interviews, November 2012, New Delhi.

²⁸¹ Hizbul Commanders in Jammu & Kashmir Recalled to PoK Camp, *The Daily Excelsior*, November 24, 2001.

return to Pakistan but this too was ignored by a number of other commanders in IJK who sided with Dar.

Dissenting voices within the valley's HM intensified in 2002. It appears that Dar and his associates had not only set up their own faction, but they likewise received funds from the Indian RAW.²⁸² On May 1, a Srinagar daily printed a text by the HM's deputy commander-in-chief Abdul Ahmad Bhat, promising to cease all military operations if India initiated a dialogue.²⁸³ This move seemed to be in line with efforts by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to collect a coalition of secessionist groups before the J&K State elections. "Salahuddin, who had appointed Bhat to contain just these kinds of ideas, was infuriated."²⁸⁴

The next day, HM announced that Majid Dar, commander Zargar, central division commander Zafar Abdul Fatah and a number of his followers were no longer its members. Dar was charged with the defiance of leadership's orders to return to Pakistan and castigated as a covert RAW agent.²⁸⁵ Apart from Syed Salahuddin only two members of the Hizbul were in favor of the verdict. Former north division chief, Abdul Rashid Hajam and a deputy south division commander Abdul Ghani stood behind their chief's allegations. Two others - the Hizbul's north division commander Majid Jehangir and Ghulam Rasool Dar, angrily walked out of the command council meeting. Two other Hizbul leaders, Pir Panjal regiment commander Shamsher "Khan and former south division commander Khalid Saifullah, argued that Majid Dar

²⁸² Since the eruption of conflict with Salahuddin in late 2001, Dar's faction received fewer funds from the ISI. Dar's camp was also pressed by a series of the Indian Intelligence Bureau operations which intercepted illegal money transfers from Pakistan to the valley. Praveen Swami, J&K After 9/11 More of the Same, available online: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume11/Article3.htm>.

²⁸³ Praveen Swami, The Hizbul Meltdown, *Frontline* (Chennai), May 25 - June 7, 2002, available online: <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm>.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*

²⁸⁵ *Ibid*

needed to be given more time to act as per Salahuddin's orders and return to Pakistan."²⁸⁶ Despite these reconciliatory calls, the split in HM was a fact by mid-2002.

The split was, however, far from settled as long as Dar's faction was able to attract HM's disgruntled members.²⁸⁷ This led to a turf war in the PCK where the two camps claimed their rights over training camps and other assets. The skirmishes temporarily ceased only after the ISI organized Dar's faction as a separate militant outfit in January 2003 and pledged its support.²⁸⁸ By that time, Dar and his supporters had already decided to renounce violence and take part in the upcoming IJK State Assembly elections. As Dar was preparing to promote his new party, the Jammu and Kashmir Salvation Movement, an unidentified hitman shot him dead in front of his house in Sopore in March 2003.²⁸⁹

Dar's assassination provoked a shock within the Hizbul cadre in Pakistan. In early 2003 street clashes between the two sides were revived. The ISI again stepped in with an interest in permanently resolving the succession crisis in HM. After a thorough investigation the ISI ordered the two parties to pay money to each other and they also completely ceased the support to Dar's group.²⁹⁰ Salahuddin survived and remained firmly in control of the organization primarily because of the ISI's support.²⁹¹ HM had again become centralized outfit under Salahuddin's firm grip.

But after these incidents HM was mostly sidelined by the ISI in favor of Pakistani outfits such as LeT and JeM. In June 2003, following the visit of then US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the Musharraf government was urged to curb activities of some jihadi groups,

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*

²⁸⁷ There were reportedly some senior HM commanders who defected to Dar after the breakup. Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 237.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁸⁹ Marwah, *op. cit.*, pp. 79.

²⁹⁰ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–238.

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 66.

including HM. The GOP followed suit and Salahuddin was immediately forced to leave his residence in Islamabad and to surrender some of his cars. In protest to this action, Salahuddin publicly denounced Pakistan's policy of rapprochement with India, which was accelerated in 2003, and threatened to continue jihad despite pressures. The ISI reacted promptly to his defiance by arresting some of his personal bodyguards.²⁹² Since then, Salahuddin has been confined to his home under the surveillance of the ISI. Here and there he issues a statement complaining about Pakistan's Kashmir policy. HM remains one of the strongest militant organizations,²⁹³ but ever since the 2002 state election in IJK, its activities have been waning.

Mass Desertions: A Short Story of Ikhwanul Muslimeen and Muslim Janbaaz Force

Despite its investment in HM, the ISI grew wary of creating a dominant militant party in Kashmir. As all support would have to be channeled through a single outfit, the monopoly of HM on Kashmiri insurgency could seriously weaken the ISI's bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the insurgents. The ISI preferred a fractured insurgency whereby its control would be maintained through the manipulation of material support and, ultimately, by pitting each group off against the other. Being the strongest outfit in the valley HM had a hegemonic agenda. In the early 1990s, HM undertook the incorporation of other Pakistan-sponsored movements by any means deemed necessary. Some organizations such as Al-Badr, Hizbullah or al-Umar Mujahideen willingly merged with HM. Those who refused, including the JKLF, Ikhwanul Muslimeen or Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF), were ruthlessly punished: hundreds of their members were intimidated, kidnapped or executed across the valley.²⁹⁴

²⁹² Mubashir Zaidi. The Himalayan Implosion, *The Herald*, June 2003, pp. 58–59.

²⁹³ “Only in January 2004, the Hizbul had claimed killing 770 Indian soldiers and losing 232 of its fighters in 314 encounters during 2003.” Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 68.

²⁹⁴ “According to a Hizbul Mujahideen commander, the organization eliminated some 7,000 political rivals. (...) Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 155. Amanullah Khan, the PCK JKLF chairman argues that around 500 of its cadres were wiped

As a consequence, the victims of HM's campaign started to fracture along those organizational lines that were under the most intense pressure. The most prone to desertion were outfits in which local commanders or strongmen were quite autonomous from the central leadership. Ikhwanul Muslimeen (IUM) was one such group. The group was established in 1991 as the Jammu and Kashmir Student Liberation Front (JKSLF) after splitting from the JKLF. In 1992, the JKSLF was divided into two whereby the new outfit led by Hilal Beg was renamed Ikhwanul Muslimeen indicating that the group adopted Islamist ideology and endorsed Pakistan as its principal. Formally, the group's central body was set up in the PCK to coordinate with the ISI, and with the commanders and political activists in districts such as Srinagar, Baramula, Anantnag, Pulwama and Kupwara.²⁹⁵

In practice, however, IUM's local commanders in north and south Kashmir were chiefly associated with their respective communities, and lacked solid organizational links to one another.²⁹⁶ In turn, IUM's central leadership was in charge of an atomized commander corps which reduced its ability to control the situation on the ground. In the case of a major counterinsurgency or fratricidal violence against the local units there was little Hilal Beg and other leaders could do to influence the behavior of their lower echelons. Such a decentralized command and a divided commander corps only increased the chance of desertion in the face of attrition. My theory expects decentralized organizations outside sponsor's reach such as IUM and MJF to develop a perception of vulnerability, leading them to favor desertion.

This scenario started to unravel in 1992, when HM launched attacks against the IUM cadres in the valley. There were numerous examples of HM members confiscating guns,

out by HM. Muhammad Amir Rana. 2004. *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Lahore: Mashal Books, pp. 86–87.

²⁹⁵ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 80.

²⁹⁶ Paul Staniland. 2012. Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia *International Security* 37(1): 142–177, at pp. 170.

kidnapping or killing IUM combatants.²⁹⁷ With ISI's blessing, Hilal Beg sought to check HM's power by aligning with other victims such as JKLF and Al Umar Mujahideen. But when this did not work out, IUM tried burying the hatchet with HM in late 1992.²⁹⁸ Unfortunately for IUM the HM resumed its attacks and by 1993 a new wave of attacks against it took place across Kashmir. In north Kashmir a section of IUM led by a local folk singer Kukka Parrey became a target of harsh Hizb reprisals. According to Parrey, "I was encircled from all sides: on one front I was fighting the security forces, and on the other I had to deal with the militants of the Hizbul Mujahideen."²⁹⁹ After several skirmishes between Parrey and HM in 1993 and 1994, "Kuka had turned his guns on the Hizb"³⁰⁰. Instead of supporting his commander, the central leadership of Hilal Beig in the PCK only added fuel to the fire. Beg demanded Parrey not to retaliate against HM's attacks.³⁰¹ When Kukka refused to obey, he and his company were disarmed and he fled with his men to Delhi. Soon after, he deserted with his entire unit to the Indian side because, as he put it, "I knew the day I stopped fighting the HM, I would be terminated along with my gang"³⁰². Other segments of the IUM faced similar fate. The IUM sections of Liaqat Ali Khan and Usman Majid joined Parrey's pro-India camp, expanding the wave of desertions into south Kashmir.³⁰³

Another organization with a similar faith was Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF) founded in 1988 under the auspices of Shabir Shah's People's League Party (PL). Like IUM, MJF comprised Kashmiris, with most of the recruits coming from northern districts and Srinagar. In contrast to IUM, MJF was militarily stronger, having as many as 300 troops and receiving a solid

²⁹⁷ Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 105.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 248.

²⁹⁹ Pradeep Thakur. *Militant Monologue: Echoes from the Kashmir Valley*. New Delhi: Parity Paperbacks, pp. 47.

³⁰⁰ Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 286.

³⁰¹ Thakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

³⁰² Thakur *op. cit.*, pp. 50.

³⁰³ Praveen Swami. A beleaguered force. *Frontline* (Chennai), February 12, 1999.

amount of ISI support. Absent any alternative source of funding, MJF was a state-reliant organization. Similar to IUM, it had a central body which had control over the rank and file only on paper.

In practice, the MJF leadership failed to build organizational links with its field commanders and foot soldiers. The main problem was that MJF's district branches were spawning faster than the central leadership could establish a meaningful control over their commanders.³⁰⁴ As a result, there was no feedback to the central leadership about who was doing what, where and how across J&K. As Aditya Sinha points out in her biography of MJF's chief commander Babar Badar, "the MJF hierarchy did not know who was going across to Pakistan (...) When Babar Badar became Salar-e-Allah (chief commander) he had absolutely no idea how many boys there were in the ranks of the MJF"³⁰⁵. Simultaneously, "when the trained militants returned, Babar had no choice but to assimilate them into what was slowly growing into an unwieldy outfit".³⁰⁶ Therefore, MJF was essentially a decentralized outfit.

Due to such a decentralized character, MJF would ultimately come under serious strain once the Indian army targeted its top cadre. The first exogenous shock to the organization came from the IJK police actions. In 1991, Shabir Shah, the MJF political leader, was arrested by the Indian police. Beheaded followers "had become aimless after Shabir Shah's arrest"³⁰⁷. Then in the same year MJF's commander in J&K Babar Badar was apprehended. The second exogenous shock came from HM in 1991-1993. MJF suffered heavy toll losing more than 100 cadres (one third of its actual size!).³⁰⁸ In order to save the group from complete disaster, the remnants of the

³⁰⁴ Aditya Sinha. 2000. *Death of Dreams: a Terrorist's Tale*. India: Harpercollins Publishers, pp. 58.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 59.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 60.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 57.

³⁰⁸ Jamal, *op. cit.*, pp. 157.

MJF integrated into Jihad Force to form Al Jihad Force (AJF).³⁰⁹ However, “Al Jihad had never really integrated the old MJF and the Jihad force”³¹⁰. The new group seemed to combine the fractious leadership with the poor organizational links between the leadership and the rank and file.

In 1993 Babar Badar was released from jail deciding that MJF, with ISI’s blessing, is to be revived as a separate outfit. He immediately split from AJF, leaving the group to suffer heavy casualties by the Indian forces and eventually leave the fight (one AJF commander, Javed Hussain Shah even joined the Indian side).³¹¹ But neither could Babar Badar hold the eroding organization together while resisting the mounting Indian attacks. In February 1996, he decided to bandwagon with New Delhi announcing the end of his militant career.³¹² He was accompanied by a group of commanders from Al Jihad, Al Umar Mujahideen and Muslim Mujahedin in his bid for political dialogue with India. After Babar Badar became a politician, the MJF ceased to exist as organization with some members filling the ranks of other outfits or following the steps of their erstwhile commander.

The cases of IUM and MJF demonstrate that decentralized organizations that are exposed to COIN and hostile rival movements are likely to develop the perception of vulnerability. Separated from their leadership and sponsor, the rank and file of both organizations could not receive a timely support. The leadership of IUM even refused to support its commanders against HM’s targeting. Under such circumstances, the two organizations developed a perception of

³⁰⁹ Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 92.

³¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 157.

³¹¹ In 1993, a number of AJF senior commanders, advisors and leaders were arrested or eliminated by the Indian police. Some of these names include its military advisor Javed Ahmad Dar, senior leader Zubair Ahmad, chief Maulana Gyias-ud-Din, chief commander Sheikh Abdul Aziz, acting chief Bilal Ahmad and Jammu area commander Raja Khalid Manhas. Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 153.

³¹² He was joined by 15 senior commanders from the Jammu region. Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–156.

vulnerability that is most visible in Kukka Parrey's testimony. Caught between targeting and survival, both organizations chose to desert.

Dissatisfied with the performance of the Kashmiris, and disappointed in Salahuddin's control of its commanders, by 2001 ISI had mostly shifted its support to Pakistani outfits who were expected to mercilessly carry out violence against the civilians and to be more obedient to Pakistan. This did not turn out to be so. I describe three movements in details in the next chapter, and their behavior toward Pakistan in the post-2001 period.

B. PAKISTAN AND FOREIGN MILITANTS IN KASHMIR

Amid the growing lethal pressure from the Indian counterinsurgency and paramilitary, the insurgency had started to lose its momentum in 1994-1995. According to some Indian government figures, these years witnessed the highest death toll of militants. In addition, the so-called "Kalashnikov culture" encouraged by Pakistan had by that time alienated the population in the valley. The power of the AK47 has corrupted the militants who turned their guns against the locals through extortion, loot, rape and murder. As a result, "the ISI's recruitment base in Kashmir Valley gradually dried up, though recruitment by force continued for some more time"³¹³. To revive the insurgency, Pakistan began to introduce foreign militants into the valley, in the summer of 1996. The ISI opened a new front in the Jammu areas of Doda, Punch, Rajouri and Udhampur.³¹⁴ The aim was to destabilize the previously unaffected areas.

The introduction of foreign militants also had an adverse consequence on the relationship between the ISI and HM. As of 1998, the gap between the master and its client had widened,

³¹³ Gurmeet Kanwal. 1999. Proxy War in Kashmir: Jihad or State-Sponsored Terrorism? *Strategic Analyses* 23(1): 4-5.

³¹⁴ Gurmeet Kanwal. 2002. *Pakistan's Proxy War*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, pp. 13.

resulting in ISI's support for the overthrow of Salahuddin from the HM helm.³¹⁵ The problem with the foreign militants, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Ansar, was that they were given more space and resources than HM under the pretext of greater effectiveness in fighting the Indian Army. To draw a wedge between its proxies, the ISI "appointed Pakistani militants and foreign mercenaries as commanders of several insurgent groups, especially the Hizbul Mujahideen"³¹⁶. Moreover, these foreigner outfits, known as *mujahideen*, were also engaged in looting, killings and harassment of the locals which damaged HM's reputation as indigenous organization. In some areas, the mujahideen also clashed with HM's local commanders. But, even though they had many Pakistanis in their ranks, the mujahideen were often disobedient of Pakistan's orders. In the next section I present one such movement, Harkatul Ansar.

Defiance of Harkatul Ansar

Foreign militants, mostly from Afghanistan, were introduced to J&K by in 1991-1992 to bolster militants' capabilities. The Afghan fighters were usually dispatched by the Afghan-based militant groups, Harkatul Mujahedin (HuM), Harkatul-e-Jihad-Islami (HUJI), to the PCK from where they would be assigned to an active outfit. In 1993, the ISI decided "they wanted a better control and direction"³¹⁷ over these militants and combined them into a single front. As a result, the Harkatul Ansar (HUA) of Pakistan, was born in late 1993 through the merger of Harkatul Mujahedin (HuM), Harkatul-e-Jihad-Islami (HUJI) and Jamaatul Mujahedin. The leadership was divided between Fazlur Rahman Khalil, the head of the HUM, who headed the HUM for the whole of Pakistan, and Sadaatullah Khan, who was in charge of the PCK unit. In IJK, too, HuA was led by the existing HuM and HUJI commanders with Sajjad Khan Afghani being named

³¹⁵ ISI Sacks Hizbul Chief. *Tribune*. 31 January 1998, 1, pp. 1.

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 20.

³¹⁷ Sahni, *op. cit.*, pp. 136.

chief commander and Amjad Bilal deputy chief commander. At the moment of inception, HuA numbered 300 militants, mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but included Afghan and Arab veterans of the Afghan war as well. “The source and amount of HUA’s military funding are unknown, but are believed to come from sympathetic Arab countries and wealthy Pakistanis and Kashmiris”.³¹⁸

The HuA had never achieved a centralized organization in J&K. Both HuA and its predecessors, HuM and HUJI were “considered as not well organized as other big jihadi organizations”³¹⁹. In fact, ever since its inception in 1993, HuA’s leadership had been factionalized between the HuM and HUJI. Their chiefs frequently clashed over authority accusing each other of fund misappropriation.³²⁰ In January 1994, Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar, chief of HuM, took over as a Chief Commander of HuA. Instead of consolidating the nascent outfit, Ahangar only developed serious differences with Mehrajuddin Sheikh, leader of HUJI, over who is in charge of leading operations in J&K.³²¹ Given that HuA’s rank and file was outside ISI’s reach, it should develop the perception of autonomy, seeking to defy Pakistan’s policies on the ground.

Indeed, HuA’s factionalized structure affected its field commanders in J&K, weakening their discipline and creating headaches for the ISI. In mid-January, the main HuA valley commander Sajjad Shadid Khan known as Afghani embarked on a series of reckless actions in Srinagar without ISI’s approval. When Afghani found out that one of his brothers-in-arms named Langrial was caught by the Indian army, he did not wait for approval from either the HuA or ISI to free him. Afghani tried to free his comrade through a frontal attack on a Srinagar regiment,

³¹⁸ B. Raman. Harkatul Mujahideen – An Update.
<http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/691/currentpage/35/Default.aspx>.

³¹⁹ Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 249.

³²⁰ Santhanam *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 102.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

which held Langrial.³²² After this attempt failed, Afghani kidnapped an Indian major hoping for exchange.³²³ But the Indian army would not budge. Furious, Afghani finally executed the Indian officer and went into hiding, leading his unit to dissipate in the wilderness. The ISI officer responsible for HuA scolded its leadership for Afghani's misbehavior and decided it was necessary to send in somebody senior to reign in the undisciplined rank and file.

To patch up these organizational and operative tensions within the movement, Maulana Masood Azhar, a skillful cleric from Bahawalpur and the movement's Secretary General was sent by ISI in early February 1994 to J&K. However, upon landing to Srinagar Azhar was apprehended by the Indian police together with Afghani. The detention of the senior leader and the number one commander dealt a major blow to ISI's attempt to consolidate HuA in the valley. HuM and HUJI leaders remained deeply divided and acted autonomously from each other, the ISI being the only spring that holds them together.³²⁴

Provoked by the Indian action, the HuA leadership now sought a more radical way to release Afghani and Azhar – through kidnappings. Equipped and instructed by the ISI, the Kashmiri branch of HuA led by commander Sikander kidnapped two British nationals, Kim Housego and David Mackey, in June 1994. Sikander immediately demanded that the Indian government release Azhar, Afghani, Langrial and a number of other HuA inmates. When the Indian side refused, Sikander and his crew held the Britons for another seventeen days. They released the hostages after the Western embassies mounted a significant pressure on the Pakistani government. Determined to free Azhar, Afghani and Langrial, the ISI and HuA hammered out Operation Ghar. This time, HuA would form a front organization labeled Al-Faran to make it harder for India to blame Pakistan for abductions. Al Faran comprised 24

³²² Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark. 2012. *The Meadow*. London and New Delhi: Penguin Books, pp. 49.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 264.

members mostly Pakistanis. In early 1995 it was decided that Al-Faran should kidnap some foreign engineers as this would, they reasoned, exert a greater pressure on India to fold in their demands. In essence, Al-Faran was different from HuA but in name.³²⁵ Two HuA commanders were put in charge of the operation – Mohammad Sikander and Abdul Hamid Turk – and dispatched to south J&K, nearby Anantnag, to fish for potential targets.

The HuA would turn out to be a terrible choice for this operation. There are two reasons for this: (a) alternative resources as a more general condition; and (b) in particular, HuA's factionalized structure and the lack of control over Al-Faran commanders. First, HuA commanders relied on alternative financial sources outside Pakistan,³²⁶ and enjoyed formidable connections to "elements of the wider Deobandi infrastructure that existed inside Pakistan."³²⁷ While it received funding from the Pakistani intelligence service for the Kashmir jihad, these other means of support meant HuA could continue to operate independently, were official funding cut off."³²⁸ Second, both Sikander and Turk enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the group's leadership in Pakistan. Subcontracting the operation to the two field commanders, the HuA leadership achieved plausible deniability but it likewise weakened the chain of command as there was no senior official who would oversee Al Faran and report back to Pakistan. In turn, this volatile organization also meant that Al Faran enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from ISI, which faced problems with HuA's factionalized status.

In July 1995, Al Faran already diverged from the previous plan by kidnapping six western tourists – Keith Mangan and Paul Wells from the UK; two Americans, John Childs and Donald Hutchings; Dirk Hasert from Germany; and Hans Christian Ostrø from Norway. Childs

³²⁵ Various interviews October-December 2012, Delhi.

³²⁶ Devadas, *op. cit.*, pp. 206.

³²⁷ Country Reports on Terrorism 2010. U.S. Department of State, 2010. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm>.

³²⁸ Alexander Evans. 2000. *Kashmiri Separatists-The Harkat ul Ansar*, Monterey Institute.

managed to escape his abductors, whereas Ostrø was taken hostage after that incident. Al Faran first demanded the release of Azhar and twenty other HuA members. However, as the time passed the group came under serious pressure even from the Kashmiri separatist leaders such as S.A.S Gilani, the leader of JI and All-Party Hurriyat Conference (umbrella organization of Kashmir's pro-separatist parties) and militants such as HM to release hostages. This pressure was reinforced by a massive condemnation of Al Faran after Ostrø was beheaded by Turk in mid-August 1995. It appears that Al Faran itself became fractured by that time between Sikander's faction leaning toward a compromise with India and the Turk faction, carrying out the decapitation of Ostrø in defiance of calls for moderation.³²⁹ All of my interviewees suggest that ISI did not support such an action. Other authors even suggest that Turk's action was condemned by his Pakistani patrons who were aware that New Delhi would exploit Al Faran's cruelty to its own advantage.³³⁰

By October, Al Faran moderated its stance, demanding that India release fifteen and later only four members. In a subsequent battle of nerves, the movement agreed to release the remaining hostages for money. But this deal leaked to the press. Outraged, Al Faran threatened to kill the hostages. With the winter coming all roads to Pakistan would soon be blocked. Al Faran's could not afford another blunder and its leaders searched for a way out of the impasse. They let it be known that they would hand over the hostages in return for a safe exit. Under unclear circumstances, the hostages were executed in December 1995 despite Al Faran's fold.³³¹

³²⁹ Levy and Scott-Clark, *op. cit.* This is also in line with a testimony by one of the militants involved, who claimed that at that time the movement was in tatters becoming "anti-Pakistani". Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 282.

³³⁰ Levy and Scott-Clark, *op. cit.*

³³¹ After undertaking a systematic field work, journalists Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark came to the conclusion that the hostages were eventually handed over by Al Faran to local militias supported by GOI. They argue that GOI used these militias to execute the hostages on 13 December 1995 in order to put the blame on Pakistan. This finding is not corroborated by the literature. The identity of executioners as well as the resting place of the hostages remains the mystery to this day.

Whether the hostages were executed by Al-Faran or a pro-India paramilitary does not change the fact that the group defied Pakistan's orders, particularly in the case of the Norwegian's execution and the calls to release the hostages. Why did Al-Faran defy orders? The evidence suggests that the reason rests with the inability of HuA leadership to build a centralized organization which could monitor and sanction its commanders. Sikander and Turki had been given too much a leeway in Operation Ghar. With the authority to make autonomous decisions on the ground, Al Faran not only diverged from the prior operational goals but also fragmented into two. The Turk faction apparently turned a deaf ear to ISI instructions. Consequently, this created a backlash against Pakistan. Alternative resources broadly factor in HuA capability to defy orders but they fail to account for the timing and motives of key actors in the command chain. Common ethnicity may have some predictive power regarding Al Faran's commanders. In particular, Sikandar was Kashmiri, while Turk hailed from Afghanistan suggesting that they should not be loyal to ISI. However, this assumption runs short of convincing the reader why Turk and not Sikandar defied ISI's command regarding the well-being of the tourists. Another shortcoming stems from the HuA ethnic composition: according to the common ethnicity explanation one would expect HuA to be a reliable organization since its leadership was Pakistani, and most of Al-Faran's operatives were also from Pakistan. Yet, it is obvious now that this was not the case.

ISI's Favorite Goes Rogue: How Jaish-e-Mohammad Turned Against Pakistan

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) was one of the deadliest Kashmiri militant organizations that have ever been sponsored by Pakistan. Formed on the ruptures of Harkatul Ansar/Mujahideen,

the central leadership never managed to establish a cohesive and centralized organization.³³² Nominally, JeM was headed by Maulana Azhar after he was freed from Indian prison in December 1999 in exchange for 185 passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814. In fact, JeM retained an overlapping membership with its former parent organization, HuM, and rather autonomous commanders. Since JeM was involved in the Afghan theater, the leadership established ties to the Taleban and Al-Qaeda, which provided JeM with material support. Reportedly, several of Azhar's close family members worked in the Taleban government and hundreds of JeM members were trained "in camps in Afghanistan, bringing them into contact with al-Qaeda"³³³.

Despite its decentralized nature and support from Al-Qaeda, JeM quickly became one of Pakistan's favored proxies. Some argue that the ISI sponsored JeM's creation in order to check LeT's growing power.³³⁴ The ethnic composition of JeM was the additional reason for its preferential status. Approximately three-quarters of JeM's members were Pakistani from North Punjab, the region from which hails the core of Pakistan's military corps. The ISI believed that shared ethnicity would make JeM more obedient to the military's objectives in Kashmir than "foreign" jihadi groups with pan-Islamic agendas.³³⁵

However, it is precisely Pakistani outfits such as JeM that were most defiant of their sponsor's orders. JeM appeared to be hostile to any sort of Pakistani-supported negotiated

³³² In fact, the separation from HuM and the establishment of JeM had violent repercussions. The two got embroiled into conflict over property. HuM operatives tried to retake some of its offices in Punjab from JeM cadres. This led to shootouts in Pakistan and Afghanistan where HuM had bases. The fight ended when Usama bin Laden intervened pledging money to HuM for the lost offices and inventory. There are still some skirmishes over the ownership of martyrs. Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–221. Stephen Tankel notes that JeM was "(...) organizationally fractious, with a weak ideological foundation". Stephen Tankel. 2011. *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 123.

³³³ Hussain, *op. cit.*, pp. 66

³³⁴ Hassan Abbas. 2005. *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America's War Terror*, London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 214.

³³⁵ Farzana Shaikh. 2009. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. New York, Columbia: Columbia University Press, pp. 175.

settlement with India. Unlike LeT's ideological rigidity, JeM was less ideologically electrified, more decentralized and able to muster alternative material resources from Afghanistan and its Deobandi connections in Pakistan. Even if Azhar refrained from undermining the peace process, the rank and file of JeM was uneager to compromise. This situation intensified after Pakistan modified its policy of support for Kashmiri militants in the wake of the US-led "war on terror". Musharraf's decision to align with Washington against the Taleban and Al-Qaeda angered those organizations that had close ties to them. These included HuM, JeM but also LeT. By October 2001, JeM was set on a collision course with the Musharraf regime. The conflict between JeM and the military regime was fueled by the organization's internal squabbles between a moderate leadership and the hawkish rank and file. The hawks decided to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with their patron's policies. On October 1, 2001, a handful of JeM operatives carried out a suicide attack on the Kashmir legislative assembly in Srinagar, center of Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed thirty-one people. A Jaish operative drove a truck armed with explosives into the Legislative Assembly building in Srinagar, Indian-controlled Kashmir, killing himself and thirty eight people. The attack undermined Pakistan's efforts to portray militants as freedom fighters and put the Musharraf government under strong international pressure to shut down the militant organizations. Taking place less than a week after 9/11, the event was framed by the Pakistani government as a "terrorist action".

Even though his ISI backers urged Azhar to rein in the rank and file of JeM there was little he could do. To avoid detention, Maulana Azhar reportedly expelled some of those activists who were involved in the attacks. But most of the members disliked Musharraf's U-turn and perceived the President as a traitor to their cause. Due to close links to the Taleban and Al-Qaeda, many JeM followers were enraged by Musharraf's alliance with the USA. Under these

circumstances, a faction of JeM members decided to act in a more defiant fashion that would bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war. On 13 December 2001 five armed men entered the main gate of the Parliament House in New Delhi in a car with Home Ministry and Parliament labels, and opened fire as they got out of the vehicle. The security personnel shot back at the gunmen killing all of the infiltrators.

JeM immediately claimed responsibility for the attack but removed it the next day after the ISI put pressure on Azhar.³³⁶ Even though the Indian authorities put on trial four members of JeM and found them all guilty, there is no clear evidence that JeM's central leadership sanctioned the suicide operation. To the contrary, some insider sources even claim that the leadership was caught off-guard when it happened as they allegedly sent no mission to New Delhi.³³⁷ The former ISI chief Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi, however, alleges that JeM is behind the attack while denying any state involvement.³³⁸ One journalist who investigated the attack suggests that the operation was given unilateral approval from an ISI General who managed rebel organizations in India-controlled Kashmir. Musharraf was supposedly unaware of the operation and enraged by its consequences as he knew that this move would give India *casus belli* and delegitimize the Kashmiri groups he was meticulously trying to shield from international criticism.³³⁹

Although Musharraf may not have directly authorized this operation, the go-ahead by an intelligence officer suggests that the ISI was involved in its planning and execution.³⁴⁰ Regrettably, whether this is a case of defiance can only be coded *ex post*. And in this respect the

³³⁶ Hussain, *op. cit.*, pp. 67.

³³⁷ Muhammad Amir Rana. 2001. *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Lahore: Mashal Books, pp. 234.

³³⁸ B. Muralidhar Reddy, Jaish Behind Parliament Attack: ex-ISI chief, *The Hindu*, March 7, 2004, <http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/07/stories/2004030703320900.htm>.

³³⁹ Who Will Strike First?, *The Economist*, 22 December, 2001, available online: <http://www.economist.com/node/917228>.

³⁴⁰ Interview, former senior intelligence officer (name withheld), October 18, 2012, Delhi; Interview, Praveen Swami, October 23, 2012, Delhi.

incident proved to be costly for Musharraf. Soon after the attack, India demanded that Islamabad stop supporting Kashmiri militants and the two countries mobilized their armies along the border. India sent troops to Kashmir and Punjab in its most significant military mobilization since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. As a response, Pakistan also mobilized its troops.³⁴¹ Worried about a dangerous escalation, US officials began pressuring the Musharraf regime to take concrete steps against JeM. On October 12, the US government froze the accounts of JeM.

The Indo-Pakistani tension was de-escalated only after President Pervez Musharraf followed suit and prohibited all JeM's financial transactions in December. Maulana Masood Azhana, the leader of JeM, was shortly afterwards placed under house arrest even though the Pakistani authorities refused to hand him over to India. On January 12, 2002, the organization was banned together with its accomplice, LeT, and three more radical groups. "No party in future will be allowed to be identified with words like Jaish, Lashkar or Sipah," warned Musharraf in a subsequent speech, which seemingly marked Pakistan's abandonment of its jihadi policy in Kashmir.

Indeed, President Musharraf stayed true to his promise and all of the banned militant groups were encouraged to continue their activities albeit under new banners. Lashkar-e-Taiba became Pasban-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, Jaish-e-Mohammad labeled itself Khuddam-ul-Islam, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen changed its name to Jamiat ul-Ansar. The financial and intelligence support to JeM was resumed only after a couple of months of official prohibition. Azhar was released by a court order just a few months after his arrest.

³⁴¹ Rorry McCarthy. Dangerous Game of State-Sponsored Terror that Threatens Nuclear Conflict. *The Guardian*. 25 May, 2002, available online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/25/pakistan.india>.

But Pakistan had already created a monster beyond its control. After JeM was officially banned and its financial assets seized,³⁴² the factionalism within the movement intensified. With the organization located within Pakistan JeM should develop the perception of opportunity, and react violently toward the shift in Pakistan's policy after 2001. Masood Azhar was seemingly in favor of compliance with GOP instructions.³⁴³ By 2002, however, Azhar had lost support within his outfit as the majority of members of the JeM Supreme Council demanded his resignation. Particularly irritated by Pakistan's U-turn was a JeM faction led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar who decided to retaliate against the ban and the increasing US influence on Islamabad by launching a series of terrorist attacks across Pakistan against western nationals, Christians and Shia Muslims. Backed by Osama bin-Laden, the rank and file of financially impoverished JeM pressed for a jihad against the "slave" government of Pakistan in opposition to the guidance of the group's leadership.³⁴⁴

From March to September 2002 the first suicide missions were carried out in Islamabad, Karachi, Murree, Taxila and Bahawalpur targeting state officials. JeM activists returning from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban stirred up sectarianism throughout Pakistan by targeting Christian temples, diplomatic missions and Shia mosques.³⁴⁵ The arrested Jaish members later revealed that the suicide bombings were planned in November 2001 on the eve of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. One of the factional leaders, Maulana Abdul Jabbar convened a meeting at the Balakot training camp in Pakistan. The participants were gathered around a so-

³⁴² Pakistan perhaps opened Pandora's box with the seizure of JeM's financial assets because the lack of resources ignited quarrels over money. "Jaish sources claim that the distribution of finances was the primary source of conflict between Jabbar and Azhar". Azmat Abbas. 2003. Death Wish. *Herald* (Karachi), July 2003. Jabbar along with other members accused Azhar of nepotism and personal enrichment to the detriment of the organization.

³⁴³ Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism: A Threat to Regional and International Security, *Terrorism Monitor*, 17 November, 2005, 3(22): 8–10, at pp. 9.

³⁴⁴ Anatol Lieven. 2011. *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. New York: Public Affairs, pp. 225.

³⁴⁵ Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy. *Islamist Networks The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*. London: Hurst&Company, pp. 31.

called “Brigade 313” and were members of Pakistani-sponsored organizations as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkatul-Mujahideen.³⁴⁶ They decided to resist the increasing US influence on Islamabad through militant means including suicide bombings within Pakistan.

The ISI demanded Masood Azhar resign in the rank and file of Jaish and stop Jabbar’s operations. However, Masood Azhar informed the ISI that he had nothing to do with this outfit and he was no longer responsible for their actions. Azhar wrote that “the expelled members were sectarian terrorists who should be arrested instead of being allowed to regroup”³⁴⁷. Allegedly, by 2002 Masood Azhar had lost the support within the group: seven out of ten members of the JeM Supreme Council had distanced from him. One of them was quoted saying:

Our main difference with Azhar was that he deviated from the cause of jihad to liberate the occupied Kashmir. Unlike Azhar and his masters in the Pakistani intelligence agencies we are not ready to sacrifice jihad for the sake of funds.³⁴⁸

As a result of this internal turmoil, JeM was engulfed in turf war between various factions.³⁴⁹ Rather than splitting to form their own organizations, these factions continued to compete with their parent over authority, money, offices and training grounds across Pakistan. On one hand, Masood Azhar caved in to ISI pressures and promised to do everything in his power to stop the targeting of US personal in Pakistan.³⁵⁰ On the other hand, this move angered the bulk of Azhar’s commanders who saw his move as a betrayal of the jihadi cause. In late 2002, Jabbar launched a faction within JeM called Jamaat-ul-Furqaan which became a launching pad for deadlier attacks against the Pakistani government.³⁵¹ Some Pakistani military sources

³⁴⁶ Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 20.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 26. Azhar also tried to distance from Maulana Jabbar and his faction by depicting him as a “sectarian terrorist”. Abbas, *The Militant Brigade*, pp. 60.

³⁴⁸ Mir, *op. cit.*

³⁴⁹ Rohit Honawar. 2005. Jaish-e-Mohammed. IPCS Special Report, No. 4, 1–7, at pp. 2.

³⁵⁰ Abbas, *The Militant Brigade*, pp. 60.

³⁵¹ By 2003, JeM had split into the Khuddam ul-Islam (KuI), led by Azhar and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar. Despite the split, JeM continued to operate as a single organization and be associated with its original identity. Source: Honawar, *op. cit.*, at pp. 1.

assert that besides Jabbar's faction, JeM had become a battleground of many competing factions that violently opposed Azhar's adherence to Pakistan and the ISI.³⁵² The organizational disarray was further exacerbated by the support to competing factions from "rogue" members of the ISI. Together with a group of JeM's factional leaders and members from other militant organizations the renegade ISI officers provided logistical support to two failed assassination attempts against President Musharraf.³⁵³

The prelude to these assassination attempts was marked by a second round of repression against the Pakistani-based militant groups. While the first round was mild, the second was much harsher involving the arrest of militant leaders, seizure of offices and freezing of bank accounts. On 15 November 2003, the Musharraf government banned JeM (alias Khudam-ul-Islam), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (alias Jamiat-ul-Ansar), Jamaat-ul-Furqan (sister organization of JeM) and Hizb-ul-Tehrir. Of all these groups, JeM received the harshest treatment by the security forces because Washington seemed to be concerned about the movement's "logistical support to fugitive Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders"³⁵⁴. In contrast, LeT had managed to escape the government's wrath; it was only issued a warning and placed on the watch list.

Less than a month after the second ban a group of militants carried out two assassination attempts against President Musharraf. The first occurred on December 14, 2003, when a bomb exploded after President Musharraf's highly guarded motorcade crossed a bridge in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Although the bridge is nearby Musharraf's residence and heavily guarded by the military, the hitmen were able to install explosives to the pylons below it. The second attack

³⁵² Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 27.

³⁵³ Syed Shoaib Hasan. Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque. *BBC News*. 27 July, 2007, available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm.

³⁵⁴ Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 47.

occurred on December 25, 2003, when two suicide bombers drove car bombs into Musharraf's convoy. Both attacks failed to kill the President.

The identities of the two suicide bombers were soon discovered. One was a member of the JeM from Azad Kashmir, who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. The other was from HUJI who also fought with the Taliban. "Since only a minority of military officers knew the route and timing of Musharraf's travels and which of several identical cars he would be using at any given time, suggesting that elements within the military were involved in the attacks"³⁵⁵. The investigation also revealed that "the explosives used in the attacks came from an al-Qaeda camp in the Pakistani tribal area of South Waziristan"³⁵⁶.

The growing dissatisfaction of Islamists with the change in GOP's policy toward Kashmir has escalated into a confrontation with the Musharraf regime. Many in JeM and other militant organizations were not eager to put their arms down, even if that meant war with the GOP. As voiced by a militant leader in the aftermath of the assassination attempts:

The anger towards Musharraf and his policies is natural. We have lost so many friends, brothers and relatives in the Kashmir struggle. What was that for? We are not going to sit quietly.³⁵⁷

The GOP immediately took action against JeM and interrogated its top circle. The officials claimed that there was enough evidence against the militant organization. However, Masood repeated his earlier claim that those involved in the assassination attempts were renegades who had been expelled from the organization for misbehavior. As JeM spokesperson, Maulana Yousaf Hussain, said

³⁵⁵ Zahid Hussain, Dangerous Liasons, *Newsline Magazine*, 18 January, 2004, <http://www.newsline magazine.com/2004/01/dangerous-liaisons/>.

³⁵⁶ Ahmed Rashid. 2008. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking, pp. 230-232.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

The expulsions of Maulana Abdul Jabbar and other leaders eventually led to a split in our group. The dissidents were adamant to carry out suicide missions against the US interests in Pakistan to avenge the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.³⁵⁸

The GOP eventually clamped down on some militants and members of the security apparatus. More than one hundred military and intelligence employees had been apprehended and interrogated, and some were even found guilty and sentenced to death. However, the Musharraf government took no action against other militant groups whose members were involved in attempts at his life. There were no mass crackdowns similar to those in 2003, nor arrests of militant leaders. Even Azhar, who had publicly called for Musharraf's assassination, was not arrested.

As of 2004, JeM has largely fallen into obscurity. In 2009, it resurfaced with new suicide attacks and a more consolidated leadership under Azhar. The outfit may have between one and two thousand active fighters and several thousand personal.³⁵⁹ It appears that JeM was given permission from the ISI to resume operations against the Indian forces after the leadership has been purged from "problematic" cadres. Thus, despite its previous attacks on the state, the GOP counts on JeM as a strategic asset in J&K.

A Monster that Never Was: The Loyalty of Lashkar-e-Taiba

In 1986 Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad (Center for Preaching, MDI) was founded by two Pakistani engineering professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal to participate in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and to spread the Wahhabi Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought in Pakistan, a puritanical version of Sunni Islam that forbids television, cinema and pictures. Initially, both ISI and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided support to

³⁵⁸ Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 25.

³⁵⁹ Hassan Abbas, Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, *CTC Sentinel*, April 2009, 4(2), available online: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss4-Art1.pdf>.

the MDI, but after the Soviet troops had been ousted the CIA cut its support to the organization. ISI continued to rely on the organization sending its fighters and suicide squads to J&K to target Hindu population and the Indian army. The attacks were carried out by MDI's technically militant wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure, hereafter LeT), which had the identical leadership as its parent organization. With its centralized organization, the model expects LeT to remain obedient to Pakistan even in the case of a major shift in Islamabad's policy toward the Kashmir conflict.

Indeed, ever since its introduction to J&K in 1992³⁶⁰ LeT has meticulously executed ISI orders related to ethnic cleansing and targeting of Indian police and army. LeT also became notorious for its massacres of Hindus across J&K in the early 2000s, which pitted it against Hizbul who allegedly refused to carry out identical ISI demands.³⁶¹ LeT was also the first outfit to initiate *fedayeen* attacks in the valley – the specialty that made it the most respected and feared among other organizations. The organization claims to have executed nearly one hundred suicide missions in the period 1990-2000.³⁶² In December 2000, LeT even carried out a suicide attack on an Indian barrack inside the Red Fort in Delhi.³⁶³ Such a deadly specialization earned LeT the status of the most favorable outfit in the ISI circle. Some authors even suggest that ISI Generals closely planned all LeT attacks together with its leadership and chief commanders.³⁶⁴

Given that “the Markaz and the Lashkar-e-Toiba are extremely secretive organizations”,³⁶⁵ the claims I am making regarding the internal organization should be taken with a grain of salt. By and large, I draw on various pieces of information from books, articles

³⁶⁰ Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 329.

³⁶¹ Husain Haqqani. 2005. *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 290.

³⁶² Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 337.

³⁶³ My Indian interviewees claim that ISI was behind this operation.

³⁶⁴ Tankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 61.

³⁶⁵ Amir Mir, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed: Lashkar-e-Toiba, in Harinder Baweja (ed.). 2002. *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror*. New Delhi: Roli Books, pp. 66.

and newspapers, and triangulate them with interviews with Indian security officials to construct the image of the organization.

Despite the sea of information, one finding is common to all the sources – the LeT command and control is highly centralized and Hafiz Saeed rules the organization while his family members and cronies occupy key positions in the hierarchy.³⁶⁶ There might be a *Majlis-e-Shura* (Council of Elders), similar to advisory council in Hizbul, but even if such a political body exists it is most likely a consultative forum presided by Saeed who makes all decisions. Moreover, LeT is compartmentalized into departments dealing with religious affairs; social welfare, education and charity; and jihad.³⁶⁷ Each of these departments is headed by Saeed's kinsmen or close associates who are responsible directly to him. The jihadi department is organized in a typical military fashion, with a supreme commander and his deputy, provisional commander, district commanders, and battalion commanders.

The LeT's chain of command is a pyramidal and highly specialized structure responsible for recruitment, training and execution of militant operations. Unlike Jaish and Harkat, whose commanders were quite autonomous from its leadership, Saeed controls most of the processes in LeT's operational command through the heads of sections who report to him.³⁶⁸ This is the main reason why LeT stayed loyal to Pakistan after the government cracked down on the militancy in the wake of September 2001. The centralization of the command and control in LeT is the factor that makes it decisively different from other, similar organizations, such as Jaish and Harkat, who turned against Pakistan owing to their decentralized and fractionalized organizational structure.

³⁶⁶ Wilson John. 2011. *The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War*. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, pp. 137–139.

³⁶⁷ Tinkel, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 142; Clarke, *op. cit.*

The comparison of LeT, and Jaish and Harkat points to four similarities. First, in all these organizations the majority of fighters were non-Kashmiris, or more precisely the Pakistanis from Punjab, the region from which the bulk of Pakistan's military corps is recruited. Some authors argue that LeT has proportionally more Pakistani fighters than any other outfit, which makes it more dedicated to ISI and the government.³⁶⁹ While this argument may hold true, it is also noticeable that LeT is a transnational movement with the most diverse ethnic composition (its cadres originate from places such as Central Asia, the Sudan, Afghanistan and Bosnia) among the militant outfits.

Second, they all are insulated from the Indian army's reprisals because their infrastructure is based in Pakistan. LeT seems to be more specialized organization, as it operates a huge complex in Muridke comprised of, among other facilities, schools and research institutes, ambulances and hospitals, and farms.³⁷⁰

Third, these are all very capable organizations; they have between a couple of hundred to few thousand fighters under their command. Even though they are infiltrated in J&K, their social network among the local population is weak.

Finally, all the groups have relied on alternative sources of support. Jaish, Harkat and LeT, all of them have had links with Al-Qaeda usually through mutual assistance in the form of intelligence sharing, training or the provision of shelter.³⁷¹ In addition, LeT receives covert support from Saudi Arabia and numerous private organizations from this and other Gulf countries.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 78; Ashley J. Tellis. 2012. The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, pp. 10-11, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf (03/07/2013).

³⁷⁰ Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 76.

³⁷¹ Praveen Swami, Lashkar Chief's Release Cause of Global Concern, *The Hindu*, 13 October, 2009.

³⁷² Rahul Tripathi, Madani Raised Huge Funds for Terror From Saudi Arabia, *The Times of India*, 07 June 2009; Chandran, D. Suba and Rekha Chakravarthi, Lashkar-e-Taiba, in Arpita Anant (ed.). 2012. *Non-State Armed Groups in South Asia: A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, pp. 253.

In spite of these similarities, LeT remained loyal, while Harkat defied the operational orders and Jaish turned guns against Islamabad. In the previous sections, I have shown how the decentralized command and control in Harkat and Jaish's fractionalized organization contributed to their defection. LeT never embraced Jaish's violent path. To my knowledge, there is neither a report indicating LeT's defiance of ISI orders (even though the 2001 Indian Parliament in collaboration with JeM is a border case for defection).

Apart from the operational obedience, there is likewise no record of LeT attacks against the Pakistani state, nor against any other military or civilian target within Pakistan.³⁷³ Remember how the fractioning of Jaish triggered a series of attacks against the Pakistani establishment, religious groups and foreigners after September 2001. The fractionalization of JeM was accelerated by Pakistan's closure of some camps, relocation of others and, most importantly, by the decision to confine the militants to their camps. The lack of control and accountability to leadership in JeM prompted the rank and file to start freelancing or join other outfits. This has accelerated the dissipation of JeM's command and control in the aftermath of 9/11 to the extent that the outfit evolved into a conglomerate of embattled factions.

In contrast, LeT accepted ISI's demand to lower its profile in J&K and act only with the permission from the agency. Reportedly, in 2001 LeT decided to send small companies, between ten and fifteen fighters, across the LOC instead of large formations to adjust to Musharraf's policy change.³⁷⁴ In turn, LeT was allowed to preserve its large training camps in PCK.³⁷⁵ GOP's tolerance of LeT's militant infrastructure enabled its rank and file to carry out, if limited, operations across the LOC under ISI's watchful eye. As a result, the leadership was able to

³⁷³ See e.g.: C. Christine Fair. 2011. Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State. *Survival* 53(4): 1–23, at pp. 9–10; Tellis, *op. cit.*; Ahmed Rashid. 2012. *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West*. New York: Penguin Books, pp. 53.

³⁷⁴ Mir, *op. cit.*, pp. 96.

³⁷⁵ Hussain, *op. cit.*, pp. 53; Tankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 127; Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 57.

maintain the cohesiveness of the organization and avoid mass defections. LeT complied to POK's orders because its "command and control as well as hierarchical structure has remained intact over the years"³⁷⁶.

Owing to its compliance, LeT mostly avoided the "witch hunt" of 2001-2003, when GOP clamped down on JeM, HUJI and other militant organizations in the country. Although Hafiz Saeed was arrested in December 2001 for his fiery speeches, the court ordered his release within a year time.³⁷⁷ But even when Pakistan, under a significant US pressure, enlisted LeT as a terrorist organization, the organization preserved its hierarchy. Despite the house arrest of some top members, Hafiz Saeed and his close circle continued to hold meetings, plan terrorist attacks, and keep in touch with other outfits. In 2003, LeT was spared the second round of bans. In return for compliance on Pakistan's 2004 rapprochement with India – an episode that enraged many militant outfits – LeT was allowed to freely carry on with fund-raising, holding public rallies, and the recruitment and training of cadres.³⁷⁸

LeT did not change behavior toward GOP because it avoided intensive leadership crises and factionalism that have plagued similar outfits such as Jaish and Harkat. The preservation of organizational hierarchy meant that LeT's rank and file could not easily turn rogue as the central leadership controlled the key resources necessary for their activities. LeT avoided Jaish's faith because Hafiz Saeed received the full support of ISI and GOP after he had accepted the change in Pakistan's policy toward armed struggle in J&K. This support was most visible in GOP's refusal to clamp down on LeT's militant activities, and continued logistical and military assistance.

³⁷⁶ Abbas, Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.

³⁷⁷ Nicholas Howenstein suggests that Saeed's allies in GOP played a crucial role in his release. Nicholas Howenstein, *The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir*, *Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)*, 5 February, 2008, 1–41, at pp. 21.

³⁷⁸ Zaffar Abbas, Endgame Begins, *The Herald*, February 2004, 51–62, at pp. 61.

While LeT preserved its command and control, it was not immune to individual and brief splits. For instance, in 2003 a LeT senior member and former Pakistani officer, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, left the outfit and joined the infamous Brigade 313 that was involved in the assassination attempt against Musharraf. Likewise, in 2004 there were reports indicating a power struggle within the LeT command and control, but over funds and not policies. Reportedly, some senior leaders opposed the leadership of Hafiz Saeed and established a breakaway group labeled Khair-un-Naas (KN).³⁷⁹ The breakaway group was made up of former LeT senior members who had accused Saeed of nepotism, corruption and violation of party goals. The split had no significant impact on LeT's organizational structure and is thought to be orchestrated by the ISI in response to pressure from the US to ban the LeT.³⁸⁰ Some close associates of the LeT leader claim that ISI engineered the split as a warning to Saeed to tone down his speeches on jihad in J&K.³⁸¹

Trajectories of Militant Behavior in Kashmir: Assessing the Arguments

In this section I assess the explanatory power of my and alternative theories. The argument I advance in this chapter engenders considerable, although not full, explanatory power. My theory suggests that exogenous pressures on non-centralized rebel movements are likely to cause rebel defection. In particular, COIN and inter-rebel conflict may lead commanders and factions of non-centralized groups to desert, while the shift in sponsor's policy is likely to make the rebels defy or turn guns against their sponsor. My theory partly fails to explain why Harkatul Ansar defied Pakistan's demand to keep the hostages alive even though Islamabad had not

³⁷⁹ Lashkar Parent Unit Jamaat-ud-Dawa Splits, *Rediff.com*, 16 July, 2004, available online: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jul/16let.htm>.

³⁸⁰ A senior KN member even stated that "Khairun Naas and Lashkar-e-Taiba are basically the same, but the LT is banned in Pakistan so we adopted the name Khairun Naas". Amir Rana, Jamaatud Dawa splits, 18 July, 2004, available online: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-7-2004_pg7_20.

³⁸¹ Amir Mir. 2008. *The Fluttering Flag of Jihad*. Lahore: Mashal Books, pp. 178.

changed its policies. It appears that its defiance was a result of factionalized militant organization and transnational support while exogenous pressures played no role. Similarly, my theory cannot explain the timing of Hizbul Mujahideen's ceasefire with the Indian army. Even though the movement became factionalized in 1997/98 following the internal ruptures between Salahuddin and Dar, Hizbul commanders initiated the rapprochement with GOI against Pakistan's wishes only in 2000.

The rest of predictions are mostly supported by the evidence. First, decentralized outfits such as JKLF, Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Mujahideen tended to desert the fighting when they faced decapitation and decimation by COIN and rebel rivals. The JKLF was the most factionalized movement and it suffered two major leadership crises, in 1990 and 1993, and a plethora of splits, some of them being instigated or supported by Pakistan. Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Mujahideen had all been splinters who suffered additional splits thanks to their weak command and control, and the attrition at the hands of the Indian army and Hizbul.

Second, Hizbul Mujahideen remained obedient to Pakistan until late 1990s because it managed to preserve the most centralized structure owing to its ties to Jamaat-e-Islami. Despite the growing Indian offensive against Hizbul in 1992 onward, the movement did not suffer any desertions in this period. However, the disassociation of Jamaat and the conflict over leadership in late 1990s led a group of disgruntled commanders, headed by chief commander Dar, to seek an accommodation with GOI.

Finally, the theory explains why the two Pakistani outfits, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba pursued completely different paths in their relationship with Pakistan. My argument accurately depicts how the change in Pakistan's policy toward the Kashmiri militancy

in 2001 – ushered in by the US administration – led the fractious Jaish to turn against the state and centralized Lashkar to tone down its cross-border activities and synchronize its moves with the establishment.

On the other hand, the alternative theories receive mixed support from the evidence. First, shared preferences partly explain the varying relationship between Pakistan and purely Kashmiri movements. The discrepancy arising from different identities and ideologies is most visible in JKLF's case. However, other ideologically similar movements who fought for Kashmir's integration with Pakistan, such as Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Mujahideen, eventually abandoned their sponsor. A predominantly Kashmiri movement with a moderate Islamist ideology, Hizbul Mujahideen, proved to be more loyal to Pakistan's cause than any other Kashmiri militant outfit. In terms of indigenous movements, shared ethnicity seems to broadly figure in their decision to abandon the fighting. Because the indigenous militants had their families and homes in the valley, the loyalty to Pakistan seemed to be under the increasing strain as the years passed and there was no conflict resolution in sight. The GOI could use this opportunity to lure some outfits into desertion by promising them amnesty and the return to normal politics. This approach worked in the case of JKLF, and, allegedly, in Hizbul's negotiations over the Ramzan ceasefire. Even though the Pakistani outfits were insulated from such threats, some remained loyal, while others turned against the state. This argument cannot explain why Lashkar and Jaish, the two groups with predominantly Pakistani stuff, pursued completely different policies in relation to Pakistan.

Second, the alternative resources helps explain the behavior of some Pakistani outfits, such as Harkat and Jaish, while it fails to account for Lashkar's loyalty. The Kashmiri outfits

have not received any major alternative source of support, and this argument fails to explain their defections.

Third, the capabilities also offer an incomplete picture of the Kashmir insurgency. I find that the weakest outfits, Ikhwanul, Muslim Janbaaz Force and Muslim Mujahideen, tended to desert, while the strongest, Harkat and Jaish, engaged in defiance and switching sides. The argument about the weaker rebels deserting the combat appears to be complementary to my argument that the exogenous pressures lead to the overall erosion of militant organization. However, the strongest organizations, Lashkar and Hizbul, have mostly remained loyal throughout the insurgency inflating the explanatory power of the capabilities argument.

CHAPTER 5

Refining the Theories

In the previous chapters I have aimed to examine why and under what conditions some rebel movements defect against their state sponsors, while others do not. Using a novel dataset on sponsor-rebel relations I statistically analyzed more than one hundred rebel movements in Chapter 3. Subsequently, I explored in-depth the behavior of six rebel outfits in Kashmir toward Pakistan in Chapter 4. The six organizations have provided a solid within-case comparison of units with different organizational structure, nature of ties with Pakistan, capabilities and alternative sources of support. In this chapter, I use the findings from the previous chapters to draw implications for my and alternative approaches. In addition, I ask whether the scope of my theory should be narrowed or enhanced beyond asymmetric conflicts by considering statistical analysis of different periods and types of warfare.

The particular focus of my investigation in Chapter 3 was to demonstrate an association between rebel organization structure and their propensity for defection. The findings have confirmed my argument: indeed, the lower the centralization of the command and control, the more likely is a sponsored movement to defect against its sponsor. By drawing on principal-agent theories, I have also sought to test the alternative arguments including ethnic/ideological ties, multiple sponsors/transnational support and the military strength of sponsors and rebels. Surprisingly, the results have indicated that shared ethnic ties may more often prompt rebels to defect than non-ethnic sponsorships; in addition, transnational ties encouraged rebels to turn against their sponsors.

In Chapter 4, I have traced the patterns from Chapter 3 and linked them to defection/non-defection. In particular, I asked why have some movements (e.g. Harkatul Ansar and JKLF) defied orders, while others (e.g. Muslim Janbaaz Force and Ikhwanul Muslimeeen) deserted combat. Additionally, why has Jaish-e-Mohammad turned its guns against Pakistan, while Lashkar-e-Taiba remained loyal? I started off by demonstrating how the difference in organizational structure of these movements affected their behavior, and how interactions with a sponsor and other players led to a change in the command and control enabling some commanders and factions to act independently of their leadership. In particular, I indicated how the centralized organization of Hizbul Mujahideen and Lahskar-e-Taiba rendered them more loyal to Pakistan, unlike JKLF, Muslim Janbaaz Force, Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Muslim Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkatul Ansar whose decentralized/fragmented organization eventually led to their fallout with Pakistan.

In this chapter, I use these findings to refine my and alternative arguments. I thematically organize this analysis, discussing each theory separately. Discussed here are only those factors that have proved robust across the tests, and these are organizational structure, ethnic ties and transnational support. In this discussion I tease out particular mechanisms that can be probed in future in-depth studies. After that, I statistically check whether the argument I develop in this dissertation is applicable in other contexts. In particular, I ask how organizational theory performs in different periods. Perhaps the theory I advance here cannot account both for the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. In these wars, rebels may have less need for external support, or, if they receive it, be less dependent on their sponsors.

To check whether the development of a movement's organization is portable across time and types of warfare, the next section uses the SOR dataset and the multilevel logistic modeling

to test for the significance of factors in the Cold War/Post-Cold War period and among territorial and non-territorial conflicts. I split the population into two paired samples: sponsorships 1968-1989 versus sponsorships after 1989, and asymmetric versus symmetric conflicts.

Mechanisms

In the previous chapters I statistically analyzed principal-agent framework against a broad range of rebel movements. Likewise, I used the case of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir to illustrate aspects of the framework by examining the defection/non-defection of Kashmiri and Pakistani outfits alike. Even though the case study partly supports the framework, I did not develop particular causal mechanisms, apart from my theory, that link the propositions to defection. In this section, I consider the theories by focusing on each proposition, going back to the statistical findings and to the case study identifying the mechanisms and assessing their applicability to other cases.

To assess the relevance of these arguments, I also draw on cases beyond Kashmir. In doing so, this assessment is aimed at illustrating common traits of sponsorships in different civil wars rather than offering a comprehensive case-study. The additional cases provide some support, but should be regarded as supplementary evidence to the case study in Chapter 3. This approach is a much weaker alternative to case-studies given that it ignores the complex nature of civil conflicts and lacks the in-depth evidence to rigorously test the underlying mechanisms. At the same time, this approach is useful for understanding how the mechanisms stemming from the theoretical propositions perform under varying circumstances. In the subsequent sections, I analyze each individual proposition using the findings in Chapter 4. Drawing on supplementary cases, the mechanisms should not be seen as isolated pathways. They might be linked to other propositions in triggering defection.

Organizational Theory

There are three mechanisms that seem to produce defection: the first leads to mild defection, while the latter two drive severe defection. All of them are related to the length of delegation chain. First, when a rebel leadership and lower echelons are geographically separated, with the former residing in the sponsor and the latter in the target country. In this mechanism, the rank and file of non-centralized organizations can twist the initial orders from the central leadership because it is not well monitored and controlled. If the rank and file also draws on popular support and resources, it can also avoid the costs of sanctions for misbehavior. Therefore, the space for hidden action dramatically widens and commanders and factions can reasonably ignore sponsor's orders without incurring too high costs for their actions as they are out of sponsor's reach.

This mechanism is most clearly on display in the cases of Harkatul Ansar and partly JKLF. The separation of Harkatul's leadership and rank and file has given more space to the commanders to engage in egregious behavior. Located in the inaccessible mountain peaks of Kashmir, the Harkatul commanders could not communicate with their leaders in Pakistan even if they were the most loyal cadres. After one of their leaders was captured, the rank and file of Harkatul first attacked an Indian army base, and then kidnapped a group of foreign tourists. Both actions were executed without Pakistan's explicit approval. On top of that, the Harkatul operatives beheaded one of the captured tourists and possibly killed the rest. The evidence shows that this was clearly against Pakistan's instructions and interests. On the other side, the JKLF leadership was split between Pakistani and Kashmiri wings. The Pakistani wing had little control over the Kashmiri corps. In addition, the Kashmiri JKLF used its popular support to defy Pakistan's orders relating to organizational and operational issues.

This mechanism is also present among the Afghan Mujahideen who fought against the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul in the 1980s. They all had political leaders based in Pakistan who issued directions and supplied arms and money to commanders who fought in the field. Mohammad Yousaf notes that “the gap between those who fight and those who do not was difficult to bridge (because) the leaders were the subject of much criticism (...) for their soft living, smart cars and well-furnished villas”³⁸². In addition, each commander had “his own base (...) from which he received reinforcements, food, shelter and sometimes money”³⁸³. The Afghan commanders were responsible for the protection of their communities. As a consequence, they were more autonomous *vis-à-vis* their leaders, and consequently more disobedient. The commanders would often carry out attacks against the government posts and clash with other commanders without a clearance from its leadership, let alone ISI.³⁸⁴ After the Soviet departure from Afghanistan in 1988 all Mujahideen parties (except Hekmatyar’s centralized Hizb) “showed increasing resistance to ISI attempts to direct them militarily; some observers said the commanders were ‘on strike’.”³⁸⁵

In the second mechanism there is COIN or inter-rebel clashes aimed at the rank and file that is territorially separated from its leadership. Detached from its rank and file, the rebel leadership has scarce information about the needs and interests of its troops, and much less information about the inflow, type and number of recruits that are joining the local branches. As a result, recruits are randomly assimilated into local outfits, with little or no effort invested in horizontal (among the lower echelons) and vertical (between upper and lower echelons) organizational consolidation. Even if the leadership has broad knowledge about the situation on

³⁸² Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin. 1992. *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story*, London, pp. 59.

³⁸³ *Ibid*, pp. 66

³⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 65

³⁸⁵ Barnett Rubin. 2002. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. Oxford University Press, pp. 251.

the ground, the territorial separation hampers the flow of supplies to remote units. Devoid of support both from their leaders and sponsors non-centralized organizations are likely to seek an agreement with the target government or desert fighting to avoid ill fate.

This ill fate has struck a number of decentralized movements in Kashmir such as JKLF, MJF, Ikhwanul Muslimeen and Muslim Mujahideen. While their political leadership was isolated from hardships, the commanders were under heavy fire from the Indian military and Hizbul Mujahideen. The MJF and Muslim Mujahideen cadres massively deserted after their leaders were killed or imprisoned. An Ikhwanul faction led by Parrey joined the Indian military as their Pakistan-based leadership did nothing to deter Hizbul attacks. The JKLF was targeted by both the Indian military and Hizbul eradicating the Kashmiri section and forcing the remaining leaders, i.e. Yasin Malik, to desert in 1994. However, the JKLF defection was preceded by Pakistan's defection, who encouraged splits in the movement and Hizbul attacks. Whereas Hizbul developed a highly centralized organization that prevented desertion in the early 1990s, the end of the decade produced a shift in its organizational structure. The withdrawal of support from its political wing, Jamiaat Islami, has weakened the control within a movement leaving more dissatisfied and influential commanders to behave autonomously from the Pakistan-based political leadership. One of them, Majid Dar, made a cease-fire with the Indian military against the directions from the central leadership and Pakistan. Pakistan used more radical outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad to derail the cease-fire.

Infighting and non-centralized organization have caused desertions in a number of rebel movements. For instance, after a series of defeats dealt by Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) – sponsored by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE – began disintegrating in August 1979. Reportedly, by November hundreds of ELF

commanders and fighters have either fled to neighboring Sudan or deserted to the rival EPLF or to the Ethiopian Army. Demoralized, cornered, and fragmented the ELF leadership decided to pursue cease-fire with the Mengistu regime.³⁸⁶ Syria immediately ceased its support and established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Another example is the desertion of the Anyanya. Israel had provided weapons and training to the movement and also sent three advisors to South Sudan. The weapons had been supplied through Uganda. However, in 1972, Ugandan President Idi Amin, pressed by Egypt and Libya, closed Israel's embassy there and expelled all Israelis. With this came an end to the use of Uganda as the main route for running arms to South Sudan - the other being an expensive airdrop into southern Sudan by planes flying over Ethiopia and refueling in Kenya. The rebels were forced to reconsider peace talks with the Sudanese government. When Khartoum offered religious and cultural autonomy that year, the Anyanya leadership accepted the agreement known as the Addis Ababa Accords. According to the Anyanya leader and commander Joseph Lagu, this move was made without a consultation with Israel and "Israel was somewhat upset by the peace deal³⁸⁷". Lagu even flew to Nairobi to explain the situation to his Israeli contacts.

In the final mechanism, a non-centralized organizations as a whole is located within sponsor's reach. Striving to distinguish themselves from their central leadership, different commanders appeal to powerful individuals, political parties, religious groups or even factions within the sponsor state for additional political, economic and social support. In this case a rebel organization or its segments are directly meddling into the politics of the sponsor state. This

³⁸⁶ William Larousse. 2001. *A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in Mindanao-Sulu Philippines*: 1965-2000. Interreligious and Intercultural Investigations. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, pp. 158-159, available online: <http://www.n49intelligence.com/N49-Somali-Region-Update-July-2010.pdf> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

³⁸⁷ Danna Harman. *Leaving Bitterness Behind*. *Haaretz*, January 28, 2011, available online: <http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/leaving-bitterness-behind-1.339712> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

creates alternative sources of material support allowing radical commanders and factions to take on a life of their own. When coerced by its central leadership they are likely to disobey orders. If a sponsor decides to punish such a behavior, fractionalized rebels may shun its authority, and turn their guns against the sponsor. For weak and unresolved governments – who suffer from chronic instability – this challenge may ultimately drag their countries into civil war. The Palestinian movements, along with the Tamil Tigers, have engaged in such actions against their respective sponsors.

While organizational theory offers a solid account of rebel defection, other factors should be considered when faced with fine-grained information. Focused on the inner workings of a rebel movement, organizational theory alone cannot account for external shocks. As indicated in the previous chapters and the above narratives, for rebels to defect against sponsor there need to be some incentives outside of the organization. For example, the theory I develop in this project assumes that each rebel organization operates in the shadow of target state coercive capabilities. When deserting their sponsors, this coercive power is unleashed on the organization leading to disintegration of non-centralized entities. Similarly, defying orders or turning guns against the sponsor are stimulated by the ties and support that the rank and file develops with other actors. Throughout the previous chapters, ethnic ties and transnational support, have demonstrated such an effect on organizational structure. In the case of Kashmir, shared ethnicity and transnational ties have indicated the ability of Harkatul Ansar to defy orders, and the danger of Jaish's ties with ethnic and transnational actors. In the following subsection, I briefly revisit the cases of Yugoslav sponsorship of co-ethnics in Croatia and Bosnia to show how these two factors may be interwoven in producing defection.

Ethnic and Transnational ties

The statistical findings and partly the case study revealed a surprising association between shared ethnic ties and defection. The positive association between transnational ties and defection was also confirmed. There is at least one mechanism at play. In this mechanism, rebels – who are located outside sponsor’s territorial control – defy orders because they can draw on transnational material support from their co-ethnics in the sponsor state such as the business, church, political parties and other nationalist organizations. This may be triggered by the rebels’ dissatisfaction with sponsor’s policy or sponsor’s defection.

Although the first mechanism is not on display in the Kashmir case, there are a number of other cases that demonstrate its partial applicability. One such scenario unraveled between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serb rebel organizations in Croatia and Bosnia during the 1990s. Following the outbreak of war in Croatia, the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) under Milan Babic proclaimed the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK). In Bosnia, the Bosnian SDS under Radovan Karadzic christened its statelet the Serb Republic (RS). Since 1991/1992 both RSK and RS had received military support – mostly weapons, fuel, salaries and advisors – from the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. According to Babic, the Milosevic government used the state security services and the remnants of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to train, organize and issue commands to local fighters in the RSK.³⁸⁸ The identical military structure was created in RS, where the security services and the JNA were integrated into the Bosnian Serb military. The importance of FRY’s support was summed up by Karadzic in May 1994: “without Serbia nothing would have happened, we don’t have the resources and would not have been able to make war.”³⁸⁹ The then chief commander of RS army, General

³⁸⁸ Testimony of Milan Babic, Trial Transcript, November 19, 2002, pp. 12970-71, (“SAO Krajina and RSK were completely economically and financially dependent on Serbia.”).

³⁸⁹ “The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-95: Highlights and Excerpts, Dr. Robert J. Donia,” submitted by prosecution August 1, 2003.

Ratko Mladic, admitted that FRY's support accounted for almost 90 per cent of its military consumption.

Yet, even this stark dependence on Yugoslav resources did not make the co-ethnics more obedient to Milosevic. By 1993, FRY had suffered harsh economic sanctions for its involvement in Bosnia and Croatia, leading the Yugoslav economy to suffer the worst hyperinflation in monetary history. The international pressure to cease support to the rebels, had led Milosevic to moderate its goals by accepting some sort of political autonomy for the statelets in Croatia and Bosnia. The main problem was how to convince the rebel leaders to give up their political autonomy and economic privileges created during wartime. Both RSK and RS had installed governance structures through which they levied taxes, provided social services and conducted illicit trade. Accept anything short of independence would compromise these privileges. This was unacceptable to the RSK and RS elites.

In 1991, RSK's Babic refused the Contact Group's Carrington plan, which Milosevic was ready to accept with certain modifications. Following the 1993 Vance-Owen plan, the rift between Milosevic and RSK widened. This plan envisioned the establishment of UN Protected Areas after the withdrawal of the FRY army and paramilitaries from Croatia. While Milosevic accepted the plan, Babic refused it, fearing that the withdrawal of the army and paramilitaries would leave him without a protection. Babic was soon toppled down with Belgrade's blessing and involvement, and replaced by Goran Hadzic, a strongman from Knin. As Hadzic's political status waned, Milosevic turned on him and backed Milan Martić, the RSK police minister. Although dependent on FRY's support, Martić also defied Milosevic. In 1994, Martić rejected the Contact Group Plan calling for the conflict resolution. In turn, Belgrade imposed sanctions on

the RSK. Finally, when the Croatian army initiated a counter-offensive against the RSK, the Milosevic regime stood aside while its agent perished in August 1995.

In Bosnia, the SDS regime was more coherent under the political leadership of Radovan Karadzic, but also dependent on Serbian support despite facing a weaker central government in Sarajevo. This did not prevent Karadzic from defying Milosevic's dictate. In 1993, the Vance-Owen plan was presented to the warring parties; the plan proposed the division of Bosnia into ten cantons and three of them with a Serb majority. Encouraged by the support from the entire Serbian political opposition, Karadzic rejected the plan to Milosevic's disappointment. With the upcoming elections, Milosevic restrained himself from unpopular moves including severe punishment against the RS. However, when the RS assembly refused the 1994 Contact Plan the FRY government introduced a temporary blockade on the Drina cutting out all goods except food and medicines.³⁹⁰ Unlike the fragmented RSK where different strongmen vied for political power, the absence of opposition to the Karadzic regime, and the support from Serbian opposition parties prevented the regime change.

RSK's defiance partly came as a response to Milosevic's reconciliatory policies. Its elites feared losing security and political privileges if any of the proposed plans were signed and implemented. Simultaneously, both Babic and Martic were able to adopt defiant policies because they could rely on their co-ethnics in FRY for some military support. Given that backing the co-ethnics was popular with the elites and electorate, the Serbian political opposition vocally or materially threw its support behind the intransigent rebel leaders, especially when they openly clashed with Milosevic. Some opposition parties such as the Democratic Party led by Zoran Djindjic provided only vocal support. Others like the Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk

³⁹⁰ Jonathan S. Landay, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1993
Serbia's Milosevic Tightens Pressure On Bosnian Serbs <http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0510/10012.html>.

Draskovic and the Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Seselj, had sent their paramilitaries to the battlefield in Croatia and Bosnia. Although Seselj refused to support Babic's rejection of the Vance-Owen plan (his party was in coalition with Milosevic at that time), he encouraged RSK's disobedience after the fallout with Milosevic in 1993. Moreover, Seselj – who ran a branch of his party in RSK – had presented himself as an alternative all-Serb leader allowing RSK leadership to maintain uncompromising positions when they ran against Milosevic's demands.

In Bosnia, too, Seselj established the Serb Radical Party branch in 1993 positioning himself as an alternative ally to Milosevic. When the RS leadership rejected the Vance-Owen plan, Seselj offered his support to Karadzic. In addition to Seselj's Radicals, Karadzic also cooperated with Vojislav Kostunica who led the Democratic Party of Serbia, a small nationalist party with ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church. Kostunica always sided with Karadzic against Milosevic. Despite the unstable support from the Democratic Party, Djindjic also backed Karadzic when the latter rejected the Contact Group Plan. The Bosnian SDS, therefore, had support from the Serbian opposition. Even though this support was more vocal than material, it allowed Karadzic and his allies to mobilize elites and public opinion against Milosevic during the elections. Playing on the nationalist sentiment in Serbia, Karadzic sought to use public support to further his agenda while minimizing the risk of Milosevic's punishment. However, both the RS and RSK overestimated Belgrade's "red lines" stubbornly adhering to their policies even when they threatened Milosevic's political survival.

The Portability of Theories across Wars and Periods

The mechanisms for the organizational theory that I outlined above, have hitherto been probed in the context of asymmetric wars. In these conflicts, rebels are much weaker than the target government and they need to stick to their sponsors if they are to survive. The case of

Kashmir in Chapter 3 is one such conflict. In this Chapter, I briefly analyzed the case of the Afghan Mujahideen, but this conflict was also asymmetric. So far, I have not tested how my theory performs in other wars and periods. In this section, I first ran regression analysis after splitting my dataset into asymmetric and symmetric warfare using Kalyvas' classification. Then I test if these explanations can travel across time, using the Cold War as a threshold.

During the Cold War, civil conflicts were dominated by irregular warfare – a small group of combatants fighting against a much stronger government using hit-and-run tactics, sabotages, ambushes etc. Poorly equipped and mostly ideologically-driven, these movements were usually launched in the countryside, from where they would draw on popular support to start a revolution against the regime. But militant outfits were much weaker than the government, and they desperately needed foreign support. To attract a superpower or regional hegemon, a rebel movement would adopt an anti-leftist or anti-rightist ideology and hope that its call would be answered by one of the superpowers. At that time, there were a plenty of cases where either of the superpowers or their allies provided a military support to rebel movements: Afghanistan (1979-1992), Angola (1975-2002), Mozambique (1979-1992), to name few. The foreign support significantly prolonged the lifetime of some movements (e.g. Fatah, RENAMO, SPLM/A [1980s]), and helped others unseat the government (e.g. FMLN, Khmer Rouge). With the end of the Cold War and the termination of superpower-sponsored proxy warfare many rebel movements were deprived of support and left to transform their strategies or perish. As a consequence, the loss of massive foreign support to both governments and rebels has encouraged opportunistic (rather than revolutionary) rebels to rise against very weak or collapsing states leading to a shift in the character of warfare from asymmetric to conventional wars.³⁹¹ From Tajikistan and Bosnia to Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo, foreign support has been

³⁹¹ Balcells and Kalyvas (2010)

present, but it played a minor role than during the Cold War. The resurrection of conventional wars, which are characterized by the balance of power between the belligerents, has allowed rebels to survive much longer than before even without a foreign sponsor. The growing relevance of transnational networking may have also compensated for the lack of state sponsorship given that weapons and equipment could be delivered or purchased from militant non-state actors without strings attached.

What are the consequences of this shift for my and alternative explanations? In general, we should expect rebels to be less committed to their sponsors given that the end of the Cold War has ushered in more symmetric conflicts. My theory performed well in the Kashmir conflict, which is the case of asymmetric warfare. While my theory may hold in the context of symmetric wars, it may be driven by a different mechanism. Due to the balance of power between the belligerent parties rebel organization may suffer fewer organizational shocks in symmetric conflicts. Potential changes in the command and control are more likely to be initiated by the commanders and factions who are dissatisfied with their status or the management of their leadership. Any defection coming out from such a change may not be directed toward the sponsor itself but to the particular opportunities/grievances of the dissatisfied rebel commanders and factions.

In addition, rebels may be more capable to resist their sponsor's demands. Rebel strength should be more important in conventional wars, and stronger rebels are expected to defect against their sponsors. Additionally, the superpowers have been largely replaced as sponsors by regional hegemons or neighboring states who are less capable states. We should, therefore, expect more capable sponsors to be more effective in deterring rebel defection during the Cold

War as opposed to weaker sponsors of the post-1989 world who should be associated with more defection.


On the other hand, both shared ideology and embedded advisors should act as a strong prevention against defection in the Cold War, and be less potent after 1989. Inversely, with the collapse of the ideologically polarized world, ethnicity has arisen as a powerful driver of armed conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. We should, therefore, expect sponsors to instrumentalize shared ethnic ties to keep their clients in line with their policies.

During the Cold War, the presence of multiple sponsors often meant that a superpower intervened with its allies (e.g. the Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia, Angola and Guatemala) or through them (USA through Pakistan in Afghanistan). Such sponsors had closely coordinated their policies on handling the insurgents as there was an implicit hierarchy in decision-making. After 1989, the multiple state support to rebels did not cease, but it became less hierarchical as the now-dominant sponsors, mostly regional powers and weaker states, worked separately or in competition with each other to control rebellions. For instance, in the period 2001-2003, the Rwandan and Ugandan military supported two separate rebel movements, RCD and MLC, against the Kabila Junior regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo only to end up quarreling and shooting at each other over the exploitation of diamonds in the rebel-held areas. We should, therefore, expect multiple sponsors to prevent defection prior to 1989 and to have no effect or even encourage it in the post-Cold War era.

The results for the Cold War versus Post-Cold War period are presented in Figure 10 using forest plots after a multilevel logistic regression. Presented are log odds of defection versus non-defection, where the circle is point estimate of the effect, the bar signifies 95 percent confidence intervals and the middle line stands for line of no effect. Statistically significant

results do not touch or cross the line of no effect. When the estimate is on right of the line of no effect it implies that for one unit change in the factor the odds of defection are increasing.

Figure 10. Odds of Defection (Cold War vs. Post-Cold War)



In contrast, when the estimate is on the left, non-defection is favored for each unit increase. The results reveal, against the expectation, that organizational structure is significant across periods, despite moving closer to the line of no-effect in the Post-Cold war period. One can, therefore, be confident that the level of rebel centralization affects the propensity for defection regardless of the period.


On the other hand, the results for shared preferences show some surprising trends. Ethnic ties increase the probability of defection in the Post-Cold War period, while their influence is positive but statistically insignificant in the Cold War era. This may be due to a greater number of ethnic-driven sponsorships after 1989 and particularly due to defections in cases such as Bosnia, Croatia and Kashmir. Multiple sponsors increase the odds of rebel defection in the Cold

War era. This is a surprising result given that multiple sponsors were usually ideological coalitions headed by a superpower. Such coalitions were more ideologically coherent and there was a tacit hierarchy between sponsors. Weaker rebels are found to be more likely to defect than stronger ones before 1989.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the rebels have become better equipped and larger in size, and the estimate in the Post-Cold War period suggests that stronger movements are more inclined toward defection. While the previous tests have shown that the training and embedded advisors may increase the discipline of sponsored rebels, this finding applies only to the Post-Cold War. The impact of training on rebel defection is negative but statistically insignificant as one moves to the Cold War period. This indicates that monitoring mechanisms and ideological indoctrination through embedded advisors have become more effective in preventing militant agents from reneging on their commitments.


Moving to the second test I test how my theory performs when different types of warfare are considered. Drawing on the typology developed by Kalyvas and Balcells, I distinguish between irregular (i.e., asymmetric), conventional and SNC conflicts in my dataset. As the number of SNCs in my dataset is quite small, I present them together with conventional warfare in Figure 11 under the label symmetric conflicts. Even by lumping them together, the SOR dataset is biased towards irregular (asymmetric) conflicts. There are, roughly, 50 per cent more asymmetric than symmetric conflicts in the dataset. As pointed out above, this may have been caused by a vivid involvement of superpowers in the irregular wars during the Cold War, as opposed to sporadic engagement of weaker sponsors after 1989.

Figure 11. Type of Warfare per Conflict in the SOR Dataset



The results outlined in Figure 12 indicate that my theory may be applied beyond asymmetric wars to explain sponsor-rebel even though the confidence interval almost cuts across the line of no effect. Due to a small number of cases of conventional warfare in the dataset, future research should focus on conducting in-depth case studies to check for this possibility. In addition, ethnic ties demonstrate a positive and significant association with defection in asymmetric, but not in symmetric warfare. In contrast, training appears to deter defection in symmetric conflicts. This may point to the influence of a number of superpower-backed proxy wars in places, such as Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, where a considerable material support was accompanied by military training and foreign advisors who monitored the performance of a movement.

Figure 12. Odds of Defection (Asymmetric vs. Symmetric Conflicts)



As expected, multiparty civil conflicts appear as a strong predictor of defection in asymmetric conflicts where rebel movements defect being unable to fend off rivals while fighting a much stronger government.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation moves the study of foreign intervention in armed conflicts towards the exploration of illicit ties between states and rebel movements. Most studies of civil wars focus on rebel-government interactions alone. The role of foreign interveners is usually limited to shifting the balance between rebels and the government and achieving a certain war outcome. Conventional studies of civil conflicts fail to consider that interveners interact with the rebels in achieving their foreign policy goals. Recently conflict scholars have stepped beyond such a simplified picture suggesting that foreign interveners use their support to the rebels to advance particular political agendas. In examining the behavior of rebel organizations toward their sponsors, this dissertation has introduced another important phenomenon to the study of armed conflicts: rebel defection.

In the introduction I asked the central question: why do some rebel organizations turn against their state sponsors, while others, assuming the same opportunities, refrain from such a behavior? Related to this question, under what conditions do sponsors fail to maintain control over their rebel clients? The rebels need all the support to wage and win the war, and angering or turning against their external benefactors could have devastating consequences for their armed struggle.

In analyzing the phenomenon of rebel defection, I have framed it as a form of organizational behavior that stems from the principal-agent dynamics between a sponsor and rebel movement. The sponsor provides some material resources to the rebels and delegates the authority to carry out violence in return for the rebel cooperation over goals, organization, strategies and tactics. Ideally, the sponsor provides adequate supplies to the rebels who use them to further the goals of their external supporters. However, the rebels may have different

preferences from their sponsors, or possess private information about their abilities and aims. Under such circumstances sponsors cannot perfectly monitor every rebel action. The rebels may pursue actions whose revelation can be damaging to sponsor's reputation. In addition, they can behave opportunistically by making secret deals with the target government or deserting the fighting. Finally, the rebels may use the given authority and resources against its sponsor.

These problems stem from the length of delegation chain from a sponsor to the rebel movement. Some delegation chains are short and straightforward: a sponsor delegates authority and resources to a rebel organization with a clear central leadership and robust hierarchy. The resources are channeled through a leadership who decides how the support is distributed among the rank and file. In doing so, the leadership makes sure that the rank and file is obedient. Disgruntled commanders are deprived of the resources, weakening them in the absence of strong local ties and alternative allies. The central leadership is likely to methodically execute sponsor's orders because it receives private rewards attached to the regular support.

However, delegation chains in state sponsorship of rebels are often very long, involving many powerful rebel commanders and factions with diverging interests from their leadership, and a sponsor. The issue with long delegation chains is that they increase the distance between a sponsor and the rebels. The longer the distance between the sponsor and rebels, the higher the costs of supplying resources and monitoring rebel activity. If the sponsor is unable to efficiently transport resources and control its clients, the room for hidden action widens. In particular, the problem is that in such non-centralized rebel organizations, commanders and factions are more autonomous from their leaders. They have strong local ties or extra-organizational ties to other rebels and governments. For this reason, they are unconstrained by sponsor's aid and less

accountable to their leaders. Consequently, non-centralized organizations are more prone to defection against their sponsors.

Non-centralized rebel organizations engage in defection under two particular external shocks. One comes directly from the delegation chain and is triggered by the change in sponsor's policy of support. Often sponsors are pressured by third parties to cease their support to the rebels. These pressures may be severe including sanctions or threat of force. A sponsor may cave in these pressures and advocate restraint in executing offensive operations against the target government, support cease-fire, peace talks and proposals. All these forms of reconciliatory policies are likely to gradually lead to divisions and tensions between the sponsor and the rebels because national concerns of sponsors are not shared by the narrow-focused rebel movements. In fact, such a shift in sponsor's policy may threaten rebel territorial gains or its very survival. If the sponsor attempts to force its client to comply with a new course, the rebels may resist, by raising voice or their arms against the patron. But if the rebels give in, this may create discontent among the commanders and factions, who may turn both against their leadership and sponsor.

Another shock comes outside the delegation chain and stems from COIN and inter-rebel clashes. The decimation of the rank and file at the hands of the target government and rivals encourages resentment, disorder and fear among the commanders and foot soldiers. Intimidations, targeted killings, kidnappings and skirmishes weaken the ties between the rebel leadership and rank and file prompting commanders and factions to reconsider their loyalty to the cause. As the conflict prolongs, and attrition grows, the affected rank and file becomes more attracted to civilian life. Under such conditions, the target government can stir these hopes by buying off greedy commanders, offering amnesty or promising political offices.

This dissertation has, therefore, suggested three mechanisms leading to rebel defection. First, the rebels with a factionalized organization are likely to disobey orders when the sponsor adopts more reconciliatory policies, and they are outside his or her reach. Second, desertion stems from COIN or rebel violence applied to a decentralized organizations when they are located outside sponsor's reach. Third, rebels switch sides (turn their guns against the sponsor) when a factionalized or decentralized organization is presented with sponsor's shift toward a more reconciliatory policies. Because defiance and switching sides require similar conditions, I suggest that the two are distinguished by sponsor's coercive reach. Defiance is more favorable among factionalized organizations whose leadership and/or commanders reside outside sponsor's purview, usually across the international border. Switching sides is caused by either decentralized or factionalized organizations that operate within the sponsor country.

Findings

The quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 identified a significant association between the level of centralization within rebel organizations and their defection against sponsors. This is the major finding of my empirical section and the most direct application of my theory. Non-centralized rebel organizations are more likely to defect against their sponsors even when controlling for conflict factors such as conflict intensity, type of incompatibility, sponsor's capacity, and target government's military size etc. Further analyses in Chapter 5 revealed that the relationship between the level of rebel centralization and propensity for defection is not limited to particular space and time but is rather a general trend across conflicts over the last four decades.

Chapter 3 has likewise revealed some interesting results regarding the relationship between rebel defection and other principal-agent explanations. One of the most important

findings is that shared ethnicity is not a condition for stable sponsorship. On the contrary, the results show that co-ethnics are often defiant, tend to desert and even turn guns against their kin states. This finding is robust across space and time, and retains statistical significance even when some major cases of ethnic sponsorship such as Palestine and Kashmir are excluded. The positive effect of ethnic ties on rebel defection is especially pronounced in cases where the rebel organization is decentralized or fragmented. It appears that very autonomous commanders and factions build ties to political elites and organizations within the sponsor country that ultimately pit them against the sponsor government.

Second, the results suggest no relationship between multiple sponsors and rebel defection. Perhaps these proxies were too crude to capture the alternative support for rebel movements. For this reason, I have introduced another variable, transnational support that takes into account non-lethal and lethal support from ethnic and ideological non-state actors (e.g. militants groups, regional organizations, diaspora etc.). The transnational support has indicated a positive correlation with defection, and particularly with mild defection.

Third, I find that weaker rather than stronger rebels are more likely to disobey orders. This finding seems counterintuitive given that weaker rebels can suffer greatly from angering their sponsors. Another interesting result is that rebel strength is not associated with desertion and switching sides. One would expect weaker rebels to be more vulnerable to decapitation and attrition, which would ultimately force them to desert. Sponsor's capacity becomes significant only in the Cox models, which indicate that poor sponsors are likely to suffer all types of defection.

Finally, among the control variables training, target's military power and multiparty conflicts have proved to be robust across the models. Particularly important finding for policy

makers is that the provision of training to a rebel organization decreases the risk of defection, and particularly rebel disobedience, while it does not prevent severe defection. Another important finding is that rebel movements tend to defect against sponsors when they face weaker target governments. This finding applies, however, only to instances of defiance. Finally, the presence of multiple rebel organizations seems to be detrimental to the discipline of sponsored rebels and under such conditions they tend to defect more often.

In Chapter 4, using the case study of Kashmir, I analyzed how the change in Pakistan's support and Indian COIN affected the behavior indigenous and Pakistani militant outfits toward Islamabad. The statistical analysis has indicated a correlation between the level of rebel centralization and defection supporting the organizational argument developed in this dissertation. As mentioned above, however, my argument is based on three mechanisms about the dynamics of rebel behavior. These mechanisms include factors such as the change in sponsor's policy of support, COIN and/or inter-rebel violence which are not suited for statistical testing. To test for these causal mechanisms, I carried out detailed analysis of Pakistan's sponsorship of eight major Kashmiri militant outfits.

This qualitative analysis has demonstrated evidence of two of the three mechanisms. Contrary to my argument that defiance requires change in sponsor's policy and non-centralized organizations, the evidence from the cases of JKLF and Harkatul Ansar suggests that defiance may be caused by sponsor's "defection" or stem from the rebel command and control. In the former case, Pakistan has defected against JKLF by reducing its support, instigating splits within the movement and navigating other outfits against its members. Weakened by the machinations of its erstwhile sponsor, the JKLF was poised to disobey orders and had eventually turned into an easy prey for the Indian security services. On the other hand, the case of Harkatul Ansar suggests

that internal squabbles within a fragmented movement led the rank and file to disobey orders. There were no changes in Pakistan's policy that preceded the defection of Harkatul's operatives. However, it is consistent with my argument that the two most centralized militant outfits, Hizb (in the nineties) and Lashkar, had stayed loyal to Pakistan despite the attrition from COIN and change in Islamabad's policy after 9/11, respectively. Likewise, desertion plagued decentralized movements, such as Muslim Janbaaz Force, Ikhwanul Muslimeen and Muslim Mujahideen, when faced with COIN or insurgent fratricide. Hizbul commanders also sought cease-fire with India against Pakistan's instructions after their organizational structure decentralized in 1998. Finally, the theory correctly predicts the behavior of Jaish-e-Mohammad in the aftermath of 9/11 whose rank and file turned against Pakistan.

While these cases indicate support for the organizational theory, they further point to some interesting dynamics that are surprising given existing principal-agent explanations. One of them, which is also corroborated by the statistical findings, is the general lack of loyalty among the outfits with ethnic affiliation to the Pakistani government. Apart from Lashkar, which confirms the expectations of the ethnic ties other outfits Jaish and Harkatul have proved defective despite their overwhelming Pakistani Punjabi composition. It was precisely their links to political and religious organizations in Pakistan as well as transnational connection that made them, or more precisely their rank and file, more autonomous from Pakistan. This approach finds more support regarding the Kashmiri outfits who often deserted or defied their sponsor. But the reason for that was their exposure to the Indian COIN, mutual clashes and fragile command and control rather than the lack of ethnic ties.

The second interesting finding is that alternative sources of support had an effect on the decision of fragmented outfits such as Jaish and Harkat to defect against Pakistan. Both outfits

had drawn on support from other outfits in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But these ties did not have a major influence on the behavior of the two movements. It was rather their internal politics, and particularly the alienation of the rank and file from the central command that led to their defection. Likewise, for the alternative resources, the behavior of Lashkar – whose leadership receives the financial support from private donors in the Gulf – is puzzling, because the movement has never turned against its sponsor despite the U-turn in Pakistan's approach to Kashmir militancy in the wake of 9/11. Finally, the indigenous outfits – who heavily depended on Pakistan for support – have proved disloyal to their sponsor and defected as soon as their decentralized organizations crumbled under the Indian COIN and conflict with other outfits.

The final finding is that the propensity for defection did not discriminate between the weaker and stronger movements. Comparatively weaker outfits, especially those from Kashmir, have indeed proved to be less resilient to attrition and eventually chose to desert. However, even the strongest among Kashmiri outfits, Hizbul Mujahideen, had expressed the will to negotiate the end of armed struggle. By the same token, among the Pakistani outfits, despite their similar strength, Lashkar responded in a different way to Pakistan's change of policy than Jaish and Harkat. In fact, in spite of being the deadliest and one of the most popular militant organizations in Pakistan, Lashkar has never used its strength and social connections to bully the Pakistani government.

The findings from the quantitative and qualitative section of this dissertation indicate that analyzing interventions in armed conflicts as exclusively a game between a sponsor and a rebel movement hampers our ability to explain why some rebels turn against their sponsors while others do not. Based on the length of delegation chain from sponsors to their clients, I have argued for analyzing variation in the organization of rebel movements in conflict, and the impact

of external shocks on the organizational behavior. Within this theory rebel organizations reveal complex relationships between the leadership, commanders and factions even though the case study suggests that sponsors also shape the behavior of their clients. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of interventions by developing and testing a framework that captures the problems in the relationship between sponsors and their rebel clients. Scholars and policymakers alike have pointed to the disastrous consequences of these illicit ties for the conflict intensity and duration, as well as the victimization of civilians.

Implications for Conflict Studies

The theory and empirical research presented in this dissertation understands foreign interventions in armed conflicts as a delegation of violence from governments to rebel organizations. Although this research is concentrated primarily on explaining the conditions under which the rebels defect against their state sponsors, there are implications for broader topics within conflict studies.

The key theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it shows how external interveners are intertwined with domestic processes in the context of armed conflicts. This is the first conceptual and theoretical attempt at understanding and explaining the relationship between foreign governments and local rebels. Conventionally, it has been acknowledged that the presence of external assistance radicalizes domestic rebels exacerbating the conflict intensity and violence. Despite the negative impact of state sponsorship, most scholars have focused only on motives for intervention, and the consequences of external support to rebels on conflict intensity and civilian abuses. Apart from a handful of descriptive studies, conflict scholars have largely failed to address how such illicit relationships are structured, sustained and terminated. While the popular literature and media are inflated with the reports using such terms as “proxy war” and

“blowback”, conflict studies is lagging behind in providing adequate analytical tools for analyzing these phenomena. This dissertation applies the principal-agent framework from economics to understand what factors make sponsorships of rebels more durable or fragile, how external actors and processes affect sponsor-rebel ties, when rebel clients defect against their sponsors and what the consequences of rebel defection on the wider armed conflict are. As such, this dissertation provides the most comprehensive analysis of challenges facing foreign interveners and their armed clients.

The related implication for conflict studies is that neither sponsor-rebel ties are coherent, nor rebel movements are unitary actors. Traditionally, scholars take the ability of foreign interveners to achieve their agendas for granted, and pay less attention to whether and how interveners interact with the armed opposition in civil conflict. Moving beyond this assumption, this study shows that interveners use a combination of coercion and material incentives to control their clients, but their attempts backfire when rebel organizations lack a hierarchical command and control. This dissertation confirms previous assumptions that policies of target governments, sponsors and other rebel actors may affect the internal politics and behavior of rebel clients. But it also reveals that sponsor’s ability to manipulate or arm-twist their *protégés* into submission often leads to rebel defection. Sponsors are not omnipotent *vis-à-vis* their clients because rebel movements are complex entities comprised of leadership, commanders and factions who often have embattled agendas and allies. This dissertation demonstrates that some of these actors often act against the will and interests of their leaders and sponsors. Therefore, the complexity of rebel outfits a paradox in state sponsorship of rebels: that rebels (or their parts) may act in ways that are individually rational, but detrimental to its sponsor.

These implications indicate the importance of scholars moving toward the understanding of intervention in armed conflicts as a complex game between sponsors, their clients and the target government. Rather than being one-time events, military interventions in civil conflicts entail alliance dynamics between sponsors and local rebels, and scholars interested in studying internationalized civil wars must consider the nature and evolution of such illicit relationships to comprehend fully the factors driving these conflicts. This dissertation has focused on the rebel defection against state sponsors, although the length of delegation chain and the level of rebel centralization may have an effect on other conflict phenomena (e.g. victimization of civilians, conflict intensity and outcome etc.).

This project opens at least two avenues for further research. The first area is how external states manage militant actors. The argument and evidence of this dissertation suggest that sponsors use different strategies to manage their militant agents. Some sponsors prefer throwing their weight behind a single movement, while others support myriad outfits. In Afghanistan, Pakistan has used the first strategy in the eighties, and turned to the latter with the rise of the Taliban in mid-nineties. In Jammu and Kashmir, in contrast, Pakistan had supported the rise of JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, while seeking to check their power by backing other movements. Sponsors use different strategies to manage multiple organizations either by pitting them off each other or by forging alliances between their agents. The conflict processes and outcomes that emerge from these strategies should be taken seriously. Civil wars are not primarily shaped by domestic actors, but also by their relationship with external players. Without analyzing the impact of external players on militant movements, our knowledge of rebel organization, strategies and outcome remains inconclusive.

The second area for further research is to examine how the nature of ties between sponsors and their agents affects rebel organization, behavior and survival. One of the key limits of this project is its underdeveloped understanding of how shared ethnicity, religion and ideology relate to rebel behavior. The finding of this dissertation indicates that ethnic ties between sponsors and rebels exacerbate defection. But I did not theorize how shared ethnicity or ideology shapes insurgent behavior in armed conflict. I bracket the influence of common ties by focusing on rebel behavior toward their sponsors. Beyond this framework, future research could address whether and to what extent ideational ties affect militant cohesion and longevity, their propensity for violence against civilians and odds of victory. Such an agenda could include arguments emphasizing the commitment of kin states toward their brethren, or distinguishing the influence of particular ideologies (e.g. Marxism vs. Islamism). On a related note, future research could explore how the combination of ideational norms and specific institutional ties between sponsors and rebels (e.g. foreign advisors/trainers) affects rebel discipline. Could sponsors use such norms and institutions to prevent their agents from carrying out large-scale indiscriminate violence against civilians?

Apart from the theoretical contribution of this dissertation to conflict studies, the presented framework has direct implications for policymakers interested in designing responses to armed conflicts. In the next section, I suggest some implications for the third parties, sponsor and target governments and the rebels.

Implications for Policy

Leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of armed conflicts and interventions, civil wars bring terrible consequences. The policy implications that I draw out in this section are dedicated to those third parties who are interested in bringing a conflict to an end. However, I am

aware that once the genie has been released from the bottle, these policy implications may also be (mis)used for warmongering purposes. Although preventing such a scenario is beyond my powers, my policy conclusions are not intended to promote any political view, especially not interventionist.

This dissertation advances two implications for governments and international organizations seeking to design responses to state sponsors and their rebel clients. The first implication is how to deal with state sponsors. In terms of sponsors, most policy recommendations have so far proposed solutions based on a “stick-and-carrot” policy toward state sponsors. Economic sanctions and use of force are usually advised as a hard response, whereas giving financial and military support to sponsors in return for their termination of support is seen as a soft solution.

These policies have been successful in cases of armed conflicts featuring a single sponsor and a small number of support-dependent rebel outfits, such as, for example, Former Yugoslavia. In this case the USA, the major third party, has used credible threats against Yugoslavia and promises of material incentives to Croatia to isolate them from their respective clients in the Bosnian conflict. The economic sanctions against Belgrade have particularly devastated the Yugoslav economy, prompting the Milosevic regime to search a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, its ethnic client in Bosnia had not suffered from the effects of sanctions and decided to preserve its hard line policies. As the pressure was mounting on Yugoslavia Milosevic demanded the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept a newly drafted peace proposal by the Contact group. The Bosnian Serb leadership refused, and Milosevic introduced economic sanctions against its *protégé* hoping that by severing the ties with his clients the USA would ease its economic sanctions. After their brawl with Milosevic, the Bosnian Serbs lost their only ally, which led to

their losses in the battlefield and ultimately to their consent to participate in a US-sponsored peace conference.

However, these cases are rare and civil wars often involve multiple supporters and rebel clients. Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir insurgency reveals the difficulty of breaking the ties with multiple militant outfits even when there is a political will. For this reason, third parties should look for ways to sever the ties between a sponsor and most powerful outfits. In some armed conflicts, doing so would require a mixed approach: offering material incentives to the sponsor, while supporting the political-military efforts of target government against the militants. In particular, ethnic sponsorships of decentralized movements may be the most suitable type for this approach since such rebels are more likely to desert combat.

However, third parties should be careful when pressuring sponsors to terminate the support to their ethnic brethren as this may create a backlash and ignite violence within a sponsor country, especially when the rebels are numerous and fragmented. Unless a third party can provide full political, military and intelligence assurance to the sponsor, it should refrain from using coercion to make the sponsor cease its support to rebels. The third party should adopt an incremental approach to termination of sponsorship by negotiating the removal of support from the least to the most important outfit. A sponsor should not be rewarded for each step in this process because the disassociation with a rebel movement may be symbolic and temporary as the case of Pakistani militants changing their names to avoid future bans has shown. A third party should threaten with sanctions or use of force against a sponsor or a rebel organization if the sponsor attempts to renege on the agreement at any stage.

Such an approach may be effective where there is a non-territorial contention between a sponsor and target government such as the Sudan-Chad proxy war. In these instances, third

parties are advised to step in mediation and promise financial support if the sponsorship is ceased. Unfortunately, enduring rivalries between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Iran and Israel, India and Pakistan, among others, are about ethnicity, territory, ideology or some of these factors combined. Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible for third parties to tackle state sponsorship with material incentives alone when the root cause of conflict is more complicated.

In this context, it is important to redirect the agenda from non-negotiable issues as who controls territory to more practical, down-to-earth issues, including how territory is governed, what is the level of infrastructure, health and education, social services and employment opportunities. It may be even more beneficial for the countries to focus on the state of their overall relations and liberalize the movement of individuals and good across the border. Despite the small steps and occasional violation of cease-fire agreement, India and Pakistan have made small but important steps in this direction with the initiation of the 2004 composite dialogue. Pakistan's decision to grant Most Favored Nation status to India by the end of 2012 is more than an economic concession; it is a significant political gesture that even two bitter rivals can replace armed confrontation with cooperation.

This dissertation has demonstrated that terminating sponsorship takes time and carefully dealing with the military and intelligence circles of sponsors who may be in favor of militancy even when the government is against. In Pakistan, the military seems hostile towards India and still backs many militant outfits and their alliances. Third parties should, therefore, support a comprehensive democratic transition in Pakistan and other similar sponsors as well as attempts of elected leadership to gain control over foreign and security policy from the military. Regional organizations may help in long term. The EU and OSCE have played a significant role in fostering democratic government among member state and candidates to membership. Regional

organizations in other geographical areas, such as ASEAN or Organization of African Unity should also design programs that could support similar long-term developments apart from standard conflict prevention mechanisms.

The second area relevant for policy is how to deal with insurgents. Organizations are the key actors in armed conflicts. The ISIS is a violent organization that makes strategies and carries out attacks in Iraq and Syria. By understanding how power is distributed between the leaders and followers within such organizations, policy makers will be able to analyze why and how violent non-state actors operate. Counterinsurgency should be adjusted to the nature of insurgents. Leaders of centralized organizations are able to increase their capabilities and manpower, and with the help of foreign sponsors become menace to governments. As shown in this dissertation, centralized organizations tend to be obedient and disciplined. Use of force against them will not lead to their demise. Counterinsurgency must be replaced with diplomacy. Because centralized organizations heavily depend on external support, conflict resolution requires a rapprochement with a sponsor. Negotiating the terms of terminating support to pro-Russian statelet with Moscow, is a shortcut to conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine. Without Russia's backing, the eastern Ukrainian statelet will be more vulnerable to counterinsurgency, and more inclined toward a peace agreement.

On the other hand, leadership targeting will be more effective against decentralized organizations. While decapitated Lashkar-e-Taiba would most likely spawn a new leader and continue its operations, the headless JKLF had to surrender to save its remnants. Decentralized organizations like JKLF generate longer delegation chains. Sponsors are unable to effectively monitor or punish such organizations. Another strategy of tackling decentralized organizations would be to buy off commanders, by promising them amnesty, luxurious life or political career.

This strategy, however, may only work after the organization suffered losses in the battlefield. A demoralized rank and file will be more likely to fall prey to greed.

Factionalized organizations are the most difficult to crack when they are located within the sponsor's reach. Killing the leaders of factionalized organizations will not end the conflict since the factions can keep fighting even if the target government invests heavily into counterinsurgency. Negotiating with sponsors over the termination of support is fruitless because factionalized organizations tend to disobey orders. Counterinsurgency can succeed only if there is a combination of negotiations with the sponsor, the use of force against particular factions or commanders and the divide and conquer approach to disgruntled elites.

This project seeks to understand why some armed groups are more prone to defect against their sponsors than others. Foreign sponsors and rebels constantly deal with issues of organization and control in their relationship. Understanding rebel behavior toward their sponsors should start from analyzing how organizational structures respond to war pressures, and how militants' internal politics evolves over time.

APPENDIX A

Table 13. State Sponsorships Included in the Dataset

Sponsor	Rebels	Target	Sponsorship Period	
			Start Year	End Year
China	Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Egypt	Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar	Afghanistan	1980	1981
Pakistan	Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar	Afghanistan	1980	1994
Saudi Arabia	Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar	Afghanistan	1980	1991
United States	Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar	Afghanistan	1980	1991
Pakistan	Hezb-i-Islami Khalis	Afghanistan	1980	1991
Saudi Arabia	Hezb-i-Islami Khalis	Afghanistan	1980	1991
United States	Hezb-i-Islami Khalis	Afghanistan	1980	1991
Pakistan	Ittehad-e Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Saudi Arabia	Ittehad-e Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
China	Jamiaat-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Pakistan	Jamiaat-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1979	1982
Saudi Arabia	Jamiaat-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1979	1982
United States	Jamiaat-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1979	1982
China	Harakat-i- Inqilab-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Pakistan	Harakat-i- Inqilab-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Saudi Arabia	Harakat-i- Inqilab-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
United States	Harakat-i- Inqilab-i-Islami	Afghanistan	1980	1988
China	Jabha-e-Najat-e- Mili Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Pakistan	Jabha-e-Najat-e- Mili Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Saudi Arabia	Jabha-e-Najat-e- Mili Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1988

United States	Jabha-e-Najat-e-Mili Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1988
China	Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1989
Pakistan	Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1989
Saudi Arabia	Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1989
United States	Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1989
Iran	Sazman-i Nasr	Afghanistan	1980	1992
Iran	Harakat-e- Islami ya Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1980	1988
Iran	Sepah-i Pasdaran	Afghanistan	1980	1992
Iran	Hizb-i Wahdat	Afghanistan	1989	1994
Iran	Junbish-i Milli- yi Islami	Afghanistan	1993	1995
Uzbekistan	Junbish-i Milli- yi Islami	Afghanistan	1994	1995
Pakistan	Taliban	Afghanistan	1995	2010
Saudi Arabia	Taliban	Afghanistan	1995	1998
Zaire	FNLA	Angola	1975	1979
Congo	UNITA	Angola	1993	1995
France	UNITA	Angola	1976	1978
Morocco	UNITA	Angola	1977	1999
South Africa	UNITA	Angola	1975	1988
Togo	UNITA	Angola	1993	2000
United States	UNITA	Angola	1986	1992
Zaire	UNITA	Angola	1975	1995
Armenia	Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh	Azerbaijan	1991	1994
India	Jana Samhati Samiti/Shanti Bahini	Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	1975	1977
Croatia	Croatian Defense Council	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993	1994
Yugoslavia	Serbian Republic of	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	1995

	Bosnia and Herzegovina			
China	Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	1968	1973
China	Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	1979	1991
Thailand	Khmer Rouge	Cambodia	1980	1994
China	The Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front	Cambodia	1981	1990
Thailand	The Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front	Cambodia	1980	1988
United States	The Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front	Cambodia	1983	1991
Liberia	MJP	Ivory Coast	2002	2003
Liberia	MPIGO	Ivory Coast	2002	2003
Libya	FROLINAT	Chad	1969	1977
Sudan	FROLINAT	Chad	1968	1969
Libya	Movement for Democratization and Development	Chad	1991	2002
Egypt	FAN	Chad	1977	1982
Sudan	FAN	Chad	1977	1982
United States	FAN	Chad	1979	1982
Libya	FAP	Chad	1981	1986
Sudan	FUCD	Chad	2005	2006
Libya	GUNT	Chad	1983	1986
Sudan	UFDD-F	Chad	2006	2009
Sudan	RFC (UFR)	Chad	2007	2009
Sudan	FPRN	Chad	2006	2009
Sudan	FUC	Chad	2005	2006
Sudan	MPRD	Chad	2006	2009
Venezuela	FARC	Columbia	1999	2012
Yugoslavia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	Croatia	1991	1995
Rwanda	CNDP	Democratic Republic of Congo	2006	2008
Rwanda	RCD	Democratic Republic of	1998	1999

		Congo		
Uganda	RCD	Democratic Republic of Congo	1998	2001
Uganda	MLC	Democratic Republic of Congo	1998	2001
Uganda	AFDL	Democratic Republic of Congo	1996	1997
Zambia	AFDL	Democratic Republic of Congo	1996	1997
Iraq	ELF	Ethiopia	1976	1980
Saudi Arabia	ELF	Ethiopia	1975	1977
Sudan	ELF	Ethiopia	1976	1978
Syria	ELF	Ethiopia	1978	1980
United Arab Emirates	ELF	Ethiopia	1978	1979
Iraq	EPLF	Ethiopia	1978	1979
Sudan	EPLF	Ethiopia	1976	1991
United Arab Emirates	EPLF	Ethiopia	1977	1979
Sudan	TPLF	Ethiopia	1976	1988
Somalia	SALF	Ethiopia	1977	1980
Eritrea	ONLF	Ethiopia	1999	2008
Somalia	WSLF	Ethiopia	1976	1983
Sudan	OLF	Ethiopia	1978	2010
Sudan	EIJM - AS	Eritrea	1997	2003
Russia	Republic of Abkhazia	Georgia	1992	1993
Bhutan	NDFB	India	1996	2004
Bangladesh	NLFT	India	2001	2004
Bangladesh	NSCN - IM	India	1992	1996
Bangladesh	PLA	India	1992	1993
Pakistan	PWG	India	1998	2000
Pakistan	Al Barq	India	1990	1998
Pakistan	Al Jihad Force	India	1991	1998
Pakistan	Al Umar Mujahideen	India	1989	1994
Pakistan	Hakat-ul-Ansar	India	1993	1999
Pakistan	Hizbul Mujahideen	India	1989	2004
Pakistan	Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon	India	1992	1994

Pakistan	Jaish-e-Mohammad	India	2000	2003
Pakistan	JKLF	India	1988	1994
Pakistan	Lashkar-e-Taiba	India	1996	2004
Iraq	Mujahadeen e Khalq	Iran	1986	2001
Iran	SCIRI	Iraq	1982	1996
Egypt	Fatah	Israel	1968	1976
Iraq	Fatah	Israel	1968	1976
Jordan	Fatah	Israel	1968	1970
Lebanon	Fatah	Israel	1968	1972
Syria	Fatah	Israel	1968	1988
Egypt	PFLP	Israel	1968	1970
Jordan	PFLP	Israel	1968	1970
Egypt	PDFLP	Israel	1968	1970
Jordan	PDFLP	Israel	1968	1970
Syria	PFLP-GC	Israel	1968	1974
Syria	Hamas	Israel	1993	2012
Iran	Hamas	Israel	1993	2012
Syria	Hezbollah	Israel	1990	2006
Iran	Hezbollah	Israel	1990	2006
Syria	PIJ	Israel	1995	2007
Iran	PIJ	Israel	2007	2012
Guinea	LURD	Liberia	2000	2003
Ivory Coast	NPFL	Liberia	1989	1990
Burkina Faso	NPFL	Liberia	1989	1990
Libya	NPFL	Liberia	1989	1991
Algeria	POLISARIO	Morocco	1975	1989
Libya	POLISARIO	Morocco	1975	1983
China	Communist Party of Burma	Burma/Myanmar	1968	1979
Rhodesia	RENAMO	Mozambique	1977	1980
South Africa	RENAMO	Mozambique	1980	1992
United States	FDN	Nicaragua	1982	1990
Cuba	FSLN	Nicaragua	1978	1979
Afghanistan	Baluch People's Liberation Front	Pakistan	1975	1977
Iran	MNLF	The Philippines	1979	1988
Libya	MNLF	The Philippines	1975	1988
Democratic Republic of Congo	PALIR	Rwanda	1998	2001
Uganda	FPR	Rwanda	1990	1994
Soviet Union	FMLN	El Salvador	1980	1991
Burkina Faso	RUF	Sierra Leone	1989	1990

Liberia	RUF	Sierra Leone	1997	2000
Libya	RUF	Sierra Leone	1998	1999
Eritrea	ARS/UIC	Somalia	2006	2008
Ethiopia	SNM	Somalia	1983	1988
Ethiopia	SSDF	Somalia	1982	1984
India	EROS	Sri Lanka	1983	1987
India	TELO	Sri Lanka	1985	1988
India	LTTE	Sri Lanka	1983	1986
Angola	ANC	South Africa	1981	1988
Soviet Union	ANC	South Africa	1981	1988
Tanzania	ANC	South Africa	1981	1988
Zambia	ANC	South Africa	1981	1988
Angola	SWAPO	South Africa	1976	1988
Cuba	SWAPO	South Africa	1978	1988
China	SWAPO	South Africa	1975	1976
Soviet Union	SWAPO	South Africa	1975	1978
Zambia	SWAPO	South Africa	1978	1979
Israel	Anyanya	Sudan	1969	1972
Uganda	Anyanya	Sudan	1969	1972
Chad	JEM	Sudan	2004	2009
Eritrea	JEM	Sudan	2003	2004
Chad	SLM/A	Sudan	2004	2008
Eritrea	SLM/A	Sudan	2004	2005
Libya	SLM/A	Sudan	2004	2005
Ethiopia	SPLM/A	Sudan	1983	1999
Libya	SPLM/A	Sudan	1983	1984
Uganda	SPLM/A	Sudan	1989	1999
Eritrea	SPLM/A	Sudan	1995	2002
China	Communist Party of Thailand	Thailand	1973	1979
Laos	Communist Party of Thailand	Thailand	1976	1978
Vietnam	Communist Party of Thailand	Thailand	1976	1978
Syria	PKK	Turkey	1984	1998
Iran	PKK	Turkey	1986	1999
Greece	PKK	Turkey	1993	1999
Sudan	ADF	Uganda	1996	1998
Zaire	ADF	Uganda	1997	1998
Sudan	LRA	Uganda	1994	2001
Sudan	WNBF	Uganda	1995	1997
Libya	IRA	United Kingdom	1985	1991

Afghanistan	IMU	Uzbekistan	1999	2001
Mozambique	ZANU	Zimbabwe	1974	1976
Tanzania	ZANU	Zimbabwe	1974	1976
Zambia	ZANU	Zimbabwe	1974	1976

APPENDIX B

Table 14. Enlisted Instances of Rebel Defection in the Dataset

Year	Sponsor	Rebels	Defection Type/Narrative	Source
1991	Saudi Arabia	Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar)	defiance - denounced Saudi Arabia for their siding with the US in the Gulf War of 1991.	Barnett Rubin. 2002. <i>The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State formation and Collapse in the International System</i> , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
1983	Pakistan, USA, China	Jamiaat-i-Islami	desertion - Rubin writes about ISI problems with the autonomy of Jamiaat's commander Massoud. Although Pakistan had excellent relations with the group, ISI often had to use Hekmatyar's forces to coerce Massoud to compliance. However, in 1983, to ease the pressure from both the USSR and Hekmatyar, Massoud signed a truce with Soviet troops without consulting Jamiaat's leader Rabbani.	Barnett Rubin. 2002. <i>The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State formation and Collapse in the International System</i> , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 220.
1982	Syria	Fatah	defiance - Syrians had changed their policy toward Israel in 1982, when they agreed to a ceasefire with the Israeli troops invading Lebanon and left the PLO to their fate in Beirut. Deprived of Syria's aid in Lebanon, Arafat refused to follow its rejectionist stance toward the Reagan plan, which provided no role for the PLO and called for Jordan and non-PLO Palestinians to negotiate with Israel over the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a consequence, the Assad regime allegedly backed a split within the Fatah. The Arafat faction of the Fatah was expelled from Syria after he accused Syrian troops of helping mutineers fighting in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon.	Sources: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. "Syrian Comment on Arafat's Expulsion". June 27, 1983. www.lexisnexis.com ; Christian Science Monitor. "How Arafat miscalculated and lost his hold on the PLO". July 6, 1983. www.lexisnexis.com The Times (London). "Has the PLO run out of friends?" July 9 1986. www.lexisnexis.com
1989	Syria	Fatah	defiance - In April 1988, Syria reconciled with the Fatah and allowed the organization to reopen its office in Damascus. However, in	The Guardian. "Arafat orders end to raids against Israel".

			November 1989 Arafat unilaterally ceased fire against the IDF and entered peace talks with the US. Such move was opposed by Syria and the rejectionist front who stepped up propaganda activities against the Fatah.	November 25, 1988. www.lexisnexis.com; The Jerusalem Post. "Attempts to Undermine Arafat's Policy". www.lexisnexis.com
1969	Syria	Fatah	defiance - For the first year after June 1967, Fatah generally adhered to the understanding reached with the authorities not to conduct active military operations, restricting itself to reconnaissance and supply missions in the "Golan sector" bordering Israel. However, as the Syrian power struggle between Jadid and Assad intensified in 1969, the Fatah stepped up guerilla activities in the "Golan sector" against the instructions of the Syrian government. A source indicates that "Asad responded to a sharp rise in guerrilla attacks on the Golan front by prohibiting combat activity and banning the movement of armed or uniformed guerrillas and military vehicles in civilian areas without prior permission from the Syrian army".	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 187
1969-1970	Lebanon	Fatah	defiance - Lebanon was coerced by its Arab neighbors to give the Fatah sanctuary in 1969. The Cairo agreement provided the Fatah the legal right to right to manage the camps, working through popular committees established alongside the Lebanese institutions. The Lebanese government also accepted the right of the guerrillas "to attack Israel through specific corridors in the eArqub, and pledged that the army would coordinate with the PLO, by way of the PASC and designated liaison officers, on military matters including deployment, communications, medical evacuation, and supply. In return the PLO would maintain internal discipline, provide a census of its military personnel, and submit to the jurisdiction of Lebanese civil and military authorities." However, the Fatah soon violated the accord by "setting up at least half a dozen combat bases in the Bint Jbayl district in late	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 192-193

			1969 and early 1970, evading army controls with the help of sympathetic Lebanese officers and soldiers".	
1970	Jordan	Fatah; PFLP; PDFLP	assault - The armed clashes between the Jordanian armed forces and the Fatah and PFLP in June. On 10 June the PFLP seized two hotels in the core of Amman taking dozens of foreign guests hostage. The PFLP also attempted to seize the government radio station and Fatah rocketed the royal palace. Total casualties were estimated at 800-1,000 by 12 June. In July the PDFLP raided a government building in Amman. In August the PFLP argued that the Palestinian leadership should assault the throne directly, by splitting the army and launching a general offensive with all guerrilla and militia forces under its command. The key to such a strategy, in the view of the PFLP, was to end the Arab ceasefire with Israel. Three days of sporadic clashes soured into insurgency on 31 August, when the Jordanian army shelled refugee camps in Amman. The violence intensified the next day, after king Hussain's convoy came under fire near the airport in what the authorities described as a deliberate assassination attempt. By the evening of 2 September, 33 persons had been killed and 160 wounded by Palestinian count, and 60 guerrillas had been arrested in various areas. After further clashes with the government, the Fatah revolutionary council decided on 8 September to join the fray and the call for the overthrow of the government was issued.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 252, 255-256, 259

1970	Egypt	PFLP; PDFLP	defiance - On 22 July, Nasir and King Hussein accepted a ceasefire with Israel along the Suez Canal. The Palestinian movement was disunited on its stand towards Nasir. Arafat, as PLO chairman, and Fatah were cautious in their criticism, but the Palestinian Left immediately launched a campaign of public vilification. The harshest denunciation of Nasir came from the PFLP and PDFLP members who paraded a donkey with his photograph on it. Nasir retaliated with the expulsion of 140 PFLP and PDFLP supporters from and cutting its remaining ties with the Leftists.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 253
1971-1972	Lebanon	Fatah/ PLO	assault - After the defeated PLO relocated its HQ from Jordan to Lebanon, the organization became part of the Egypt-Syrian war design. According to this plan, the PLO was supposed to instigate clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon. But as Lebanon suffered Israeli raids in return the government in Beirut decided to abrogate the Cairo agreement and curtail the Palestinian guerilla through armor and infantry attacks on the refugee camps. Fatah responded by carrying out rocket attacks on Lebanese airbases.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 314-315
1970	Egypt	Fatah/ PLO	defiance - Egypt and Jordan accepted Rogers plan but the Fatah reportedly criticized this policy shift in July 1970 without joining the protests organized by the PFLP and PDFLP.	NEW YORK TIMES. July 29, 1970. www.lexisnexis.com
1974	Syria	PFLP-GC	desertion - following Syrian decision to accept a final ceasefire with Israel and a limited disengagement of forces from the Golan sector the PFLP-GC decided to align with Syria's longstanding rival Iraq. Following their unholy alliance, a number of PFLP-GC members were arrested and guerilla bases in the border region were placed under tighter restrictions.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 340

1975	Syria	Fatah/ PLO	defiance - In April 1975, the PLO and LNM organized a massive protest in Beirut denouncing the Syrian intervention in Lebanon and the shelling of Palestinian refugee camps. Soon after this, the Fatah representative in Cairo indicated that Syrian government detained hundreds of PLO members and confiscated both military and non-military supplies.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 389
1976	Syria	Fatah/ PLO	assault - On June 5, the PLO entered armed clashes with the Syrian army by preemptively disarming its paramilitary outposts in Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and other smaller towns across Lebanon after Syria decided to increase its intervention.	Yezid Sayigh. 1997 . <i>Armed Struggle and the Search for State</i> , Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, 393
		Guinea	assault - The ICG Report notes that a fighting broke out between the Guinean army and LURD forces in late 2000, leading to the destruction of much of the town of Guéckédou in Guinea.	ICG Report. Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability. April, 24, 2002, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/liberia/Liberia%20The%20Key%20to%20Ending%20Regional%20Instability
1988	Pakistan	Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis), Ittehad-e Islami, Jamiaat-i-Islami, Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, Jabha e the Najat e Mili Afghanistan, Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan	defiance - Rubin indicates that in after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan in 1988 all Mujahideen parties (except Hekmatyar) "showed increasing resistance to ISI attempts to direct them militarily; some observers said the commanders were 'on strike'."	Barnett Rubin. 2002. <i>The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System</i> . Oxford University Press, 251

1988	Iran	Harakat-e-Islami ya Afghanistan	defiance - Refused to enter the Shia unity party formed by Iran in 1989. In retaliation, Tehran expelled HIA from its territory.	Neamatollah Nojumi. 2002. <i>The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan</i> . NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 103
1995	Pakistan	Taliban	defiance - One of the examples of Taliban's defiance was the initial attack on Herat in the spring of 1995, which was opposed by the ISI. The Taliban has carried out that military operation without ISI approval. Another act of defiance occurred in August when the Taliban decided to prolongue the detention of a captured Russian crew against the orders from the ISI.	Davis, How the Taliban Became a Military Force, in: William Maley (ed.). 1998. <i>Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban</i> . NY: New York University Press, 59, 71; Rashid, "Pakistan and the Taliban," 84.
1996	Pakistan	Taliban	defiance - The Taliban refused to ally with the Afghan rebel leader Dostum even though ISI demanded this from them on several occasions.	Ahmed Rashid. Pakistan and the Taliban, in: William Maley (ed.). 1998. <i>Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban</i> . NY: New York University Press, 82
1998	Saudi Arabia	Taliban	defiance - Saudi Arabia provided money to the Taliban from July 1996. Since the Taliban repeatedly refused to hand over Usama bin Laden, the Saudis ceased their support by September 1998. At least this is what a Taliban official declared in October 1998. "Saudi Arabia denied asking the Taliban for the extradition of Bin Laden, attributing the freeze in relations to certain unspecified actions by the Taliban."	Abdulkader Sinno. 2008. <i>Organizations at War in Afghanistan & Beyond</i> . Cornell University Press, 233. "Taliban suggest Afghan-Saudi committee to discuss bin Laden," <i>Agence France-Presse</i> , October 6, 1998 "Saudi Arabia denies asking for bin Laden's extradition," <i>Agence France-Presse</i> , October 14, 1998.

1993	Yugoslavia	Republic of Srpska (RS)	<p>defiance - In 1993 Yugoslav President Milosevic bowed to Western pressures to accept the Vance-Owen plan. He demanded Karadzic to accept the plan, but RS President remained unmoved and promised to take the issue to the Assembly. In May, Milosevic delivered a speech to the RS assembly urging the leadership of Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan. By 1993 western sanctions were wrecking havoc on Yugoslav economy and Milosevic sought RS's assuiscence to get rid of UN embargo. The RS objected because the plan would decrease its territorial gains and did not guarantee its merger with Yugoslavia. Furious of their rejection, Milosevic imposed an embargo against the RS. However, Belgrade would continue to provide RS military arms and Yugoslav army would preserve communication with the army of Bosnian Serbs.</p>	<p><u>Jonathan S. Landay,</u> <u>Special to The</u> <u>Christian Science</u> <u>Monitor MAY 10,</u> <u>1993</u> Serbia's Milosevic Tightens Pressure On Bosnian Serbs http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0510/10012.html.</p>
1992	United States	UNITA	<p>defiance - Savimbi did not adhere to the US-brokered cease-fire and resumed the fighting against the MPLA government as soon as his party lost the general elections</p>	<p>The New York Times. Widespread Attacks by Unita Rebels in Angola Are Reported. October 31, 1992. www.lexisnexis.com; The Washington Post. Opposition Troops on the Move in Angola; Luanda Airport, Dozens of Towns Attacked With Several Killed as Peace Breaks Down. October 31, 1992. www.lexisnexis.com</p>

1984	S. Africa	Renamo (MNR)	<p>defiance - After the South African government signed the Nkomati accord (non-aggression pact) with Mozambique in March 1984, Renamo became concerned about Pretoria's commitment to their cause. Reportedly, in October a Renamo spokesman accused the apartheid regime of "betrayal" and of "being in the league with the Marxists of Maputo". The hostility of Renamo. As a report indicates, the cause for conflict "is not any major withdrawal of material or logistical support (...) but rather the failure of Pretoria to fully support the MNR's political demands"</p>	<p>Robert Davies. 1985. South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period: A Critical Analysis of Effects and Implications. Report nr. 73. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, University of Uppsala. 5-62, at 33. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. MNR Activities a Threat to S Africa's Interests. January 23, 1985. www.lexisnexis.com</p>
1981-1982	China; Thailand	KPNLF	<p>defiance - Throughout 1981 China (and to less extent Thailand) put pressure on the leadership of KPNLF to ally with the Khmer Rouge but they each time refused to do so. In 1982, angered by Son Sann's continuous attempts to foil the proposed Khmer resistance tripartite summit in Peking with Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan, Beijing stopped its military aid to the KPNLF on March 12. Another source reports that China withheld arms delivery to the KPNLF annoyed with its failure to attack the Vietnam troops in Cambodia.</p>	<p>The Globe and Mail (Canada) March 19, 1981 Thursday Unity, outside support elude Khmer leaders in latest spate of talks BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Other Reports on Indochina; Suspension of Chinese military aid to Son Sann. March 16, 1982. www.lexisnexis.com The Washington Post. Noncommunist Rebels Reportedly Attack Vietnamese in Cambodia. October 12, 1982. www.lexisnexis.com</p>

1988	China	FUNCIN PEC	desertion - In 1988 Beijing grew dissatisfied with Sihanouk's decision to unilaterally negotiate with the Vietnam-backed regime in Phnom Penh and hoped his bid for peace through negotiations would fail. Since this compromise-seeking attitude involves negotiations with the enemy and the willingness to "exit the conflict" without patron's consensus I code it as an attempt to desert rather than defiance.	United Press International. Sihanouk says China unhappy over peace talks. February 12, 1988. www.lexisnexis.com ; United Press International. China withholds usual support for Sihanouk. August 11, 1988. www.lexisnexis.com
1995, 1999	Libya	MDD	desertion - "The MDD reunited under Medallah's leadership in 1995, though many divides within the organization still existed. The group was comprised of roughly five factions in these years: Youssou Sougoudi's National Union for Democracy and Socialism, the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), the Western Armed Forces (FAO), the Action for Unity and Development (AFUD), and Medallah's dominant faction. In fact, several of these factions, claiming represent the whole of the MDD, signed cease fire agreements with the Deby government in 1995. Following a brief period of intense fighting in 1998, Medallah returned from exile to sign a peace accord with the government in 1999, an act which the MDD described as an "act of betrayal." Medallah was disowned, and a new leader, Guel Etkatou, emerged."	http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136
1976	Libya	FROLIN AT	desertion - The growing internal power-struggle led the dissatisfied unit from Wadai to change sides and join the government.	J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins. 2008. <i>Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster</i> . Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 111-112.

1976	Libya	FAN	<p>assault - Habre's conflict with his erstwhile sponsor unravelled when Qadhaffi annexed the Aouzu strip in 1975. In fact, FAN further fractured after the Libyan move. Habre opposed the occupation while Goukouni, who could not hide his jealousy toward Habre, supported the Libyans. Qadhaffi masterfully drew a wedge between the two men. In March 1975, he organized a gathering of the rebel "chiefs" at Aozi village in the Aozou Strip. Qadhaffi demanded the FAN to release the Franoise Claustre, a French official, who had been held captive for over a year by Habre's FAN. Habre refused to cave in Libyan demands, while Goukouni accepted. The Libyan emissaries proposed a Habre-Qadhaffi meeting in May to resolve the conflict. However, Habre did not show up at the rendezvous. Relations between them continued to deteriorate. In late July a Libyan force attempting to raise the Libyan flag at Omchi, a small oasis in the Aozou Strip, was attacked by Habre's FAN. Three Libyans were killed, seven wounded, and sixteen imprisoned.</p>	<p>J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins. 2008. <i>Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster</i>. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 108-110.</p>
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1981	Libya	FAP	<p>desertion - GUNT (a fragile group of warlords gathered around Goukouni's FAN) had unanimously demanded the immediate evacuation of all Libyan forces from Ndjamenā and the Chari-Baguirmi prefectures. Libyan commander in NDjamēna, Jalloud was informed that all Libyan troops must leave Chad by 31 December 1981. Goukouni confirmed the decision of his council and in subsequent interviews implied that France, Qaddafi's archenemy in Chad, would rearm the GUNT and deploy troops. Ahmat Acyl, the GUNT foreign minister, declared publicly his unequivocal support for the continued presence of Libyan troops around Ndjamenā, in contradiction to the decision of the GUNT council of ministers demanding their immediate withdrawal. Qaddafi, not surprisingly, was infuriated with these conflicting statements and ambiguities by the petty chieftains of GUNT. His Libyan troops had suffered heavy casualties and the loss of a great deal of expensive materiel, the reward for which was a demand to withdraw from those whom he personally despised.</p>	<p>J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins. 2008. <i>Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster</i>. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 153.</p>
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1986	Libya	FAP	<p>assault - "During the convoluted manipulations by the rebel leaders for the control of GUNT, Goukouni publicly protested his demotion and refused to follow orders from the Libyan military command or Qaddafi. He was summarily arrested and sent to Tripoli. When he declined to 'recognize Acheikh Ibn Oumar's government,' he was placed under house arrest". The CDR tried to disarm Goukouni's Popular Armed Forces (FAP). The two opponents were about evenly matched, and when the Islamic Legion refused to intervene in what they regarded as a tribal dispute, the Toubou of Goukouni and the Arabs of the CDR of Acheikh slaughtered one another with enthusiasm. After heavy casualties on both sides, the PAP withdrew, regrouped, and encircled Erdi. They demanded that the CDR surrender, but when Acheikh's troops refused, the Toubou launched a devastating assault on 5 October. When the CDR defenders were about to be overrun, Colonel Khalifa, commander of the Libyan expeditionary forces in Chad, ordered his air force to strafe the Toubou to save Acheikh who had just arrived to take command of an embarrassing defeat. The FAP succeeded in shooting down one Libyan plane but now outgunned, they retired from Erdi into their sanctuaries in the Tibesti. During its retreat the FAP destroyed a large Libyan convoy guarded by T-62 tanks and covered by Sukhoi jets between Faya and Aozou to capture a huge amount of arms and 135 Libyan troops to exchange for Goukouni Oueddei, under house arrest in Tripoli.</p>	<p>J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins. 2008. <i>Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster</i>. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 153.</p>
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2004	Venezuela	FARC	<p>assault - According to this source, in September 2004 a skirmish between FARC and the Venezuelan border guards occurred next to the Sarare River in the state of Apure. FARC initially denied the involvement but the Venezuelan government found out that the attack from ambush was carried out by the group's Tenth Front. This was the first such attack by FARC guerillas on Venezuelan soldiers since the Mutual Pact of Understanding signed between the two parties in 1999. The reasons for this attack probably rest with a breakdown in cooperation between the Chavez regime and the rebels following an abortive coup against Venezuela's strongman. Politically vulnerable, Chavez sought to improve external security through a rapprochement with Colombia. In doing so, his regime increased the repression of the group through the detention of FARC operatives and financial blockade throughout 2004.</p>	<p>International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2011. <i>The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of 'Raul Reyes'</i>. London: IISS. 113-114.</p>
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1998	Rwanda	RCD	<p>desertion - RCD was a collection of leaders with different backgrounds who were united only by their aim to topple down President Kabila and assume power in Kinshasa. Composed of socialists and capitalists, peasants and academics, and Mobutists and anti-Mobutists it was a diverse movement. According to the source, it did not have the clear leadership and all the decisions were made during intense squabbles between different elements of RCD. Wamba Wamba, an academic, was a nominal rebel leader, but he had little influence over the others. From the first days of the rebellion, as RCD soldiers were blazing across the country, Wamba called for a cease-fire and negotiations with Kabila, "causing Rwandan commanders to grind their teeth in frustration". In early 1999, he was toppled by Rwanda and other leaders after a petty quarrel over the distribution of resources to the group. Coding this event as desertion because the leader of the organization attempted to exit the conflict against the wish of its sponsor, Rwanda.</p>	<p>Source: Jason K. Sterns. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: the Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: Public Affairs, 249-250.</p>
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1999	Rwanda	RCD	<p>desertion - In 1999, after the capture of strategic town Lisala, the birthplace of Mobutu, the Ugandan commander, General James Kazini, assembled the RCD troops and gave them a choice—either they will return to Kisangani and work with the Rwandans, or stay with Uganda and help it build a new rebellion. Reportedly, most of the troops fighting alongside Ugandan troops chose the latter. This was preceded by major desertions from Rwandan camp by Arthur Z'Ahidi Ngoma, a senior RCD official who fled to France, and the RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba who left the Rwandan controlled Goma for Ugandan-controlled Kisangani. I code this instance as desertion of RCD's sponsor, Rwanda, because two or RCD's top officials fled their sponsor: Ngoma left the conflict, while Wamba joined the hostile Ugandan army.</p>	<p>Source: Jason K. Sterns. <i>Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: the Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa</i>. New York: Public Affairs, 266.</p> <p>Africa News. Uganda; Congo Rebels Split, Wamba In Kampala. January 28, 1999. www.lexisnexis.com</p> <p>Africa News. Congo Kinshasa; Wamba Moves Base Amid Dissent In Rebel Camp. April 9, 1999. www.lexisnexis.com</p>
1996	Pakistan	Al Barq	<p>desertion - After a split in March 1996 over the money allocation, a faction led by a senior member Bilal Lodi along with members of other rebel organizations formed the Forum for Permanent Resolution (FPR) to advance the "dialogue process' with the Indian government. Since this move involves an offer to exit the conflict amidst Pakistan's involvement in the rebellion, I infer that the sponsor was against this policy and code it as desertion.</p>	<p>K. Santhanam Sreedhar and Sudhir Saxena Manish. 2003. <i>Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery</i>. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 105.</p>
1994-1995	Pakistan	Harkat-ul-Ansar	<p>defiance - During 1994-1995, HuA commenced a series of abductions with an aim of trading them for their detained senior members. The available sources indicate that ISI did not approve of these abductions as it caused considerable embarrassment to the Pakistani government.</p>	<p>Manoj Joshi. 1999. <i>The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties</i>. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 370-371</p> <p>K. Santhanam Sreedhar and Sudhir Saxena Manish. 2003. <i>Jihadis in Jammu and</i></p>

				<i>Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery</i> . New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 105
1995	Pakistan	Hizbul Mujahideen	desertion - Once a ruthless executioner of other Kashmiri militant groups, Hizb became the target of these same outfits in 1994-1995. Different counter-insurgency groups like those of Kuka Parrey (IUM), Shirir Khan (MM) and Nawaz Azad (MM), who deserted to India after Hizb had decimated their ranks, challenged Hizb combatants and forced a retreat from the Indian controlled J&K. As a consequence of this fratricide, a source reports massive surrenders of Hizb rank and file to Indian security forces throughout 1995.	K. Santhanam Sreedhar and Sudhir Saxena Manish. 2003. <i>Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery</i> . New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 129.
2000	Pakistan	Hizbul Mujahideen	desertion - In July 2000, Abdul Majid Dar, a senior commander of the Hizbul supported by local commanders from Jammu and Kashmir announced a ceasefire with the government of India despite the opposition from ISI and his party chief Salahuddin. Even worse, Dar and his followers were ready to continue further talks without having Pakistan on board. This has created tensions in the group and led to Dar's expulsion from the Hizbul in 2001. After a series of clashes between the Dar faction and the loyalists ISI has agreed the separation of the two sides with Dar establishing his own group. Dar had aimed to completely leave the fighting and join the Kashmiri political scene before he was killed in early 2002.	Salah-ud-Din wanted Dar to postpone Hizb ceasefire offer, <i>Rediff</i> , August 3, 2000, available online: http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/03jk4.htm

1994	Pakistan	Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen (IUM)	desertion – See Chapter 4	David Devadas. 2007. <i>In Search of a Future: The Story of Kashmir</i> . New Delhi, India: Penguin. Manoj Joshi. 1999. <i>The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties</i> . New Delhi, India: Penguin, 425-426 Thakur, Pradeep. 2003. <i>Militant Monologues: Echoes from the Kashmir Valley</i> . New Delhi, India: Parity Paperbooks.
2001	Pakistan	Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM)	defiance	See Chapter 4
2002	Pakistan	Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM)	assault	See Chapter 4
2003	Pakistan	Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM)	assault	See Chapter 4

1989	Pakistan	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)	defiance - There had been significant tensions between the ISI and JKLF leaders during the second half of 1989. Arif Jamal argues that the ISI attempted to force the JKLF to change its public message. The ISI demanded JKLF stop calling for "sovereignty" for Kashmir and instead focus on "self-determination." The ISI also requested the appointment of an ISI representative to sit in on the JKLF Central Committee as an observer. Both demands were rejected by the JKLF leadership.	Arif Jamal. 2009. Shadow War. <i>The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir</i> . New York: Melville House, 146.
1994	Pakistan	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)	desertion - In 1992/93 JKLF experienced serious internal crisis, turning into a fractionalized group, when some senior members and commanders openly challenged the Amanullah Khan leadership demanding his removal. At the same time, Pakistan decreased its support to the JKLF in favor of Hizbul Mujahideen whose members embarked on kidnappings, torture, disarmament and killings of JKLF cadres across J&K. Coupled with the increasing counterinsurgency of the Indian army, the JKLF's fragile organization succumbed to the pressures and in 1994 the Yasin Malik faction renounced the violence and adopted a "Gandhian approach".	See Chapter 4
1979	Iraq	Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)	desertion - In March 1979 ELF turned to Iran for financial aid. Iraq, a long-time rival of Iran, was disappointed with this move and decided to cut off its support for ELF and redirect it to ELF's factions.	The Globe and Mail (Canada). Eritrean rebel group loses Iraqi support. August 18, 1979. www.lexisnexis.com

1980	Syria	Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)	desertion - after a series of defeats dealt by Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), ELF began disintegrating in August 1979. Reportedly, by November hundreds of ELF commanders and fighters have either fled to neighboring Sudan or deserted to the rival EPLF or to the Ethiopian Army. Demoralized, cornered, and fragmented the ELF leadership decided to pursue cease-fire with the Mengistu regime. Syria immediately ceased its support and established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.	The Globe and Mail (Canada). Eritrean guerrilla arm near collapse. November 5, 1980. www.lexisnexis.com
2004	Eritrea	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	defiance - an unconfirmed report notes that an ONLF President Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf had organized talks between the ONLF's chairman in London and the Ethiopian government. The report also points out that the move has divided the upper echelons of the ONLF, with the ONLF Ethiopia-based chairman, Muhammad Umar Usman and the secretary-general, Muhammad Sirad Dolal holding separate talks with officials from the Ethiopian embassies in London and Nairobi, "without each knowing what the other is doing. The meeting between Mr Usman and Col Yusuf is the cause of the rift between the ONLF leadership." Apparently, another source indicates that Eritrea is against any talks or a cease-fire pressing the ONLF leadership to continue its struggle and threatening to cut the support otherwise.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Ethiopian ONLF rebel movement "on the verge of being disbanded. June 2, 2004. www.lexisnexis.com

2010	Eritrea	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	desertion - In the summer of 2012 former Brigadier General Kamal Galchuu attempted to wrest control of the party leadership from Chairman Daawud. Kamal, who deserted from the Ethiopian army in 2006, unsuccessfully claimed the leadership. Toward the autumn, OLF's executive committee and central committee confirmed Daawud's leadership. Apparently Eritrea did not back general Galchuu's bid. Chairman Daawud admitted that a number of OLF cadres in "southern Oromia" quit the party and some even defected to other movements and the Ethiopian government when Kamal's bid failed.	http://ayyaantuu.com/horn-of-africa-news/oromia/wikileaks-takes-on-olf-leaders/
1978	Libya	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	desertion - In December 1977 at the party's congress in Mecca, the election of Salamat Hashim as MNLF's Shairman triggered factionalism and splits within the group. The newly elected leadership accused the previous chairman, Nur Misuari, of authoritarianism, ideological decadency and corruption. Supported by Libya, Misuari rejected the election and expelled Salamat Hashim and Abu Khair Alonto, one of the few top leaders to remain in the Philippines, from the MNLF. The Salamat faction, also known as the New MNLF Leadership, was coopted by Egypt, while the Abu Khair faction surrendered to the government of the Philippines in March 1978.	William Larousse. 2001. <i>A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in Mindanao-Sulu Philippines</i> : 1965-2000. Interreligious and Intercultural Investigations. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 158-159; http://www.n49intelligence.com/N49-Somali-Region-Update-July-2010.pdf
1992	Yugoslavia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	defiance - In February 1992, Yugoslav President Milosevic, RSK's key supplier of arms, fuel and money, accepted the Vance Plan for cease-fire. Milan Babic, the President of RSK, strongly opposed the Plan even though he was overruled by the assembly. On 26 February 1992, Babić was deposed and replaced as President of the RSK by Goran Hadzic, a Milošević loyalist.	

1990	Rwanda	Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)	<p>defiance - On 1 October 1990, fifty RPF rebels followed by one hundred combatants dressed in the uniforms of the Ugandan national army left their posts and crossed the border from Uganda into Rwanda. Uganda's involvement was immediately speculated. Gerard Prunier argues that Uganda's President Museveni was aware of the RPF's plans, but did not explicitly support it. "Apparently, Museveni had several motives for not interfering, including stability in western Uganda and the possibility of a strengthened position in future refugee negotiations with Habyarimana. Museveni himself denies any knowledge however, claiming that the RPF had launched the invasion 'without prior consultation'. This case is coded as defiance although it still remains unclear whether Museveni sanctioned the invasion."</p>	Gérard Prunier. 1995. <i>The Rwanda Crisis, 1959–1994: History of a Genocide</i> . London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 93-98.
1981	Soviet Union; Vietnam; Cuba; Nicaragua	Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	<p>defiance - In 1981, the FMLN launched the so-called "Final Offensive" aimed at toppling down the government of El Salvador with the help of Nicaragua, Cuba and other socialist countries. The operation turned out to be a failure as the guerillas did not capture a single town. The source reports that the reason for the disaster stemmed from the failure of FMLN's factions to synchronize their attacks. For instance, a follow-up report by the FMLN central command found that the ERP faction in the La Union area refused to carry out its assignments, and that the RN faction failed to make any attacks.</p>	Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer. 1995. <i>Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas</i> . Westport, CT: Praeger, 19.

2008	Eritrea	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia/ Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC)	desertion – “In 2008 ARS/UIC fragmented into two factions: one based in Djibouti and the other in Asmara, Eritrea. The Djibouti faction signed a peace deal with the Somali transitional government and largely stopped fighting, while the Amsara faction continued fighting the Somali Transition Government and Ethiopia under Eritrea's patronage.”	Uppsala University Armed Conflicts Database
1982	Ethiopia	Somali Salvation Front (SSDF)	defiance - On June 30, 1982, Ethiopian army, together with SSDF combatants launched an offensive at several points along Ethiopia's southern border with Somalia which were held by Somalia's army (SNA) and its proxy Ogaden Liberation Front. The Ethiopians and SSDF expelled the enemy forces and occupied the villages of Balumbale and Goldogob, on the Somali side. “After the United States provided emergency military support to Somalia, the Ethiopian attacks ceased. However, the Ethiopian/SSDF units remained in Balumbale and Goldogob, which Addis Ababa maintained were part of Ethiopia that had been liberated by the Ethiopian army. The SSDF disputed the Ethiopian claim, causing a power struggle that eventually resulted in the destruction of the SSDF's leadership.”	http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/sierra/somalia1978b.htm

1986	India	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)	desertion - On April 29, 1986 the LTTE launched an offensive against TELO camps in the northeast, killing over 150 TELO fighters. TELO's leader, Sri Sabarattinam, was also killed in LTTE's onslaught on May 6, 1986. With the decapitation of TELO, Selvam took over the reins of the TELO in Madras, but he could not reanimate the organization. Following its annihilation sources report "massive" desertion of members who went back to civilian life. The end of TELO as armed group seems to go against India's interest of keeping as many Tamil groups afloat as possible.	Hawksley, H. Sri Lankan rebel group reports victory over rival TELO faction. <i>The Guardian</i> . May 2, 1986, www.lexisnexis.com Hawksley H. Tamil Tigers claim defeat of rivals. <i>The Guardian</i> . May 7, 1986, www.lexisnexis.com
2009	Sudan	UFDD Fundamental	desertion - Reportedly, as many as 1,500 former Chad rebels crossed back into Chad from Sudan on 3 September. The ex-rebels were from Adouma Hassaballah's UFDD-Fundamental formations. Apparently, Khartoum did not approve of their action.	Wikileaks Cables. SRSG Angelo Confirms Massive Defection From Rebel. September 4, 2009. http://dazzlepod.com/cable/09NDJAMENA381/?q=UFD%20sudan
2008	Sudan	RFC (UFR)	defiance - On February 28, National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) director General Salah Ghosh reportedly met with the leader of RFC Timan Erdemi and other Chadian rebel leaders and demanded that they launch a renewed offensive against Chad's President Idriss Deby within two weeks. The source indicates that Erdemi refused Ghosh's demand because Khartoum denied him a leadership role in a united Chadian opposition. Sudan was by Erdemi's confession "not happy" about his decision.	Wikileaks Cables. Chad: RFC's Erdemi Plans Land Grab While Other Rebels Move to Topple Deby. March 17, 2008 http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM397/?q=erdimi%20sudan Wikileaks Cables.Minawi: Erdemi Rejects Khartoum's Push for Renewed Offensive. March 3, 2008. http://dazzlepod.com/cable/08KHARTOUM311/?q=erdimi%20sudan

2006	Sudan	FUC	<p>desertion - The withdrawal of the Sudanese support and an alleged payment of \$5.5 million from Libyan President Moammar Gadaffi may have combined to induce Chadian rebel leader Mahamat Nour to sign a peace agreement with the Deby government in Tripoli December 24. It appears that FUC was also prompted by a setback in April which rendered Nour's party a "spent force with few options". Apparently FUC's April attack on N'djamena was a disaster. Nour rounded up his fighters in the East and traveled secondary roads to N'djamena with no regard to adequacy of supply lines, reinforcement or the consequences of failure. As a result, his ranks were annihilated in a failed "suicidal" attack. This is coded as desertion because the sources do not make it clear that Sudan supported FUC's move.</p>	<p>Wikileaks Cables. Deby Peace Accord with FUC's Nour -- One Less. January 9, 2007. http://dazzlepod.com/cable/07NDJAMENA18/?q=erdimi%20sudan</p>
2009	Sudan	FPRN	<p>defiance - As of 2008 the Sudan decided to curb the activities of its Chadian proxies in response to Ndjamenas "pacification" of JEM. Khartoum restricted the access to Sudan-Chad border to its clients However, foreign minister of the Sudan, Moussa Faki Mahamat reportedly complained that while some proxies such as Iman Erdimi's UFR and Mahamat Nouri's UFDD complied with the decision, other movements, specifically Adoum Yakoub's FPRN refused to cave in Sudan's demand and were conducting militant activities south of El Geneina including laying mines. Another source reports that in the same year, Yakoub defied orders to merge with other Chadian armed groups. This is a clear case of defiance of FPRN toward Sudan.</p>	<p>Wikileaks Cables. Chad-Sudan Detente "On Track," Chad Rebels In. December 15, 2009. http://dazzlepod.com/cable/09NDJAMENA601/?q=UFDD%20sudan http://www.smallarms-surveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-25-Local-and-Regional-Dimensions-Chad-Sudan-Rapprochement.pdf</p>

1972	Israel	Anyanya	<p>desertion - Israel provided the movement with weapons and training and also sent three advisors to South Sudan. The weapons were supplied through Uganda. However, in 1972, Ugandan President Idi Amin, pressed by Egypt and Libya, closed Israel's embassy in Kampala and expelled all Israelis. With this came an end to the use of Uganda as the main route for running arms to South Sudan - the other being an expensive airdrop into southern Sudan by planes flying over Ethiopia and refueling in Kenya. The rebels were forced to reconsider peace talks with the Sudanese government. When Khartoum offered religious and cultural autonomy that year, the Anyanya leadership accepted the agreement known as the Addis Ababa Accords. According to the Anyanya leader and commander Joseph Lagu, this move was taken without a consultation with Israel and "Israel was somewhat upset by the peace deal". Lagu even flew to Nairobi to explain the situation to his Israeli contacts. This case is coded as desertion because the outfit terminated the peace agreement without sponsor's prior knowledge and backing.</p>	<p>Haaretz. Leaving bitterness behind. January 28, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/leaving-bitterness-behind-1.339712</p>
2007	Chad	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	<p>desertion - Reportedly, in February 2007, there was some factional infighting between JEM's central leadership and the followers of senior member Abdulmajied Duda. Apparently, the latter were dissatisfied with "totalitarianism" of JEM's leader Dr. Ibrahim. As a result, Duda and a group of 100 fighters from his Al-Aranga tribe deserted their outposts and even signed an agreement with the Sudanese government. Duda was subsequently assassinated by JEM.</p>	<p>http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=204037</p>

2008	Chad	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	desertion - In 2008 JEM continued to be fractionalized with the establishment of a splinter group in March 2008. An internal fissure within JEM led the faction composed of the Massaleit and Eringa tribes to broke from the parent organization and sign a ceasefire agreement with the Sudanese Government, according to UN sources and a JEM representative in El Fasher.	http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08KHARTOUM346&q=chad%20jem
2006	Chad	Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)	defiance - SLM/A was a fractionalized organization composed of at least two factions -- one led by Minni Arkou Minawi and the other headed by Abdul Wahid Mohammad Nour. It appears that Nour, who resided in France, did not establish a separate organization but rather continued to claim recruits, infrastructure and resources of the SLM as a whole. In May 2006, Nouri reportedly tried to "established back channels with Khartoum without the consent of the SLM coalition and was intending to sign an agreement with Khartoum that would be unacceptable to them". The SLM insider likewise claims that Nour "had consequently been placed under an 'executive freeze' for going beyond his mandate, essentially preventing him from committing the SLM to any peace agreement". Nour's defiant behavior seems to be unacceptable to SLM's sponsor Chadian President Idris Deby who in 2006 was not eager to disengage from the proxy war with Sudan. The evidence in support of this claim is Deby's unwavering backing of SLM's rejectionist attitude toward the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA, May 2006). However, with respect to the acceptance of DPA there was a strange turnaround in the attitude of the two factions. Nour seemed to reject the agreement, while Minawi openly endorsed it. President Deby reacted against Minawi's defiance by pitting two main rejectionist groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) against him. Several armed clashes between Minawi and the two groups were reported in the summer of 2006.	http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06NDJAMENA618&q=chad%20jem http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06NDJAMENA968&q=chad%20jem http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06KHARTOUM1668&q=chad%20jem

1991	Uganda; Ethiopia	Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Mo vement (SPLA/M)	<p>desertion - The source indicates that in September-December of 1991 a group of commanders led by Lam Akol, a senior SPLA commander in Upper Nile, launched a coup against the leadership of John Garang. The commanders were, reportedly, unsatisfied with Garang's centralized command and his tight alliance with the failing Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. The overthrow of Garang was officially announced on 28 August 1991, when three commanders raised their voices against "dictator" Garang and demanded "reforms" and "democracy" in the movement. As a prelude to this coup, the faction suffered heavy casualties and lost the town of Melut to the Sudanese army after Khartoum stepped up attacks against the Upper Nile SPLA command in May. Reportedly, the SPLA did not send any reinforcements to their embattled comrades in the Upper Nile. The rebels were also faced with the problem of 100,000 refugees that could be solved only in cooperation with Khartoum. As a result, the commanders established contacts with the Sudanese government, received some material support and became coopted before the anti-Garang rebellion took place in September.</p>	Douglas H. Johnson. 2003. <i>The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars</i> . The African National Institute and Oxford, 94-99
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1978	China; Laos; N. Vietnam	Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)	<p>desertion - Political and military disputes between CPT's principal sponsors, China and Vietnam, had serious consequences on organization's ability to please its principals. Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia followed by the toppling-down of the Khmer Rouge regime created a serious gulf between CPT's principals. In 1978 the CPT was asked to choose between its erstwhile sponsors. CPT opted for the "alliance with Beijing and the Khmer Rouge denouncing Vietnam as an agent of social imperialism in Southeast Asia. Pham Van Dong, Vietnamese prime minister, declared in 1978 that all assistance to the CPT was suspended. In 1979 the CPT training camps in Laos were closed and the combatants expelled."</p>	<p>Pierre Rousset. 2009. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Thailand. <i>International Journal of Socialist Renewal</i>. http://links.org.au/node/1247.</p> <p>M. Ladd Thomas. 1986. Communist Insurgency in Thailand: Factors Contributing to Its Decline, <i>Asian Affairs</i>, 13(1): 17-26, at 19.</p>
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1974-1975	Tanzania; Mozambique; Zambia	Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	<p>defiance - On the 3rd December 1974, the OAU (i.e. rebel sponsors and other African states) brokered a unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU, the two rebel groups fighting against the Rhodesian government. “ZANU was in a poor position to negotiate the agreement as it had incurred significant manpower losses with the arrest of its leaders. There was also factional fighting between those loyal to Sithole, Mugabe and military commander Josiah Tongogara. A small faction of ZANU soldiers objected to the signing of the unity accord, not only because of the fractured state of the party but because of the prospect of serving alongside ZAPU. Led by a soldier named Thomas Nhari, a faction of ZANU rebels marched from their Chifombo base in eastern Zambia and other bases in Mozambique to disrupt events in Lusaka. This was to become known as Nhari Rebellion. The ZANU turmoil was crushed by the Zambian police who rounded up the rebels and handed them over to Chitepo, the most senior official of ZANU in Zambia. Without permission from the Zambian government or other sanctuary states, Chitepo ordered the killing of 250 ZANU fighters in Lusaka. These two events clearly indicate that a faction of ZANU acted opposite to the orders from its sponsors making this the instance of defiance.”</p>	http://matsheumhlope.wordpress.com/category/zambia-research-trip/
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